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Chapter 3 
Contents 
Jason Chuah  
The first four editions of this chapter were written by Elizabeth Macdonald. The editors would like to say 
that it still owes a great deal to her. 
Most contracts can be made orally, in writing, or a combination of both. A question of whether what is said 
is an express term of the contract will depend on a number of factors developed and discussed in-depth 
in this document. The following are addressed: statements in contracts; collateral contracts; parol 
evidence rule; written terms or notices from signed contractual documents; and notice of contractual 
terms from unsigned documents. 
A Express Terms 
Statements 
Basic approach 
[3.1]  
Most contracts can be made orally or in writing or there may be a combination of oral and written terms1. 
The question will be whether what was said became a term of the contract and it is often put in terms of 
whether the statement was a warranty or a representation. In this context warranty is used ‘in its ordinary 
English meaning to indicate a binding promise’2, rather than a particular type of term, in contrast to those 
situations in which what is in question is the type of term and ‘warranty’ is then used in distinction to the 
classification of terms as conditions or innominate terms3. A statement may be both a term and a 
misrepresentation, and if it is not a term but a mere representation, a remedy may, nevertheless, be 
available, if it is untrue, if it constitutes a misrepresentation. Damages4 are now quite readily available for 
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But see para 2.261 ff. 
2
 
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 374. 
3
 
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 374: 
‘They use [warranty] to denote a subsidiary term in a contract as distinct from a vital term which they call 
a “condition”. In doing so they depart from the ordinary meaning not only of the word ‘warranty’ but also of 
the word “condition”. There is no harm in this, so long as they confine this technical use to its proper 
sphere, namely to distinguish between a vital term, the breach of which gives the right to treat the 
contract as at an end, and a subsidiary term which does not. But the trouble comes when one person 
uses the word “warranty” in its ordinary meaning and another uses it in its technical meaning …’ 
On conditions, warranties and innominate terms see para 3.34. 
4
 
Damages are awarded on different bases for a breach and a misrepresentation. 
misrepresentation5, but, before the mid-1960s, they were only available for misrepresentations which 
were fraudulent6 and, although any misrepresentation makes a contract voidable7, at that time, their very 
limited availability for misrepresentation provided an added impetus for the courts to find that such 
statements had become terms8. It is possible that a statement may be found not to be a term of the main 
contract but of a collateral contract9. 
‘To create a warranty no special form of words is needed’10 but it is well established that a statement ‘can 
only be a warranty provided it appear on evidence to be so intended’11. In other words, the basic test is 
that of the intention of the parties12, and it ‘depends on the conduct of the parties, on their words and 
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Section 2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967: see chapter 4. 
6
 
Ie prior to the provision of a damages remedy in Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 2(1) and prior to the 
provision of a common law remedy for negligent misstatement in Hedley, Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners 
[1964] AC 465 (and the recognition that it was still available even if the statement became a term: Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801. 
7
 
Rescission may become barred: para 3.51 ff. 
8
 
See Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801, Lord Denning MR at 817: 
‘Ever since Heilbut, Symons & Co Ltd v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 we have had to contend with the rule as 
laid down by the House of Lords that an innocent misrepresentation gives no right to damages. In order to 
escape from that rule, the pleader used to allege … that the misrepresentation was fraudulent, or 
alternatively a collateral warranty. At that time we nearly always succeeded on collateral warranty … more 
often than not the court elevated the innocent misrepresentation into a collateral warranty and thereby did 
justice in advance of the Misrepresentation Act 1967.’ 
9
 
See para 3.3. 
10
 
De Lasalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215, AL Smith MR at 222. 
11
 
Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30, Viscount Haldane at 38, Lord Moulton at 50; Oscar 
Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 375, Hodson LJ at 
378; Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65, [1965] 1 WLR 623, 
Salmon LJ at 629; De Lasalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215 at 222; Routledge v McKay [1954] 1 All ER 
855, [1954] 1 WLR 615. 
12
 
But see the dictum of Lord Denning MR in Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd 
[1965] 2 All ER 65, [1965] 1 WLR 623 at 627: 
‘It seems to me that if a representation is made in the course of dealing for a contract for the very purpose 
of inducing that other party to act upon it, by entering into the contract, that is prima facie ground for 
inferring it was intended as a warranty … But the maker of the representation can rebut this inference if 
he can show that it really was an innocent misrepresentation, in that he was in fact innocent of fault in 
making it, and that it would not be reasonable in the circumstances for him to be bound by it.’ 
behaviour, rather than on their thoughts’13. It is their intention, objectively ascertained. It must be deduced 
‘from the totality of the evidence’14. There are factors which have been identified as highly relevant15 in 
the determination of whether the requisite intention that the statement was to have contractual effect was 
present, but none of them is decisive16. 
Factors 
[3.2]  
The importance of a statement to the making of the contract may be a highly relevant factor. It may be 
clear to both sides that a certain element was very important to one of the parties in the decision to 
contract. It may be that, in the absence of a statement on that element, by the other party, there would 
have been no contract1, or no contract at the price agreed2 and the statement may then well be found to 
have been intended as a term3. As, for example, where one party stated that he would not even ask the 
price of the other party's hops if sulphur had been used in growing them and that other party then named 
his price. It was found to be a term of the contract that sulphur had not been used in growing the hops4. 
An indication that a statement by one party, can be relied upon, and need not be verified, may indicate 
that it should be regarded as a term. A prospective seller may indicate to a potential buyer that he, or she, 
can rely upon the seller's statement as to the condition of the goods, and need not check them for him-, or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
The latter part of this may be seen as indicating a test of reasonable reliance for a term but when it was 
referred to in Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801, it was only the first part, with its reference to 
intention which was quoted. In addition, it is possible to see the latter part of the dictum as merely in 
keeping with the fact that the intention test is objective. 
13
 
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 375; Dick 
Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65, [1965] 1 WLR 623 Lord Denning 
MR at 627; Eyre v Measday [1986] 1 All ER 488, Slade LJ at 492–3; Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644. 
14
 
Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30, Lord Moulton at 50. 
15
 
Delay between the making of the statement and the contract has been seen as of some relevance: 
Routledge v Mckay [1954] 1 All ER 855, [1954] 1 WLR 615. But see Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64. 
16
 
Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30, Lord Moulton at 50; Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 
All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 376, Hodson LJ at 378. 
1
 
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CBNS 844; De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215; Couchman v Hill 
[1947] KB 554; Harling v Eddy [1951] 2 KB 739. 
2
 
Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801. But see Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, 
[1957] 1 WLR 370. 
3
 
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CBNS 844; De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215; Esso Petroleum v 
Mardon [1976] QB 801. 
4
 
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CBNS 844. 
her-, self and that may then lead to the conclusion that the seller's statement is a term of the contract of 
sale5. For example, the soundness of a horse became a term of a contract because when the purchaser 
had been inspecting it, the seller had said ‘You need not look for anything; the horse is perfectly sound. If 
there was anything the matter with the horse, I would tell you’6. In such a situation, ‘it becomes plain by 
the words, and the action, of the parties that it is intended that in the purchase the responsibility of the 
soundness shall rest upon the vendor’7. However, the situation may be otherwise where the statement is 
accompanied by some indication that it should not be relied upon. There may be, for example, some 
qualifying phrase added to the statement, such as ‘so far as the vendor knows’8 or a suggestion that an 
independent assessment of the contract goods should be obtained9. Alternatively, the fact situation may 
make it clear that the statement is one that the other party would normally be expected to verify10, or there 
may be a trade practice to that effect11. 
Disparity of knowledge, expertise or experience between the parties may be relevant factors in 
determining if a term is intended. When a statement of fact is in question, it is more likely to be found to 
be a warranty if it is within the maker of the statement's own knowledge12 or if that person is in the better 
position to ascertain the truth13. The relevant intention is less likely to be found if the maker of the 
statement has to rely on some secondary source of information, particularly if he, or she, is in no better 
position to ascertain the facts than the other party14. For example, when a consumer told a dealer the age 
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Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64. 
6
 
Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64. 
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Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64, Loud Moulton at 86. 
8
 
Gilchester Properties Ltd v Gomm [1948] 1 All ER 493. Or the qualification that the statement is made ‘to 
the best of [his or her] knowledge and belief’ by its maker: Hummingbird Motors Ltd v Hobbs [1986] RTR 
276. But see the discussion of statements of opinion, in this para. 
9
 
Ecay v Godfrey (1947) 80 Ll L Rep 286. 
10
 
See Mahon v Ainscough [1952] 1 All ER 337 and Strover v Harrington [1988] Ch 390 for an analogous 
situation. 
11
 
This would seem to be the explanation of the different conclusion in Hopkins v Tanqueray (1854) 15 CB 
130 to that reached in Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 64. 
12
 
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 375; Routledge 
v McKay [1954] 1 All ER 855, [1954] 1 WLR 615, Denning LJ at 623. 
13
 
Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65, [1965] 1 WLR 623. 
14
 
As was the case in Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370. See also 
Routledge v McKay [1954] 1 All ER 855, [1954] 1 WLR 615. But see Beale v Taylor [1967] 3 All ER 253, 
[1967] 1 WLR 1193. 
of the car he wished to sell, relying on the log book, which he produced for the dealer, the age of the car, 
which was wrong, was not found to be a term of the contract15. In contrast, a car dealer was held liable in 
relation to erroneous statements about the mileage of a car he was selling16. In relation to a statement of 
opinion, it has been said that ‘a representation of fact is much more likely to be intended to have 
contractual effect than a statement of opinion’17, but if there is a disparity of expertise or experience 
between the parties, so that the maker of the statement is in the better position to reach the relevant 
opinion, the necessary intention may be found18. However, when what is in question is, for example, an 
opinion as to future sales, such as an estimate of the annual sales of a new petrol station, the warranty 
found may not be a guarantee that the amount estimated will be achieved but rather that the estimate 
was arrived at by the use of reasonable care and skill19. 
Some aspects of these propositions are likely to change when the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 is adopted. 
As regards consumer contracts for the supply of goods, any pre-contractual information required to be 
provided by the supplier under the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 201320 shall be treated as terms of the contract21. As for consumer contracts for the 
supply of services, the Bill states that: 
every contract to supply a service is to be treated as including as a term of the contract anything 
that is said or written to the consumer, by or on behalf of the trader, about the trader or the service, 
if— 
(a) it is taken into account by the consumer when deciding to enter into the contract, or 
(b) it is taken into account by the consumer when making any decision about the service after 
entering into the contract.22  
The parol evidence rule is considered below23. Here it can be noted that the recording of contract terms in 
writing, omitting the contested statement, may indicate that the statement was not intended to be of 
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Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370. 
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Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 65, [1965] 1 WLR 623. 
17
 
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801 at 826. 
18
 
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801 at 826; De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215, AL Smith 
MR at 222 (but note that no factor is decisive: Heilbut Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30, Lord 
Moulton at 50). 
19
 
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; see also Hummingbird Motors Ltd v Hobbs [1986] RTR 
276, Kerr LJ at 281. 
20
 
SI 2013/3134. 
21
 
Clause 12, Consumer Rights Bill 2014 (as presented to the House of Lords for second reading, July 
2014). 
22
 
 Clause 50, Consumer Rights Bill 2014 (as presented to the House of Lords for second reading, 
July 2014). 
contractual effect24. It may be found that the document was intended to record all the terms25, but, even 
where the other terms are in writing, oral statements may be found to be intended to have contractual 
effect, either as terms of the main contract or of a collateral contract26. It will be a matter of what other 
factors are present. 
Collateral contracts 
[3.3]  
The courts may, on occasion, find that although a statement is not part of the main contract, it is part of a 
collateral contract1. Collateral contracts have tended to be found where there is some obstacle in the way 
of finding that the statement is a term of the main contract or where it would be ineffective if such a finding 
was made. They have, for example, in appropriate cases, been found to avoid the effect (or the perceived 
effect) of the parole evidence rule2, of exemption clauses3 and of the doctrine of privity of contract4. They 
require all of the elements of any other contract such as an intention to create legal relations and 
consideration5 and in Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton6 Lord Moulton said: 
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See para 3.4. 
24
 
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 376. 
25
 
T & J Harrison Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1918] 1 KB 608, Pickford LJ at 609. 
26
 
Birch v Paramount Estates (Liverpool) Ltd (1956) 167 EG 396; Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All 
ER 325, [1957] 1 WLR 370, Lord Denning MR at 376. 
1
 
Mann v Nunn (1874) 30 LT 526; Angell v Duke (1875) 32 LT 320; Henderson v Arthur [1907] 1 KB 10; 
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30; Jameson v Kinmell Bay Land Co (1931) 47 TLR 593; 
Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554; Hill v Harris [1965] 2 QB 601; Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea 
Merzario Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078; Charnock v Liverpool Corpn [1969] 3 All ER 473, 
[1968] 1 WLR 1498; Brown and Davies Ltd v Galbraith [1972] 3 All ER 31, [1972] 1 WLR 997; Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; Brikom Investments v Carr [1979] QB 467; IBA v EMI 
Electronics Ltd (1980) 14 BLR 1; Record v Bell [1991] 4 All ER 471, [1991] 1 WLR 853; Thinc Group v 
Armstrong [2012] EWCA Civ 1227. 
2
 
[1951] 2 KB 854. 
3
 
See further in this para. 
4
 
Eg Webster v Higgin [1948] 2 All ER 127; Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229. 
5
 
See below in this para. 
6
 
[1913] AC 30 at 47. 
‘Such collateral contracts, the sole effect of which is to vary or add to the terms of the written 
contract, are therefore viewed with suspicion by the law … Not only the terms of such contracts but 
the animus contrahendi on the part of the parties to them must be shown.’ 
However, the strength of the impetus against a collateral contract must be doubted7, and albeit against 
the background of the making of the main contract, consideration should be given to the same type of 
factors8 as those indicated above as relevant to the question of whether a statement was intended as a 
term of a contract9. Where it is a collateral contract which is in question, the indicator of the intention that 
the statement should be a term will often be that the main contract would not have been made without it10. 
In De Lassalle v Guildford11, for example, a tenant had only executed a lease after the landlord gave an 
assurance that the drains were in a satisfactory condition. No term to that effect was included in the 
lease, but the defects in the drains made the landlord liable under a collateral contract. 
Collateral contracts have been found where it has been argued that an oral statement cannot be part of 
the main contract because of the parol evidence rule. It has been said that the finding of a collateral 
contract ‘eases the consciences of those who believe that the parol evidence rule is a strict and 
meaningful prohibition’12. It was originally thought a statement could be found to be part of a separate 
collateral contract only if the statement merely added to the written document and did not vary or 
contradict it13. However, that must now be doubted. In City & Westminster Properties Ltd v Mudd14 a 
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Although (distinguishing Shanklin Pier v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854 – see below) the point has 
recently been made that, ‘Lord Moulton's words apply even more strongly to the present case where it is 
sought not to vary the terms of a written contract but to make the defendants additionally liable to the 
another party for the same performance but with greater potential liabilities.’: Jonathan Wren & Co Ltd v 
Microdec plc (1999) 65 Con LR 157, [64]. 
8
 
It has been indicated that there cannot be a collateral contract in relation to something ‘central’ to the 
main contract: Hamed El Chiaty & Co v Thomas Cook Group Ltd, The Nile Rhapsody [1992] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 399 at 407. But see Law Com Rep No 154 (note 86, p 20): 
‘… We are not aware of an English case in which it has been suggested that a collateral contract might 
not be valid because its subject matter is so important to the transaction as a whole that the contract can 
no longer be described as “collateral”… In addition, it may be noted that the ordinary meaning of collateral 
does not necessarily denote subordination.’ 
9
 
See para 3.2. 
10
 
Eg Morgan v Griffith (1871) LR 6 Exch 70; Erskine v Adeane (1873) 8 Ch App 756; Newman v Gatti 
(1907) 24 TLR 18 at 20; Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554; Webster v Higgin [1948] 2 All ER 127; Harling v 
Eddy [1951] 2 KB 739; City & Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129; Evans 
(Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078; Brikomm Investments v 
Carr [1979] QB 467; Hamed El Chiaty & Co v Thomas Cook Group Ltd, The Nile Rhapsody [1992] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 399 at 407. 
11
 
[1901] 2 KB 215. 
12
 
Wedderburn ‘Collateral Contracts’ [1959] CLJ 58 at 69. On the parol evidence rule see para 3.4. 
13
 
Mann v Nunn (1874) 30 LT 526; Angell v Duke (1875) 32 LT 320; Henderson v Arthur [1907] 1 KB 10. 
collateral contract was found which rendered unenforceable a right of one of the parties under the main 
contract. The case was concerned with the renewal of a lease of a shop by Mr Mudd, who also slept on 
the premises. At the renewal, the plaintiff wished to include a new term stating that the premises were 
only to be used for business purposes. Mr Mudd made it clear that he wished to go on residing on the 
premises and that he would not accept the new term. He only accepted the new lease, with the new term, 
after the plaintiff stated that, if he signed the lease, no objection would be made to his continuing to live 
on the premises. Had Mr Mudd not thought that he would be able to continue to live on the premises he 
would not have signed the new lease, but moved to other premises which were available at the time. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff sought forfeiture of Mr Mudd's lease on the basis that he was in breach of its 
terms by residing on the premises. Harman J dismissed the action for forfeiture. ‘There was a clear 
contract acted upon by the defendant to his detriment and from which the plaintiff [could not] be allowed 
to resile’15. 
Collateral contracts have also been found where the main contract is not made between the same two 
parties and, in effect, the finding of a collateral contract avoids the effect of the privity rule. In Shanklin 
Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd16 the pier owners, who had wished to have their pier painted, had been 
assured by Detel Products that their paint was suitable and would last for seven to ten years. On the 
basis of that assurance, the pier owners had specified that the painters, with whom the pier owners had 
contracted for the painting of the pier, should use Detel Products' paint. The painters used the paint but it 
proved unsatisfactory and only lasted about three months. The pier owners wished to sue Detel Products 
but it was the painters who had purchased the paint from Detel. Nevertheless, it was held that the pier 
owners could succeed in an action for breach of contract against Detel Products. The statement as to the 
suitability of the paint formed a collateral contract of the form ‘if Detel Products’ paint is specified for 
purchase by the painters then we (Detel Products) undertake its suitability for the job'17. 
As has been indicated, a collateral contract, just like any other, requires there to be an intention to be 
bound18 and consideration19. The consideration for the promise in the collateral contract is usually 
entering into the main contract. Lord Moulton stated:20  
‘It is evident, both on principle and on authority, that there may be a contract the consideration for 
which is the making of some other contract. “If you will make such and such a contract I will give 
you one hundred pounds,” is in every sense of the word a complete legal contract. It is collateral to 
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[1959] Ch 129, see Wedderburn [1959] CLJ 58, at 83–84. Based on Hoyt's Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 
CLR 133 a no conflict rule still applies in Australia. 
15
 
[1959] Ch 129 at 145–146. See also Couchman v Hill [1947] KB 554; Brikom Investments v Carr [1979] 
QB 467. 
16
 
[1951] 2 KB 854. But see Jonathan Wren & Co v Microdec plc (1999) 65 Con LR 157, n 7 above. 
17
 
See also Charnock v Liverpool Corpn [1968] 3 All ER 473, [1968] 1 WLR 1498; Brown and Davies Ltd v 
Galbraith [1972] 3 All ER 31, [1972] 1 WLR 997. 
18
 
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30, Lord Moulton at 45–46. 
19
 
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 at 47. 
20
 
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 at 47. 
the main contract, but each has an independent existence, and they do not differ in respect of their 
possessing to the full the character and status of a contract.’ 
In addition, as was pointed out in the Shanklin Pier case, there is ‘no reason why there may not be an 
enforceable warranty between A and B supported by the consideration that B should cause C to enter 
into a contract with A’21. 
The parol evidence rule 
The rule 
[3.4]  
The parol evidence rule may be seen as encompassing three rules1: 
(i) A version of the ‘best evidence’ rule2. 
(ii) A rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence for the purposes of varying, contradicting or 
subtracting from the terms of a document. 
(iii) A rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence to aid the construction of documents. 
It is the second of these ‘rules’ which must be considered here and which will now be referred to as the 
parol evidence rule. The type of situation to which it is relevant is that in which there is a written 
document3 containing contract terms and the question arises whether evidence can be given to show that 
the parties agreed to additional express terms which were not contained within the written document. It 
has been said that it ‘is firmly established as a rule of law that parol evidence cannot be admitted to add 
to, vary or contradict a deed or other written document’4 and it has been seen as ‘a salutary rule which 
prevented great inconvenience and troublesome litigation in many instances’5. Although referred to as the 
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[1951] 2 KB 854 at 856. 
1
 
Law Com WP No 70, paras 4–7, Law Com Rep No 154, para 1.2. Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd [1992] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 127. 
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Ie a rule dealing with the proof of the contents of a document by means other than the production of the 
document. 
3
 
Or documents where there is incorporation from another document by reference: Jacobs v Batavia and 
General Plantations Trust Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 287. 
4
 
Jacobs v Batavia and General Plantations Trust [1924] 1 Ch 287, Lawrence J at 295; Evans v Roe (1872) 
LR 7 CP 138; Inglis v Buttery (1878) 3 App Cas 552; Leggott v Barrett (1880) 15 Ch D 306; Miller v 
Travers (1832) 8 Bing 244; National Bank of Australasia v Falkingham & Sons [1902] AC 585 at 591; 
Henderson v Arthur [1907] 1 KB 10; Hitchings & Coulthurst Co v Northern Leather Co of America [1914] 3 
KB 907; O'Connor v Hume [1954] 2 All ER 301, [1954] 1 WLR 824 at 830; Thorne (LG) & Co Pty Ltd v 
Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1956) 56 SRNSW 81 at 88; Edwards v O'Connor [1991] 2 
NZLR 542; Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor [1893] AC 317; Pickering v Dowson (1813) 4 Taunt 779; 
Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540 at 545; National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen 
Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785 at 818–819; WF Trustees Ltd v Expo Safety Systems Ltd 
(1993) Times, 24 May. 
5
 
‘parol evidence rule’ it has extended beyond oral statements to written documents which were not part of 
the relevant document6, such as earlier proposed terms7, drafts8 or preliminary agreements9. 
Misnomer as a rule 
[3.5]  
However, the idea of the parole evidence rule as a ‘rule’, was considerably undermined by the numerous 
exceptions to it, particularly as further terms could be found in a collateral contract1 but, even more 
fundamentally, in its non-applicability where the written document, or documents, was (or were) simply 
found not to be intended2 to contain the whole of the parties' contract3. In J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd 
v Andre Merzario Ltd4 it was said that the rule ‘has little or no application where one is not concerned with 
a contract in writing … but with a contract which … was partly oral, partly in writing and partly by 
conduct’5. The impact of that ‘exception’ was recognised in Yani Haryanto v E D & F Man (Sugar) Ltd6. 
Staughton LJ said7: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Mercantile Agency Co Ltd v Flitwick Chalybeate Co (1897) 14 TLR 90, Lord Halsbury at 90. 
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Or added to it by reference: Jacobs v Batavia & General Plantations Trust Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 287. 
7
 
Inglis v Buttery (1878) 3 App Cas 552. 
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Miller v Travers (1832) 8 Bing 244; National Bank of Australasia v Falkingham & Sons [1902] AC 585 at 
591. 
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Hutton v Watling [1948] Ch 398; Leggott v Barrett (1880) 15 Ch D 306. 
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See para 3.3. It will often make no difference whether the disputed ‘term’ is found to be part of the main 
contract or of a collateral contract eg De Lassalle v Guildford [1901] 2 KB 215; Mendelssohn v Normand 
Ltd [1970] 1 QB 177 at 186; J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andre Merzario Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 930, 
[1976] 1 WLR 1078. See also Wedderburn ‘Collateral Contracts’ [1959] CLJ 58 at 71; Law Com no 154, 
para 2.34. 
2
 
The intention of the parties must be objectively ascertained: see Law Com No 154, para 2.14. 
3
 
Allen v Pink (1838) 4 M & W 140 at 144; Harris v Rickett (1859) 4 H & N 1 at 7; Malpas v London and 
South Western Rly Co (1866) LR 1 CP 336; Mercantile Bank of Sidney v Taylor [1893] AC 317 at 321; 
Gillespie Bros & Co v Cheney, Eggar & Co [1896] 2 QB 59; Turner v Forward [1951] 1 All ER 746 at 749; 
J Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andre Merzario Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078; Yani 
Haryanto v E D & F Man (Sugar) Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 44 at 46; Guardian Ocean Cargoes Ltd v 
Banco Do Brasil SA [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68 at 80. 
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[1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078. 
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[1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078, Roskill LJ at 1083. 
6
 
‘Having heard all the evidence, I am left in no doubt whatever that the parties did not intend the 
written contracts to contain the whole terms of their bargain … If it be objected that there can 
scarcely be anything left of the parol evidence rule when this case is within an exception to it, so be 
it. The rule may once have been beneficial in discouraging litigation, but I do not see that it has any 
tendency to promote justice.’ 
On close consideration of the rule the Law Commission indicated the inappropriateness of viewing it as a 
rule8, as such, and ‘clearly discussed and explained’ the ‘circular nature of the rule’9: 
‘When it is proved or admitted that the parties to a contract intended that all the express terms of 
their agreement should be as recorded in a particular document or documents, evidence will be 
inadmissible (because irrelevant) if it is tendered only for the purpose of adding to, varying, 
subtracting from or contradicting the express terms of that contract.’10  
They continued to use the label ‘parol evidence rule’ for the sake of established practice, but it may be 
seen as doing nothing more than expressing a presumption11 and it was seen as such by Lord Russell CJ 
in Gillespie Bros & Co v Cheney, Eggar & Co12: 
‘although when the parties arrive at a definite written contract the implication or presumption is 
very strong that such contract is intended to contain all the terms of their bargain, it is a 
presumption only, and it is open to either of the parties to allege that there was, in addition to what 
appears in the written agreement, an antecedent express stipulation not intended by the parties to be 
excluded, but intended to continue in force with the express written agreement.’ 
However, even viewing it as a ‘presumption’ must be treated with caution. It may be said that ‘the rule has 
no application unless it is first determined that the terms of the agreement are wholly contained in a 
written document’13 and: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
[1976] 2 All ER 930, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 44. 
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[1976] 2 All ER 930, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 44 at 46  
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Law Com Rep No 154. See also Youell v Bland Welch [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127, Beldam LJ at 140. 
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Wild v Civil Aviation Authority (25 September 1987, unreported), Ralph Gibson LJ. 
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Law Com Rep No 154, para 2.7. See also Harris v Rickett (1859) 4 H & N 1 at 7; Howden Bros Ltd v 
Ulster Bank Ltd [1924] 1 IR 117; Turner v Forward [1951] 1 All ER 746; Degeld Options Ltd v Malook (1 
July 1996, unreported), Popplewell J: 
‘… the rule has no application unless it is first determined that the terms of the agreement are wholly 
contained in a written document. In one sense, this is a somewhat circular argument because in deciding 
whether the parties intended that the whole agreement should be in the written document it may be 
necessary to have regard to oral evidence.’ 
See also Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac Ltd (22 April 1993, unreported), QBD (Off Ref). 
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Wedderburn [1959] CLJ 58 at 62. 
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[1896] 2 QB 59 at 62. 
‘In reaching a conclusion as to whether a document which looks like a complete contract was the 
whole contract, the court does not apply any presumption of law. Rather it will reach its conclusion 
on the evidence tendered, applying to its judgment the prima facie probability derived from its 
experience of how people normally behave in a given situation.’14  
It may be viewed as ‘an important factor to be placed in the scales … that businessmen do not ordinarily 
put their names to written contracts when they intend a different bargain’.15  
It seems that terms found outside the written document which vary or contradict it, may nevertheless be 
found to be intended to be part of the contract16 and it would also seem that it is possible to have such 
terms in a collateral contract17. Where there are oral terms contradicting the written terms of a contract, 
the situation:18  
‘is no different in principle from that in which the parties agree two inconsistent terms both of 
which are set out in the same document. The court will have to decide which of the two 
inconsistent terms more nearly represents the intention of the parties.’ 
The conclusion that the parol evidence rule is of very limited effect does not, of course, affect the situation 
in which there are formality requirements in relation to the contract. Irrespective of the view taken of the 
parol evidence rule, in those situations such requirements will impact upon attempts to introduce 
additional terms, beyond those contained in the written document19. 
If a mistake has been made in the contents of a written contract, so that it does not say what it was 
intended to say, the document may be rectified20 and the parol evidence rule is not relevant – ‘after 
rectification the written document does not continue to exist with a parol variation; it is to be read as if it 
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18
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Hamed El Chiaty & Co v Thomas Cook Group, The Nile Rhapsody [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 399, Hirst J 407–
409 (affd [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 382). 
had been originally drawn in its rectified form’21. In addition, ‘the parol evidence rule only applies to the 
ascertainment of the original intention of the parties when the contract was made. The rule does not apply 
to the subsequent variation of the contract’22 or its discharge23. 
‘Exceptions’ 
[3.6]  
A number of ‘exceptions’ to the parol evidence rule have been found, although the identification of the 
‘rule’ as a ‘circular statement’ may make it more appropriate simply to label them as ‘examples of 
situations in which the … rule … could never apply’1. 
It has already been indicated that the applicability of the rule is determined by whether the document was 
intended to contain the whole of the agreement, and if it was not, evidence of other terms is admissable2. 
This may occur, for example, where the written document is merely intended to provide some record of 
the contract but not to set out all the terms of the agreement as, for example, when it is merely a receipt3. 
The document may be intended ‘merely as a memorandum … not as containing the terms of the contract 
itself’4. The situation may occur in which a standard form document was originally intended by one party 
to set out the whole contract but, before the conclusion of the contract, that was overridden by some oral 
term. There may be, for example, in the standard terms, a broad discretion as to how containers are to be 
transported but also a clear oral guarantee that particular containers will be shipped below deck, 
overriding the standard term5. Similarly, there may be an assurance given as to the subject matter of a 
sale, so as to procure the sale, which overrides a broad exemption clause in the standard form contract6. 
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Allen v Pink (1838) 4 M & W 140; Graves v Key (1832) 3 B & Ad 313; Lee v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly 
Co (1871) 6 Ch App 527; Beckett v Nurse [1948] 1 KB 535. 
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Allen v Pink (1838) 4 M & W 140; Orion Insurance Co plc v Sphere Drake Insurance plc [1992] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 239. But see Hutton v Watling [1948] Ch 398. 
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J Evans & Sons (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andre Merzario Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 930, [1976] 1 WLR 1078. See 
also BCT Software Solutions Ltd v Arnold Laver & Co Ltd [2002] EWHC 1298 (Ch), 2 All ER (Comm) 85. 
On interpretation in such cases see para 3.5. 
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In addition, as has been indicated, a statement may be found to be a term of a collateral contract, rather 
than of the main contract7, and implied terms have also been seen as beyond the scope of the rule, with 
evidence admitted to show that the situation is appropriate to imply a term in law8 or by custom9. (Custom 
or usage may also be used to show that the words used in the contract had a particular meaning, as for 
example where a contractual reference to ‘1,000 rabbits’ was shown to mean 1,200 rabbits10.) 
The parol evidence rule relates to the content of the contract and not to its validity as a contract. Evidence 
as to contractual intention11 and consideration12 may be given and the rule does not impinge upon issues 
of validity such as mistake13 or non est factum14, or upon fraud15, illegality16 or misrepresentation17. In 
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See terms implied in custom: para 3.25. 
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(1839) 5M & W 535; Spicer v Cooper (1841) 1 QB 424; Grant v Maddox (1846) 15 M & W 737; 
Leidemann v Schultz (1853) 14 CB 38; Myers v Sarl (1860) 3 E & E 306; Norden Steamship Co v 
Dempsey (1876) 1 CPD 654; Aktieselskab Helios v Ekman [1897] 2 QB 83; Peterson v Freebody [1895] 2 
QB 294. 
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Bowes v Foster (1858) 2 H & N 779; Rogers v Hadley (1863) 2 H & C 227; Clever v Kirkman (1875) 33 LT 
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addition, evidence has been admitted to show the nature of the agreement, for example, that an apparent 
conveyance is a mortgage18 and also that terms appearing to create a licence, rather than a lease, were a 
‘mere sham’ attempting to evade statutory restrictions19. Evidence has also been accepted of an oral 
agreement between the parties that the terms of the written document were not to have effect as a 
contract until a condition had been fulfilled20. In Pym v Campbell21 it was shown that there had been an 
oral agreement that the written terms for the sale of a patent were only to become effective on the 
approval of the invention in question by a third party, whose approval was not given. 
Agency has also provided a situation seen as falling outside of the rule. A party acting as an undisclosed 
agent will appear to contract as principal, but evidence may be introduced to allow the undisclosed 
principal to sue or be sued on the contract22 unless that is expressly23 or impliedly24 excluded by the 
terms of the contract or if the contract was made ‘for reasons personal to the agent which induced the 
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third party to contract with the agent to the exclusion of his principal or anyone else’25. These restrictions 
are somewhat obscure26. 
Entire agreement clauses 
[3.7]  
The terms of the contract may contain a clause which is an attempt to produce the effect of a parol 
evidence ‘rule’ in the strictest sense, ieie., a clause which states that there are no terms in the contract 
other than those included in a particular document1. These clauses are known as ‘entire’ or ‘whole’ 
contract clauses2 and are in common usage. Similar clauses (‘non-reliance’ clauses) may be used in an 
attempt to prevent pre-contractual statements being misrepresentations or may attempt to combine both 
objectives. Their effectiveness at common law needs to be addressed as does the impact upon them of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The 
common law will be addressed and then the legislation. 
In relation to the use of entire agreement clauses to prevent what would otherwise be a term from being 
so regarded, the Law Commission took the view that at common law:3  
‘[An entire agreement clause] may have a very strong persuasive effect but if it were proved that 
notwithstanding the clause, the parties actually intended some additional term to be of contractual 
effect the court would give effect to that term because that was the intention of the parties.’ 
Certainly, it can be strongly contended that such a clause should not simply be taken at face value but 
that its effectiveness should be gauged by considering the interaction of the clause and the underlying 
factors from which conclusions are drawn as to the existence of terms, or, at the least, that they should be 
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Although it may not do so in the same way as would a strictly operating parol evidence rule. See 
Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 611, [2000] 3 EGLR 31, Lightman J, [7] – ‘The 
operation of the clause is not to render evidence of collateral warranty inadmissible as evidence as is 
suggested in Chitty on Contract (28th edn), vol 1, para 12-102; it is to denude what would otherwise 
constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect’. A somewhat different additional role was unsuccessfully 
sought to be given to an entire agreement clause in ProForce Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 69, [2006] All ER (D) 247 (Feb). In allowing an appeal against a striking out Mummery LJ (at 
[40]) was of the view that the entire agreement clause was ‘not apt to govern the construction of the 
written terms that the parties had included or to exclude evidence relevant to the ascertainment of their 
meaning’. 
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E Peden and J W Carter ‘Entire agreement – and similar – clauses’ (2006) 22 JCL 1. 
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Law Com Rep No 154, para 2.15. 
seen as contradictory terms and a priority decided between them on the basis of the parties' intentions4. 
However, although there are some indications5 of a different approach, currently the courts seem 
basically to be taking the line that such clauses should simply be taken at face value. Their mere 
existence as terms serve to provide the certainty that there is no need to consider the possibility of further 
terms beyond those stated in the identified contractual documents6, although, they will, of course, have to 
be appropriately drafted to cover the situation in question7. So, in Deepak Fertilisers v ICI8 the contract 
contained a clause stating: 
‘This contract comprises the entire agreement between the parties, as detailed in various Articles 
and Annexures and there are not any agreements, understandings, promises or conditions, oral or 
written, expressed or implied concerning the subject matter which are not merged into this contract 
and superseded hereby. This contract may be amended in the future only in writing executed by the 
parties.’ 
The Court of Appeal took the view that Rix J, at first instance, had been ‘perfectly correct to hold that this 
excluded liability in respect of collateral warranty’9. Similarly, in Inntrepreneur v East Crown10 Lightman J 
viewed entire agreement clauses as of very significant effect. He said:11  
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Cable & Wireless v Muscat [2006] IRLR 354; Bushway v RNLI [2005] IRLR 674. 
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Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 611. See also Alman & Benson v Associated Newspapers Group Ltd (20 June 
1980, unreported); Kingsley IT Consultants Ltd v McIntosh [2006] EWHC 1288 (Ch), [2006] All ER (D) 
237 (Feb) at [62]–[63]; Total Spares & Supplies v Antares SRL [2004] EWHC 2626 (Ch), [2004] All ER (D) 
255 (Nov); Ravennavi SpA v New Century Shipbuilding Co Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 58, [2007] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 756, [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 24 at [25]. 
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Hotel Aida Opera SARC v Golden Tulip Worldwide BV [2004] EWHC 1012 (QB), [2004] All ER (D) 74 
(May) at [90]–[91]; Cheverney Consulting v Whitehead Mann Ltd [2005] EWHC 2431 (Ch), [2005] All ER 
(D) 115 (Nov) at [104]; Cyprotex Discovery Ltd v University of Sheffield [2004] EWCA Civ 380, [2004] All 
ER (D) 27 (Apr) at [63]; Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corpn v Texaco Ltd [2003] EWHC 1964 (Comm), 
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[1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 387. 
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Stuart Smith LJ delivering the judgment of the court, at [34]. 
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‘Such a clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual terms 
are to be found in the document containing the clause and not elsewhere, and that accordingly any 
promises or assurances made in the course of negotiations (which in the absence of such a clause 
might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save insofar as they are 
reflected and given effect in that document. The operation of the clause is not to render evidence of 
collateral warranty inadmissible as evidence as is suggested in Chitty on Contract, 28th ed, vol 1, 
para 12-102; it is to denude what would otherwise constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect.’ 
Lightman J emphasised the certainty provided by this treatment of entire agreement clauses12. He also 
thought that it would have been sufficient had the clause ‘been worded merely to state that the agreement 
containing it comprised or constituted the entire agreement between the parties’13. Plainly, in his view, the 
clause prevented any successful argument from being made that there were other terms, no matter the 
strength of the factors supporting a claim that the parties had intended them. (Of course, if such factors 
were considered, the evidential value of the entire contract clause could be considerable in the 
appropriate context. If the clause was contained in a professionally drafted contract, and being used in a 
business context against someone who had received expert legal advice, it might be difficult for a 
convincing argument to be made that the underlying facts had not been affected by the clause so as to 
prevent the conclusion arising that there was an additional contract term14.) 
On the whole, the approach currently indicated, to entire agreement clauses and the content of the 
contract, emphasises certainty at the expense of any consideration of the reality of the clause as a 
reflection of the transaction between the parties. The situation is now much the same in relation to the 
use of non-reliance clauses to prevent claims for misrepresentations, although the mechanism is 
somewhat different, being based on estoppel. It is now ‘contractual estoppel’ which is successfully used, 
‘evidential estoppels’ having proved to be difficult to establish. Cases such as EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v 
McGarrigan15 and Watford Electronics v Sanderson16 took the line that ‘an acknowledgement of non-
reliance … is capable of operating as an evidential estoppel’. So that it was ‘apt to prevent the party who 
has given the acknowledgment from asserting in subsequent litigation against the party to whom it has 
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been given that it is not true’17. However, that required (i) that the statements (ie as to non-reliance on the 
(mis)representation) in the clauses were clear and unequivocal, (ii) that the representee had intended that 
the representor should act upon those statements (as to non-reliance), and (iii) that the representor had 
believed those statements (as to non-reliance) to be true and had acted upon them18. The difficulties 
which could arise in fulfilling those requirements are evident when it is remembered that the statements 
as to non-reliance were likely to be found in the standard form contract of the representor and they were 
being used to claim that the representee had so asserted his non-reliance that he was estopped from 
proving that he relied on a representation. In Watford Electronics v Sanderson it was recognised that 
those requirements for an evidential estoppel might ‘present insuperable difficulties; not least because it 
may be impossible for a party who has made representations which he intended should be relied upon to 
satisfy the court that he entered into a contract in the belief that a statement by the other party that he had 
not relied upon those representations was true’19. However, in Peekay v Intermark Ltd v Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd20 the use of a different form of estoppel – ‘contractual estoppel’ – was 
recognised, which did not have this difficulty. Moore-Bick LJ stated: 
‘[56] There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree that a certain state 
of affairs should form the basis for the transaction, whether it be the case or not. … Where 
parties express an agreement of that kind in a contractual document neither can subsequently 
deny the existence of the facts and matters upon which they have agreed, at least so far as 
concerns those aspects of their relationship to which the agreement was directed. The 
contract itself gives rise to an estoppel: see Colchester Borough Council v Smith [1991] Ch 
448, [1991] 2 All ER 29, [1991] 2 WLR 540, affirmed on appeal [1992] Ch 421. 
[57] It is common to include in certain kinds of contracts an express acknowledgment by each of 
the parties that they have not been induced to enter the contract by any representations other 
than those contained in the contract itself. The effectiveness of a clause of that kind may be 
challenged on the grounds that the contract as a whole, including the clause in question, can 
be avoided if in fact one or other party was induced to enter into it by misrepresentation. 
However, I can see no reason in principle why it should not be possible for parties to an 
agreement to give up any right to assert that they were induced to enter into it by 
misrepresentation, provided that they make their intention clear, or why a clause of that kind, 
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if properly drafted, should not give rise to a contractual estoppel of the kind recognised in 
Colchester Borough Council v Smith.’ 
Obviously to be effective to generate a contractual estoppel, the ‘non-reliance’ clause must be 
appropriately drafted21 and it will not, in any event, prevent claims of fraud22. However, the two forms of 
estoppel are different. If a contractual estoppel can be relied upon, there is no need to contend for an 
evidential estoppel23 and ‘in the case of a contractual estoppel the party relying on the clause does not 
need to prove that he believed the truth of the acknowledgment of non-reliance’24. ‘Contractual estoppel’ 
gives the same kind of mechanical effect to a clause in relation to prevention of a misrepresentation 
claim25 as has been given to clauses preventing there from being additional terms. 
However, what now needs to be considered is whether entire agreement clauses might be treated as 
exemption clauses and so subject to either the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (if they are preventing 
additional terms) or the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (if they are preventing a claim for 
misrepresentation)26. In the context of the question of additional terms, any such approach would, of 
course, undermine the certainty generated by simply taking the clause at face value as effective to do 
what it says. 
It would appear that a conventional entire agreement clause is not an exemption clause of the kind with 
which UCTA was and is principally concerned27. Since it prevents any collateral contract or warranty from 
coming into existence, it could not be the subject of s 3(2)(a) – simply because there would be no 
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collateral contract, in the first place, which the relevant party could be found to have breached. Nor would 
s 13 materially assist for the same reason. 
However, it might be said that different considerations would apply as regards s 3(2)(b)(i). That said, it is 
unclear how precisely that section would apply28; what is however limpid is that the section seeks to 
prevent a party from using a fine print in the contract to allow itself to provide something other than that 
defined by the principal terms of the contract. It is especially pertinent that the section refers to 
performance ‘which was reasonably expected’ rather than the actual performance specified in the 
contract. It would seem thus to follow that it is not impossible that a pre-contractual representation or 
undertaking could affect the performance that is reasonably expected of a party29. 
It would not be inappropriate therefore to subject entire agreement clauses to the reasonableness test in 
UCTA in relation to both collateral warranties and representations. However, s 3(2)(b)(i) will only be 
applicable if it is possible to identify both the performance that was reasonably expected and that defined 
by the contract. 
The application of UCTA would undermine the certainty stemming from the ‘face value’ approach to entire 
agreement clauses. However, the extent of the artificiality of the current treatment of ‘entire agreement’ 
clauses at common law is the kind of approach which invites an active use of UCTA 1977 on occasion. 
To the contrary when the evidential estoppel approach is considered in relation to attempts to extend 
entire agreement clauses to prevent a successful claim for misrepresentation. The examination of the 
facts required to generate an evidential estoppel should have made it possible to contend that a clause 
should not be regarded as exemption clause if it is such as to generate an evidential estoppel and the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 3 would not come into question30. However, again, the approach now taken 
in relation to non-reliance clauses and contractual estoppel is a very mechanical one which would invite 
the application of the statutory controls and they have been seen as applicable31. However, whatever the 
type of clause (whether dealing with terms or representations, or both), if it is a non-individually 
negotiated term, in a contract between a consumer and a seller or supplier, it will fall to be considered 
under the fairness test in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations32 and certainly the Office 
of Fair Trading, which was formerly empowered to challenge unfair terms33, took the view that such 
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clauses will generally be unfair34 and in Office of Fair Trading v MB Designs (Scotland) Ltd, an entire 
agreement clause was found to be unfair under the Regulations35. 
It is not surprising that courts are unprepared to permit too easily an entire agreement clause to negate 
liability for misrepresentation. In BSkyB Ltd v HP Enterprise Services UK Ltd36 the entire agreement 
clause provided that the agreement and its schedules ‘constitute the whole agreement between the 
parties in relation to the subject matter and supersede any previous discussions, correspondence, 
representations and agreements between the parties with respect thereto’. The issue in that case was 
whether that clause excluded liability for non-fraudulent misrepresentation. Ramsey J concluded that it 
did not. In doing so, he distinguished between exclusion of liability for misrepresentation and exclusion of 
liability for collateral warranties. The judge considered that although there was reference in the clause to 
representations, there was nothing that indicated that it was intended to take away a right to rely on 
misrepresentations. As Browne-Wilkinson J said in Alman and Benson v Associated Newspapers Group 
Ltd: ‘If it were designed to exclude liability for misrepresentation it would, I think, have to [be] couched in 
different terms, for example, a clause acknowledging that the parties had not relied on any 
representations in entering into the contract.’37 Equally, as Jacob J stated in Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP 
Industries Ltd, ‘In other words, if a clause is to have the effect of excluding or reducing remedies for 
damaging or untrue statements then the party seeking that protection cannot be mealy-mouthed in his 
clause. He must bring it home that he is limiting liability for falsehoods he may have told.’38 It thus follows 
that clear words are needed to exclude a liability for negligent misrepresentation. 
In Axa Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd and Others39 the clause in question was fairly 
conventional and provided as follows: 
‘this Agreement shall supersede any prior promises, agreements, representations, undertakings or 
implications whether made orally or in writing between you and us relating to the subject matter of 
this Agreement’. 
AXA had sued a number of financial advisers for the claw-back of various commissions. In their defence 
to those claims, the financial advisers argued that they had been induced to enter into the agreements by 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations and/or collateral warranties made by AXA. The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the entire agreement clause appearing in the contract was concerned with 
agreements rather than misrepresentations. As such, whilst it was effective to exclude liability for 
collateral warranties, it did not exclude liability for misrepresentations. As with BSkyB Ltd v HP Enterprise 
Services UK Ltd, whilst it was recognised that the word ‘representation’ did appear in the clause, the court 
held that as a matter of construction it was ‘sandwiched between words of contractual import’. 
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Written terms or notices – signed 
Basic rule 
[3.8]  
The basic rule in relation to the incorporation of terms from signed contractual documents stems from 
L'Estrange v Graucob1. Scrutton LJ said:2  
‘When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then in the absence of fraud, or … 
misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly irrelevant whether he had read the 
document or not’. 
Maughan LJ also made it clear that not only is it irrelevant that the signatory has not read the signed 
document, it is also irrelevant that he, or she does not know of its contents. He also added the 
qualification of the application of the doctrine of non est factum3. The qualification of fraud or 
misrepresentation would seem to relate particularly to fraud or misrepresentation as to the terms4. The 
factors which will generally vitiate a contract such as duress, undue influence, and misrepresentation will, 
of course, do so whether a contract has been signed or not. 
Other than these obvious qualifications, it has been assumed that there might be a possible exception to 
the rule in L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd that where the terms are especially unusual or onerous, a party will 
not be able to rely on the clause unless he has done enough fairly to bring the clause to the attention of 
the other party5. However, it is not easy to show that commercial terms are unusual or onerous6. 
Moreover, there is no consensus that the exception would apply to signed contracts. In Interfoto Picture 
Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd7 the defendant was held not to be bound by a term in a 
                                                     
1
 
L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. See also Parker v South Eastern Rly Co (1877) 2 CPD 416; 
The Luna [1920] P 22; Blay v Pollard and Morris [1930] 1 KB 628; Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing 
Co [1951] 1 KB 805; Denning LJ at 808; Bahamas Oil Refining Co v Kristiansands Tankrederie A/S, The 
Polyduke [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211; Harvey v Ventilatoren-fabrik Oelde Gmbh (1988) 8 Tr L 138; 
Charlotte Thirty Ltd & Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46; Saphir (Merchants) Ltd v Zissimos 
[1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep 490 at 499; Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] QB 69; One 
World (GB) Ltd v Elite Mobile Ltd [2012] EWHC 3706 (QB); see also paragraphs 90–92 of Do-Buy 925 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank [2010] EWHC 2862 for a good account of the authorities. 
2
 
[1934] 2 KB 394 at 403. 
3
 
[1934] 2 KB 394 at 406. 
4
 
See below para 3.10. 
5
 
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433; also, One World (GB) Ltd v 
Elite Mobile Ltd [2012] EWHC 3706 (QB). 
6
 
One World (GB) Ltd v Elite Mobile Ltd [2012] EWHC 3706 (QB); Allen Fabrications Ltd v ASD Ltd (t/a 
ASD Metal Services and/or Klockner & Co Multi Metal Distribution [2012] EWHC 2213 (TCC). 
7
 
[1989] QB 433. 
printed set of conditions which had been provided to him in the form of a delivery note, but which he had 
neither signed nor read. In Ocean Chemical Transport v Exnor Crags Ltd8, Evans LJ, with whom Henry 
and Waller LLJ agreed, was prepared to assume that the principle might apply to onerous and unusual 
clauses in a signed contract ‘in an extreme case where a signature was obtained under pressure of time 
or other circumstances’. In HIH v New Hampshire9, Rix LJ questioned whether the principle could actually 
properly be applied outside the context of incorporation by notice10. In Amiri Flight Authority v BAE 
Systems plc11, Mance LJ, with whom Rix and Potter LLJ agreed, noted the doubts of Rix LJ in HIH v New 
Hampshire and stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether the principle could ever apply to signed 
contracts. He envisaged that it might do so where for example a car owner was asked to sign a ticket on 
entering a car park or a holidaymaker asked to sign a long small-print document when hiring a car, if, in 
either case, the relevant document proved on close reading to contain a provision of an extraneous or 
wholly unusual nature. in either case which document proved to have a provision of ‘an extraneous or 
wholly unusual nature’; but that such cases might be ones where the application of the provision was 
precluded by an implied representation as to the nature of the document. He reiterated the normal rule 
that in the absence of any misrepresentation, the signature of a contractual document must operate as an 
incorporation and acceptance of all its terms. As Moore-Bick LJ said in Peekay v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group12: 
‘It was accepted that a person who signs a document knowing that it is intended to have legal effect 
is generally bound by its terms, whether he has actually read them or not. The classic example of 
this is to be found in L'Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394. It is an important principle of English 
law which underpins the whole of commercial life; any erosion of it would have serious 
repercussions far beyond the business community.’ 
Whether signed or not, a document cannot introduce new terms once a contract has been concluded, 
although it may lead the parties to vary an existing contract13. 
Contractual documents 
[3.9]  
It has been emphasised that the document signed must be a ‘contractual document’ if signature of it is to 
incorporate terms into a contract and in Michael Joseph Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire and Triact 
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Michael Joseph Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire and Triact Civil Engineering Ltd (1996) 5 Tr L Rep 
371. The ‘timing’ of the introduction of the document more usually arises for consideration in the context 
of unsigned documents: see para 3.12. 
Civil Engineering Ltd1 this led to the conclusion that signature of a time sheet could not incorporate the 
terms there referred to. The question has been put in terms of whether ‘the document purport[ed] to have 
contractual effect’2 but, more broadly, it would seem to depend upon how the reasonable person would 
have viewed it3 taking account of ‘the nature and purpose of the document’ and ‘the circumstances of its 
use as between parties’4. 
Misrepresentation 
[3.10]  
In Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co1 consideration had to be given to a misrepresentation of the 
contents of the document which had been signed. In that case, before the claimant signed the document, 
the exemption clause was innocently stated to be far narrower than it was and it was held that the clause 
could not be relied upon in relation to a breach which it was appropriately worded to cover but which was 
beyond the scope of the clause as misrepresented2. If a misrepresentation is that the scope of a term is 
more limited than it is, as was the case in Curtis, it is not clear whether the term can be relied upon in 
relation to the limited scope it was misrepresented to have3. 
Artificiality 
[3.11]  
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[1951] 1 KB 805, Somervell LJ at 808: ‘this exception never became part of the contract between the 
parties’; Denning LJ at 810: ‘when the signature to a condition, purporting to exempt a person from his 
common law liabilities, is obtained by an innocent misrepresentation, the party who has made the 
misrepresentation is disentitled to rely on the exemption’. But note Denning LJ at 809: ‘it was a sufficient 
misrepresentation to disentitle the cleaners from relying on the exemption, except in regard to beads and 
sequins’ – the misrepresentation was that the clause only covered damage to beads and sequins. 
The artificiality which may be present in incorporating contract terms in this way has not gone unnoted1 
and may now be relevant if the application of the ‘reasonableness’ test under the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 is in question2, or the fairness test under the Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts 19993. In both situations, when the consent and knowledge of the relevant party is to be judged 
objectively, that should occur without the artificiality which may be present in the rules as to incorporation. 
However, the recognition of the artificiality has led to arguments for the development of the common law 
in this area. It has been argued4 that the common law could escape from such artificiality by following the 
approach taken in Smith v Hughes5 and considering whether the party putting the forward the document 
for signature realised, or should have realised as a reasonable person, that the signor was not intending 
to agree to the clauses there set out. Such an approach is not unknown elsewhere. In the Canadian case 
of Tilden-Rent-A Car v Clendenning6 unusual and onerous printed clauses were not incorporated and the 
line was taken that signature could only be relied upon as showing assent to a document when it was 
reasonable for the person relying on the signed document to believe that the signor assented to its 
contents. Further, it has also been suggested7 that the reasoning on the ‘red hand rule’ in the context of 
incorporation by notice8 in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd9 could provide a 
basis for a requirement that for there to be incorporation by signature of unreasonable or unusual 
clauses, the proferens must show that his intention to incorporate a condition of that nature was fairly 
brought to the notice of the other party. There have been indications that the court would be willing to 
extend the ‘red hand rule’ from incorporation by notice to incorporation by signature10, but more generally 
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the indications are against such an extension11. In most cases, any unfairness in the strict application of 
the signature rule will now be met by the extensive protection against ‘unreasonable’ clauses provided by 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and, 
against the background of that statutory protection the certainty produced by the strict application of the 
signature rule will normally outweigh its drawbacks12. However, in an extreme case, where the legislated 
protections do not deal with the considerable unfairness which would be created if a particular term was 
incorporated by signature, and without knowledge, the operation of the red hand rule may be extended 
into this context. Any such extension is, of course, unlikely then to be confined to the situations where 
there is no legislated protection. 
Notice – Unsigned documents1  
Time 
[3.12]  
No document, sign or notice can introduce new terms into an existing contract once it has been 
concluded, and that applies whether it has been signed or not, although the point generally arises in 
relation to unsigned documents1. In appropriate cases, clauses may be incorporated not because of the 
notice provided in the instant case, which is too late, but because there has been a sufficient course of 
past dealings between the parties to do so2. In addition, an attempt to introduce late terms might lead the 
parties to vary the existing contract. 
Notice 
[3.13]  
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When one party, the proferens, has a set of terms on a document or sign the question arises as to 
whether the other party is bound by them when he, or she, has not signed them. There is no difficulty 
where their contents was known to that other party and that party knew, or should have known, as a 
reasonable person, that the proferens intended1 to include them in the contract. In that situation, that 
other party's acceptance will clearly encompass the proferens' terms2. However, the more commonly 
arising situation is where that other party has no knowledge of the content of the terms and may not even 
be aware of their existence. Where there is no knowledge of the content or existence of the terms, the 
basic test for their incorporation is whether the proferens provided ‘reasonably sufficient’ notice of the 
terms3. This generally need only relate to their existence and the proferens intent to use them as terms of 
the contract. This means that when notice is provided the terms themselves need not normally be 
included, but merely a reference to them and the place where they may be found4, and it may not be 
necessary to refer to where they may be found if they are reasonably accessible (ie if the reasonable 
person would realise where they are to be found and could reasonably do so)5. However, the situation 
differs in relation to clauses which are unusual or unreasonable6. In relation to such clauses, additional 
efforts will be required by the proferens if ‘reasonably sufficient’ notice is to be provided. A signed 
acknowledgement of receipt of the notice by one party could go some way towards showing that sufficient 
and reasonable efforts had been taken to ensure that that party’s attention was drawn to the terms of the 
agreement7. 
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Just as in relation to incorporation by signature8, fraud or misrepresentation as to terms in unsigned 
documents or signs should prevent them being relied upon, at least to the extent that they were 
misrepresented9. 
Basic test 
[3.14]  
Where there is no knowledge of the content of the terms or of their existence, the basic test of the 
incorporation of clauses in unsigned documents or signs is whether the proferens ‘did what was 
reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the condition’1. This has also simply been put in terms of 
whether ‘reasonable notice of the terms [has] been given’2 or even, in terms of whether the clause was 
‘fairly brought to the attention of the other party’3, although the latter formulation is primarily used when an 
unusual or unreasonable term is being considered. The test is objective4. It is a matter of sufficiency of 
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reasonable notice that the writing contained conditions.’ 
Despite its citation (see eg Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163; Thompson v London, 
Scottish and Midland Rly Co [1930] 1 KB 41), this three-stage test should not be regarded as an accurate 
statement of the current law. It is inconsistent with the emphasis on the basic test as one of fact. It is also 
inconsistent with a requirement of a greater degree of notice for unreasonable or unusual terms (see para 
3.16). 
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notice for the reasonable person, not the particular individual, and some difficulty of the individual such as 
illiteracy5 is irrelevant. The situation may, however, be different if the difficulty of the individual6, or the 
type of individual7, was, or should have been, realised by the proferens. More generally, past dealings 
between the parties may impact upon what amounts to reasonably sufficient notice in relation to a 
subsequent contract between them8. 
The basic test of ‘reasonably sufficient notice’ is one of fact9, taking account of such factors as the 
smallness of the print10, the placing of the terms within a document11, whether a ticket has been folded 
over12 or if the clause had been obscured by a date stamp13. It may be that there will not normally be 
reasonably sufficient notice of a clause printed on the back of a ticket if the front of the ticket does not 
plainly indicate that14, but it should depend upon all the facts of the particular case15. The use of a fax 
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machine, transmitting only one side of a document, led to the terms on the back of the original not being 
incorporated, even though what was transmitted said ‘for terms see back’. The situation was not regarded 
as equivalent to incorporation by reference. It was thought to be a ‘more cogent inference that the terms 
were not intended to apply’16. A supplier's faxed page with ‘Delivery based on our General Conditions of 
Sale’ at its foot, when the ‘Conditions’ were not supplied, did not provide reasonably sufficient notice in a 
‘battle of the forms context’ ie where the purchaser had already sent their own standard terms with their 
offer17. In general, the type of transaction may be relevant18 and it may be easier to establish that 
reasonably sufficient notice has been provided if the transaction is of a type in which it is commonly 
known that standard terms will be used19. The opportunity for the other party to examine the document or 
sign by which the proferens seeks to provide notice may be relevant20. 
Type of document 
[3.15]  
The type of document in which the clause is found will be relevant to the question of its incorporation. As 
has been indicated, a non-contractual document will not incorporate terms1. However, in the context of a 
general requirement of reasonably sufficient notice, the type of document may also be seen as relevant to 
that requirement2 – even in relation to clauses which are not unreasonable or unusual, notice does not 
merely relate to the existence of the clauses, but their existence as intended contract terms. If it is a 
document which is not of a type which the reasonable person would expect to contain contract terms then 
that will indicate an absence of reasonably sufficient notice3. Clauses have failed to be incorporated from 
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a deck chair hire ticket4 and a cheque book5. In contrast, if a contract is of a type commonly known to 
include standard terms that will assist incorporation. Such ‘common knowledge’ may relate to people in 
general6 or to those normally undertaking the type of transaction in question7. 
The content of the clause 
[3.16]  
‘How much is required as being … “reasonably sufficient notice of the condition”, depends upon the 
nature of the … condition’1. The point was graphically made by Denning LJ2: 
‘the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it. Some clauses 
which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand 
pointing to [them] before the notice could be held to be sufficient.’ 
For obvious reasons, this is sometimes referred to as the ‘red hand rule’. It applies to clauses which are 
unusual3 or unreasonable4, although more recently the reference has usually been to ‘onerous’ clauses’ 
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Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 348. 
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rather than unreasonable ones5, but it would seem that ‘onerous’ clauses should be regarded merely as a 
type of unreasonable clause. In any event, the point has been made that the ‘words “onerous or unusual” 
are not terms of art. They are simply one way of putting the general proposition … that more is required in 
relation to certain terms than to others depending on their effect’6. It has been said that the rule requires 
the proferens to ‘show that his intention to attach [a] … condition of that nature was fairly brought to the 
notice of the other party’7 and the type of clause was identified with some specificity as one ‘restrictive of 
statutory rights’ and ‘relating to personal injury’. However, there have also been indications that notice of 
the type of clause, even at that level of particularity, will not suffice, but that what is required is that the 
proferens show that ‘the particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other party’8. 
The rule has been applied to a clause imposing an additional charge for retention of hired goods beyond 
a set period, when the hire charge was more per item per day than was charged by ten other hirers per 
item per week9. More commonly, it has been applied in the context of exemption clauses to clauses 
exempting liability for personal injury due to negligence10, and to terms removing rights given by statute, 
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particularly in the context of personal injury11, although it has also been extended to a clause restricting 
liability for breach of the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 197912 and to an arbitration clause which 
statute would not have inserted in the consumer context13. It was regarded as inapplicable in relation to a 
term limiting the right of appeal under s 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 where the parties had agreed to 
arbitration14. However, the potential was recognised for it to apply to a clause requiring arbitration in Utah 
in relation to a distributorship agreement operating in the UK if it was uncommon or would ‘in practice’ 
mean that the claimant had ‘no real prospect of pursuing her claim’15. It was regarded as inapplicable to a 
‘rule’ in a newspaper scratchcard game which turned ‘an apparent winner into a loser’ but which was also 
seen as ‘merely [depriving] the claimant of a windfall for which he [had] done very little in return’16. 
Some consideration should be given to the potential evolution of the rule, particularly against the 
background of its overlap with legislative controls. (Artificialities in the contracting process may be 
relevant to both the ‘requirement of reasonableness’ under the UCTA 197717 and the fairness test under 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.18) This overlap can be seen as the basis of 
the difference of opinion in the Court of Appeal in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd19 as to the 
operation of the rule. The majority thought that in considering whether a clause was unusual or 
unreasonable (and so within the scope of the rule), it was the particular clause which had to be addressed 
and which could therefore be unusual or unreasonable because of its extent or scope. Hobhouse LJ took 
a different view, claiming that a clause had to be unusual or unreasonable as a type of clause in order for 
the rule to apply20. Plainly the approach of the majority was in keeping with that previously taken21. 
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applying it only on the basis of the type of clause, rather than in relation to the particular clause – would 
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that the rule now merely generated uncertainty without being of any significant benefit. However, neither 
UCTA 1977 nor the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 could have dealt with the 
onerous and unusual clause in Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes23 – it imposed an 
obligation, rather than exempting liability and it was a business to business contract – and the rule is still 
perceived as useful24. In Lacey's Footwear v Bowler International Brooke LJ was an enthusiastic 
advocate of the rule, preferring its use to what he saw as the ‘Byzantine’ construction approach adopted 
by the majority25 and there have been suggestions that its operation might be extended to the context of 
incorporation by signature26. In addition, in concluding that the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 should 
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Commission emphasised the use of common law devices to control exemption clauses27 and noted28 as 
of particular interest Bingham LJ's reference in Interfoto29 to ‘a contractual principle of dealing in good 
faith’ of which the red hand rule was seen as forming a part. The balance seems to remain in favour of 
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the continued operation of the red hand rule in its original form30 and this would seem to have been 
strengthened by the perception of the rule as an element of the common law (alongside the potential for 
claims as duress, undue influence and mistake) which means that an agreement to arbitrate can 
effectively waive rights under Human Rights Act 1998, Pt 1, Sch 1, art 6 rather than infringe them31. 
Reference 
[3.17]  
It has long been accepted that incorporation can occur by reference, ie the ticket or other document need 
not contain the terms but can merely state that a set of terms is being incorporated and where they are to 
be found1 and the route to the terms may be circuitous2. It may not be necessary to state where they may 
be found if they are reasonably accessible (ie if the reasonable person would realise where they are to be 
found and could reasonably do so)3. However, if the terms referred to contain unreasonable or unusual 
terms, then a mere reference to the terms as a whole will not suffice to incorporate terms of that type4. It 
will need to be shown that, at least, the intention to incorporate terms ‘of that nature was fairly brought to 
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the notice’ of the party it is sought to bind5. It should also be noted that in the 1999 Regulations on Unfair 
terms in Consumer Contracts, the list of terms6 which maybe regarded as unfair includes: 
‘Terms which have the object or effect of …. 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.’ 
In contracts between consumers and sellers or suppliers, this requires consideration of the accessibility of 
any terms it is sought to incorporate by reference and that will reflect upon the fairness of the referring 
term. 
Course of dealing and trade practice 
[3.18]  
It may be that the relevant contract between the parties is not an isolated transaction but part of a pattern 
of dealing between them. In some cases, when the proferens has failed to incorporate his, or her, 
standard terms into the particular contract, those terms may nevertheless be incorporated on the basis of 
a course of dealing1 between the parties2. The incorporation of terms by a prior course of dealing is a 
question of fact and degree3. It will depend, amongst other things, on the number of previous contracts, 
how recent they were, and the similarity in terms of subject matter and the manner in which they were 
concluded. 
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Thompson [1930] 1 KB 41, Megaw LJ: see para 3.16. The same should apply where the party it was 
sought to bind knew of the existence of the terms but not their content. 
6
 
Sch 3, para 4(4). 
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Roe v R A Naylor Ltd (1918) 87 LJKB 958 at 963; Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 2 All ER 121, [1956] 1 
WLR 461; McCutcheon v David MacBrayne [1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1 WLR 125; Kendall & Sons Ltd v 
Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31; PLM Trading Co (International) Ltd v Geogiou [1987] CLY 430; Circle 
Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427; Hollier v Rambler Motors Ltd 
[1972] 2 QB 71; SIAT di del Ferro v Tradax Overseas SA [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470; affd [1980] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 53; Transmotors Ltd v Robertson Buckley & Co [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 224; British Crane Hire Ltd v 
Ipswich Plant Hire [1975] QB 303; Walek v Chapman [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 279; Lamport & Holt Lines Ltd 
v Coubro & Scrutton Ltd, The Raphael [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 659; Victoria Fur Traders Ltd v Roadline 
[1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 570; E Scott (Plant Hire) Ltd v British Waterways Board (20 December 1982, 
unreported); Chevron International Oil Co Ltd v A/S Sea Team [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 356; Johnson Mathey 
Bankers Ltd v State Trading Corpn of India [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 427; Rees Hough Ltd v Redland 
Reinforced Plastics Ltd (1983) 2 ConLR 109; Lacey's Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd v Bowler International 
Freight Ltd (17 March 1995, unreported). 
2
 
Or between one of the parties and companies in the same group: SIAT di del Ferro v Tradax Overseas 
SA [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470; affd [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 53. See also Eastman Chemical International AG 
v NMT Trading [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 25. 
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Capes (Hatherden) Ltd v Western Arable Services Ltd [2010] Lloyd's Rep 477; also Lisnave Estaleiros 
Navais Sa v Chemikalien Seetransport GmbH [2013] EWHC 338. 
In Kendall v Lillico4, for example, the parties made a contract on the telephone and that was followed by 
the despatch of a ‘sold note’ containing the terms in question. In each case, the sold note arrived too late 
to incorporate terms into the instant contract5 but, by the time of the disputed transaction, the terms were 
instead incorporated on the basis of the course of dealing by the parties – three or four transactions a 
month following the same pattern over a three-year period6. The mechanism by which incorporation by a 
course of dealing occurs is that the circumstances are such that, at the time of contracting, both parties, 
as reasonable persons, would have assumed the inclusion of the proferens’ standard terms in the offer 
and acceptance7. The test for such incorporation has been said to be: 
‘what each party by his words and conduct reasonably led the other party to believe were the acts 
he was undertaking a legal duty to perform.’ 
8
  
This refers not to the actual belief of the ‘other party’ but to what that party would have been led to believe 
as a reasonable person9. In addition, the point can be made that as both the instant case and the past 
dealings are significant in relation to such incorporation the test could be more fully formulated as: 
‘whether, at the time of contracting, each party as a reasonable person was entitled to infer from the 
past dealings and the actions and the words of the other in the instant case, that the standard clauses 
were to be part of the contract.’ 
Three or four transactions a month for three years have been sufficient10 to generate a course of dealing 
to incorporate terms, as have 11 transactions in six months11. ‘Intermittent’ contact between the parties 
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Kendall & Sons Ltd v Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31. 
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See para 3.12. 
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See also Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427 – 11 such 
transactions in six months. 
7
 
Kendall & Sons Ltd v Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31, Lord Morris at 90. Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd 
[2000] CLC 1341, Clarke LJ, [26] – ‘Given the course of dealing … both parties will have made the oral 
agreement on the basis that the contract would be subject to the same terms as before …’. 
8
 
Diplock LJ in Kendall v Lillico (sub nom Hardwick Game Farm Ltd v SAPPA) [1966] 1 All ER 309, [1966] 1 
WLR 287 at 339 adopted in the House of Lords by Lord Wilberforce at [1969] 2 AC 31, 130 and for a 
similar formulation see Lord Pearce at 113, Lord Reid in McCutcheon v MacBrayne [1964] 1 All ER 430, 
[1964] 1 WLR 125 at 128, Donaldson J in SIAT v Tradax [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470 at 490, Staughton J in 
Johnson Mathey Bankers [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 427 at 433, Clarke LJ in Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd 
[2000] CLC 1341, para 27. 
9
 
SIAT di del Ferro v Tradax Overseas SA [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470, Donaldson J at 490. 
10
 
Kendall & Sons Ltd v Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31. 
11
 
Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427. 
and contracts which were then regarded ‘isolated affairs’ were not sufficient12, and neither were three or 
four transactions over a five-year period13. Not only the number of transactions and the time scale are 
relevant, but also such matters as the consistency of the introduction of the standard terms14. There is no 
requirement of complete consistency between previous transactions and the instant case, what is 
required is consideration of how the past and instant transactions would impact upon the perceptions of 
the parties15. Trade practice may be relevant to incorporation. Where there are only a small number of 
prior transactions, which in themselves might be insufficient to incorporate the proferens' standard terms, 
there may nevertheless be incorporation if the parties share a common trade background16. In general, it 
will be easier to establish incorporation by a course of dealing where both parties are in business17, rather 
than where one is a consumer18. 
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Metaalhandei JA Magnum BV v Ardfields Transport Ltd [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 197 at 203. 
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Hollier v Rambler Motors Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71, [1972] 1 All ER 399 at 402. 
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See also Lacey's Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd v Bowler International Freight Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 369. 
15
 
The majority in McCutcheon v MacBrayne might have been seen as indicating a requirement of complete 
consistency but see Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Export Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427, 
Taylor LJ at 431; SIAT v Tradax [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 53, Megaw LJ at 56; Banque Paribas v Cargill 
International SA [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 96, Webster J at 98. There appears to be a more relaxed approach 
where the incorporation of the term is anticipated by EU law; for example, case law suggests that such an 
approach is to be adopted in respect of art 23 of Council Regulation 44/2001 which refers toprovides for 
the incorporation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause by means ofinto a contract as a result of  an 
established course of dealings. See The Tilly Russ (MS) [1985] 1 QB 931; Mainschiffahrts-
Genossenschaft eG v Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL [1997] QB 1; SSQ Europe SA v Johann & Backes 
OHG [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 465; Africa Express Line Ltd v Socofi SA [2009] EWHC 3223 (Comm), [2010] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 181. 
16
 
British Crane Hire Corpn v Ipswich Plant Hire [1975] QB 303, Lord Denning MR at 310–311, [1974] 1 All 
ER 1059 at 1061. See also SIAT v Tradax [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 470, Donaldson J at 490: 
‘Both Mr Johnson and Mr Eves approached the matter on the basis that terms can be incorporated in a 
contract either as a result of a course of dealing or by application of the British Crane doctrine which they 
seem to regard as different approaches. I do not think they are different. They are two different examples 
of a much wider concept, namely that a contract is not made in a vacuum but against a background of 
present and past facts and future expectations and that its terms are to be gathered not only from 
expressed words but also from their conduct viewed against that background.’ 
See also Victoria Fur Traders Ltd v Roadline [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 570; Fal Bunkering of Sharjah v 
Grecale of Panama [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 369. 
17
 
Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427. And see, in the context of 
two business parties, Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd [2000] CLC 1341, Clarke LJ, [29] – ‘neither party can 
have supposed that the only terms were those expressly referred to on the telephone’. 
18
 
British Crane Hire v Ipswich Plant Hire commenting on Hollier v Rambler Motors Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71. See 
also Mendelssohn v Normand [1970] 1 QB 177. 
Incorporation by a course of dealing may be seen as an extension of incorporation by ‘reasonably 
sufficient notice’19 with, in this context, the ‘notice’ provided by the past transactions, rather than an 
unsigned document introduced in the instant case. However, even if that is the case20, the test set out in 
this section draws attention to the elements more specifically relevant in the course of dealing situation 
and is, therefore, to be preferred. Raising the issue of the relationship of incorporation by a course of 
dealing to incorporation by ‘notice’ does, however, indicate the need to consider the application here of 
the ‘red hand’ rule21 so that what would be sufficient to incorporate other terms may not incorporate 
unreasonable or unusual terms. In Circle Freight International Ltd v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd22, in 
deciding that the clauses were incorporated by a course of dealing, it was noted that they were ‘not 
particularly onerous or unusual’23. 
Trade practice or trade terms of a particular trade or industry may also be incorporated by implication. As 
long as the parties are in a similar trade or industry and are aware generally of the content of those terms 
(or at least have easy access to them for reference) and that those terms are ordinarily and regularly 
imposed on transactions of the same a similar  nature as that of the contract in question, they would be 
bound by those terms even if those terms were not mentioned during contractual negotiations24. The 
question is not whether those terms are reasonable but whether by means of relevant trade practice, the 
parties are said to have agreed to their incorporation25. 
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Circle Freight International Ltd v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427 at 433, McCutcheon 
v David McBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1 WLR 125, Lord Devlin at 138. On incorporation by 
notice see para 3.13. 
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See para 3.16. 
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Clearly the terms incorporated by a course of dealing are not present when the contract is made and are 
therefore, in a sense, ‘implied’ and the ‘officious bystander test’ for the incorporation of terms implied in 
fact (see para 3.20) has been viewed as relevant in this context (McCutcheon v David McBrayne Ltd 
[1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1 WLR 125, Lord Reid at 128). However, this may be coupled with a 
‘business efficacy test’ (see para 3.20) and terms implied in fact generally are often said only to be 
implied where it is necessary to do so (see para 3.20). Such a restrictive approach to the incorporation of 
terms implied in fact generally is to prevent there being, or being seen to be, an extensive rewriting of the 
parties' bargain by the court (eg Trollope and Colls Ltd v North West Region Hospital Board [1973] 2 All 
ER 260). Where terms are being imported less abstractly, because they have appeared in the parties' 
previous transactions, that same risk is not present. 
22
 
Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427. 
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Taylor LJ at 433 and compare euNetworks Fiber UK Ltd v Abovenet Communications UK Ltd [2007] 
EWHC 3099 (Ch), [2007] All ER (D) 373 (Dec), Briggs J at [217]–[218]. But see Petrotrade Inc v Texaco 
Ltd [2000] CLC 1341, [25]. 
24
 
British Crane Hire Corp Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] QB 303; Chevron International Oil Co Ltd v 
A/S Sea Team [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 256; Laceys Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd v Bowler International Freight 
Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 369 at 378; Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis UK Ltd [2006] EWHC 1900 (Comm); 
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd v JVC (UK) Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 438; Lisnave Estaleiros Navais SA v 
Chemikalien Seetransport GmbH [2013] EWHC 338 (Comm); Matrix Europe Ltd v Uniserve Holdings Ltd 
[2008] EWHC 11 (QB), [2008] 1 CLC 205. 
25
 
When it comes to contracting by an exchange of emails, the prevailing view is that even if the final email 
making the formation of the contract complete does not refer to or include previous email exchanges 
leading to the conclusion of the exchange, those prior emails would be evaluated by the court when 
incorporating terms. 
In addition to the terms expressly agreed upon by the parties, terms may be implied. This document 
discusses the implied terms of the contracts namely, terms implied in fact, terms implied in law and terms 
implied by custom. 
B Implied Terms 
[3.19]  
In addition to the terms expressly agreed upon by the parties, terms may be implied. Often the express 
terms of a contract do not deal with every aspect of the performance and there may be scope to imply a 
term or terms. There are different types of implied term, with different requirements for the making of an 
implication. A term may be implied by custom1, on the basis that the parties contracted against the 
background of the relevant custom. Terms may also be implied in fact or law. 
‘When it implies a term in a contract a court is sometimes laying down general rules that in all 
contracts of a certain type – sale of goods, master and servant, landlord and tenant and so on – 
some provision is to be implied unless the parties have expressly excluded it. … Sometimes, 
however, there is no question of laying down a prima facie rule applicable to all cases of a defined 
type but what the court is being asked to do is to rectify a particular … contract by inserting in it a 
term which the parties have not expressed.’2  
Terms implied because a contract is of a certain type, may be referred to as terms implied in law3. Those 
implied into particular contracts on the basis that the parties intended to include them, may be referred to 
as terms implied in fact. In addition, terms which have not been expressed in the making of the particular 
contract, may nevertheless be imported into it on the basis of a course of dealing between the parties4, 
and terms may be implied by statute5 into particular types of contract. 
Terms implied in fact 
[3.20]  
                                                                                                                                                                           
See Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom [2009] UKPC 10. 
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See para 3.25. 
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Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, Lord Cross at 257–258. 
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See para 3.21. 
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See para 3.18. 
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See eg Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 12–15. Whether the parties can prevent the implication of statutorily 
implied terms will depend on statute. The exclusion of the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is 
regulated by UCTA 1977, s 6: see para 3.81. 
In implying terms in fact, the intention of the parties (objectively ascertained) is sought1, ‘collected from 
the words of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances’2. It is emphasised that the court will not 
‘improve the contract which the parties have made for themselves’3 and traditionally the search for the 
parties, intention has occuredoccurred within restricted boundaries, through the use of a ‘stringent’4 test 
or tests (the ‘business efficacy test’ and the ‘officious bystander test’). These tests have confined the 
search for the parties' intention to its least disputable area and have thus provided some assurance that 
the courts are not rewriting the parties' bargain.5 However, in the Privy Council case Attorney-General of 
Belize v Belize Telecom6, Lord Hoffmann took the line that implying terms in fact is part of the 
construction of the contract and that the traditional tests should merely be seen as indicators of the 
intention of the parties and should not stand in the way of fulfilling that intention. He stated:7  
‘the question for the court is whether such a provision would spell out in express words what the 
instrument, read against the relevant background would reasonably be understood to mean’. 
Undoubtedly, the implication of terms in fact is founded on the objectively ascertained intention of the 
parties and plainly that can simply be seen as part of the process of construction. Nevertheless, even 
post-Investors construction of express terms is not simply a matter of applying basic principle. (There are, 
for example, artificial restrictions on the evidence of the background to the transaction which can be 
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Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, Lord Edmund-Davies at 266; Rhodes v Forwood (1876) 1 
App Cas 256, Lord Chelmsford at 268; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108, Lord Wright at 
137; KC Sethia (1944) Ltd v Partabmull Rameshwar [1950] 1 All ER 51, Jenkins LJ at 59; Abbott v 
Sullivan [1952] 1 KB 189, Morris LJ at 219; Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional 
Hospital Board [1973] 2 All ER 260, Lord Pearson at 267; Attica Sea Carriers Corpn v Ferrostaal 
Poseidon Bulk Reederei GmbH [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 250, Lord Denning MR at 254; Shell UK v Lostock 
Garages [1977] 1 All ER 481, Lord Denning MR at 488; Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 249; 
Duke of Westmister v Guild [1985] QB 688, Slade LJ at 699; Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War 
Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The Good Luck [1990] 1 QB 818, [1989] 3 All ER 628; National Bank of 
Greece SA v Pinios Shipping Co, The Maira [1990] 1 AC 637, [1989] 1 All ER 213; Ashmore v Corpn of 
Lloyd's (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620, Gatehouse J at 626; Hughes v Greenwich London Borough 
Council [1994] 1 AC 170, Lord Lowry at 179; McVitae v UNISON [1996] IRLR 33, Harrison J at 39; 
Harrods Ltd v Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1997] FSR 420, Neuberger J at 453; Ennstone Building 
Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 916, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 479, [33]. 
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Ali v Christian Salvesen Food Services Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 721, Waite LJ at 726. 
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Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 2 All ER 260, Lord 
Pearson at 267. 
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Paul Smith Ltd v H & S International Holding Inc [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127, Steyn J at 131; Ashmore v 
Corpn of Lloyds (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620, Gatehouse J at 627. 
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See n 3. 
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[2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 1. 
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[2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 1 at [21]. 
considered in the search for the parties' intention).8 The exact impact of Lord Hoffmann's casting aside of 
the tests traditionally used to keep the implication of terms within narrow bounds is not yet clear. Although 
His Lordship’s statement has been endorsed with approval by a number of high-level judicial decisions9, it 
should be noted that the Court of Appeal has subsequently confirmed that necessity remains the 
touchstone for the implication of any term10. The question which always has to be asked is whether the 
proposed implied term is necessary to make the contract work11. A case from Singapore, Peng v Mai12, 
decided that  the Singapore courts would not follow to the extent that Lord Hoffmann’s new formulation to 
the extent that it implied that the traditional ‘business efficacy’ and ‘officious bystander’ tests are no longer 
central, that would not be followed in Singapore13. This will be returned to below, but first consideration 
should be given to the restrictive tests traditionally used in relation to terms implied in fact. 
The ‘business efficacy’ test was stated, and explained in The Moorcock14: 
‘the law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the parties, with the object of 
giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all events it should 
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See para 3.43. 
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For example, Mediterranean Salvage & Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading & Commerce Inc (The ‘Reborn’) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 531; Chantry Estates (Southeast) Ltd v Anderson [2010] EWCA Civ 316; KG Bominflot 
Bunkergesellschaft für Mineralole Mbh v Petroplus Marketing AG [2010] EWCA Civ 1145; Beazer Homes 
Ltd v Durham CC [2010] EWCA Civ 1175; Garratt v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 425, 
[2011] IRLR. 591; Crema v Cenkos Securities plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1444; BDW Trading Ltd v JM Rowe 
(Investments) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 548; Consolidated Finance Ltd v McCluskey [2012] EWCA Civ 1325; 
Procter and Gamble Co v Svenska Cellulose Aktiebolaget SCA [2012] EWCA Civ 1413. 
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See Mediterranean Salvage & Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading & Commerce Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 531, 
[2009] 1 CLC 909, Lord Clarke MR at [15]. 
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Ibid, at [15] and [18]. 
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[2012] SGCA 55; 149 Con LR 117 (judgment by Andrew Phang JA). 
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See also Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 43; 151 Con LR 170 where the 
Singapore Court of Appeal made it plain that it remains the law in Singapore that the implication of 
contract terms is to be considered using a three-step process: (a) ascertaining how the gap in the 
contract had arisen; (b) considering whether it was necessary in the business sense to imply a term to 
give the contract efficacy; (c) considering the specific term to be implied, applying the officious bystander 
test. 
14
 
The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, Bowen LJ; Hamlyn & Co v Wood & Co [1891] 2 QB 488; KC Sethia 
(1944) Ltd v Partabmull Rameshwar [1950] 1 All ER 51; Bander Property Holdings v J S Derwen [1968] 2 
All ER 305; Lupton v Potts [1969] 3 All ER 1083, [1969] 1 WLR 1749, Plowman J at 1753; Vosper 
Thorneycroft v Ministry of Defence [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 58 at 61; Alpha Trading Ltd v Dunshaw – Patten 
Ltd [1981] QB 290, Brandon LJ at 304; Paula Lee Ltd v Robert Zehil & Co Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 390, Mustill 
LJ at 396; Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] QB 688, Slade LJ at 699; Ben Shipping Co v An Bord 
Bainne [1986] 2 All ER 177, Bingham J at 182; Barclays Bank v Taylor [1989] 3 All ER 563, [1989] 1 WLR 
1066, Lord Donaldson at 1074; Sun Alliance etc v RJL [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 410 at 412. 
have. In business transactions such as this what the law desires to effect by the implication is to 
give such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been intended at all events by both 
parties.’ 
It is often said that the test is that of ‘necessity’. The ‘necessity’ referred to here relates to what is required 
‘to render the contract workable’15 and that will depend upon the construction of the contract16. The 
touchstone, as is often said, is necessity, not merely reasonableness or usefulness17. That said, there is 
some judicial opinion that in certain types of contracts it might be better to focus on questions of 
reasonableness, fairness and the balance of competing policy considerations rather than on the elusive 
or protean concept of ‘necessity’18. 
In addition to the ‘business efficacy’ test, the ‘officious bystander’ test is also often cited. In Shirlaw v 
Southern Foundaries Ltd Mackinnon LJ said19: 
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Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Crédit Du Nord [1988] 3 All ER 902, [1989] 1 WLR 255, 
Steyn J at 263. 
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See eg CEL Group v Nedlloyd Lines [2003] EWCA Civ 1716, [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 689 at [15] – 
‘Everything depends upon the true construction of the contract in question. If the agreement was that CEL 
would have the exclusive right to provide for all the defined haulage requirements of NLL's business over 
the three year period, then there was no difficulty about implying a term … that NLL would do nothing of 
their own motion to make it impossible for CEL to supply those requirements. If the agreement was simply 
that NLL would not go elsewhere for their haulage requirements, then there is nothing to prevent NLL 
disposing of their business in whatever way they saw fit’. 
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Liverpool CC v Irwin [1977] AC 239 at 266; BP Refinery (Westenport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 
52 ALJR 20 at 26; Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 44; Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 at 104; Scally v Southern Health and Social 
Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294; Bedfordshire CC v Fitzpatrick Contractors Ltd (1998) 62 Const LR 64 at 
71; Mousaka Inc v Golden Seagull Maritime Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 797 at 802; Meridian International 
Services Ltd v Richardson [2008] EWCA Civ 609, [2008] Info TLR 139; Brookfield Construction Ltd v 
Foster & Partners Ltd [2009] EWHC 307 (TCC), [2009] BLR 246; Arla Foods UK plc v Barnes [2008] 
EWHC 2851 (Ch), [2009] 1 BCLC 699; Mediterranean Salvage and Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading & 
Commerce Inc (The ‘Reborn’) [2009] EWCA Civ 531, [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 639 at [15]–[18]; IMT Shipping 
and Chartering GmbH v Chansung Shipping Co Ltd (The ‘Zenovia’) [2009] EWHC 739 (Comm), [2009] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 139 at [23]; AET Inc Ltd v Arcadia Petroleum Ltd [2009] EWHC 2337 (Comm), [2010] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 593 at [39]; Strydom v Vendside Ltd [2009] EWHC 2130 (QB); Chantry Estates (South East) 
Ltd v Anderson [2010] EWCA Civ 316, 130 Con LR 11; Re Agrimarche Ltd [2010] EWHC 1655 (Ch), 
[2010] BCC 775; Dhamija v Sunningdale Joineries Ltd [2010] EWHC 2396 (TCC), [2011] PNLR 9; Cassa 
di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino SpA v Barclays Bank Ltd [2011] EWHC 484 (Comm), [2011] 
1 CLC 701 at [544]; Leander Construction Ltd v Mullaley & Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 3449 (TCC) at [41]; NSB 
Ltd v Worldplay Ltd [2012] EWHC 927 (Comm); Consolidated Finance Ltd v McCluskey [2012] EWCA Civ 
1325, [2012] CTLC 133; Euroption Strategic Fund Ltd v Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB [2012] 
EWHC 584 (Comm), [2013] 1 BCLC 125; Greatship (India) Ltd v Oceanografia SA de CV [2012] EWHC 
3468 (Comm), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1244 at [41]; Proton Energy Group SA v Orlen Lietuva [2013] 
EWHC 2872 (Comm) at [43]. 
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See for example Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293 (per Morritt V-C with 
respect to a contract of employment); Peden, ‘Policy Concerns behind Implication of Terms in Law’ (2001) 
117 LQR 459. 
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‘Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is something 
so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if while the parties were making their bargain an 
officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in the agreement, they would 
testily suppress him with a common “Oh, of course”.’ 
The authorities by no means put the relationship of the traditional tests beyond doubt. It has not been 
uncommon to find them equated or joined as one test. In Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan 
Regional Hospital Board for example, Lord Pearson said20: 
‘It must have been a term that went without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to 
the contract, a term which, although tacit, is part of the contract the parties made for themselves.’ 
Such comments indicate that the tests should be regarded as cumulative, with terms being implied if they 
are both necessary to give the contract business efficacy and also so obvious that they go without 
saying21. However, they have also been referred to as separate tests22. It has been said that they are 
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Food Corpn of India, The Demoder General T J Parke and King Theras [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68, Steyn J 
at 71; El Awadi v BCCI SA [1990] 1 QB 606, [1989] 1 All ER 242, Hutchinson J at 252; Fal Bunkering of 
Sharjah v Grecale Inc of Panama [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 369. 
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[1973] 2 All ER 260 at 267. See also Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) [1918] 1 KB 592, 
Scrutton LJ at 605; Comptoir Commercial Anversois v Power & Son & Co [1920] 1 KB 868, Scrutton LJ at 
898; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108; Lupton v Potts [1969] 1 WLR 1749, Plowman J at 
1753; Shell UK v Lostock Garages [1977] 1 All ER 481, Lord Denning MR at 488; Frobisher (Second 
Investments) Ltd Kiloran Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 425, Walton J at 431; Fraser v Thames Television 
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‘distinct tests with the result that a term may sometimes be implied on the basis of one but not the 
other’23. As a distinct test, the ‘officious bystander’ test has been viewed as ‘broader in scope than the 
Moorcock test’, but nevertheless as ‘a stringent test’24. Even if viewed as two tests, it has been 
recognised that ‘they [would] often overlap’25. Whilst these views may be logical if the idea of terms to 
give a contract business efficacy or the idea of terms which are so obvious that they go without saying are 
considered in the abstract, there may be further legal restrictions to consider. It has been said that ‘it is 
hornbook law that a term may only be implied [in fact] if it satisfies the legal test of strict necessity’26. If 
‘necessity’ is a requirement of an implication based on the ‘officious bystander’ test27, as well as the 
‘business efficacy test’, all cases covered by the ‘officious bystander’ test must also fall within the 
‘business efficacy’ test28 if a term is to be implied. However, even if they are viewed as distinct tests, with 
‘necessity’ restricted to the ‘business efficacy’ test, they would still be very restrictive tests and the 
implication of terms in fact would be confined to those areas where there is least scope for dispute that 
the terms implied reflect the intention of the parties. There would seem to be little reason not to accept 
them as distinct tests, but the point may, of course, be made redundant by Lord Hoffmann's approach in 
Belize Telecom. 
Some further consideration should now be given to Lord Hoffmann's approach in Belize Telecom. His 
dismissal of the traditional tests should be looked at. First, he sought to deprive the ‘business efficacy’ 
test of all impact. He took the line that it meant that a term would be implied where it was ‘necessary to 
give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties’.29 Basically, Lord Hoffmann was simply saying 
that the ‘business efficacy’ test means no more than that if the parties' intended the term, even if they did 
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not express it, it is necessary for it to implied to fulfil their intentions. There have been some other 
indications that the test should be treated in this way30, but undoubtedly it is a new approach. 
Traditionally, the test has been confined to the production of a subset of the terms which could be implied 
on the basis of the parties' intentions – the subset of those it is necessary to imply to make the contract 
workable. So, for example, in Liverpool City Council v Irwin31 Lord Wilberforce said32 ‘the courts are willing 
to add a term on the ground that without it, the contract will not work – this is the case … of the doctrine of 
The Moorcock as usually applied’. Secondly, Lord Hoffmann sought to take a similar approach to the 
‘officious bystander test’, again seeking to say that it did no more than reflect that the test was simply that 
of the intention of the parties. He said:33  
‘the requirement that the term must go “without saying” is no more than a way of saying that, 
although the instrument does not expressly say so, that is what a reasonable person would have 
understood it to mean’. 
Again, the point can be made that the ‘officious bystander test’ has been used to identify a subset of 
those terms which would be found to be implied if the test was simply that of the intention of the parties. 
Again, it limits the scope for claims that the court is not basing the implication on the intention of the 
parties, but is seeking to improve the contract. 
However, even if questions can be raised in relation to Lord Hoffmann's arrival at the conclusion that the 
‘business efficacy’ test and the ‘officious bystander’ test have just assisted the courts to determine what 
the contract means, rather than themselves providing tests for the implication of terms, the real question 
to be asked is the extent to which his approach should be followed. Is Lord Hoffmann here doing for 
implied terms what he did for the construction of express terms in the Investors Compensation Scheme 
case – moving the law on from an artificially limited approach towards basic principle?34 In the aftermath 
of Investors there was considerable concern that too much uncertainty had been introduced into the law. 
That did not stop the Investors approach becoming embedded in law, but in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon 
Homes Ltd35 an artificial restriction on the background admissible to show the parties' intentions has 
recently been maintained by Lord Hoffmann to avoid uncertainty and costs. His approach to implied terms 
takes a larger step. There would seem to be greater scope for uncertainty here than in the Investors 
approach to the construction of express terms. More significantly, allowing more of the relevant 
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background evidence in interpreting express terms reduced the distortion of the contents of the contract 
by the process of construction. It is not obvious that restricting terms implied in fact to those least 
disputable causes distortion to anything like the extent that the historical approach to construction did. 
Further, the less restricted the approach taken to implied terms, the greater the risk of distorting the 
content of the contract through the introduction of terms which do not fulfil the intentions of the parties. 
There is a difference in interpreting express terms and in implying terms in fact. In Philips Electronique 
Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd36 Sir Thomas Bingham MR drew a distinction between 
interpreting express terms and implying terms, which might be seen as significant here. He said:37  
‘The court's usual role in contractual interpretation is, by resolving ambiguities or reconciling 
apparent inconsistencies, to attribute the true meaning to the language in which the parties have 
expressed their contract. The implication of contract terms involves a different and altogether more 
ambitious undertaking: the interpolation of terms to deal with matters for which, ex hypothesi, the 
parties themselves have made no provision. It is because the implication of terms is potentially so 
intrusive that the law imposes strict constraints on the exercise of this extraordinary power’. 
Lord Hoffmann's move towards basic principle in relation to terms implied in fact takes a bigger step than 
did his judgment in Investors. In MeditteraneanMediterranean Salvage & Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading & 
Commerce Inc38 Lord Clarke MR predicted that Lord Hoffmann's analysis in Belize Telecom ‘will soon be 
as much referred to as his approach to the construction of contracts in Investors’. Nevertheless, Lord 
Clarke's analysis reflects the traditional approach. He re-emphasised the question of whether the 
implication is ‘necessary to make the contract work?’,39 rather than adopting Lord Hoffmann's substitute of 
whether it is ‘necessary to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties’. Lord Clarke also 
stated, ‘Moreover, as I read Lord Hoffmann's analysis, although he is emphasising that the process of 
implication is part of the process of construction of the contract, he is not in any way resiling from the 
often stated proposition that it must be necessary to imply the proposed term.’40 Further, he quoted the 
above dictum from Philips Electronique. In addition, in Graveholt v Hughes41 Arden LJ took the line that 
‘in the light of the decision in Mediterranean Salvage and Towage Ltd v Seamar Shipping’ nothing in the 
approach taken in Belize Telecom affects ‘the conditions necessary for the implication of a term on the 
grounds of business efficacy’. Lord Hoffmann’s approach is not readily displacing the traditional approach 
in the Court of Appeal. If anything at all, Arden LJ considers Lord Hoffmann’s statement to have made the 
matter of necessity even more important. Her Ladyship said, ‘The party seeking to establish an implied 
term must therefore show not simply that the term could be a part of the agreement but that a term would 
be part of the agreement. It follows, as Lord Hoffmann made clear in Belize, that the starting point is that, 
if there is no express term, none should be implied because if the parties intended that a particular term 
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should apply to their relationship they would have included a term to that effect, rather than left it to 
implication.’42  
Although when considering the implication of a term in fact, each case will be dependent upon its 
individual facts, the courts have identified some factors of recurring relevance. As these are dependent 
upon the underlying basis of the implication being the intention of the parties, these remain of relevance 
whether or not Lord Hoffmann's new approach is fully adopted43. In addition, as the foundation of any 
implication in fact is the fulfilment of the parties' intentions, it is always determinative where it is clear that 
one party would not have agreed to the particular term44. In such cases, no implication in fact can be 
made45(although, subject to that lack of agreement being embodied in an express term, a term may be 
implied in law46). The other commonly occurring factors cannot have the same impact, but must be 
viewed against the background of all the facts. 
Knowledge of what the term refers to has been seen as relevant to the question of the implication of a 
term in fact. In Spring v NASDS47, it was said48: 
‘If … the bystander had asked the plaintiff … “won’t you put into it some reference to the 
Bridlington Agreement?,” I think (indeed I have no doubt) the plaintiff would have answered 
“What's that?”.’ 
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This was related to the ‘officious bystander test’ but it is not dependent upon that test. The parties will not 
intend that the contract should cover something of which they have no knowledge. However, the point 
should be made that the question of the parties' knowledge should be addressed objectively. 
The fact that there are several possible versions of the implied term will militate against any implication in 
fact, as will the inability to state the term precisely49. Such factors indicate that a particular version of the 
term is not so obvious that it goes without saying or necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, 
and the problems of trying to deal with these objections were noted in Ashmore v Corpn of Lloyds (No 
2)50: 
‘In summary, the original way in which the implied [term] was pleaded was too wide to be 
reasonable, let alone a matter of necessity. This was recognised by the plaintiff's counsel and 
successive attempts were made to overcome these difficulties. These inevitably became more 
complex and less likely to satisfy the officious bystander test. There is no possibility of both parties 
answering the question posed … with an immediate “yes of course, that is so obvious it goes 
without saying”.’ 
More simply, and more broadly, there is an obvious problem in trying to argue that a term should be 
implied on the basis of the parties' intention if the content of the term is not clear. 
The existence of detailed express terms will also militate against the implication of a term51. In those 
cases there is no ‘obvious lacuna which the court can fill in confidence that it is doing no more than giving 
effect to what the parties intended’52. That is particularly the case if there is a term, or terms, dealing with 
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the area in relation to which it is claimed that there should be an implied term53. In contrast, it has been 
viewed as strongly favouring an implication that the express terms do not provide a complete contract54, 
to the extent that such a factor may seem at times to be referred to as a separate basis of implication55. 
However, in Society of Lloyd's v Clementson56 Steyn LJ made the point that57: 
‘It is not analytically right to say there is an independent … category [of] incomplete contracts, 
cases of so-called incomplete contracts are covered by principles governing terms implied by fact 
or by law.’ 
The situation may also be such that the incompleteness of the contract may not indicate that the parties 
intended there to be further terms. Where there was a carefully negotiated collective agreement across a 
broad front, representing a compromise between the objectives of employer and employee it was said:58  
‘should any topic be left uncovered by an agreement of that kind, the natural inference … is not 
that there has been an omission so obvious as to require judicial correction, but rather that the topic 
was omitted advisedly from the terms of the agreement on the ground that it was too controversial 
or too complicated to justify any variation of the main terms of the agreement to take account of it.’ 
More broadly, the point has been made that:59  
‘If the parties appreciate that they are unlikely to agree on what is to happen in a certain not 
impossible eventuality, they may well choose to leave the matter uncovered in their contract in the 
hope that the eventuality will not occur.’ 
An implied term of good faith? 
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Implied terms serve to fill gaps left by the parties. Some jurisdictions take the view that there is an 
overriding duty of good faith implicitly incorporated in the parties’ contractual relations60. In a High Court 
decision, Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited61, Leggatt J took the view that 
given that the factual matrix or background to the contract is relevant to the process of implying terms 
(following Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Limited62), it is 
entirely possible to imply a duty of good faith or honest dealings. In his opinion, the relevant background 
against which contracts are made includes not only matters of fact known to the parties but also shared 
values and norms of behaviour. The judge stated, ‘Some of these are norms that command general social 
and business acceptance. Many such norms are naturally taken for granted by the parties when making 
any contract without being spelt out in the document recording their agreement … A paradigm example of 
a general norm which underlies almost all contractual relationships is an expectation of honesty. That 
expectation is essential to commerce which depends critically on trust.’63 Leggatt J also pointed out that 
‘the essence of contracting is that the parties bind themselves in order to co-operate to their mutual 
benefit’64 and the duty of fair dealing rests on standards of conduct with ‘which, objectively, the parties 
must reasonably have assumed compliance without the need to state them’65. It is thus not inconceivable 
that a duty to act in good faith or honestly could be implied, according to the judge. 
However these assumptions are not likely to be universally recognised or appreciated. Indeed, many 
would disagree with those thoughts about the ‘essence of contracting’66. It might be argued for instance 
that it is the parties’ freedom of contract to pursue self-interests without an externally imposed duty to 
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cooperate for the mutual benefit. It should not be assumed thus that Leggatt J’s decision provides a legal 
basis for the imposition of a general duty of good faith into English contract law. As regards the possibility 
of implying a term of good faith into the parties’ particular contract, that is a far less controversial matter. 
Such a term could be used as a gap-filler, as long as the tests on implication of terms can be satisfied67 – 
including the requirement to find a ‘clear lacuna’ in the contract where such a term is necessary to make 
the contract work commercially68. It would however be a step too far to use the vehicle of an implied term 
to impose a general duty of good faith in performance69. It is important to remember Lord Hoffmann’s 
words, ‘It cannot introduce terms to make it fairer or more reasonable.’70  
Terms implied in law 
[3.21]  
‘Terms implied in fact are individualised gap fillers, depending on the terms and circumstances of a 
particular contract. Terms implied in law1 are in reality incidents attached to standardised contractual 
relationships, or perhaps more illuminatingly, such terms can in modern US terminology be described as 
standardised default rules’2. More specifically, terms are implied in law where the contract is of a defined 
type, encompassing ‘those relationships which are of common occurrence, such as … seller and buyer, 
owner and hirer, master and servant, landlord and tenant, carrier by land or by sea, contracts for building 
work and so forth’3. The implication is not based on the parties' intention ‘but on more general 
considerations’4. There are two basic requirements for the implication of a term in law, and it has been 
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said that ‘the first requirement is that the contract in question should be of a defined type … The second 
requirement is that the implication of the terms should be necessary’5. However, it is increasingly clear 
that it is inappropriate to refer to the second requirement as one of ‘necessity’, and that is returned to 
below. Here the point can be made that as the implication is not based on the parties' intention, it can be 
made even if such a term was not intended by both parties, provided there is no contrary express term6. 
‘In these relationships the parties can exclude or modify the obligation by express words, but unless they 
do so, the obligation is a legal incident of the relationship which is attached by the law itself’7. However, in 
some situations, even where there is a clear, express, contrary term, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19778 
or the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 19999, may render it ineffective and allow the 
implication. 
It was noted above that it would militate against the implication of a term in fact where several possible 
versions of the putative implied term are put forward, or the content of the term contended for is 
uncertain10. Such circumstances will not usually prevent a term being implied in law because in making 
that implication the court does not have to try to find the term the parties would have agreed upon, and an 
implication in law can introduce a more complex term11. However, even in relation to a potential 
implication in law, the complexities of the situation may sometimes be such as to lead the court to refuse 
to make the implication. In Reid v Rush & Tompkins Group plc12 it was said:13  
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‘As to treating such a term as implied by law, the arguments in favour of a social policy which 
would require employers to provide some level of personal accident insurance for the benefit of 
men and women working overseas and for their dependants, are obvious but there appears to be no 
way in which the court could embody this policy in the law without the assistance of the 
legislature.’ 
If it is to be implied, the substance of the term should be reasonable14. 
‘To say as Lord Reid said in Young & Marten v McManus Childs Ltd [1969] 1 AC 454 at 465 that 
‘no warranty ought to be implied in a contract unless it is in all circumstances reasonable’, is in my 
view quite different from saying that warranty or term which is, in all circumstances, reasonable 
ought to be implied in a contract. I am confident that Lord Reid meant no more than that unless a 
warranty or term is in all circumstances reasonable there can be no question of implying it into a 
contract, but before it is implied much else besides is necessary ….’ 
The implication of terms in law occurs in relation to types of contracts and, in relation to the long 
established types of contracts, there are also established terms to be implied in law. For example, in 
relation to the lease of a furnished house, it has long been accepted that a term will be implied that at the 
time of commencement of the tenancy, the house will be reasonably fit for habitation15 and the same 
applies in relation to a contract for the sale of land and the building of a house on it16. 
In English contract law, a duty of good faith is also not implied as a matter of law. There is no general 
legal requirement that the parties should conduct their business transactions in good faith17. That said, as 
discussed above, it appears uncontroversial that it may be possible to imply a term of good faith based on 
the parties’ presumed intention as demonstrated by their particular contractual relationship and the factual 
background18. 
Subject to contrary express term 
[3.22]  
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It is ‘axiomatic that the scope of an express term cannot be cut down by an implied term’1, but it may be 
difficult to discern whether the scope of the express term is such as to generate a conflict with a 
contended for implied term which would prevent the implication2. However, it has been indicated that 
where there is such a conflict the express term may be treated as a term excluding or restricting liability 
and, where the contract is an appropriate one, subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19773 and, of 
course, there are also the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 to be considered in 
relation to an appropriate express term. 
A contract of a defined type 
[3.23]  
There are clear examples of situations in which a term is implied because of its type rather than because 
of the parties' intention in the particular case. In Liverpool City Council v Irwin1 Lord Cross referred to ‘sale 
of goods, master and servant, landlord and tenant and so on’. They are commonly occurring and 
recognisable types of contract. It has been said that the ‘issue and purchase of traveller's cheques is self 
evidently’ a contract of a defined type2, but it was thought it would not be ‘acceptable’ to put a ‘solus 
agreement between supplier and buyer’ into that category although such agreements were viewed as ‘of 
common occurrence’3. It has been denied that a single standard form contract, however widely used, 
could be a contract of a defined type on the basis that ‘it is not part of a genus it is sui generis’ and that 
‘there must first be established a genus’4. 
The ‘type’ of contract may be stated with much greater precision than simply that of sale of goods or 
employment and there is an interaction between that delimitation and whether the implication can be 
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Ashmore v Corpn of Lloyds (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620, Gatehouse J at 630. The case was 
concerned with contracts between Lloyd's Names and ‘Lloyds’ and in Society of Lloyd's v Clementson 
[1995] CLC 117 no such difficulty was envisaged. It may have been viewed as coming within the type of 
‘agreements by which members of an organisation [agree] to be bound by its rules and regulated by a 
committee or similar organisation’ (at 133). 
regarded as passing the second part of the test. In Scally v Southern Health and Social Services5 Lord 
Bridge said:6  
‘Carswell J accepted the submission that any formulation of an implied term of this kind which 
would be effective to sustain the plaintiff's claim in this case must necessarily be too wide in its 
ambit to be acceptable as of general application. I believe however that this difficulty is 
surmounted if the category of contractual relationship in which the implication will arise is defined 
with sufficient precision.’ 
The case was concerned with doctors' contracts of employment, which included a contributory pension 
scheme requiring 40 years' contribution for maximum benefit. However, the terms were varied to give the 
employees an opportunity, for a limited period, to purchase extra years of contribution to make their 
pensions equivalent to one based on 40 years' service. The problem arose because the plaintiffs were not 
informed of that opportunity and did not exercise their right. It was held that a term, requiring notice to 
have been given to them, would be implied in law. The implication was viewed as one which should be 
made because the contract was one arrived at by collective bargaining, not individual negotiation, and the 
doctors could not reasonably be expected to know of the opportunity unless given notice. That this 
reasoning falls short of ‘necessity’ is returned to below. The point to be made here is that the contracts in 
which such an implication would be made were of a carefully stated ‘defined type’, reflecting this rationale 
for the implication. Lord Bridge said7: 
‘I would define it as the relationship of employer and employee where the following circumstances 
obtain: (1) the terms of the contract of employment have not been negotiated with the individual 
employee but result from negotiation with a representative body or are otherwise incorporated by 
reference; (2) a particular term of the contract makes available to the employee a valuable right 
contingent upon action being taken by him to avail himself of its benefit; (3) the employee cannot, 
in all circumstances, reasonably be expected to be aware of the term unless it is drawn to his 
attention.’ 
Second requirement 
[3.24]  
In the Liverpool City Council1 case Lord Cross said2 that in implying a term in law, ‘the court will naturally 
ask itself whether in the general run of such cases the term in question would be one which it would be 
reasonable to insert’3. However, Lord Wilberforce asserted that4 ‘such obligations should be read into the 
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contract as the nature of the contract itself requires, no more, no less; a test in other words of necessity’ 
and it is ‘necessity’, as the test for terms implied in law, which became the stated test5.However, it has 
been acknowledged that ‘historically terms implied by law … emerged which did not satisfy a test of 
necessity in the ordinary sense’6, and describing the test as one of ‘necessity’ has been the subject of 
criticism7. As will be seen below, it is coming to be recognised that a test encompassing much broader 
issues is in question. The restrictions on implication in law were recognised as ‘less stringent’ than in 
relation to terms implied in fact8. In Scally v Southern Health and Social Services it was said that:9  
‘A clear distinction is drawn … between the search for an implied term necessary to give business 
efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider considerations, for a term which the 
law will imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual relationship.’ 
In that case, the right to add to an employee's pension entitlement was of no effect unless the employee 
was aware of it, but he could not reasonably be expected to be aware of it unless his attention was drawn 
to it, and it was regarded as ‘necessary to imply an obligation on the employer to bring it to his attention to 
render efficacious the very benefit which the contractual right … was intended to confer’10. Nevertheless, 
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it was still thought that such an implied term might ‘be stretching the doctrine of implication for the sake of 
business efficacy beyond its proper reach’11. However, even if not ‘necessary’ in any strict sense, this 
may not be seen as too divorced from necessity in more everyday usage. In addition, some of the other 
factors considered by the courts do not sit too oddly alongside a test stated in terms of necessity – the 
existence of established terms implied in law in relation to the type of contract in question12, and whether 
the agreement is in some sense ‘incomplete’13. However, much broader factors are also looked at, which 
do not have any real relationship to a test stated in terms of ‘necessity’. Imbalance in bargaining power in 
contracts of the type in question has been considered14, and even more broadly, considerations ‘of justice 
and social policy’15 have been looked at. 
Such broader considerations have most obviously been at work in recent years in the context of contracts 
of employment, for example, in relation to the implication of a term that the employer will not engage in 
conduct which is likely to undermine the trust and confidence required if the employment relationship is to 
continue16. It has been recognised that there are evolutionary social forces active in this area. 
‘But over the last 30 years or so, the nature of the contract of employment has been transformed. It 
has been recognised that a person's employment is usually one of the most important things in his 
or her life. It gives not only a livelihood but an occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem. 
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Malik v BCCI [1997] 3 All ER 1 at 5. 
The law has changed to recognise this social reality. Most of the changes have been made by 
Parliament … And the common law has adapted itself to the new attitudes…’17  
Further, in Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd18, again in the context of an employment contract, the 
Court of Appeal explicitly recognised the inefficacy of a test stated in terms of necessity. Dyson LJ said:19  
‘It seems to me that rather than focus on the elusive concept of necessity, it is better to recognise 
that, to some extent at least, the existence and scope of standardised implied terms raise questions 
of reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of competing policy considerations.’ 
Such an approach should not be seen as confined to contracts of employment20. Characterising the test 
as one of ‘necessity’ did warn against too easily implying terms, but that can be achieved more explicitly. 
It has been recognised: 
‘the decision of the court concerned to imply a term “in law” … established a precedent for similar 
cases in the future for all contracts of that particular type … Hence …. Courts ought to be as – if 
not more – careful in implying terms in this basis compared to the implication of terms [in fact]’.21  
There is much to be said generally for the recognition that there are broader issues to be weighed than 
can be appropriately encompassed in a test referred to in such terms. The point has been made that:22  
‘[It] would be appropriate for the courts to be more open about the policy issues with which they 
are wrestling. Policies and principles which are established by prior judicial observations provide 
good reasons for future judicial decisions. More openness would allow judges to feel less that they 
were creating the law, and more that they were ensuring continuity of the common law's 
development.’ 
A final point should be made. Recognition that the nature of the test encompasses far broader issues 
than a reference to ‘necessity’ would imply does not deny an interaction between the weight of the factors 
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considered and the scope of the type of contract being looked at. The limited implication in the 
correspondingly limited category of relationships in Scally was seen as one which could appropriately be 
made23. A broader term to be implied into contracts of employment generally, that the employer will take 
reasonable care of the economic well being of the employee, was denied as one which would impose an 
‘unfair and unreasonable burden on employers’.24  
Custom 
[3.25]  
Terms may be implied on the basis of an established custom or usage of the relevant market or trade1. 
The parties need have no knowledge of the custom2 but it must be notorious3. In Hutton v Warren4 
although there was no express term to that effect, it was held, on the basis of custom, that the tenant of a 
farm, on being given notice to quit, was entitled to an allowance for seeds and labour. In that case Parke 
B said that the basis of such implication was the intention of the parties. He stated5: 
‘It has long been settled, that in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of custom and usage is 
admissible to annex incidents to written contracts on matters on which they are silent. The same 
rule has also been applied in transactions of life, in which known usages have been established and 
prevailed, and this has been done on the principle of presumption that, in such transactions, the 
parties did not mean to express in writing the whole of the contract by which they intended to be 
bound, but to contract with reference to those known usages.’ 
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It is, however, very artificial to regard such an implication as based on the intention of the parties. No 
such intention need be established. It is simply that the term will be excluded if the contract evidences a 
contrary intention. 
‘An alleged custom can be imported into a contract only if there is nothing in the express or 
necessarily implied terms of the contract to prevent such inclusion and further that a custom will 
only be imported into a contract where it can be so imported consistently with the tenor of the 
documents as a whole.’6  
In Walford's case7, for example, a custom that a broker's commission was payable only when hire was 
earned under a charter, could not be implied into a contract with an express term stating that the owners 
were to pay commission on the signing of a charter. 
In order for a practice to be regarded as a custom or usage that will be implied as such, into appropriate 
contracts, it must be8: 
‘certain, in the sense that the practice is clearly established; it must be notorious, in the sense that it 
is so well known in the market in which it is alleged to exist, that those who conduct business in the 
market contract with the usage as an implied term; and it must be reasonable.’ 
If a custom is unreasonable, ‘the courts have said they will not recognise it as binding on people who do 
not know of it and who have not consented to act upon it’9. However, the basic question is whether ‘there 
was in the trade, a “uniform … practice so well defined and recognised that contracting parties must be 
assumed to have had it in their minds when they contracted”’10. When it is attempted to establish a 
                                                     
6
 
London Export Corpn Ltd v Jubilee Coffee Roasting Co [1958] 2 All ER 411, [1958] 1 WLR 661, Lord 
Jenkins at 675; Cunliffe-Owen v Teather & Greenwood [1967] 3 All ER 561, [1967] 1 WLR 1421, Ungoed 
Thomas J at 1437 – ‘usage may be admitted to explain the language used in a written contract or to add 
an implied incident to it, provided that if expressed in the written contract it would not make its terms or its 
tenor insensible or inconsistent’; Kum v Wah Tat Bank Ltd [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 439 at 445; Affréteurs 
Réunis Société Anonyme v Walford [1919] AC 801; Palgrave, Brown & Sons Ltd v SS Turid [1922] 1 AC 
397; Re L Sutro & Co v Heilbut, Symons & Co [1917] 2 KB 348; Cory Bros Shipping Ltd v Baldan Ltd 
[1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 58 at 63. 
7
 
Affréteurs Réunis Société Anonyme v Walford [1919] AC 801. 
8
 
Cunliffe-Owen v Teather and Greenwood [1967] 3 All ER 561, [1967] 1 WLR 1421, Ungoed Thomas J at 
1438; Vitol SA v Phibro Energy AG, The Maturaki [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 84, Evans J at 88. See also Yates 
v Pym (1816) 6 Taunt 446; Nelson v Dahl (1879) 12 Ch D 568; Re Walkers, Winder & Hamm and Shaw, 
Sons & Co [1904] 2 KB 152; John W Pryke v Gibbs Hartley Cooper Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep 602, Waller 
J at 615; Cory Bros Shipping Ltd v Baldan Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 58 at 63. See also Baker v Black Sea 
and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 833; Crema v Cenkos Securities [2010] EWHC 461 
(Comm), [2010] All ER (D) 143 (Mar). 
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Perry v Barnett (1885) 15 QBD 388, Brett MR at 393; Blackburn v Mason (1893) 68 LT 510; Lord Esher 
MR at 511 – ‘A person may agree to be bound by an unreasonable custom of the market, but he is only 
bound if, when he entered on the dealing, the custom was made known to him, and he agreed to be 
bound’; Cunliffe-Owen v Teather and Greenwood [1967] 3 All ER 561, [1967] 1 WLR 1421, Ungoed 
Thomas J at 1438. 
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custom or usage, there may be ‘considerable force’ in the contention that there cannot be any such 
practice or usage in the trade if there is a ‘difference of opinion among independent expert witnesses’11. It 
can also be said that ‘arrangements or compromises to the same effect as the alleged usage do not 
establish usage; they contradict it. They may be the precursors of usage but usage presupposes that 
arrangements and compromises are no longer required’12. 
This document is an examination of the classification of terms of contracts in relation to the contracting 
party’s right to sue for damages or rescind the contract upon occurrence of breach. In detail it covers the 
contingent conditions and the warranties and innominate terms of the contracts. 
C Classification of Terms 
Contingent conditions 
Terminology 
[3.26]  
A wide variety of meanings is given to the word ‘condition’ in the contractual context. It ‘is a source of 
recurring confusion’1. It may be used loosely, simply to mean any term, or as designating a particular type 
of term, as distinct from a warranty or an innominate term. However, it may also be used in relation to 
contingencies – designating, for example, an event upon the happening of which, a contractual obligation 
becomes operative2. Contingent conditions, both promissory and non-promissory, are considered first 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Vitol SA v Phibro Energy AG, The Maturaki [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 84, Evans J at 88, quoting Fox-Bourne v 
Vernon & Co Ltd (1894) 10 TLR 647, Russell LJ; Fyffes Group Ltd v Reefer Express Lines Pty Ltd, The 
Kriti Rex [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 171, Moore-Bick J: 
‘the implied obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch arises from the nature of the contract and is 
necessary in order to give it commercial efficacy. Its existence is by now so well established that it can be 
regarded as an ordinary incident of any contract of carriage by sea which exists unless the parties have 
expressly or impliedly provided otherwise.’ 
In the context of contracts of employment and the impact of policies adopted by the employer it was said 
in Duke v Reliance System Ltd [1982] IRLR 347 that ‘a policy adopted by management unilaterally cannot 
become a term of the employee's contract on the ground that it is established custom and practice unless 
it is at least shown that the policy has been drawn to the attention of the employees or has been followed 
without exception’ (Browne Wilkinson J). And see also Quinn v Calder Industrial Materials Ltd [1996] 
IRLR 126, EAT at 128: ‘in our view, the question is not whether the period has been “substantial” in some 
abstract sense, but whether in relation to the other circumstances it is sufficient to support a contractual 
term. Again with regard to communication, the question seems to us to be not so much whether the policy 
has been made or become known directly to the employees or through intermediaries, but whether the 
circumstances in which it was made or has become known support the inference that employers intended 
to become contractually bound by it.’ 
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Cunliffe-Owen v Teather and Greenwood [1967] 3 All ER 561, [1967] 1 WLR 1421, Ungoed Thomas J at 
1438. 
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Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 209, Lord Steyn. 
2
 
here, before an examination of the classification of terms as conditions, warranties or innominate terms, 
ie classification which is important to the injured party's right to rescind on the occurrence of a breach3. 
Non-promissory contingent conditions 
[3.27]  
There may be an event upon the occurrence of which the existence, or the operation, of the contract is 
contingent. Such an event may be referred to as a condition and it may be that the contract, or some 
obligation, will not become operative, or even into being1, until the occurrence of a condition precedent, or 
will cease to operate upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent. The contingencies considered here 
are non-promissory in themselves, with neither party having undertaken that, for example, a condition 
precedent will occur. However, one or both parties may have undertaken subsidiary obligations in relation 
to the contingency. Whether there is a contingent condition, and whether there are any subsidiary 
obligations is a matter of construction2. 
There may be conditions subsequent, upon the occurrence of which the contract ceases to operate3. It 
was a contingent condition of an employees’ share option scheme that the particular employing 
                                                                                                                                                                           
In Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd, Heritage Oil plc v Tullow Uganda Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1048, for example, 
the contract provided that before a duty of indemnification had to be performed, the party being 
indemnified must give notice within a particular period of time. That was considered by the contract to be 
a ‘condition precedent’. Such conditions precedent usually attract very severe consequences; as such, 
the courts are always careful to construe and apply them strictly. In the context of insurance contracts, 
this appreciation is reflected by some reluctance to classify notification of loss provisions as conditions 
precedent: see, for example, Colman J in Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
694 at 699–700. It has been held that in such contracts a ‘conditional link’ between the assured's 
obligation to give notice and the underwriters' obligation to pay the claim needs to be established (Friends 
Provident Life and Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 601, [2006] 
Lloyd's Rep IR 45, Mance LJ at [31]). Be that as it may, it is clear that such conditions are enforceable as 
long as the words are explicit and apt in evincing the ‘clear intention of the parties’ (George Hunt Cranes 
v Scottish Border and General Insurance [2001] EWCA Civ 1964, [2002] Lloyd's Rep IR 178, Potter LJ at 
[11]; and Eagle Star Insurance v Cresswell [2004] EWCA Civ 602, [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 537, Longmore 
LJ at [20]. 
3
 
See para 3.34. 
1
 
A ‘prerequisite to the very existence of an agreement’ was referred to as the ‘proper’ meaning of 
‘condition’ by Lord Denning MR in Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v Schuler AG [1972] 2 All ER 1173, 
[1972] 1 WLR 840. 
2
 
Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 437 at 453; Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI (Run-
off) Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 694, 66 ConLR 57: ‘It is clearly unnecessary that express words referring to 
the term as a condition precedent should be used for it may be inferred from the context and other 
provisions.’ However, there may be a practice in relation to particular types of contracts of expressly 
stating that terms are conditions precedent where that is intended, and the lack of any express indication 
may then be seen as indicating that a provision is not a condition precedent, particularly where other 
provisions of the contract are expressly so labelled (see eg Alfred McAlpine plc v BAI (Run-off) Ltd in the 
context of insurance). 
3
 
Head v Tattersall (1871) LR 7 Exch 7 (but see Stoljar ‘The Contractual Conception of Condition (1953) 69 
LQR 485, 506–511); New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] 
subsidiary should remain a member of the relevant group of companies and the plaintiff employee's 
option to purchase shares lapsed when the employing subsidiary was sold off by the group4. There may 
be an obligation not to prevent the occurrence of a condition precedent5, and similarly, an obligation may 
exist not to bring about the occurrence of a condition subsequent6, but none was found in that case. No 
express or implied term was found which obliged the group not to sell off the subsidiary. 
Preventing a contract coming into existence 
[3.28]  
A condition precedent may prevent the coming into being of a contract at all, rather than merely 
suspending its obligations. In Pym v Campbell1 the plaintiff wished to sell to the defendants a share in an 
invention of the plaintiff. A written document appeared to contain an agreement for the purchase. The 
plaintiff sought to rely upon it, but the defendant established that the parties had further agreed that the 
written document was only to be the agreement if the plaintiff's invention was approved of by a third party, 
who had not given his approval of the invention. Lord Campbell CJ said that: 
‘there never was any agreement entered into … it was explained to the plaintiff that the defendants 
did not intend the paper to be an agreement till Abernethie had been consulted … and that the paper 
was signed before he was seen only because it was not convenient to the defendants to remain. The 
plaintiff assented to this and received the writing on those terms.’ 
Suspending obligations 
[3.29]  
                                                                                                                                                                           
AC 1; Atlantic Maritime Co Inc v Gibbon [1954] 1 QB 88; Brown v Knowsley Borough Council [1986] IRLR 
102; Thompson v ASDA-MFI plc [1988] Ch 241; Gyllenhammar & Partners International Ltd v Sour 
Brodogradevna Industrija [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403. However, it may sometimes not be relevant whether 
the classification is of a condition subsequent or precedent: 
‘provided that the effect of the condition is clearly understood, its classification may be merely a matter of 
words … it probably does not matter in the present case whether the condition is described as 
“precedent” or “subsequent”, provided it is understood that its non-fulfilment did not prevent a binding 
contract coming into existence but did have the effect that the respondent was under no obligation to 
complete the sale unless the condition was fulfilled or waived. (Perri v Coolagatta Investments Ltd [1982] 
149 CLR 537, Gibbs CJ at 541.) See also Charles H Windschuegh Ltd v Alexander Pickering Ltd (1950) 
84 Ll L Rep 89, Devlin J at 92, Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 209, Lord 
Hutton, Lord Steyn.’ 
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Thompson v ASDA-MFI plc [1988] Ch 241. 
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See para 3.31. 
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Thompson v ASDA -MFI plc [1988] Ch 241, Scott J at 251; New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Société des 
Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1; Cheall v Association of Professional Executive Clerical and 
Computer Staff [1983] 2 AC 180. 
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(1856) 6 E & B 370; Marks v Board (1930) 46 TLR 424; Bentworth Finance Ltd v Lubert [1968] 1 QB 680; 
Astra Trust Ltd v Adams and Williams [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81; Albion Sugar Co Ltd v William Tankers 
Ltd, The John S Darbyshire [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457; Wishart v Citizens’ Advice Association [1990] ICR 
794. 
In contrast, a condition precedent may not prevent the coming into being of a contract but merely 
suspend the obligations1. In Marten v Whale2 two linked sales of a car and a piece of land were 
conditional on the approval of the title and restrictions on the land by the solicitor of the purchaser of the 
land. The condition was not fulfilled but, in the interim period, there had been a contract in existence and 
the sale of the car by the party to whom title to it had not passed, could nevertheless pass good title to it 
to a bona fide third party under what is now Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 25. The ‘seller’ had no title but, 
because the contract was in existence, albeit with its obligations suspended and subject to the condition 
precedent, there was an ‘agreement to sell’ the car, which was sufficient for the purposes of s 253. 
Distinguishing the two 
[3.30]  
When there is no contract in existence prior to the fulfilment of the condition precedent, it might be 
referred to as the situation in which there is a ‘condition precedent to the contract’, whilst the situation in 
which the contract exists but obligations are suspended could be distinguished by referring to it as a 
‘condition precedent to the performance’1. In whatever way the two categories are referred to, it has been 
said that there is not ‘a method by which it can readily be determined into which category a particular 
collection of words falls’2. However, it can be suggested that the question which should be focused on is 
whether the parties intended there to be any obligations prior to the fulfilment of the condition. If, for 
example and most commonly, it was intended that they should not be free to withdraw unless the 
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Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251; Smith v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694; United Dominion Trust 
(Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74; Smallman v Smallman [1972] Fam 25, 
Lord Denning MR at 31; Alan Estates Ltd v W G Stores Ltd [1982] Ch 511; Haslemere Estates v Baker 
[1982] 1 WLR 1109; Graham v Pitkin [1992] 1 WLR 403; Roadworks (1952) Ltd v Charman [1994] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 99 at 103; North Sea Energy Holdings NV v Petroleum Authority of Thailand [1997] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 418, Thomas J at 429. Gibbs CJ, Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537 at 
546: 
‘I consider that when the time has elapsed for performance of a condition which is not a promissory 
condition, but a condition precedent to the obligation to complete a contract of sale, either party, if not in 
default, can elect to treat the contract as at an end if the condition has not been fulfilled or waived.’ 
See also Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 209. 
2
 
[1917] 2 KB 480. 
3
 
The question of whether a condition suspends obligations or prevents the existence of a contract is most 
commonly important in determining if the parties were under any obligations prior to the fulfilment of the 
condition precedent – see para 3.31. In Albion Sugar Co Ltd v William Tankers Ltd, The John S 
Darbyshire [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457 at 464 the question was important in relation to the effectiveness of 
an arbitration clause. 
1
 
Albion Sugar Co Ltd v William Tankers Ltd, The John S Darbyshire [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457, Mocatta J 
at 464. 
2
 
Albion Sugar Co Ltd v William Tankers Ltd, The John S Darbyshire [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457, Mocatta J 
at 465. 
condition is not fulfilled by the appropriate time3, then there must be a contract in existence, but with its 
major obligations suspended4. 
The established phrase ‘subject to contract’ normally5 prevents a contract from coming into being prior to 
the execution of the formal document, because the parties still have to agree to that document6. The mere 
fact that one party pressed for the completion of formal documentation should not be taken as an 
indication that the agreement could not be legally binding until such documentation had been completed7. 
Documentation could be intended merely to be a record of what had already been agreed. The words 
‘subject to details’ ‘have a recognised meaning when used in the context of the sale of ships: there is no 
binding agreement until all the details of the proposed formal agreement have been agreed’ but the 
precise wording and the context must be looked at in each case8. In Lee Parker v Izzett (No 2)9 the 
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Lord Jenkins, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Cheng [1960] AC 
115: 
‘(i) where a conditional contract of sale fixes a date for the completion of the sale, then the condition must 
be fulfilled by that date; (ii) where a conditional contract of sale fixes no date for completion of the sale, 
then the condition must be fixed within a reasonable time; (iii) where a conditional contract of sale fixes 
(whether specifically or by reference) the date by which the condition must be fulfilled, then the date so 
fixed must be strictly adhered to…’ 
Smith v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694; Re Sandwell Park Colliery Co [1929] 1 Ch 277; Re Longlands Farm etc 
[1968] 3 All ER 552. But see 29 Equities Ltd v Bank Leumi (UK) Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1490. 
4
 
Ee v Kakar (1979) 40 P & CR 223. 
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But see Richards Properties Ltd v Corpn of Wardens of St Saviour's Parish, Southwark [1975] 3 All ER 
416; Alpenstow v Regalian Properties Ltd [1985] 2 All ER 545, [1985] 1 WLR 721. 
6
 
Devlin J, Windschuegh v Pickering & Co Ltd [1950] 84 Ll L Rep 89 at 92: 
‘The phrase “subject to contract” has of course, been construed as meaning that no contract is made, but 
I think that is purely because of the word “contract” in “subject to contract”. The phrase means “subject to 
the making of a contract hereafter” and, partly because it is becoming so usual now, has to be regarded 
as a term which signifies to anyone who uses it that the matter has not progressed beyond the stage of 
negotiations.’ 
See also Derby & Co Ltd v ITC Pension Trust Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 890 in relation to leases. Apart from the 
strength of the accepted formula, the mere fact that the parties envisage that their agreement is to be 
embodied in a formal document does not mean that it is not operative before that. ‘I think that the 
decisions settle that it is a question of construction whether the parties finally agreed to be bound by the 
terms, though they were subsequently to have a formal agreement drawn up’: Rossiter v Miller (1878) 3 
App Cas 1124, Lord Blackburn. Oxford v Provand (1868) LR 2 PC 135; Von Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v 
Alexander [1912] 1 Ch 284; Branca v Cobarro [1947] KB 854; Boots UK Ltd v Goldpine Estates Ltd (18 
June 2014) (unreported) (annotated at [2014] Comm Leases 2092–2093).. 
7
 
Williams v Jones (QBD, 25 February 2014) (unreported). 
8
 
Thoresen & Co (Bangkok) Ltd v Fathom Marine Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 167 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 935 at [35]–[36]. See also case note by DR Thomas, [2004] 10 JIML 240. 
agreement was ‘subject to the purchaser obtaining a satisfactory mortgage’. It was held that it would have 
been a condition precedent to the contract coming into existence but that, in any event it was void for 
uncertainty as ‘everything was at large, not only matters like rate of interest and ancillary obligations … 
but also those two most essential points – the amount of the loan and the terms of repayment’. That 
conclusion has not gone uncriticised10, it could simply be treated as a matter of whether the mortgage 
was satisfactory to the purchaser11. The phrase ‘subject to survey’ was considered in Marks v Board12 – 
when a contract for the purchase of a house was ‘subject to surveyor's report’ it was understood to mean 
that the prospective purchaser ‘would not decide whether he would take the house until he had seen what 
the surveyor said about it and that he reserved to himself the absolute right and undisputed right to say 
whether he liked the surveyor's report. In short there was no contract, because the buyer was not yet 
bound and, therefore the seller was not bound either’13. In Astra Trust Ltd v Adams and Williams14 the 
purchase of a yacht was made ‘subject to satisfactory survey’ and Marks v Board was followed, with 
Megaw J commenting15 that he ‘did not regard the word satisfactory as adding to or subtracting from what 
would have been the meaning and effect in law in the absence of that word’16. However, in Ee v Kakar17 
the condition that the agreement was ‘subject to survey of the property’ was held not to prevent the 
existence of a contract but merely to suspend the major obligations18, with it being indicated that the 
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[1972] 2 All ER 800, [1972] 1 WLR 775, Goulding J. 
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Furmston (1983) 3 Ox J Legal Studies 438. 
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In Janmohamed v Hassam (1976) 241 Estates Gazette 609 the condition was that the purchaser should 
obtain a mortgage ‘satisfactory to himself’ within one month. Having considered Lee Parker v Izzett, 
Slade LJ regarded it as making all the difference that the satisfaction was expressed to be the 
purchaser's satisfaction. However, this could be considered to be implicit in the contingency ‘subject to 
satisfactory mortgage’, or even ‘subject to mortgage’ – note the views of Rowlatt J in Marks v Board. 
Contingency sales subject to obtaining satisfactory finance have not been seen as too uncertain in all 
jurisdictions: Barber v Crickett [1958] NZLR 1057; Martin v Macarthur [1963] NZLR 403; Scott v Rania 
[1966] NZLR 527; Meehan v Jones (1982) 56 AJLR 813. See Furmston ‘Subject to Finance’ (1983) 3 Ox 
J Legal Studies 438. 
12
 
(1930) 46 TLR 424. 
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[1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81. See also Albion Sugar Co Ltd v William Tankers Ltd, The John S Darbyshire 
[1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457 (time charterparty – ‘subject to satisfactory completion of two trial voyages); 
Wishart v Citizens Advice Association [1990] ICR 794 (employment – ‘subject to satisfactory references’). 
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[1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81 at 86. 
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See also John Howard and Co (Northern) Ltd v J P Knight Ltd [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 364, Megaw J. 
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(1979) 40 P & CR 223. 
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purchaser would be bound to obtain such a report and that the decision on it should be made bona fide19. 
In Astra Trust v Adams20, having decided that there was no contract prior to the fulfilment of the condition, 
Megaw J considered what the position would have been had a contract been in existence but with its 
operation suspended. Under those circumstances he took the view that there would be an obligation to 
use all reasonable diligence to have a survey carried out by a competent surveyor. In addition, he did not 
think that the satisfactoriness of the report could be subjected to an objective test but he did think that, 
under those circumstances, any dissatisfaction with it would have to be bona fide21. 
Subsidiary obligations 
[3.31]  
It has been indicated that where there is a contract in existence prior to the satisfaction of the condition 
precedent, there may be subsidiary obligations on one or both parties1. This may simply be an obligation 
not to withdraw2 prior to the point at which the contingency had to be fulfilled3, or there may be obligations 
relating to the fulfilment of the contingency. Whether these obligations exist and, if they do, their extent, 
will depend upon the construction of the agreement. An obligation may be found simply not to prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
This view was also taken in Varverakis v Compagnie Navegacion Artico SA, The Merak [1976] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 250 in relation to the survey of a vessel, but in that case, there were very specific express terms 
incorporated into the agreement which clearly dealt with the survey. 
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Walton J at 230: 
‘I can see no reason why, although of course retaining the right to be satisfied with any kind of report, a 
purchaser should not be bound if presented with a report which is basically satisfactory to have to act 
bona fide, … Although the two tests are quite clearly not the same, if a reasonable man would be satisfied 
with the report I would have thought that a purchaser would experience some difficulty in persuading a 
court that his failure to proceed was bona fide.’ 
20
 
[1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81. 
21
 
[1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81 at 87; Hudson v Buck (1877) 7 Ch D 683; Caney v Leith [1937] 2 All ER 532. 
1
 
Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251; Smith v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694; Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Cheng 
[1960] AC 115; Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior [1969] 1 WLR 1077; United Dominion Trust (Commercial) 
Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 104, [1968] 1 WLR 74; Alan Estates Ltd v W G Stores 
Ltd [1982] Ch 511; Haslemere Estates v Baker [1982] 3 All ER 525, [1982] 1 WLR 1109. See also 
Felixstowe Dock and Rly Co v British Transport Docks Board [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 656; Total Gas 
Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 209. 
2
 
Smith v Butler [1900] 1 QB 694; Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Cheng [1960] AC 115; Alan Estates Ltd v W 
G Stores Ltd [1982] Ch 511, Lord Denning MR at 520: 
‘If it is handed over to another unconditionally it is handed over as a deed. If it is handed over to another 
conditionally, it is delivered as an escrow. It only becomes a deed when the conditions are fulfilled… The 
question in this case is: what is the effect of an escrow before the conditions are fulfilled? One thing is 
clear. Whilst the conditions are in suspense, the maker of the escrow cannot recall it … He is bound to 
adhere to the grant for a reasonable time to see whether the conditions are fulfilled.’ 
3
 
See para 3.30, note 9. 
condition being fulfilled4, or where the contingency implies a test which requires the co-operation of both 
parties, an obligation to do what is necessary to facilitate it5, or to appoint the third party whose approval 
is required6, or, where the condition relates to the issuing of a licence, the granting of planning 
permission, or reaching an agreement with a third party, one party may be under an obligation to use 
reasonable efforts to obtain that licence7 or permission8 or agreement9. 
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Rede v Farr (1817) 6 M & S 121 at 124; Inchbald v Western Neilgherry Coffee, Tea and Cinchona 
Plantation Co Ltd (1864) 17 CBNS 733; Mona Oil Equipment and Supply Co Ltd v Rhodesia Rlys Ltd 
[1949] 2 All ER 1014; Bournemouth and Boscombe Athletic Football Club v Manchester United Football 
Club (1980) Times, 22 May. See also Thompson v ASDA-MFI plc [1988] Ch 241, Scott J at 251; New 
Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1; Cheall v Association 
of Professional Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff [1983] 2 AC 180; Little v Courage [1995] CLC 164, 
Millett LJ at 168; Grant v Cigman [1996] 2 BCLC 24. There is normally no requirement that a principal 
should not prevent the agent from earning his commission – Rhodes v Forward (1876) 1 App Cas 256; L 
French & Co Ltd v Leeston Shipping Co Ltd [1922] 1 AC 451; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] 1 
All ER 33. But see Turner v Goldsmith [1891] 1 QB 544. Where the agent's commission is dependent 
upon the entering into and performance of a contract with a third party, by the principal, the principal may 
be found to have undertaken not to deprive the agent of commission by breaching that contract: Alpha 
Trading Ltd v Dunnshaw-Patten [1981] QB 290; George Moundreas & Co SA v Navimpex Centrale 
Navala [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 515; The Energy Progress [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 355. 
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Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 – Condition precedent necessitated the trial of A's machine on B's 
site – Lord Blackburn (at 263): 
‘I think I may safely say as a general rule, that where in a written contract it appears that both parties 
have agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectively be done unless both concur in doing 
it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for 
the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect.’ 
See too Renewal Leeds Ltd v Lowry Properties Ltd [2010] EWHC 2902 (Ch). There, the overage clause 
was triggered by the final sale of a completed house. The developers refused to complete the sale of the 
final few units and claimed that they were permitted to do so under the contract. The court held that there 
was an implied term requiring the developer to complete and sell all the houses as soon as reasonably 
practicable and not to sterilise the last house so as to prevent the payment of overage. 
6
 
In Marten v Whale [1917] 2 KB 480 it was said that there was ‘an implied provision that the [relevant 
party] should appoint a solicitor and consult him in good faith’. 
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Re Anglo-Russian Merchant Traders and John Batt & Co (London) Ltd [1917] 2 KB 679; H O Brandt & Co 
v H N Morris & Co [1917] 2 KB 784; Brauer & Co (Great Britain) Ltd v James Clark (Brush Materials) Ltd 
[1952] 2 All ER 497; A V Pound & Co v M W Hardy & Co [1956] AC 588; Coloniale Import-Export v 
Loumidis & Sons [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 560; Overseas Buyers Ltd v Granadex SA [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
608. 
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Re Longlands Farm etc v Superior Developments [1968] 3 All ER 552; Hargeaves Transport Ltd v Lynch 
[1969] 1 All ER 455, [1969] 1 WLR 215; Richard West & Partners (Inverness) Ltd v Dick [1969] 2 Ch 424; 
Tesco Stores v Gibson (1970) 214 Estates Gazette 835; Fisher v Toumazos [1991] 2 EGLR 204. See 
also Smallman v Smallman [1972] Fam 25 (‘subject to approval of court’). 
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Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 209. 
In this connection, an element of cooperation and fair dealing is implied in the contractual relationship. 
There is thus an implied term to the extent that where the performance of the condition precedent is 
subject to the approval or satisfaction of the other party, that other party must not make his decision 
capriciously, perversely, irrationally or arbitrarily. In Socimer Bank v Standard Bank10 Rix LJ summarised 
the implication to be made as follows: 
‘It is plain from these authorities that a decision-maker's discretion will be limited, as a matter of 
necessary implication, by concepts of honesty, good faith, and genuineness, and the need for the 
absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity and irrationality. The concern is that the 
discretion should not be abused.’11  
As far as Rix LJ was concerned, implications of good faith and rationality, and of lack of arbitrariness or 
perversity, were ‘standard’, and ‘they represent the very essence of business, and other, relationships’.12 
On occasion one party may even have undertaken to obtain the licence or permission. The condition will 
then be promissory13 and there will be a breach in failing to obtain what was required14. 
Waiving the condition precedent 
[3.32]  
The parties may waive a condition precedent so that, for example, an agreement, ‘subject to contract’, 
becomes legally binding1. Where the condition precedent is for the benefit of one party rather than both, 
that party can waive it and the contract will become enforceable without the occurrence of the condition2. 
In relation to a contract the operation of which was suspended on the basis of the condition that the sale 
of the house was ‘subject to survey of the property’, the condition was held to be simply for the benefit of 
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Wood Preservation v Prior [1969] 1 All ER 364, [1969] 1 WLR 1077; Ee v Kakar (1979) 40 P & CR 223; 
Graham v Pitkin [1992] 2 All ER 235; Heron Garage Properties v Moss [1974] 1 All ER 421. 
the purchaser. He could waive its fulfilment and thereby make the contract operative without its 
fulfilment3. One party will not be able to waive a condition which was for the benefit of both. Where there 
was an agreement for the sale of land subject to the purchaser obtaining planning permission for the use 
of the land as a filling station, the condition could not be waived by the purchaser. The vendor was 
retaining adjoining land to build a car showroom. The condition was for the benefit of both parties. A filling 
station was viewed as a complementary business to that intended by the vendor4. 
Contingent promissory conditions 
[3.33]  
In the context of contingent promissory conditions, the contrast is between conditions precedent and 
concurrent and also independent conditions1. In this context, the contingent conditions indicate a 
relationship between the timing of the performance of the parties’ obligations. For example, the fulfilment 
by A of an obligation under the contract which A has made with B may be a condition precedent to B's 
performance of a particular obligation and such a condition precedent means that there is less risk in the 
contract for B than for A. B need not be left in the situation where he, or she, has performed the major 
obligations of the contract whilst A refuses to do so. The same, of course, does not apply to A. 
Concurrent conditions provide some protection for both parties as each party must be at least willing to 
undertake his, or her, performance to claim that the other party should do so. The Sale of Goods Act 
1979, s 28 provides an example. In the absence of contrary intention, it makes the seller's obligation to 
deliver and the buyer's obligation to pay concurrent conditions. When conditions are independent, they 
are not linked to the other party's performance. A landlord's obligations to repair and a tenant's to pay rent 
are normally independent2. 
In many situations, it will be established whether particular obligations are conditional, concurrent, or 
independent. In contracts of employment, for example, it is usual for the work to precede the obligation to 
pay. But the ‘question always must be one of the intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument 
as a whole’3. Where the performances could occur at the same time and the situation is unclear, the 
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Kingston v Preston (1773) Lofft 194, Lord Mansfield said that there were three kinds of covenant: 
‘(1) such as are called mutual and independent, where either party may recover damages from the 
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plaintiff; 
(2) covenants which are conditions and dependant, in which the performance of one depends on 
the prior performance of another, and, therefore until this prior condition is performed, the 
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Taylor v Webb [1937] 2 KB 283. 
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security thereby provided for both parties may mean that the courts should lean in favour of finding 
concurrent conditions4, and against finding independent ones. However, there may be factors indicating 
that the obligations were intended to be independent. Where there was a charterparty with one document 
stating how the hire was to be determined and a separate ‘sideletter’ which provided for payment back of 
part of those charges in a certain situation, it was concluded that ‘the very fact that they were put into 
separate documents, with the charter appearing to be complete in itself, points to the conclusion that the 
respective obligations under them were intended to be independent and not interdependent’5. Similarly, 
circumstances might make it clear that one party must perform an obligation if the other is to be able to do 
so, and that might indicate that the first party's obligation should be regarded as a condition precedent to 
that of the other. 
The term ‘promissory condition’, has been used above to indicate contingency and the order of 
performance. However, the label ‘condition’ may also be applied to a contractual obligation to contrast its 
status with that of a warranty or an innominate term. When contrasted with warranties and innominate 
terms the label ‘condition’ is applied to a term to indicate the legal consequences of the breach, in the 
sense of whether the injured party has a right to terminate the contract because of the breach. The 
classification of a term as a contingent promissory condition relates to the order of performance. 
Conditions, when contrasted with warranties and innominate terms, relate to the conformity of the 
performance rendered with that promised6. 
Conditions, warranties and innominate terms 
Types of term 
[3.34]  
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Treitel ‘“Conditions” and “Conditions Precedent”’ (1990) 106 LQR 185. Bayerische Vereinsbank v 
National Bank of Pakistan [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 59, Mance J at 65: 
‘It is however necessary to remember that the phrase “condition precedent” is capable of referring to two 
different things (a) a provision non-compliance with which may simply mean that the other party has no 
obligation to perform a particular term unless and until compliance takes place (b) that class of condition 
… any breaches of which will discharge the other party from, all further obligation to perform under a 
contract. The two things may of course inter-relate upon the true construction of a particular contract. To 
take one possible example, a condition precedent in the former sense may, if not performed within a 
specified time or within a frustrating time, entitle the other party to treat itself as discharged.’ 
See also Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Karander Maritime Co Inc [1996] CLC 749, Mance J at 754: 
‘The presentation of documents complying with such a contract is a pre-condition of the buyer's obligation 
to accept the documents. But rejection of non-complying documents does not terminate any further 
obligation or right to perform on either side. The seller may represent complying documents, within the 
contractually appointed period. Only if the seller fails to present complying documents by the conclusion 
of the contract may the buyer treat himself as discharged from further performance and claim damages 
for non-delivery.’ 
The modern usage of the classification of terms1 as ‘conditions’, ‘warranties’ and ‘intermediate or 
innominate terms’2 categorises them according to the consequences which follow their breach3. Basically, 
when a condition is breached the injured party has the right to sue for damages and also to rescind the 
contract. A breach of warranty gives rise to the right to sue for damages. When an innominate term is 
breached the legal consequences of the breach depend upon its factual consequences, ie there is a right 
to rescind the contract, in addition to suing for damages, if the breach of an innominate term is such as to 
deprive the injured party of substantially all the benefit which he, or she, was intended to derive from the 
contract4. 
This usage of condition and warranty was only settled with the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. 
Section 11(1)(b) defined a condition as a term ‘the breach of which may give rise to a right to treat a 
contract as repudiated’ and a warranty as a term ‘the breach of which may give rise to a claim for 
damages but not to a right to reject the goods’. It was also stated that a warranty is ‘collateral to the main 
purpose of the contract’5. Under the influence of that Act, with its reference to only two types of term, it 
was largely thought that a twofold division was all that was required6. However, in Hong Kong Fir 
Shipping Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd7 the court was faced with a breach of a term that the ship 
should be ‘seaworthy’, which it was particularly inappropriate to simply categorise as a condition or a 
warranty because it could be breached in many different ways, some serious and some trivial, and 
Diplock LJ said8: 
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‘There are however many contractual undertakings of a more complex character which cannot be 
categorised as being “conditions” or “warranties” … Of such undertakings all that can be 
predicated is that some breaches will and others will not give rise to an event which will deprive 
the party not in default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should 
obtain from the contract; and the legal consequences of a breach of such an undertaking … depend 
upon the nature of the event to which the breach gives rise and do not follow automatically from a 
prior classification of the undertaking as a “condition” or a “warranty”.’ 
It has been said that ‘the effect of Hong King Fir was to liberate the common law from the consequences 
of a temporary aberration’9. It was shown that a categorisation into conditions or warranties was 
insufficient and the threefold10 classification came to be recognised. To an extent, that threefold 
classification impacts upon contracts for the sale of goods. The courts have recognised that even in such 
contracts, terms not categorised by statute as conditions or warranties, can be innominate terms11. 
Additionally, however, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 has now been amended12. It still does not classify any 
terms as innominate but, under certain circumstances, it now deems breaches of the terms implied by ss 
13–1513, which are otherwise conditions, to be warranties, preventing the rejection of the goods for the 
breach in question. Such deemed classification occurs where the buyer does not ‘deal as consumer’14, 
and the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the goods. The onus is on the seller in 
relation to the question of whether the buyer deals as consumer as well as in relation to whether the 
breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the goods because of it. The statutory test has 
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a different emphasis to that of the common law innominate term15, but the basic idea is the same. The 
right to reject is linked to the seriousness of the breach. 
As regards consumer contracts, the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, which is making its way through 
Parliament at the time of writing, does not classify terms. When the Bill becomes law, large parts of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982) will cease to apply to 
consumer sales. The current provisions on quality, description, title, quantity, time and sample will all be 
subsumed into the new law. The new law will encompass the sale of goods, supply of services and sale 
of digitised goods, to the consumer. Although the Bill does not classify terms, it provides for specific 
remedies available to the consumer in the event of a breach16. Those remedies include the right to partial 
or complete rejection of the goods17, to ask for repairs or replacement18, a reduction in price19, damages 
and specific performance20. Thus, the element of uncertainty in relation to remedies for consumers should 
be reduced considerably, relatively speaking. 
It should be noted that the classification of terms as conditions, warranties and innominate terms also 
applies to implied terms21. 
The classification 
[3.35]  
The parties may expressly classify a term as a condition, warranty or innominate term but if they do not it 
is a matter of construing the contract1 and the basic test to be applied is that of the intention of the parties. 
In Bentsen v Taylor, Sons & Co (No 2)2. Bowen LJ said3: 
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Wuhan Ocean Economic & Technical Cooperation Co Ltd v Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft Hansa Murcia mbH 
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Bettini v Gye (1876) 1 QBD 183; Behn v Burness (1863) 3 B & S 751, Williams J at 755: 
‘The court must be influenced in … construction, not only by the language of the instrument, but also by 
the circumstances under which and purposes for which, the charterparty was entered into.’ 
2
 
[1893] 2 QB 274. 
‘There is no way of deciding that question except by looking at the contract in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, and then making up one's mind whether the intention of the parties, as 
gathered from the instrument itself, will best be carried out by treating the promise as a warranty 
sounding only in damages, or as a condition precedent by the failure to perform which the other 
party is relieved of his liability.’ 
Although Bowen LJ only referred to conditions4 and warranties, the basic test still applies even after the 
recognition of the third type of term and this was made clear by the House of Lords in Bunge Corpn v 
Tradax SA5, but obviously the possibility of that third type of classification must be added. In practical 
terms, the question will be whether the term in question was a condition or an innominate term, but the 
parties may ‘make it plain’ that a term is intended as a warranty6. In the past, if the term was a standard 
one in a particular type of contract and it had an established classification, it would normally have been 
taken to have been intended to be classified accordingly7. Any such use of precedent in the construction 
of the contract must now, however, be viewed in the light of the evolution in construction generally which 
was recognised in the Investors Compensation Scheme case8. 
Some emphasis should be placed on the ‘time frame’ of the assessment of the classification of a term. It 
is that of the making of the contract and this means, inter alia, that the actual breach and its 
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consequences are not relevant9, although the potential breaches, as viewed at that time frame, may be 
taken into account. In Bentsen v Taylor, Sons & Co (No 2), Bowen LJ said10: 
‘one of the first things you would look to is to what extent the accuracy of the statement – the truth 
of what is promised – would be likely to effect the substance and foundation of the adventure 
which the contract is intended to carry out … it may well be that such a test can only be applied 
after getting the jury to say what the effect of a breach of such a condition would be on the 
substance and foundation of the adventure; not the effect of the breach which has in fact taken 
place, but the effect likely to be produced on the foundation of the adventure by any such breach of 
that portion of the contract.’ 
The actual breach, and its consequences, only become relevant if a term is classified as innominate and, 
in that case, those factors will be looked at in considering whether the injured party could rescind the 
contract on the basis of the breach11. 
The classification has to take place against the background of a tension between certainty and flexibility. 
If a term is a condition, then, at least once that classification is established, there is the benefit of 
certainty12 – the right to rescind exists in relation to any breach and the injured party need give no 
consideration to whether the breach is serious enough to justify taking that step13. So, for example, in 
deciding that the place of shipment was a condition, it was said14: 
‘if the place of shipment were only an innominate term, disputes would frequently arise as to the 
buyer's right to reject a tender of goods at a port other than that contracted for. There would be an 
issue whether it was so far from, or had such different characteristics from the port of delivery 
identified in the contract as to deprive the buyer of substantially the whole benefit of the sale 
contract. The uncertainty to which such disputes would give rise and the certainty which is 
achieved if the place of shipment is a condition of the contract is clearly a highly relevant 
consideration in deciding how to classify a term.’ 
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However, the disadvantage of the classification of a term as a condition is that the injured party can 
rescind no matter how trivial the breach15 and seize the opportunity to rescind for a trivial breach to 
escape from what has become a bad bargain16. The innominate term classification has the disadvantage 
of uncertainty and the advantage of flexibility, providing the significant right to rescind only when the 
breach is also significant. Against that background, the flexibility of the classification, means that the court 
‘leans in favour of’ construing terms as innominate17. In Hansa Nord18 Roskill LJ said: 
‘In my view a court should not be over ready, unless required by a statute or authority to do so, to 
construe a term in a contract as a ‘condition’ any breach of which gives rise to a right to reject … In 
principle contracts are made to be performed and not to be avoided according to the whims of 
market fluctuations and where there is a free choice between two possible constructions I think the 
court should tend to prefer the construction which will ensure performance and not encourage 
avoidance of contractual obligations.’ 
However, whatever the merits of the classification, not all terms are to be construed as innominate. A 
balanced approach is required, and in Bunge Corpn v Tradax Export SA19, Lord Roskill made that clear20: 
‘While recognising the modern approach and not being over-ready to construe terms as conditions 
unless the contract clearly requires the court so to do, none the less the basic principles of 
construction for determining whether or not a particular term is a condition remain as before, 
always bearing in mind on the one hand the need for certainty and on the other the desirability of 
not, when legitimate, allowing rescission where the breach complained of is highly technical and 
where damages would clearly be an adequate remedy.’ 
In suitable cases, terms will be construed as conditions: 
‘It remains true, as Lord Roskill said in Cehave NV v Bremer Handelgesellschaft mbH, The Hansa 
Nord that the courts should not be too ready to interpret contractual clauses as conditions. And I 
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have myself commended and continue to commend, the greater flexibility in the law of contracts to 
which Hong Kong Fir  points the way … But I do not doubt that in suitable cases, the courts should 
not be reluctant, if the intention of the parties as shown by the contract so indicates, to hold that an 
obligation has the force of a condition and that indeed they should usually do so in the case of time 
clauses in mercantile contracts.’21  
Express classification 
[3.36]  
It has been said that the ‘parties may think some matter apparently of very little importance, essential, 
and if they sufficiently express an intention to make the literal fulfilment of such a thing a condition … it 
will be one’1. The parties may expressly classify a term for themselves. However, it must be borne in mind 
that there are numerous meanings of the word condition and mere use of that word may not lead a court 
to conclude that it is being used in the technical sense considered here2. In Schuler A G v Wickman 
Machine Tool Sales Ltd3 a German manufacturing company made an agreement with Wickman for 
Wickman to have the sole right to sell Schuler's goods in the UK for about four years. The agreement 
contained provisions relating to the promotion of Schuler's goods by Wickman. Clause 7 stated that it was 
a ‘condition’ that one of two named representatives of Wickman should visit six named UK automobile 
manufacturers each week. Wickman failed to carry out all of the specified visits and Schuler argued that 
cl 7 was expressly made a condition of the contract and, as such, there was a right to terminate the 
contract for any breach of it no matter how trivial. The House of Lords, with Lord Wilberforce dissenting, 
refused to accept that argument. Lord Reid said: 
‘no doubt some words used by lawyers do have a rigid and inflexible meaning. But we must 
remember that we are seeking to discover intention as disclosed by the contract as a whole. Use of 
the word “condition” is an indication – even a strong indication – of such intention but by no means 
conclusive.’ 
The majority saw the argument that it was intended that Schuler should be able to rescind the contract if 
Wickman missed even one visit as producing too unreasonable a result to be accepted without clearer 
words: 
‘The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant 
consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have 
intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they should make that intention 
abundantly clear.’4  
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3
 
[1973] 2 All ER 39. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Beneficial Finance Corpn Ltd (1982) 
44 ALR 241. 
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Lord Reid at 45. But Lord Wilberforce took a very different view (at 55): 
‘to call the clause arbitrary, capricious, or fantastic, or to introduce as a test of its validity the ubiquitous 
reasonable man … is to assume, contrary to the evidence, that both parties to this contract adopted a 
Similarly, where the charterparty provided ‘on any breach of this charterparty the owners shall be at 
liberty to withdraw the vessel’ the specified right to withdraw was construed as limited to breaches of 
conditions and fundamental breaches of innominate terms. An interpretation which would have allowed 
withdrawal even for trivial breaches of terms which were not conditions was rejected as ‘wholly 
unreasonable, totally uncommercial and in total contradiction of the whole purpose of the’ charter5. 
However, some emphasis should be placed upon the decision in Lombard North Central plc v 
Butterworth6 where the court felt constrained to accept that the use of the time-honoured phrase that time 
was ‘of the essence’ meant that the term was a condition and that any breach of it justified rescission, 
despite the fact that that allowed the injured party to achieve much the same result as under another 
clause which was ineffective as a penalty clause7. 
On the other hand, where the contract explicitly states that a particular obligation is a condition of the 
contract, the defaulting party may not rely on a general clause elsewhere in the contract to qualify the 
import of the express classification. In Mt Højgaard a/s v E.on Climate and Renewables UK Robin Rigg 
East Limited, E.on Climate and Renewables UK Robin Rigg West Limited8 where the contract made it a 
condition that the wind turbine to be supplied must strictly conform to international standards, it was no 
defence for the defendants to argue that elsewhere in the contract was a general clause providing for due 
diligence (which they claimed to have complied with). 
Standard classifications 
[3.37]  
In the past if the term is a standard one in a particular type of contract and it has an established 
classification, it would normally have been taken to have been intended to be classified accordingly1. So, 
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standard on the parties if their words indicate, as they plainly do, the latter.’ 
And see A/S Awilco v Fulvia SpA, The Chikuma [1981] 1 All ER 652 at 658–659. 
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Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederiarna AB [1985] AC 191. See also Attica Sea Carriers Corpn 
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Nicholls LJ viewed the result with ‘considerable dissatisfaction’ but he also said: 
‘it was a matter of importance to the plaintiffs that the agreed instalments should be paid, and should be 
paid promptly. I can see no reason to doubt that the interest charges were calculated by reference to the 
agreed hire instalment dates, on the footing that the instalments would be paid regularly and with 
reasonable promptness. To the plaintiffs a hirer who is repeatedly and significantly late with his payments 
and who has to be chased with reminders and warnings, time after time, is an unattractive hirer whose 
transaction may eventually become an unprofitable one.’ 
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[2014] EWHC 1088 (TCC). 
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Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH, The Mihalis Angelos [1971] 1 QB 164, 
Megaw LJ: 
for example, it has been noted that ‘terms relating to time of performance by sellers of their obligations 
under cif contracts have, in general been held to be conditions. That was decided so far as a term relating 
to time of shipment was concerned in Bowes v Shand2; and again so far as a term relating to notice of 
appropriation is concerned in Reuter v Sala3. The reason is no doubt the need for certainty in commercial 
matters … It is difficult to see why a term in a cif contract relating to time for the sellers to tender 
documents should not equally … be regarded as a condition’4. Similarly, the port of shipment in a cif 
contract has been classified as a condition5. The non-payment of deposits have been seen as breaches 
of condition6 and ‘usually a term requiring a letter of credit to be opened by a specified date should be 
regarded as a condition’7. It would also seem that the time of completion of sales of shares has generally 
been viewed as a condition as ‘shares continually vary in price from day to day’8. However, any such 
references to previous decisions must now be viewed in the light of the treatment of precedent, and of 
standard terms, in relation to construction since the recognition of the general evolution of contractual 
construction in the Investors Compensation Scheme case9. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
‘One of the important elements of the law is predictability. At any rate in commercial law, there are 
obvious and substantial advantages in having, where possible, a firm and definite rule for a particular 
class of legal relationship; for example, as here the legal categorisation of a particular definable type of 
contractual clause in common use.’ 
Tradax Internacional SA v Goldschmidt SA [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 604, Slynn J at 612; Nichimen Corpn v 
Gatoil Overseas Inc [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 46, Woolf LJ at 55. 
This should perhaps be applied against the background of the approach to interpretation generally 
following Lord Hoffmann's statement of principle in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich 
Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114 (see para 3.41 below) and in particular, the treatment of past 
decisions on the interpretation of terms and of standard terms (see para 3.43 below). 
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(1877) 2 App Cas 455. 
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(1879) 4 CPD 239. 
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Toepfer v Lenersan-Poortman NV [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 143, Brandon LJ. 
5
 
Petrotrade Inc v Stinnes Handel GmbH [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 142, Colman J at 150, ‘commercial lawyers 
have for years assumed that such a term is a condition’. 
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Millichamp v Jones[1983] 1 All ER 267, [1982] 1 WLR 1422 (land); Damon Compania Naviera SA v 
Hapag Lloyd International SA [1985] 1 All ER 475, [1985] 1 WLR 435 (ships). 
7
 
Nichimen Corpn v Gatoil Overseas Inc [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 46, Woolf LJ at 55. 
8
 
Re Schwabacher, Stern v Schwabwacher (1907) 98 LT 127, Parker J at 129; Hare v Nicoll [1966] 2 QB 
130 at 147, Winn LJ. However some caution must be exercised – ‘a property company may be different 
from a trading company, and a company in one line of business may be different from a company in 
another less dynamic market’: Grant v Cigman [1996] 2 BCLC 24. 
9
 
See para 3.43 below. 
Making the classification in general 
[3.38]  
However, more generally, and in practical terms, it has been noted that the basic impetus is towards the 
labelling of terms as innominate rather than as conditions because of the flexibility provided by that 
classification, but in ‘suitable cases’ conditions will be found1. It is a factor pointing to the term being 
classified as innominate that not all breaches of it will substantially deprive the injured party of all the 
benefit he, or she, was intended to obtain under the contract2, but that can be outweighed by other 
factors3, such as the interdependence of the obligation with others or with other contracts4. In general the 
interdependence of the obligation with others5 or with other contracts6 is indicative that the term is a 
condition – for example, where the performance of one party's obligation, such as timely notification of 
expected readiness to load, was necessary for the other party to be able, themselves, to comply with a 
condition of the contract, such as nomination of a loading port and ensuring the goods would be ready to 
be shipped at the appointed time7, or where, for example, ‘breach of the owner's obligation could well 
cause the charterers to be in breach of a condition of a contract with others’8. 
Terms as to quality will often be innominate terms9, but that may not be the case where the quality is 
specified with greater precision than is usual, such as where there was a statement not merely of a fibre 
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see ERG Petroli SpA v Vitol SA, The Ballenita [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 455. 
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Toepfer v Lenersan-Poortman NV [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 143; Greenwich Marine Inc v Federal Commerce 
& Navigation Co Ltd, The Mavro Vetranic [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 580; Petrotrade Inc v Stinnes Handel 
GmbH [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 142. 
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Bunge Corpn v Tradax SA [1981] 2 All ER 513, [1981] 1 WLR 711. 
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Greenwich Marine Inc v Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd, The Mavro Vetranic [1985] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 580. 
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Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, The Hansa Nord [1976] QB 44; Total International Ltd v 
Addax BV [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 333, Waller J at 341; Tradax Internacional SA v Goldschmidt SA [1977] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 604, Slynn J at 612. But see Petrotrade Inc v Stinnes Handel GmbH [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
percentage in the goods but of a maximum percentage10. In general, the importance of the term to the 
contract is a very significant indicator of whether it is apt to classify it as a condition11. It has been said 
that ‘the classification of an obligation as a condition or an innominate term is largely determined by its 
practical importance in the scheme of the contract’12. A term that the supplier of a car under a conditional 
sale agreement had the right to sell it was ‘fundamental’ to the contract and a condition13. As has been 
indicated, the need for certainty is indicative of the categorisation of a term as a condition14 and, in 
particular, it has been indicated that this means that time clauses in mercantile contracts will generally be 
conditions15 – traditionally, in relation to time clauses, it is not asked whether the term is a condition but 
whether ‘time is of the essence’ of the contract, but there is no additional significance in this 
terminology16. The impetus to classify time clauses in mercantile contracts as conditions may be 
strengthened by a phrase such as ‘at latest’17. But not all time clauses in mercantile contracts will be 
categorised as conditions18. The relative importance of the clause may indicate that it would be 
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the agreement operate …’. 
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Sa, The Ballenita [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 455. 
17
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See Valilas v Januzaj [2014] EWCA Civ 436 where the High Court reiterated the position that unless 
there is an express or implied term that time of payment shall be a condition, it will usually be treated only 
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inappropriate to classify the term as a condition, as where a time clause in relation to the giving of a 
guarantee was not classified as a condition because it did not relate to the main transaction and it was 
made clear that a more significant time clause was not to be regarded as a condition19. Similarly, a 
charterer's failure to provide timely notice narrowing a laycan spread was not seen as a breach of 
condition when the performance was not important to the owners in relation to whose obligations there 
was not a ‘natural interdependence’ with the notice20. In addition, even against the background of the 
general impetus, a clause as to the time of delivery of a ship at the end of a charter was categorised as 
an innominate term, as it was not regarded as sufficiently vital to require classification as a condition21. A 
time requirement in relation to notification of a terminal acceptance was held to be innominate on the 
basis that the number of parties involved would make the contract unworkable if it was a condition 
requiring strict compliance, but doubts were cast on this on appeal22, and the argument that trade practice 
was more relaxed and that compliance with strict punctuality posed difficulties in the sugar trade, did not 
prevent the classification, as a condition, of a term as to the time of loading of a cargo of sugar23. If a time 
clause is imprecise then that may indicate that the term does not require the certainty of the condition 
classification, as with the phrase ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’24. Similarly, a clause which stated 
that the sellers were to advise the buyers ‘without delay’ if shipment had become impossible for any one 
of a number of stated reasons25, was categorised as innominate. ‘The generality of the words ‘without 
delay’ [told] against the buyer's contention [that the term was a condition]; if a condition was intended a 
definite time limit would be more likely to be set’26. However, trade practice may give apparently indefinite 
time requirements a more precise meaning, making classification as a condition not inappropriate. In 
addition, the apparent imprecision of the statement ‘expected ready to load’ or as to the ‘expected’ arrival 
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[2003] EWCA Civ 1031, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 640, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 635 at [34]. 
time of a ship, has not prevented such terms becoming established as conditions27. Commenting on the 
lack of precision in these terms, it was said28: 
‘It does not follow … that the terms as to the expected time of arrival of the vessel and such like are 
of no importance to the charterers and ought not to be regarded as conditions. Indeed the very fact 
that the fortunes of a sea voyage may result in delay after the estimate has been given may make it 
the more important that the estimate be given honestly and on reasonable grounds.’ 
A further factor to be considered in the classification of terms was indicated in Bunge v Tradax29 in 
distinguishing the time clause in that case from the ‘seaworthiness’ clause in Hong Kong Fir. It was 
pointed out that30: 
‘the breaches which might occur of the [seaworthiness clause are] various. They might be 
extremely trivial, the omission of a nail; they might be extremely grave, a serious defect in the hull 
or in the machinery.’ 
It was considered that this made the term as to seaworthiness one in which it was appropriate for the 
legal consequences of the breach to depend upon the factual consequences31, and a time clause was 
viewed as ‘totally different in character’ – ‘As to such a clause there is only one kind of breach possible, 
namely to be late’. However, whilst it may be that a clause like that in Hong Kong Fir, which can be 
breached in many different ways, will usually be appropriately classified as an innominate term32, it does 
not follow that a term which can only be breached in one way will normally be classified as a condition or 
a warranty. Even though a term may only be breached in one way, such as by being late, it may still be 
capable of being breached to different degrees and there may be variations in the seriousness of the 
consequences which flow from any breach. 
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Federal Commerce & Navigation v Molena Alpha [1979] AC 757, Lord Wilberforce at 778. Compagnie 
General Maritime v Diaken Spirit SA, The Ymnos [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 574, Robert Goff J at 583: 
‘When I turn to consider the so-called contract guarantee clause in the present case, I am satisfied that it 
cannot properly be classified as a condition … the function of the … clause is to provide an undertaking 
by the owners that such containers can be loaded and presumably discharged, without any stability 
problems. But it is obvious … that the effect of a breach of this clause can be slight or serious … such a 
term surely cannot, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, be properly classified as a condition.’ 
Terms classified as innominate 
[3.39]  
If a term is classified as innominate, a further test has to be applied to determine if its breach gives the 
injured party the right to rescind. As has been indicated, the test has been put in terms of whether the 
breach substantially deprives the innocent party of the whole of the benefit he, or she, was intended to 
derive from the contract1. The test has also been put in terms of whether the breach went to the root of 
the contract2, equated with the test for frustration3, and it has also been said that ‘only a serious and 
substantial breach’ entitles the injured party to rescind4. A useful test is provided by Hale LJ in Rice v 
Great Yarmouth: ‘The question for the court … in any case like this is whether the cumulative effect of the 
breaches of contract complained of is so serious as to justify the innocent party in bringing the contract to 
an end.’5  
The right to rescind for breach of an innominate term was recognised where it meant that ‘the charters 
would have become useless for the purposes for which they were granted’6. A breach of a term as to 
quality was not considered sufficient to justify rescission, but it was indicated that that remedy would be 
available had the difference in quality between that contracted for and that supplied been such that it 
‘resulted in the cargo being unavailable for the further refining process to be expected from having paid a 
premium for the same’7. In addition, the views of ‘commercial men’ as to whether ‘the kind of deviation in 
quality would not be treated as entitling a rejection’ have been seen as of great weight8. 
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The construction of the document is a question of law and fact for the courts to decide. This document 
covers the: basic approach in the interpretation of contracts including the principles stated by Lord 
Hoffmann in the case of Investors' Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998]; 
construction of the ‘natural and ordinary meaning of the words’, the background or ‘matrix of fact’, and the 
commercial sense and unreasonable result of the contracts; weighing the different types of evidence of 
the parties’ intention; special meanings of the terms of contracts; construction of documents forming part 
of the same transaction, to save the contract and to correct mistakes; and the principles of ‘against the 
offeror’(contra proferentem), ‘of the same kind’ (ejusdem generis) rule and when parts of a class, 
expressly mentioned, exclude others(expression unius). 
D Construction 
[3.40]  
The construction of the document is ‘a question of law for the courts’1. It has been said that2: 
‘The expression “construction” as applied to a document, at all events as used by English lawyers, 
includes two things; first the meaning of the words and secondly their legal effect, or the effect to 
be given to them. The meaning of the words I take to be a question of fact in all cases, whether we 
are dealing with a poem or a legal document. The effect of the words used is a question of law.’ 
The objective when construing or interpreting a contract has traditionally been put in terms of ascertaining 
the parties' intention: 
‘The object sought to be achieved in construing any contract is to ascertain what the mutual 
intentions of the parties were as to the legal obligations each assumed by the contractual words in 
which they sought to express them.’3  
However, to ‘ascertain the parties' intentions the court does not of course inquire into the parties' 
subjective states of mind’4. It is said that it is the intention of both parties5, and it is objectively 
ascertained:6  
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‘The aim of the inquiry is not to probe the real intentions of the parties but to ascertain the 
contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language. The inquiry is objective: the question is 
what a reasonable person, circumstanced as the actual parties were, would have understood the 
parties to have meant by the use of specific language. The answer to that question is to be gathered 
from the text under consideration and its relevant contextual scene.’7  
It has been emphasised that it is the objective intention as embodied in the words of the contract8 – the 
‘intention as expressed’9 – and, traditionally, there was a restrictive approach to what further evidence of 
the parties' intention could be adduced. However, whilst it is the words used which are being construed, it 
has been sought to ‘dispel the idea that English Law is left behind in some island of literal construction’10 
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Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 4 All ER 717, [1995] 1 WLR 1580, Lord Steyn at 
1587. For a discussion of objective intention see eg H Collins ‘Objectivity and Committed Contextualism 
in Interpretation’ in S Worthington ed Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, 2003). 
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and context is now emphasised. In Investors' Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society11 
the House of Lords has taken the view that a ‘fundamental change … has overtaken this branch of the 
law’12. As Lord Hoffmann stated, the result has largely been:13  
‘to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense 
principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old 
intellectual baggage of “legal interpretation” has been discarded.’ 
Basic approach 
[3.41]  
What must now be regarded as the leading statement as to how construction is generally to be carried 
out is contained in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Investors' Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich 
Building Society1. The idea that, basically, what is to be used are the ‘common sense principles by which 
any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’ has already been alluded to, above, but a 
summary of principles was also set out2: 
‘(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a 
reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been 
available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.3  
(2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”, but 
this phrase is if anything an understated description of what the background may include. 
Subject to the requirement that it should be reasonably available to the parties and to the 
exception mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the 
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Bank plc v Weeks, Legg & Dean [1999] QB 309; Scottish Power plc v Britoil [1997] 47 LS Gaz R 30, 
Staughton LJ; Boat Park Ltd v Hutchinson [1999] 2 NZLR 74, 81–82 (New Zealand Court of Appeal); 
Pratt v Aigaion Insurance Co SA [2008] EWCA Civ 1314, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 387, [2008] 2 CLC 756 
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See WRM Group v Wood [1998] CLC 189, Morrit LJ at 194–195; Don King Productions v Warren [1998] 2 
All ER 608, Lightman J at 624; Dattani v Trio Supermarkets [1998] ICR 872; Barclays Bank plc v Weeks, 
Legg & Dean [1999] QB 309; Eridiana SpA v Oetker, The Fjord Wind [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 108, [10]; 
Fountain v Banner (26 October 2000, unreported), CA. 
way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable 
man.4  
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties 
and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for 
rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this 
respect only legal interpretation differs from the way we interpret utterances in ordinary life 
… 
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man 
is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of 
dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of a document is what the parties using those words 
against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The 
background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible 
meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) 
to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax 
(see Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd5)6. 
(5) The rule that words should be given their “natural and ordinary meaning” reflects the 
commonsense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic 
mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless 
conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the 
law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could 
not have had …7.’ 
Basically, it is the courts task ‘to construe the documents in a manner which effects the mutual intention 
of [the parties], against a background of the transaction as a whole, looking for the meaning which the 
language used … would convey to a reasonable person, having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably have been available to the parties … but excluding previous negotiations and evidence 
of subjective intent’.8  
‘Natural and ordinary meaning’ 
[3.42]  
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Lord Hoffmann's first point, above, sets out the basic principle according to which construction is normally 
to be performed. However, traditionally, the view has been that the starting point should be the ‘natural 
and ordinary meaning of the words’1, unless they stem from some specialist vocabulary2, and it has been 
said that that remains the case3, but it is ‘crystal clear that an ambiguity need not be established before 
the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account’4. The ‘fact that a document appears to have a 
clear meaning on the face of it does not prevent, or indeed excuse, the court from looking at the 
background’5. 
The point has been made that, bereft of context, there may be no ‘natural meaning’. There may be 
‘chameleon-like’ words which take their meaning from their context. ‘Premises’, for example, has been 
viewed as such a word and the task of the court was then seen as being to give to it ‘the meaning which it 
most naturally bears in its context and as reasonably understood by the commercial men who entered 
into the agreement’6. More broadly in some cases the notion of words having a natural meaning may not 
be a very helpful one. Because the meaning of words is so sensitive to syntax and context, the natural 
meaning of words in one sentence may be quite unnatural in another. Thus a statement that words have 
a particular natural meaning may mean no more than that in many contexts they will have that meaning. 
In other contexts, their meaning may be different but no less natural.7 In addition, the role of the ‘natural 
and ordinary meaning’ of words was addressed in Lord Hoffmann's fifth principle, above8. It may be that 
we should not ‘easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes … in formal documents’ but in 
some cases, the ‘natural meaning’, may have to give way to more forceful indications of the parties' 
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intention in the background to the contract9. Consideration of the words ‘actually paid’ in the context of a 
reinsurance contract as a whole led to them being construed so as to cover the situation where the 
insurer owed a certain sum, but had not been able to pay it due to insolvency10. 
The background or ‘matrix of fact’ 
[3.43]  
Lord Hoffmann's statement of principle in Investors emphasises the importance, in construction, of the 
background1 against which the contract was made. Agreements are concluded against a background of 
facts which were known to, or which should have been known to the parties, as reasonable people, at the 
time when they concluded their agreement. Literal interpretation, divorced from that background has long 
been abandoned. In Prenn v Simmonds2 Lord Wilberforce said:3  
‘The time has long since passed when agreements … were isolated from the matrix of facts in 
which they were set and interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations … We must … 
inquire beyond the language and see what the circumstances were with reference to which the 
words were used, and the object appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them 
had in view.’ 
As has been indicated4, in Investors' Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society, in stating 
the basic principles of construction, Lord Hoffmann viewed the ‘matrix of fact’ as, ‘if anything, an 
understated description of what the background may include’. Subject to certain exclusions, considered 
below, he viewed the relevant background, for the purposes of construction, as ‘absolutely anything which 
would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a 
reasonable man’5. That was, of course, ‘subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably 
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available to the parties’, and it should be emphasised that that is objective, not requiring actual 
knowledge6, and means both parties: 
‘It would be contrary to basic principles of construction for the meaning of a document to be 
affected by facts which were known to one party but not reasonably available to the other.’7  
It should also be emphasised that the time at which it should have been so available is when the contract 
was made8 and it does not include subsequent conduct9. ‘What the court must do must be to place itself 
in thought in the same factual matrix as that in which the parties were’10. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
This wide approach to the admissible background has caused some concerns about the costs of litigation 
(‘It is often difficult for a judge to restrain the enthusiasm of counsel for producing a great deal of evidence 
under the heading of matrix, which on examination is found to contribute little or nothing to the 
understanding of the parties' contract. I have to say that such a wide definition of surrounding 
circumstances, background or matrix of fact seems likely to increase the cost to no obvious advantage’:. 
Scottish Power plc v Britoil [1997] 47 LS Gaz R 30. Staughton LJ. See also Wire TV Ltd v CableTel (UK) 
Ltd [1998] CLC 244, Lightman J at 256) and the suggestion has been made that the background should 
be confined to ‘the immediate context, and not facts in the past, distant or even recent’ (Staughton ‘How 
do the courts interpret commercial contracts?’ (1999) 58 CLJ 303, 308). However, in Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (in liquidation) v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2001] 1 All ER 961, Lord Hoffmann 
emphasised that the admissible background only encompassed what the reasonable person would 
regard as relevant. Further in Static Control Components (Europe) Ltd v Egan [2004] EWCA Civ 392, 
[2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 429, [2004] All ER (D) 04 (Apr), Arden LJ said (at [29]), ‘I am not aware that the 
fears expressed as to the opening of the floodgates have been realised. The powers of case 
management in the civil procedure rules could obviously be used to keep evidence within its proper 
bounds. The important point is that the principles in the ICS case lead to a more principled and fairer 
result by focussing on the meaning which the relevant background objectively assessed indicates that the 
parties intended’. 
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Engineering Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 98; Haydon v Lo & Lo and the Worldwide Marine and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 336 at 340; MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Owners of the Ship 
‘Tychy’ [2001] EWCA Civ 1198, [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403. Subsequent acts may be admissible as 
evidence of what the terms were: Wilson v Maynard Shipbuilding Consultants AG [1978] QB 665; Mears v 
Safecar Securities Ltd [1983] QB 54; Egon Oldendorff v Liberia Corpn [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380 at 384. 
Maggs v Marsh [2006] EWCA Civ 1058, [2006] All ER (D) 95 (Jul), Smith LJ at [26] – ‘In my judgment it is 
clear that the principle set out in Miller's case does not apply to an oral contract. Determining the terms of 
an oral contract is a question of fact. Establishing the facts will usually, as here, depend upon the 
recollections of the parties and other witnesses. The accuracy of those recollections may be tested and 
elucidated by things said and done by the parties or witnesses after the agreement has been concluded. 
Receiving evidence of such words or actions does not mean that the judge is losing sight of his task of 
deciding what the parties agreed at the time of the contract. It is simply helping him to decide whose 
The width of the admissible background can be emphasised. Lord Hoffmann has made the point that 
‘there is no conceptual limit to what can be regarded as background’11. It is not limited to matters of fact, 
but can include ‘the state of the law’12, ‘proved common assumptions which were in fact quite mistaken’13, 
and the objective ‘aim’ of the transaction14. In relation to a contract between two practitioners in a 
particular market, it can also include a ‘general market practice’ even though such a practice falls short of 
the requirements for a ‘usage’ which would generate an implied term15. As has been indicated, it does 
however, exclude negotiations and declarations of subjective intent. Some further elucidation of this can 
be made. 
As has been indicated, in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) v Ali Lord 
Hoffmann expressly acknowledged the possibility that the admissible background could include ‘the state 
                                                                                                                                                                           
recollection is right.’ The general exclusion has been criticised – McLauchlan ‘The New Law of Contract 
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Crema v Cenkos Securities [2010] EWHC 461 (Comm), [2010] All ER (D) 143 (Mar) at [63]. In relation to 
terms implied on the basis of market usage, see above para 3.25. 
of the law’16. In doing so, he was envisaging cases in which, in construing an agreement, it is taken ‘into 
account that the parties are unlikely to have intended to agree to something unlawful or legally 
ineffective’17. Even then, unless a public policy issue is seen to be involved, it should be a matter of 
whether the situation is such that the effect of the relevant statute, for example, is ‘knowledge which 
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the 
contract’18 and that will be returned to below19. However, what requires consideration here is the 
approach to be taken to previous cases dealing with the same or similar clauses. In Ali Lord Hoffmann 
also said:20  
‘If interpretation is the quest to discover what a reasonable man would have understood specific 
parties to have meant by the use of specific language in a specific situation at a specific time and 
place, how can that be affected by authority? How can the question of what a reasonable man in 
1990 would have thought BCCI and Mr Naeem meant by using the language of an Acas form be 
answered by examining what Lord Keeper Henley said in 1758 (Salkeld v Vernon, 1 Eden 64) I can 
understand that if parties in a legal context use words in what appears to have been a technical 
sense, it may be necessary to ascertain that technical meaning from authorities. But there is nothing 
of that kind here.’ 
Nevertheless, past decisions on the meaning of terms have been referred to post-Investors21 and even 
Lord Hoffmann has found the need to justify drawing ‘a line under the authorities to date and [making] a 
fresh start’ in relation to the interpretation of an arbitration clause22. Consideration must be given to when 
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Control Components (Europe) Ltd v Egan [2004] EWCA Civ 392, [2004] 2 Lloyds Rep 429 at [16] – 
‘identical words may be given completely different interpretations in two different guarantees’ (referring to 
Andrews and Millett The Law of Guarantees (3rd edn, 2000) at 4-01). 
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Lymington Marina Ltd v McNamara [2006] EWHC 704 (Ch), [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 200 and see below. 
In GE Frankona Reinsurance Ltd v CMM Trust No 1400, The Newfoundland Explorer [2006] EWHC 429 
(Admlty), [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 665, Gross J (at [30]) found the observations’ of Aiken J in Brownsville 
Holdings v Adamjee Insurance Ltd [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 803 ‘of considerable persuasive force and, 
albeit dealing with a clause differently worded, [lending] some support’. He did not, however, base his 
decision on the case but ‘on the wording of the warranty in the present contract, construed in context’, but 
he took ‘comfort from the fact that the view [he had] come to [was] consistent with the observations of 
Aikens J in the case’. 
22
 
Fiona Trust and Holding Corpn v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 
1053 at [12] – he particularly pointed to s 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 as justifying the change in 
approach. 
it is appropriate to refer to past cases in interpreting terms. There will be some situations, for example, in 
which a past decision, or its general approach, can be viewed as falling within the Investors' principles on 
the basis that it would have been reasonably known to the parties. In MDIS Ltd v Swinbank23, for 
example, Clarke LJ acknowledged that the judgment of Devlin J in West Wake Price & Co v Ching24 on a 
clause similar to that before him was in a ‘different contract between different parties in different 
circumstances at a different time’, but he nevertheless felt able to conclude that:25  
‘both the decision and the dicta in that case can in my judgement properly be treated as relevant to 
the construction of this clause since they have been known amongst insurance lawyers and indeed 
brokers for many years and would be likely to have been in the back of the minds of those 
negotiating this contract.’ 
In other words, the previous case was treated as so well known as to be part of the background 
‘reasonably available to the parties’ when making the contract and so available for consideration in its 
construction under the Investors' approach26. Similarly in The Fjord Wind27 Clarke LJ expressly stated that 
the ‘general approach’ taken in the earlier case of Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co Ltd v Adamastos28 would 
‘be included in the background knowledge (referred to by Lord Hoffmann) which the parties would have 
had in mind had they thought about it’29. Obviously, the appropriateness of such conclusions will depend 
upon all the circumstances. It can be noted, for example, that Clarke LJ in MDIS v Swinbank did not 
merely refer to the previous decision as well known among lawyers, but also as well known among 
‘brokers’, and, in general, whether a past decision or approach falls within the Investors' ‘background’ will 
depend upon such factors as whether it is well known in the trade generally, or merely amongst lawyers, 
and the degree of involvement of legal advisers in the transaction in question. So, for example, in 
deciding to follow what was to a ‘lawyer experienced in the field’ a ‘well recognised meaning’ for a phrase 
in a settlement agreement of a dispute arising from a construction contract, the point was made that the 
agreement ‘was drawn and accepted for the parties by lawyers who may be taken to be experienced in 
disputes arising from construction or construction management contracts’30. More broadly, the point has 
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been made that the court did not regard it as ‘a particularly helpful exercise to attempt to derive the proper 
construction of [a] standard form contract from special facts’31. It has been said:32  
‘There may reasonably be attributed to the parties to a contract such as this such general 
commercial knowledge as a party to such a transaction would ordinarily be expected to have, but 
with a printed form of contract, negotiable by one holder to another, no inference may be drawn as 
to the knowledge or intention of any particular party. The contract should be given the meaning it 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which is reasonably 
available to the person or class of persons to whom the document is addressed.’ 
The nature of a standard form contract has been acknowledged. The point has been made that ‘it is not 
context-specific’ and that ‘its value would be considerably diminished if it could not be relied upon as 
having the same meaning on all occassions’33. In fact, it can be suggested that where a standard form 
contract is employed in the circumstances for which it was designed34, an established interpretation 
should be followed in the interests of certainty, whether or not that would be in keeping with the Investors' 
approach35. However, if, even in relation to such contracts, the Investors' approach must be maintained in 
full, it may be suggested that the fact that a contract is a standard form contract will in some cases, at 
least, be the dominating background factor36 so that the court would be basically focused upon the words 
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Dairy Containers Ltd v Tasman Orient Line CV, The Tasman Discoverer [2004] UKPC 22, [2004] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 667, [2005] 1 WLR 215, Lord Bingham at [12] 
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H Collins ‘Objectiviity and Committed Contextualism in Interpretation’ in S Worthington ed Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing, 2003) pp 191–192; J Steyn ‘The Intractable Problem of 
the Interpretation of Legal Texts’ in S Worthington ed Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart 
Publishing, 2003) pp 125–126; D Nicholls ‘My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words’ (2005) LQR 
577 at 587 –‘When interpreting a document intended for commercial circulation it may be reasonable to 
attach added weight to the meaning the words bear on their face. The context afforded by the nature of 
the document is one of the matters the notional reasonable reader will take into account’. See also 
ProForce Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69, [2006] All ER (D) 247 (Feb), Arden LJ at 
[57] – ‘consideration may also have to be given to the question whether some matters should be given 
less weight where (for example) the context is one in which different persons advert at different points in 
time, such as a company's constitution, than in the case of a ‘one-off’ contract between two persons’. But 
see Absalom (on behalf of Lloyd's Syndicate 957) v TCRU Ltd [2005] EWHC 1090 (Comm), [2006] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 375, Aikens J at [23]. 
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A similar point has been made in relation to contracts commonly impacting on third parties – ‘Some 
contracts are readily assignable in the market in the ordinary course of business and some are not. 
Where they are, that will be a fact well known to commercial parties and is likely to be a matter highly 
germane to the interpretation of the document, mandating a more or less literal approach to the terms 
used in the standard form contract and limited background, commonly known in the relevant commercial 
context. It may be possible to identify particular types of factors which would normally dominate the 
background to a particular type of clause. So, for example, in relation to the scope of an arbitration 
clause, previous cases were referred to in relation to ‘the likelihood that the parties would have wanted 
one stop adjudication’37. In such cases, the court is finding support for its inferences as to the likely 
motivations of the reasonable person, in the views of previous judges38. The validity of that support, within 
the Investor's principles, of course depends upon sufficient similarity in other surrounding circumstances, 
in so far as they are relevant. 
As has been indicated, the admissible background, or matrix of fact, may include evidence of the 
“genesis” and objectively of the “aim” of the transaction’39. It may be that one possible interpretation will 
‘better and more sensibly serve’ the aim of a clause and so be indicated as the appropriate construction.40 
It must be emphasised that consideration of the aim or genesis of the transaction does not admit 
evidence of subjective intention41: 
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line was taken in relation to an ‘all monies clause’ in a guarantee that the past cases ‘illustrate the type of 
provisions which may give an indication of the presumed intention of the parties’. 
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nevertheless regarded them as generating ‘not a rule of law but a cautionary principle which should 
inform the approach of the court to the construction’ of the document (at [17]). He took the view of the 
previous case that (at [10]) – ‘a long and in my view salutary line of authority shows that, in the absence 
of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims 
of which he was unaware and could not have been aware’. 
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Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237, [1971] 1 WLR 1381, Lord Wilberforce; Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 
Cl & Fin 355, Erskine J at 512, Parke B; Hvalfangerselkabet Polaris A/S v Unilever Ltd (1933) 46 Ll L Rep 
29; St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No 2) [1975] 1 WLR 468; 
Staffordshire Health Authority v South Staffordshire Waterworks [1978] 3 All ER 769, [1978] 1 WLR 1387; 
Reardon-Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995; Ultisol Transport Contractors Ltd v 
Bouygues Offshore SA [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 140 at 144; Total Transport Corpn v Arcadia Petroleum Ltd 
[1998] CLC 90, Staughton LJ at 102; Roar Marine v Bimeh Iran [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 423, Mance J at 
430. 
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Prenn v Simmonds[1971] 3 All ER 237, [1971] 1 WLR 1381, Lord Wilberforce at 1385; Plumb Bros v 
Dolmac (Agriculture) Ltd (1984) 271Estates Gazette 373; Rabin v Gerson Association Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 
526; Bromarin AB v IMD Investments Ltd [1998] STC 244 at 254. 
‘The commercial or business object of a provision, objectively ascertained, may be highly relevant 
… But the court must try not to divine the purpose of the contract by speculating about the real 
intention of the parties. It may only be inferred from the language used by the parties, judged 
against the objective contextual background.’42  
It should, however, be recognised that it may not always be possible to discern the aim or objective 
behind a contract or a particular term43 and also that the drafting of a term may be such that its aim or 
objective has only been achieved in such a way that there are also other affects, going beyond that 
purpose. In Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope44 Lord Hoffmann agreed with Lord Lloyd that the 
‘obvious case which the parties intended to exclude [from the insurance cover] was theft by electronic 
means employed from a remote location’45. But he noted that ‘in order to achieve that the parties have 
drawn a line on a map which can have fairly arbitrary consequences’. It was concluded that where a thief 
used an innocent agent to collect the money from the bank, that situation was also excluded by the 
drafting of the insurance contract which was stated to cover ‘theft … by persons present on the premises 
of the’ bank46. 
As Lord Hoffmann indicated in Investors47, even though they might be relevant to the ‘common sense 
interpretation of any serious utterance’, there are some matters which are excluded from the matrix of fact 
to be considered in construing a contract. These are the parties' ‘declarations of subjective intention’ and 
the prior negotiations of the parties48. The exceptional exclusion of prior negotiations has generated 
considerable criticism49. Nevertheless, it has recently been reaffirmed by the House of Lords in 
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Inglis v Buttery (1878) 3 App Cas 552 at 558; Leggott v Barrett (1880) 15 Ch D 306 at 311; Millbourn v 
Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231 at 240; Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696; L G Schuler AG v 
Wickman Machine Tools Ltd [1974] AC 235; Arrale v Costain Civil Engineering Co Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 98 at 101; Sudatlantica Navegacion SA v Devamar Shipping Corpn [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 271 at 274; 
Alexiou v Campbell [2007] UKPC 11, [2007] All ER (D) 319 (Feb), [15]. 
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D Nicholls ‘My Kingdom for a Horse’ (2005) LQR 577; E McKendrick Contract Law Text Cases and 
Materials (2nd edn, 2005) p 416; G McMeel ‘Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct – the Next Step 
Forward for Contractual Interpretation’ (2003) 119 LQR 272; D W McLauchlan ‘The New Law of Contract 
Interpretation’ (2000) 19 NZULR 147, 172; ProForce Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69, 
[2006] All ER (D) 247 (Feb); Lewis v Pensions Ombudsman [2005] EWHC 103 (Ch), [2005] All ER (D) 66 
(Feb). See also the comments of Thomas J in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Yoshimoto v 
Canterbury Golf Club International Ltd [2002] UKPC 40, [2002] All ER (D) 297 (Jul), [59]–[96], referred to 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd50 and this will be returned to below. The exception has led to the 
exclusion of drafts51 and of the opinion of the drafting counsel52, and a comfort letter, despatched with a 
negotiating letter, has also been excluded53, although it may be possible to refer to what has been deleted 
from a standard form contract54. The exclusion does not, of course, cover previous contracts, although 
the point has been made that a ‘cautious and sceptical approach’ may need to be taken to the assistance 
they can provide in the construction of a later contract55. Evidence of negotiations is available to establish 
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[1895] 2 QB 648 at 650; Sanday & Co v Cox, McEuen & Co (1921) 10 Ll L Rep 450 at 460; Ross, Smythe 
& Co v Bailey, Sons & Co [1940] 3 All ER 60; Mottram Consultants Ltd v Bernard Sunley Ltd [1975] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 197 at 209; Punjab National Bank v De Boinville [1992] 3 All ER 104, [1992] 1 WLR 1138 at 
1148; Team Services plc v Kier Management & Design Ltd (1993) 36 Con LR 32. But see Louis Dreyfus 
& Cie v Parnaso Cia Naviera SA [1959] 1 QB 498, Diplock J at 513 reversed on other grounds [1960] 2 
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that ‘a fact which may be relevant as background was known to the parties’56. Also, evidence of 
negotiations has been seen as admissible to show that the parties had adopted a particular meaning of a 
word or phrase57 (a ‘private dictionary’) and an entire agreement clause may not prevent that58. However, 
a ‘private dictionary’ rule of the scope previously adopted was seen by Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook v 
Persimmon as ‘infringing’ the exclusionary rule and he took the line that it was confined to the situation 
where the parties had adopted an ‘unconventional usage’59 (he did emphasise the ‘two legitimate safety 
devices’, of rectification and estoppel by convention)60. However, extra-judicially, whilst agreeing with the 
general exclusion of evidence of negotiations, Lord Bingham had stated his approval of the original 
‘private dictionary’ rule as encompassing evidence which ‘should be admissable’61. Further, Lord 
Hoffmann's limitation of the ‘private dictionary’ rule to ‘unconventional usages’ has been seen as an 
‘impossible one’62. The question has been raised ‘why is it that the court can admit evidence that, say, the 
parties always, or for a particular transaction, used “apples” to mean “pears” but not evidence that they 
used words in one of two conventional senses?’63  
However, as has been indicated, the general exclusion of evidence of negotiations has been much 
criticised64. It creates a difficult borderline, particularly when it is the purpose of the contract which is 
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looked for65. The general exclusion is chiefly based on concerns about avoiding moving from the objective 
to the subjective66 and about the nature of the negotiating process. In Prenn v Simmonds67 Lord 
Wilberforce said:68  
‘In relation to such negotiations, the reason for not admitting evidence of these exchanges is not a 
technical one or even mainly one of convenience… It is simply that such evidence is unhelpful. By 
the nature of things where negotiations are difficult, the parties’ positions, with each passing letter, 
are changing and until the final agreement, though converging, still divergent. It is only the final 
document which records consensus.’ 
However, extra-judicially, Lord Nicholls has commented:69  
‘[There] will be occasions where the pre-contract negotiations do shed light on the meaning the 
parties intended to convey by the words they used. There will be occasions, for instance, when the 
parties in their pre-contract negotiations make clear the meaning they intended by language they 
subsequently incorporated into their contract. When pre-contract negotiations assist in some such 
way, the notional reasonable person should be able to take that evidence into account in deciding 
how the contract is to be interpreted.’ 
Critical comment has also been made as to the appropriate reaction to the problems identified by Lord 
Wilberforce. It has been said that ‘the points made by Lord Wilberforce [in Prenn v Simmonds] are only 
valid as cautionary factors to be taken into account in determining the weight to be given to evidence of 
prior negotiations, not its admissibility’70. Care would need to be taken with the evidence provided by pre-
contract negotiations but that has been recognised71. However, in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes 
Ltd, having referred to practitioners' concerns that the more background was admissible, the greater 
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Lewis v Pensions Ombudsman [2005] EWHC 103 (Ch), [2005] All ER (D) 66 (Feb) at [59] – ‘Although I 
consider that common sense suggests that there was an agreed basis, I prefer not to rest my decision on 
this point. Consent by silence is not easily to be inferred, and a party to a negotiation may well decide not 
to raise a point where he sees an ambiguity’. 
would be the costs and uncertainty, Lord Hoffmann dismissed these arguments against the exclusionary 
rule on pragmatic grounds. He said:72  
‘The conclusion I would reach is that there is no clearly established case for departing from the 
exclusionary rule. The rule may well mean, as Lord Nicholls has argued, that parties are sometimes 
held bound by a contract in terms which, upon a full investigation of the course of negotiations, a 
reasonable observer would not have taken them to have intended. But a system which sometimes 
allows this to happen may be justified in the more general interest of economy and predictability in 
obtaining advice and adjudicating disputes. It is, after all, usually possible to avoid surprises by 
carefully reading the documents before signing them and there are safety nets of rectification and 
estoppel by convention.’ 
On this basis, he saw no reason to depart from the established exclusionary rule73. However, the weights 
in this type of balancing exercise may change and it can be suggested that the exclusion may come 
under renewed pressure, and the balance change, if complete acceptance is given to Lord Hoffmann's 
new approach to implying terms in fact in A-G of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd74. His approach there simply 
equates such implication with construction and dismisses the traditional restrictive ‘business efficacy’ and 
‘officious bystander’ tests. The point has been made that, in the absence of evidence of the parties' 
negotiations, it is may be difficult to tell whether the omission of an express term is deliberate, in which 
case no term can be implied, or an oversight, when it can. In Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd Bingham LJ said:75  
‘Given the rules which restrict evidence of the parties’ intentions when negotiating a contract, it 
may well be doubtful whether the omission was a result of the parties' oversight or of their 
deliberate decision: if the parties' appreciate they are unlikely to agree on what is to happen in a 
certain not impossible eventuality, they may well choose to leave the matter uncovered in their 
contract in the hope that the eventuality will not occur.’ 
The removal of the traditional, restrictive tests from the area of terms implied in fact would mean that 
there would be many more cases in which the issue of deliberate omission or oversight would be of vital 
importance and in which the evidence of the parties' negotiations might therefore be helpful. 
Further arguments have been made in relation to the exclusionary rule and were addressed by Lord 
Hoffmann. The criticism has been made that, in considering the exclusion, ‘it may be appropriate to 
consider a number of international instruments applying to contract’ which take a different approach76. 
Lord Hoffmann, however, took the line that: 
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‘One cannot … simply transpose rules based on one philosophy of contractual interpretation to 
another, or assume that the practical effect of admitting such evidence under the English system of 
civil procedure will be the same as that under a continental system.’ 
The argument has been made that the prior negotiations should continue to be inadmissible in the 
interests of third parties. In Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd Briggs J said, at first instance:77  
‘If the parties negotiations were to the extent “helpful”, to be routinely admissible as an aid to 
contractual construction, then no … third parties reading, dealing with or having transferred to 
them rights or obligations under the contract could make any safe assumption about its meaning 
without themselves carrying out an inquiry as to those negotiations, so as to put themselves in the 
same state of knowledge as the parties to the contract. Furthermore, since ambiguity is no longer 
(after the Investors Compensation Scheme case) a prerequisite for recourse to the admissible 
background, a third party's appreciation of the apparently unambiguous meaning of a word, phrase 
or term, could be subverted by reference to the original parties’ negotiations, without which no 
secondary meaning was even capable of being guessed at.’ 
Similar concerns were initially raised in relation to the general admissibility of evidence of the background 
to the contract under the Investors' approach78. In Chartbrook v Persimmon Lord Hoffmann took the 
line:79  
‘The law sometimes deals [with such] problem[s] by restricting the admissible background to that 
which would be available not merely to the contracting parties but also to others to whom the 
document is treated as having been addressed…. Ordinarily, however, a contract is treated as 
addressed to the parties alone and an assignee must either inquire as to any relevant background or 
take his chance on how that might affect the meaning a court will give to the document. The law 
has sometimes to compromise between protecting the interests of the contracting parties and those 
of third parties. But an extension of the admissible background will, at any rate in theory, increase 
the risk that a third party will find that the contract does not mean what he thought. How often this 
is likely to be a practical problem is hard to say. In the present case, the construction of the 
agreement does not involve reliance upon any background which would not have been equally 
available to any prospective assignee or lender.’ 
The exclusion of evidence of the parties' negotiations does not, of course, apply where it is rectification 
which is in question, rather than interpretation80. 
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Commercial sense and unreasonable results 
[3.44]  
In general, in keeping with the relevance of the objectively ascertained aim of the contract1, the point has 
been made that business contracts should be construed in a way which makes ‘good commercial sense’. 
In Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB Lord Diplock said: 
‘if a detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to 
a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common 
sense.’2  
And this was referred to by Lord Hoffmann in making his fifth point in the Investors Compensation 
Scheme case3 and is an important factor in showing that a linguistic or syntactical mistake has been 
made (on mistake, see para 3.49). What may be in issue is the need to perceive an overall scheme and 
not allow it to be derailed by a badly drafted point4. Of course, if what reveals the absurdity is a factor 
which would not have been ‘reasonably available to the parties at the time of the contract’, it is not 
something which can be taken into account5. 
The point has been made that, where the question of construction of a clause might arise in relation to 
numerous different fact situations, the interpretation and the ‘business common sense’ factor had to be 
looked at in relation to all of them. In Miramir Maritime Corpn v Holborn Oil Trading Ltd6, Lord Diplock 
said: 
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[1985] AC 191 at 121; Trolex Products Ltd v Merrol Fire Protection Engineers Ltd (20 November 1991, 
unreported), Staughton LJ; Niobe Maritime Corpn v Tradax Ocean Transportation SA, The Niobe [1995] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 579 at 582; Astilleros Espanoles SA v Bank of America National Trust and Savings 
Association [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 352, Evans LJ at 358–359; International Fina Services AG v Katrina 
Shipping Ltd, The Fina Samco [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 344, Neill LJ at 350; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd 
v Gulf Bank KSC [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 499 at 506; Axa Reinsurance (UK) Ltd v Field [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
26, Staughton LJ at 29; Cargill International SA v Bangladesh Industries Corpn [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 524 
at 531; Galaxy International Ltd v Novorossiysk Shipping Co, The Petr Schmidt [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 284 
at 286; Bromarin AB V IMD Investments Ltd [1998] STC 244 at 254; WRM Group Ltd v Wood [1998] CLC 
189, Mance J at 195; Wire TV Ltd v CableTel (UK) Ltd [1998] CLC 244 at 264; Static Control 
Components (Europe) Ltd v Egan [2004] EWCA Civ 392, [2004] 2 Lloyds Rep 429 at [16]; Absalom (on 
behalf of Lloyd's Syndicate 957) v TCRU Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1586, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 375, 
Longmore LJ at [7]; Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2; [2010] 1 All ER 571 at [37]. 
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Chartbrook v Persimmon [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 4 All ER 677, Lord Hoffmann at [15]; Re Sigma Finance 
Corp [2009] UKSC 2, [2010] 1 All ER 571. 
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Enviroco Ltd v Farstad Supply A/S [2009] EWCA Civ 1399, [2009] All ER (D) 206 (Dec) at [21]. 
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[1984] AC 676; International Fina Services AG v Katrina Shipping Ltd, The Fina Samco [1995] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 344, Neill LJ at 350. 
‘The words in the … bill of lading on which this appeal turns are the same irrespective of whether 
it is issued in respect of a complete or part of the cargo received on board at the first or subsequent 
loading port … there must be ascribed to the words a meaning that would make good commercial 
sense in any of these situations, and not some meaning that imposed on the transferee to whom the 
bill of lading for goods afloat was negotiated a financial liability of unknown extent that no 
businessman in his senses would be willing to incur.’ 
It should, however, be borne in mind that, as Lord Hoffmann emphasised in a different context, 
interpretation ‘is the quest to discover what a reasonable man would have understood specific parties to 
have meant by the use of specific language in a specific time and place’7. Unless an exception is made 
for standard form contracts, the extent of the relevance of different potential contexts for the use of a 
standard form contract in a given case would seem to depend upon the extent to which they are part of 
the ‘background’ reasonably available to both parties when the contract was made. 
At a more general level than the impetus to achieve ‘good commercial sense’ is the pressure against a 
construction which achieves an unreasonable result. In L Schuler A G v Wickman Machine Tools Sales 
Ltd Lord Reid said: 
‘The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant 
consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have 
intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they shall make that intention 
abundantly clear.’ 8  
Whilst this may be seen as a ‘practical rule of thumb’ reflecting ‘the common understanding of how 
language is understood’9, the courts must still avoid substituting ‘for the bargain actually made one which 
the court believes could better have been made’10. 
That should perhaps be qualified by a view occasionally taken – that the commercial sense approach to 
construction requires only that it is ‘the manner of the determination which must be commercially 
reasonable; it does not follow that the outcome has to be commercially reasonable although, if it is not, 
that would no doubt cause one to look critically at the manner of the determination’11. 
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[1974] AC 235 at 251; International Fina Services AG v Katrina Shipping Ltd, The Fina Samco [1995] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 344, Neill LJ at 350; Niobe Maritime Corpn v Tradax Ocean Transport SA, The Niobe [1995] 
1 Lloyd's Rep 579 at 583. See also Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd v Rambler Cycle Co Ltd [1959] AC 576, Lord 
Denning at 587; Centrax Ltd v Citibank NA [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 557. See also Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (in liquidation) v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2001] 1 All ER 961, Lord Bingham, [19]: 
‘If the parties sought to achieve so extravagant a result they should … have used language which left no 
room for doubt and which might at least have alerted Mr Naseem to the true effect of what (on that 
hypothesis) he was agreeing’. 
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Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313. 
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Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, Lord Mustill. Kazakstan Wool v NCM [2000] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 708, Peter Gibson LJ, [49]; Pratt v Aigaion Ins [2008] EWCA Civ 1314, [2008] 2 CLC 756 at [12]. 
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Barclays Bank plc v UniCredit Bank AG [2014] EWCA Civ 302, Longmore LJ at [15] (emphasis added). 
There is no need for there to exist an ambiguity or uncertainty in the literal reading of the contract before 
the commercial sense approach is used. As Lord Sumption observed in Sans Souci Ltd v VRL Services 
Ltd: 
‘It is generally unhelpful to look for an “ambiguity”, if by that is meant an expression capable of 
more than one meaning simply as a matter of language. True linguistic ambiguities are 
comparatively rare. The real issue is whether the meaning of the language is open to question. 
There are many reasons why it may be open to question, which are not limited to cases of 
ambiguity.’12  
If a clause or provision is capable of two meanings, it is quite possible that neither meaning will flout 
common commercial sense. In such a circumstance, it is much more appropriate to adopt the more, 
rather than the less, commercial construction13. That said, there are, of course, challenges here. The 
admissible background facts may not point clearly to one of two or more possible constructions and a 
resort to the criterion of business common sense in order to identify the most commercial interpretation of 
the agreement may actually misjudge what the parties themselves would have seen as the appropriate 
balance of interest and liability14. There is support for view taken by Briggs J, in Jackson v Dear15 first, 
that ‘commercial common sense’ is not to be elevated to an overriding criterion of construction and, 
second, that the parties should not be subjected to ‘the individual judge's own notions of what might have 
been the sensible solution to the parties' conundrum’16. 
Weighing the different types of evidence 
[3.45]  
There has been some emphasis on the need to weigh appropriately the different types of evidence of the 
parties' intention. At a narrow level the point can be made that when a printed standard form contract is 
used then, in general, greater weight will be given to any added written terms specific to that contract1. 
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[2012] UKPC 6 at [14]. 
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Barclays Bank plc v HHY Luxembourg SARL [2010] EWCA Civ 1248 at [26]; see too Rainy Sky SA v 
Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 where Lord Clarke said at [21]:’The language used by the parties will 
often have more than one potential meaning. I would accept the submission … that the exercise of 
construction is essentially one unitary exercise in which the court must consider the language used and 
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Fons HF (in liquidation) v Corporal Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 304 at [16]. 
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[2012] EWHC 2060 (Ch) at [40]. 
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As seen in Aikens LJ’s judgment in BMA Special Opportunity Hub Finance Ltd and Others v African 
Minerals Finance Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 416 at [24]. 
1
 
The added terms are the ‘immediate language and terms selected by the parties themselves’2. Again at 
the narrow level, the weighing of different evidence was considered where there was a conflict between 
the written terms of an option agreement and a plan. The line was taken that the ‘modern approach’ is not 
simply to take the view that the wording prevailed but rather that, ‘whether a plan controls a verbal 
description or a verbal description controls a plan is a question of construction of the particular 
conveyance. There is no presumption either way.’3 However, the weighing process is also a much more 
general one. 
The basic clarity of the words used and the significance of the background interact. Even after the 
Investors Compensation Scheme case, the point has been made that ‘Even if the most generous 
examination of surrounding circumstances is permitted, any decision on interpretation must pay due 
regard to the explicitness of particular wording and the nature and strength of any circumstances 
suggested as putting a different complexion on it’4. The origin of the terms may be relevant. It has been 
said that ‘in a document drawn up or vetted by lawyers the starting point must be to assume that the 
words used were intended to bear their ordinary and correct meaning’5. Similarly, the point has been 
made that ‘in the case of a package of agreements … drafted by city solicitors for large companies in 
respect of a very substantial joint venture (most particularly where there is no claim to rectification), the 
court should be slow to assume that the language used does not express the parties’ intentions and the 
court must beware the temptation to rewrite the parties bargain in a form which the court thinks just and 
reasonable’6. However, the points have also been made that mistakes ‘may be particularly 
understandable in the case of a commercial contract made under pressure of time by business people’7 
and, the background may be seen to be ‘particularly important’ where what has to be construed is in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Robertson v French (1803) 4 East 130; Glynn v Margetson & Co [1893] AC 351; Neuchatel Asphalte Co 
Ltd v Barnett [1957] 1 All ER 362, [1957] 1 WLR 356; The Athinoula [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 481. Chrismas v 
Taylor Woodrow [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 407 at 409; Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd (The 
Starsin) [2003] UKHL 12, [2003] 2 All ER 785; Jani-King (GB) Ltd v Pula Enterprises Ltd [2007] EWHC 
2433 (QB), [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 451, [27]. It has been indicated that the parties may include a clause 
giving paramountcy to the standard terms – Homburg Houthinpost v Agrosin [2001] EWCA Civ 56, [2001] 
1 All ER (Comm) 455, Rix LJ, para 56: see further the discussion of the analogous ‘entire agreement’ 
clause 3.7. 
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Robertson v French (1803) 4 East 130, Lord Ellenborough. An even stronger case is provided where the 
standard terms are merely incorporated by reference into the specific terms which they contradict: BCT 
Software Solutions Ltd v Arnold Laver & Co Ltd [2002] EWHC 1298 (Ch), [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 85, 
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Lewison Interpretation of Contracts (2nd edn, 1997), para 10.07. 
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Roar Marine v Bimeh Iran [1998] 1 Lloyd's LR 423, Mance J at 428. 
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HSBC Bank v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co (UK) Ltd (2001) Times, 11 June, Patten J. 
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Household Global Funding v British Gas Trading (29 June 2001, unreported), Lightman J, [65]. 
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Static Control Components (Europe) Ltd v Egan [2004] EWCA Civ 392, [2004] 2 Lloyds Rep 429, Arden 
LJ at [28]. 
‘colloquial language’8. The court should ‘always have an eye on the consequences of a particular 
construction, even if they only serve as a check on an obvious meaning or a restraint upon adoption of a 
conceivable but unbusinesslike one’, but it may be regarded as ‘especially important’ to ‘consider the 
implications of each interpretation’ where a clause ‘has no very natural meaning and is … open to two 
possible meanings or interpretations’9. More basically, ‘the poorer the quality of the drafting, the less 
willing the court should be to be driven by semantic niceties to attribute to the parties an improbable and 
businesslike intention’10. In addition, the point can be made that the level of scrutiny should be 
appropriate. It has been said that: 
‘Construction is a composite exercise neither uncompromisingly literal nor unswervingly 
purposive. The instrument must speak for itself but must do so in situ and not be transported to the 
laboratory for microscopic analysis.’11  
In some cases it may be that it should be acknowledged that it is unlikely that ‘any reasonable 
businessman’ would have undertaken the type of ‘detailed scrutiny’ of a clause which counsel might well 
seek to undertake before the court and that it may be more appropriate to simply read the relevant clause 
or contract as a whole ‘without pausing too long on detail’, so as to gather ‘its general thrust’12. 
A related issue is whether special clauses will override and prevail over general terms in a contract. It 
appears that there is no general presumption that that is the case; the systemic approach to construction 
of contracts confirmed in West Bromwich suggests that it should always be a question of what meaning 
the two sets of conditions read together, where possible, are intended to convey. In CLP Holding Co Ltd v 
Singh13 the Court of Appeal refused to recognise that there was a general presumption that the special 
conditions of the contract would trump the general terms, despite the existence of a clause in the contract 
providing that, in the event of conflict, the special conditions prevailed. The court held that the contract 
should be construed as a whole and every effort made to give effect to all its clauses. Also, the court 
should nevertheless preserve the general conditions so far as possible. On construing the entirety of the 
contract, though, the court concluded that no reasonable person possessed of the relevant information at 
the time of the contract would fail to find a conflict between the general and special conditions. As such, 
the court gave effect to the special conditions over the general. 
Special meanings 
[3.46]  
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Phelps v Spon-Smith (10 May 2000, unreported), [43]. 
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Gan Insurance Co v Tai Ping Insurance Co [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 299, Mance LJ, [16]. 
10
 
Mitsui Construction Co Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1986] 33 BLR 1, Lord Bridge at 14; Sinochem 
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International Fina Services AG v Katrina Shipping Ltd, The Fina Samco [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 344, Neill LJ 
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Sinochem v Mobil [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 474, Mance LJ, [28]. 
13
 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1103; see also Hostgilt Ltd v Megahart Ltd [1999] STC 141 and Wynn Realisations Ltd 
v Vogue Holdings Inc [1999] STC 524. 
Words may come from a specialist vocabulary, rather than ordinary speech, requiring consideration of the 
specialist meaning1. Evidence may be required of the scientific or technical meaning of terms2. In some 
case, it may be clear from the contract that the words are not being used technically3. Words may also 
acquire a meaning through the custom of a particular place4 or trade5. So, for example, a lease referring 
to 1,000 rabbits was found to mean 1,200 rabbits on the basis of a local custom6. More broadly, in a 
contract within the travel industry, the ‘glossary of terms commonly used in the airline industry’ could be 
regarded as part of the ‘factual matrix’ to be taken into account in the construction process7. 
In Fons HF (in liquidation) v Corporal Ltd8 the court was asked to interpret what the word ‘debenture’ used 
in the contract meant. The court approached the question of interpretation by looking at the various legal, 
regulatory and commercial contexts in which the word had been used (noting that there was no clear 
definition found in these contexts) but concluded that ultimately the interpretation should always be 
guided by the commercial sense. Lady Justice Gloster for example made it clear that for the contract in 
question, reliance on an over-technical reading was clearly not what a commercially reasonable approach 
to the matter of construction called for9. 
Documents forming part of the same transaction 
[3.47]  
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Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313, Lord Mustill. 
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Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl & Fin 355; Baldwin & Francis Ltd v Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] AC 663. 
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Graham v Ewart (1856) 1 H & N 550; Musgrave v Forster (1871) LR 6 QB 590 at 596; Glasgow Corpn v 
Farie (1888) 13 App Cas 657 at 669; Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85; Tester v Bisley 
(1948) 64 TLR 184; Michael Borys v Canadian Pacific Rly [1953] AC 217 at 223; Luigi Monia of Genoa v 
Cechofract Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 552. 
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Studdy v Sanders (1826) 5 B & C 628; Smith v Wilson (1832) 3 B & Ad 728; Clayton v Gregson (1836) 5 
Ad & El 302; Palgrave, Brown & Sons v SS Turid [1922] 1 AC 397; Aktieselskabet Dampskisselskabet 
Primula v Horsley (1923) 40 TLR 11; Hillas & Co v Rederiaktiebolaget Aeolus (1926) 32 Com Cas 69; 
Smith, Hogg & Co v Louis Bamberger & Sons [1929] 1 KB 150. 
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Gibbon v Young (1818) 8 Taunt 254; Hayton v Irwin (1879) 5 CPD 130; Re L Sutro & Co and Heilbut 
Symons & Co [1917] 2 KB 348; Westacott v Hahn [1918] 1 KB 495; Palgrave, Brown & Sons v SS Turid 
[1922] AC 397; Bulk Transport Group Shipping Co Ltd v Seacrystal Shipping Ltd [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 at 
6; Care Shipping Corpn v Itex Itagriana Export SA [1993] QB 1. 
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Association of British Travel Agents v British Airways plc [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 204, Clarke LJ, [29]. 
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[2014] EWCA Civ 304. 
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At [50]. 
Documents forming part of the same transaction are to be construed together1. So, for example, a 
discrepancy in a lease was resolved by consideration of the counterpart2, and a prospectus containing 
terms for the issue of deposit notes, could be referred to when the deposit note issued omitted one of 
those terms3. An instrument which is expressed to be subject to an earlier instrument will take effect as if 
it included that earlier instrument4. It has also been indicated that where there is one document which sets 
out the contract terms, and another which is intended to provide an explanatory note for laymen, ‘one 
should start with the assumption that the layman who read [the latter document] and did not venture into 
the [former contractual document] itself was being given an accurate account of the effect of the 
transaction’ and the latter document may therefore be `significant’ in construing the contract5. In addition, 
when a software manufacturer contracted to supply its software and provide certain services to a 
business which would then sub-supply that software as part of a package to end users, the end user 
agreements, which were scheduled to the manufacturer’s supply contract, were considered in construing 
that supply contract6. 
Documents forming part of the same contractual transaction are usually subject to what is called the 
iterative approach to the construction of commercial contracts. The iterative approach to the interpretation 
of contracts requires possible rival interpretations to be tested, not only against other textual indications in 
the contract, but also the commercial consequences of each competing interpretation7. It is not 
appropriate to divorce a consideration of the commercial consequences from textual analysis and to treat 
it as a bolt-on or cross-check. 
Saving the contract 
[3.48]  
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Ford v Stuart (1852) 15 Beav 493; Burchell v Clark (1876) 2 CPD 88; Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch D 
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at 115. 
6
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Napier Park European Credit Opportunities Fund Limited v Harbourmaster Pro-Rata Clo 2 BV and Others 
[2014] EWCA Civ 984; Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2, [2010] 1 All ER 571 (see Lord Mance’s 
speech at [12] endorsing Lord Neuberger’s dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal ([2008] EWCA Civ 
1303)). 
Traditionally the line has been taken that if it is possible to interpret a contract in more than one way and 
one way will produce a contract that is void or ineffective, then another interpretation will be adopted1. In 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) v Ali, in indicating that the ‘background’ 
available for the purposes of construction could include ‘the state of the law’, Lord Hoffmann gave as an 
example ‘cases in which one takes into account that the parties are unlikely to have intended to agree to 
something unlawful or legally ineffective’2. However, (unless there is a policy issue to consider) if the 
relevance of any ineffectiveness is merely as part of the ‘background’, it can only impact upon the 
construction of the agreement to the extent that it was ‘knowledge which would reasonably have been 
available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract’3, and the same type 
of considerations would seem to arise as in the discussion of the relevance of previous case law4. It 
would seem that it will depend upon such matters as the extent to which legal advisers were involved in 
the making of the contract and the extent to which, in any event, the area in which the parties are 
contracting is generally known to be one in which making an enforceable agreement is, in some way, 
‘regulated’. 
It has been said to be a matter of construction that it is assumed, in the absence of clear words, that 
neither of the parties is to be entitled to benefit from their own breach, but that has also been seen as an 
implied term5. 
Mistakes 
[3.49]  
Traditionally there has been limited scope for a court in construing a contract to correct mistakes. It has 
been seen as possible where ‘it is clear from the document itself, without looking at extrinsic evidence, 
that such words were used only by virtue of a draftsman's blunder’1 – where there is ‘absurdity and 
inconsistency’2. There has been scope to deal with inconsistent and superfluous terms3. It has been 
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New Zealand Shipping Co v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1; Cheall v 
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Eton College [1991] 1 All ER 267, [1988] 1 WLR 587; Gyllenhammar & Partners International Ltd v Saur 
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v Wilson (1854) 5 HL Cas 40, Lord St Leonards at 60. 
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possible to correct a reference to the wrong party, when it is clear that the other was intended4,or where it 
is clear that an error has been made in the name of a company5, or even supply a name omitted from one 
part of the document6. In some cases words which have been missed out have been supplied by the 
court7 or those which do not make sense omitted8 or corrected9 to carry out what must clearly10 have 
been the intention of the parties. If there has been a clear contradiction11 between different parts of the 
contract, effect has been given to the part which will carry out the intention of the parties12, and similarly 
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Forte Catering Ltd (1984) 272 Estates Gazette 1072; Christmas v Taylor Woodrow [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
407 at 411; Protank Shipping Inc v Total Transport Corpn, The Protank Orinoco [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 42 
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effect has been denied to terms which have been seen as repugnant to the intention in the contract as a 
whole13. When terms are incorporated by reference then the terms of the main, incorporating, document 
have normally been taken to show the intention of the parties in the case of conflicting terms14. A 
distinction has been made between repugnant or contradictory clauses and merely limiting or qualifying 
clauses15. 
However, in Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd16 and Investors' 
Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society17 a non-technical, more generally applicable, 
line was indicated in relation to ‘mistakes’. In Mannai Lord Steyn emphasised the need for a 
‘commercially sensible construction’. He said: 
‘In determining the meaning of the language of a commercial contract, and unilateral contractual 
notices, the law therefore generally favours a commercially sensible construction. The reason for 
this approach is that a commercial construction is more likely to give effect to the intention of the 
parties. Words are therefore interpreted in the way in which a reasonable commercial person would 
construe them. And the standard of the reasonable commercial person is hostile to technical 
interpretations and undue emphasis on niceties of language.’ 
Lord Hoffmann further emphasised the need to consider the words used by the parties in context, even to 
the extent of being able to recognise what the parties intended despite their use of the ‘wrong words’. He 
said18: 
‘It is of course true that the law is not concerned with the speakers’ subjective intentions. But the 
notion that the law's concern is therefore with the “meaning of his words” conceals an important 
ambiguity. The ambiguity lies in a failure to distinguish between the meanings of words and the 
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[1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114. See also Don King Productions v Warren [1998] 2 All ER 608, Lightman J at 
624: 
‘The essential task of construction is to deduce, if this is possible, from the two agreements, construed 
against their commercial background the commercial purpose which the businessmen and entities who 
were parties to them must as a matter of business common sense have intended to achieve by entering 
into them; and if such intent can fairly be deduced and if this is necessary to effectuate that intent, the 
court may require what may appear to be errors or inadequacies in the choice of language to yield to that 
intention and be understood as saying what (in the light of that purpose) that language must reasonably 
be understood to have been intended to mean.’ 
question of what would be understood as the meaning of a person who uses words. The meanings 
of words as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their syntactical arrangement, as it 
would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we use to understand a speaker's 
utterance. But it is only a part; another part is our knowledge of the background which enables us, 
not only to choose the intended meaning when a word has more than one dictionary meaning, but 
also to understand a speaker's meaning, often without ambiguity, when he used the wrong words.’ 
This approach allowed the court to construe a notice to determine a lease which stated that it was to 
determine on 12 January 1995 as effective, even though the lease required any such notice to ‘expire on 
the third anniversary of the term commencement date’, which was the 13 January 199519. Against its 
contextual setting, which included the requirements of the lease, the majority regarded the notice as 
unambiguously informing a reasonable recipient of determination of the lease on the date required – it 
would have been clear to the reasonable recipient that there was a minor error in the notice20. 
Although Mannai was concerned with an error in a unilateral contractual notice, it is clear that the same 
approach is taken to the interpretation of contracts more generally and that is embodied in Lord 
Hoffmann's statement of principle in the Investors Compensation Scheme case21. However, emphasis 
should be placed on Lord Hoffmann's fifth principle that ‘we do not easily accept that people have made 
linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents’, and determining the cases in which they have is not 
easy: 
‘It clearly requires a strong case to persuade the court that something must have gone wrong with 
the language …. It is, I am afraid, not unusual that an interpretation which does not strike one 
person as sufficiently irrational to justify a conclusion that there has been a linguistic mistake will 
seem commercially absurd to another …. The subtleties of language are such that no judicial 
guidelines or statements of principle can prevent it from sometimes happening. It is fortunately rare 
because most draftsmen of formal documents think about what they are saying and use language 
with care.’22  
Nevertheless, things do go wrong with the language of a contract23 and in Chartbrook v Persimmon Lord 
Hoffmann made the point that what is required is that ‘it should be clear that something has gone wrong 
with the language and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have understood the 
parties to mean’24. Once that is established, there is no limit ‘to the red ink or verbal rearrangement or 
correction which the court is allowed’,25 so that:26  
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EWCA Civ 392, [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 429 at [28]. 
24
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‘When the language used in an instrument gives rise to difficulties of construction, the process of 
interpretation does not require one to formulate some alternative form of words which 
approximates as closely as possible to that of the parties. It is to decide what a reasonable person 
would have understood the parties to have meant by using the language which they did. The fact 
that the court might have to express that meaning in language quite different from that used by the 
parties…. is no reason for not giving effect to what they appear to have meant.’ 
In Chartbrook not only did interpreting the term ‘in accordance with the ordinary rules of syntax’ make ‘no 
commercial sense’,27 it also made the ‘structure and language of the various provisions of Sch 6 appear 
arbitrary and irrational’ when it was ‘possible for the concepts employed by the parties … to be combined 
in a rational way’.28 What may be in issue may be the need to perceive an overall scheme and not allow it 
to be derailed by a badly drafted point29. 
The impact of Chartbrook and Investors Compensation Scheme on the law on rectification should 
however not be overstated. It might be noted that although principle 530 in Investors Compensation 
Scheme is similar to the law on rectification in how a mistake or deficient drafting is identified, the former 
does not permit the use of evidence of previous negotiations whilst the law on rectification clearly does. It 
is syllogistically problematic to allow this dissonance or inconsistency to remain and this point is not 
addressed in Chartbrook. 
As would be expected, the approach to mistakes which was embodied in Lord Hoffmann's statement of 
principle in Investors has no role to play in relation to exemption clauses. In William Hare Ltd v Shepherd 
Construction Ltd31 the court had to consider a ‘pay when paid clause’ in contracts between the main 
contractor and sub-contractors. The main contractors had failed to update the clause to take account of 
changes in the legislation which only allowed such clauses in limited circumstances of the employer's 
insolvency. It was argued that the clause should be construed so as to be effective despite the ‘mistake’. 
The court viewed the clause as functionally equivalent to an exemption clause and took the line that there 
was no scope to take the Investors approach to mistakes. Waller LJ said:32  
‘The principle which the courts have always applied to clauses by which a party seeks to relieve 
itself from legal liability,  iei.e. that to do so they must use clear words, should, in my view, be the 
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dominant principle. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill recently reiterated in Dairy Containers Ltd v 
Tasman Orient Line CV [2005] 1 WLR 215 “The general rule should be applied that, if a party 
otherwise liable is to exclude or limit his liability … he must do so in clear words; unclear words 
do not suffice; any ambiguity or lack of clarity must be resolved against that party”. It is not 
therefore in my view open to Shepherd to argue that there is a lack of clarity in a provision that 
they drafted so as to relieve themselves from liability, and that the court should use the principles 
identified by Lord Hoffmann as applicable in rare cases to rescue them.’ 
Contra proferentem 
[3.50]  
Traditionally the line has been taken that if a contract term is ambiguous the construction less favourable 
to the proferens is adopted. The rationale for the rule is said to be: 
‘That a person who puts forward the wording of a proposed agreement may be assumed to have 
looked after his own interests, so that if words leave room for doubt about whether he is intended to 
have a particular benefit there is reason to suppose that he is not.’1  
However, it has been recognised that the references to the ‘proferens’ are unclear, covering more than 
one situation – the person who drafted the clause, the person who sought its inclusion in the contract and 
the person who seeks to rely upon it. These will often coincide but need not necessarily do so and the 
justification for the rule may seem to have little connection with the particular fact situation eg ‘where the 
clauses under consideration [are] clauses contained in a common form document worked out by various 
interested parties in the construction industry and which would normally be in use between employers 
and contractors or contractors and sub-contractors from whichever side the initiative came’2. Obviously, 
the appositeness of the application of the rule in such contexts can be questioned3. In addition, the 
continued application of the rule had to be questioned more generally after the line taken in Investors that 
the way in which contracts are now interpreted has largely been assimilated to ‘the common sense 
principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’4. However, plainly the rule 
continues to be viewed as applicable post-Investors5, although there is emphasis upon it as a rule of last 
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resort, only to be used when the ‘business purpose’ of the clause, or ‘business common sense’, or simply 
the relevant background, have failed to render a clause unambiguous6. The rule is often used in relation 
to exemption clauses and will be considered further in that context7. 
However, it should also be noted here that in relation to contracts between consumers and sellers or 
suppliers, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 now state: 
‘If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most favourable 
to the consumer shall prevail….’8  
This applies when a dispute between a particular seller, or supplier, and consumer is in question. It may 
be seen as simply a version of the common law contra proferentem rule, and the line taken by the CJEU 
in European Commission v Spain9 would suggest that10. 
Ejusdem generis rule 
[3.51]  
When a contract term contains a list1 of specific words followed by2 a general word, the parties may be 
taken to have intended the general word to be confined to cover only the same type of matter as that 
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covered by the specific words3. This cannot apply if the specific words do not generate any category, or 
genus4, to which the general words could be confined5. It may be clear that the parties did not intend6 the 
general words to be confined by the specific list, as where the general words are followed by some such a 
phrase or word as ‘whatsoever’7. In addition, any rule such as the ejusdem generis rule must now be 
viewed in the light of Lord Hoffmann's point in the Investors' Compensation Scheme case, that there has 
largely been an assimilation of the way in which contracts are interpreted to ‘the common sense principles 
by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’8. However, whilst recognising that 
‘judges today are reluctant, and properly reluctant, to explain decisions on the use of language by 
reference to maxims expressed in Latin’, Scottish Power plc v Britoil (Exploration) Ltd was viewed as 
illustrating that ‘in appropriate circumstances’ the rule remains sound’9. It may be that in some cases the 
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rule reflects the ‘common sense’ reaction10. In Association of British Travel Agents v British Airways plc 
the phrase ‘and other charges’ was viewed as ‘naturally affected by the fact that it does not appear by 
itself but as part of the phrase “taxes and other charges”’11. It thus follows that although as a construction 
aid the ejusdem generis rule is useful, it should not be used to deny the contract its commercial sense12. 
Expressio Unius 
[3.52]  
Express reference to one thing in a contract may indicate that anything of the same type which is not 
expressly referred to, is not intended to be covered1. So, for example, a tenancy of agricultural land 
provided for certain payments to be made by the incoming tenants to the outgoing. It was held that that 
meant that there should be no payment for ‘foldage’ to the outgoing tenant, although it was a local 
custom, because of the other payments which had been expressly required2. However, it has been said of 
this canon of construction that3: 
‘It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow … The exclusion is often the result 
of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having 
regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.’ 
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In addition, the point must again be made, that, in construction, the emphasis has largely moved to ‘the 
common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’4. 
Exemption clauses can basically be viewed as clauses which exclude or limit, or appear to exclude or 
limit, liability for breach of contract or other liability arising by way of tort, bailment or statute. This 
document covers the: construction of exemption clauses; exemption clauses and third parties; Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977; and Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 3. 
E Exemption Clauses 
Introduction 
[3.53]  
Exemption clauses can basically be viewed as clauses which exclude or limit, or appear to exclude or 
limit, liability for breach of contract or other liability arising by way of tort, bailment or statute. This 
encompasses a wide variety of clauses1 and those in the form of an indemnity will also often be treated 
as exemption clauses2. It has, in fact, been contended that there is no such distinct type of clause and the 
clause, whatever its form is part of the definition of the obligations undertaken by the parties3. However, 
although lacking in central definitions, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, assumes that it is possible to 
identify clauses which ‘exclude … liability’ and, in general, the assumption made by the courts is that 
exclusion clauses are a distinct type of clause4 and that assumption does not seem out of line with the 
common perception of such clauses as something apart from the definition of the obligation. The 
identification of exemption clauses at a level other than that of form will be addressed below, in the 
context of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19775. 
Three basic questions arise in relation to the effectiveness of exemption clauses: 
(i) whether the clause is part of the contract ie whether it was effectively incorporated6; 
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In the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, it is less crucial that a particular exemption or limitation of liability 
clause had been incorporated in the contract. Clause 62 provides that the proscription against unfairness 
applies not only to terms but also notices. Moreover cl 61(6) states that ‘it does not matter … whether the 
(ii) whether it is worded so as to cover the breach which occurred (its construction); 
(iii) whether it is affected by legislation – principally, and most generally, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
19777, s 3 Misrepresentation Act 19678 and, now, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 19999. 
Exemption clauses will often form part of a standard form contract and they are usually written terms and 
the incorporation of written terms, in general, has already been considered10. The construction of 
exemption clauses and also the effect of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 are considered below. 
Construction 
Approaches 
[3.54]  
It is in the area of exemption clauses that construction has, perhaps, been used most inventively ‘to stab 
the idol’ of freedom of contract ‘in the back’1. However, since the advent of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 ‘strained construction’ has been deprecated. In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd2 
Lord Diplock said3: 
‘the reports are full of cases in which what would appear to be very strained constructions have 
been placed upon exclusion clauses, mainly in what today would be called consumer contracts and 
contracts of adhesion … any need for this kind of judicial distortion of the English language has 
been banished by Parliament's having made these kinds of contracts subject to the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977.’ 
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In fact, construction may now save a clause which was initially seen as too wide to ‘satisfy the 
requirement of reasonableness’ in UCTA4. 
In addition, in relation to the construction of exemption clauses, the impact remains somewhat imprecise 
of the movement in construction in general which was embodied in the principles set out by Lord 
Hoffmann in Investors' Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society5. As has been 
indicated, that approach assimilates the construction of contracts to ‘the common sense principles by 
which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’6. This will be considered further below at 
appropriate points, in relation to specific issues of the construction of exemption clauses. In general, there 
are some fundamentals – first, there is no reason to approach the exercise of construing an exemption or 
limitation of liability clause in any way differently to any other term in a contract. In Tradigrain SA v 
Intertek Testing Services (ITS) Canada Ltd Moore-Bick LJ stated: 
‘It is certainly true that English law has traditionally taken a restrictive approach to the construction 
of exemption clauses and clauses limiting liability for breaches of contract and other wrongful acts. 
However, in recent years it has been increasingly willing to recognise that parties to commercial 
contracts are entitled to apportion the risk of loss as they see fit and that provisions which limit or 
exclude liability must be construed in the same way as other terms …’7  
Second, the starting premise is the presumption that neither party intends to abandon any remedies for 
breach which are conferred to it by operation of law. Clear express words must be used in order to rebut 
this presumption8. As Lord Wilberforce noted, it surely could not be right to take it that the parties had 
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(in liquidation) v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2001] 1 All ER 961, [60]–[66]. However note also the comments of 
the Law Commission in contending for a limited scope for the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in the 
context of the rights of third parties under what has become the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999. The Law Commission emphasised the use of the common law to control exemption clauses: Law 
Com no 242, para 13.10(iv). 
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Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98, Lord Hoffmann at 
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[2007] EWCA Civ 154 at [46]; Simon J recently endorsed this approach in Bikam OOD Central Investment 
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IBM United Kingdom Limited [2014] EWHC 752 (TCC). 
8
 
Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd v Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd [1974] AC 689, Lord Diplock at 717. 
contemplated that the clause should have so wide an ambit as in effect to deprive one party's stipulations 
of all contractual force9. To do so would be to reduce the contract to a mere declaration or statement of 
intent. In construing the exclusion clause against the party seeking to rely on it, the court would prefer the 
interpretation which would not reduce the contract to a mere declaration or statement of intent10. 
There is some doubt as to whether there is a general rule that the exclusion clause should be construed 
in a manner which would prevent one party from benefiting from its wrongdoing (Alghussein 
Establishment v Eton College11). In Fujitsu Services Limited v IBM United Kingdom Limited12 the court did 
not think there was, preferring to confine the inquiry largely to the accepted principles of construction. 
A distinction has been drawn between clauses which exclude liability and those which merely limit it. 
Although, it is acknowledged that limitation clauses are still to be construed contra proferentem13, it has 
been said that they are not to be treated with ‘the same hostility as clauses of exclusion’14, and that the 
rules for the construction of exclusion clauses should not be applied in ‘their full rigour’ to limitation 
clauses15. There have been attempts to justify this distinction16. However, it seems wholly unrealistic as ‘a 
limitation clause may be so severe in its operation as to be virtually indistinguishable from that of an 
exclusion clause’17 and the distinction was rejected by the High Court of Australia18. Even though made 
                                                     
9
 
Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 
at 432; see also AstraZeneca UK Limited v Albemarle International Corporation [2011] 2 CLC 252. 
10
 
AstraZeneca UK Limited v Albemarle International Corporation [2011] 2 CLC 252, Flaux J at 313; doubt 
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11
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party who relies on his own breach to avoid a contract and thereby escape his obligations.’ 
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Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 101, [1983] 1 WLR 964 at 966 and 
971. Whitecap Leisure Ltd v John H Rundle Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 429, [2008] All ER (D) 383 (Apr), [22]. 
For the Contra proferentem rule see para 3.56. 
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Lord Fraser at 971. See also George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, 
Lord Bridge at 814. See also EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve plc [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 239 at 244; Bovis 
Construction (Scotland) Ltd v Whatlings Construction Ltd [1995] CLC 1413; University of Keele v Price 
Waterhouse [2004] EWCA Civ 583, [2004] All ER (D) 264 (May); Whitecap Leisure Ltd v John H Rundle 
Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 429, [2008] All ER (D) 383 (Apr), [22]; Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Machinenfabrik 
Ernst Hesa GMBH [2008] EWHC 6 (TCC), 118 ConLR 104, [2008] BLR 155, [193]. 
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Ailsa Craig [1983] 1 WLR 964, Lord Wilberforce at 966. See also Lord Fraser at 970. 
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by the House of Lords19, the distinction must now be open to question, in the light of the developments in 
relation to construction in general which were noted above and in BHP Petroleum Ltd v British Steel20 
Evans LJ commented on the limitation/exclusion distinction. He said:21  
‘I think it is unfortunate if the present authorities cannot be reconciled on the basis that no 
categorization is necessary and of a general rule that the more extreme the consequences are, in 
terms of excluding or modifying the liability that would otherwise arise, then the more stringent the 
courts’ approach should be in requiring that the exclusion or limit should be clearly and 
unambiguously expressed.’ 
The effects of legislation – contract drafting 
[3.55]  
When contracts are drafted, account has to be taken of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) and 
of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR). There are some clauses which 
are automatically ineffective under the Act1. However, for the most part, clauses excluding or restricting 
liability, are rendered ineffective unless they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. Since that is 
assessed against the time frame of when the contract was made2, the impact of the clause in relation to 
the particular breach is not considered, but merely the potential scope of the clause. That means that a 
clause may be ineffective because unreasonable, even though its application in the particular case would 
be reasonable3, and several narrow clauses are safer than a single wide clause. The single wide clause 
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Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803. 
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Para 43. See also Frans Maas (UK) v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm), [2005] 
2 All ER (Comm) 783. But see Ocean Chemical Transport v Exnor Craggs Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 
519, Evans LJ, [38]. 
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See eg UCTA 1977, ss 2(1), 6. 
2
 
UCTA 1977, s 11(5): see para 3.84. 
3
 
may fail in its entirety, whereas some of a series of clauses covering the same area might survive4. In 
general, the impact of UCTA 1977 must be borne in mind in drafting exemption clauses and, in many 
cases, that means the effect of the ‘requirement of reasonableness’5. 
The 1999 Regulations apply to terms which have not been individually negotiated in contracts between 
sellers or suppliers and consumers. Regulation 7(1) states that a ‘seller or supplier shall ensure that any 
written term of a contract is expressed in plain, intelligible language’. There is no clear penalty, as such, 
for failure so to state terms, but ‘plain intelligible language’ is emphasised in the Regulations6. There is 
what may be regarded as a version of the contra proferentem rule7, in regulation 7(2). In addition, whether 
a term is in ‘plain intelligible language’ affects whether a ‘core term’ is subject to the fairness test8, and 
may also impact upon whether a term is regarded as fair under the Regulations9 (unfair terms do not bind 
the consumer10). In general, the fairness test should be borne in mind in the drafting of standard form 
contracts for use between a consumer and a seller or supplier, particularly the list of terms which ‘may be 
regarded as unfair’ in sch 211. 
Strict construction, contra proferentem 
[3.56]  
An exemption clause must clearly cover what has occurred if it is to be effective1 and the burden of 
proving it does so, lies upon the party seeking to rely upon it2. They are said to be strictly construed 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 257; Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd (1994) 12 
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See para 3.105. 
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Regulation 8. 
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See para 3.112. 
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J Gordon Alison & Co Ltd v Wallsend Shipway and Engineering Co Ltd (1927) 43 TLR 323. 
2
 
British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389 at 392, referring to 
the Glendarroch [1894] P 226 at 231. Stent Foundations Ltd v M J Gleeson Group plc [2001] BLR 134, 
[15]. 
(although the meaning of ‘strict construction’ has been questioned3) and the contra proferentem rule 
applies so that any ambiguity in the clause is resolved against the proferens. So, for example, where 
there was a clause in a contract for the sale of seed stating that the ‘sellers give no warranty expressed or 
implied as to the growth, description or any other matters’, the clause was held not to cover a breach of a 
term which was a condition4. A clause in a contract of insurance referring to ‘load’ was held not to apply to 
passengers5. Reference to the ‘goods delivered’ was held not to apply to a breach through short delivery6. 
A clause dealing with ‘consequential loss or damage’ did not cover loss arising in the natural course of 
events7. 
However, it should be recognised that there is an ambiguity in the contra proferentem rule itself when the 
‘proferens’ is referred to – it may be the person seeking to rely upon the clause or the person who 
introduced it into the contract8. In many cases, particularly where an exemption clause is in question, that 
may well be the same person and the argument for the application of the rule is greater where that is the 
case, particularly if the party who introduced the clause was also responsible for drafting it. The argument 
for the use of the rule is weakest when the contract is standard form, having been worked out by both 
sides of a particular trade and it is fortuitous as to which of the parties introduced it9. Particularly against 
the background of the Investors' approach to construction in general, it may be suggested that in some 
such cases it may be more appropriate simply to look for the most likely meaning intended by commercial 
people10. Post-UCTA, and in the movement away from ‘strained construction’, the contra proferentem rule 
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misleading’: Mannai Investment v Eagle Star [1997] 3 All ER 352 at 377. 
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Wallis, Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394; Baldry v Marshall [1925] 1 KB 260. 
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Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance Co [1954] 1 QB 247. 
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Beck & Co v Szymanowski [1924] AC 43. 
7
 
Ie consequential losses are those falling within the second limb of the remoteness test in Hadley v 
Baxendale ((1854) 9 Exch 341 per Alderson B at 355); Croudace Construction Ltd v Cawoods Concrete 
Products Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 55; Trolex Products Ltd v Merrol Fire Protection Engineers Ltd (20 
November 1991, unreported), Staughton LJ; Millar's Machinery Co Ltd v David Way and Son (1934) 40 
Com Cas 204; Saint Line Ltd v Richardsons Westgarth & Co Ltd [1940] 2 KB 99; British Sugar plc v Nei 
Power Ltd (1997) 87 BLR 42; Deepak Ferilisers v Davy McKee [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 387; Hotel Services 
Ltd v Hilton International Hotels (UK) Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 750. 
8
 
BHP Petroleum v British Steel [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 133, para 16; Stent Foundations Ltd v MJ Gleeson 
Group plc [2001] BLR 134, [15]. Or sometimes, more narrowly, as the person seeking to rely upon the 
clause or the person who drafted it: Youell v Bland Welch [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 127 at 134. 
9
 
County and District Properties v Jenner [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 728 at 737 and note the comments of Oliver 
LJ in E Scott (Plant Hire) Ltd v British Waterways Board (20 December 1982, unreported). Royal and Sun 
Alliance Insurance plc v Dornoch Ltd [2004] EWHC 803 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 826 at [82], affd 
[2005] EWCA Civ 238, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 590. A Kramer ‘Common Sense Principles of Contract 
Interpretation (and how we've been using them all along)’ (2003) 23 Ox Jo LS 173, 195. 
10
 
has been described as an ‘aid of last resort’ and it has been said that it ‘would be wrong to use it to create 
an ambiguity where none realistically exists, and then to resolve the question by reference to it’11 and its 
nature as a rule of last resort must be emphasised all the more post-Investors12. In the light of these 
developments, caution is required in referring to older cases applying the rule, but it is still used13 and the 
strict approach to exemption clauses continues to be restated. 
‘The general rule … [is] that if a party, otherwise liable, is to exclude or limit his liability or to rely 
on an exemption, he must do so in clear words; unclear words do not suffice; any ambiguity or lack 
of clarity must be resolved against that party’.14  
In addition, it has recently been stated that the need for clear words is all the greater where the breach is 
one which cannot, or is unlikely to be covered by insurance as ‘the normal function of an exemption 
clause is to allocate risk between parties, normally insurable risk, so that the parties as commercial men 
know on whom is the obligation to insure’15. 
In the context of disputes between particular consumers and sellers, or suppliers, UTCCR 1999, reg 7(2) 
contains what may be regarded as a version of the common law contra proferentem rule, so that, ‘if there 
is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most favourable to the consumer 
shall prevail’16. This is considered further below17. 
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Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd v Mobil Sales and Supply Co [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 474 at 
483. McGeown v Direct Travel Insurance [2003] EWCA Civ 1606, [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 609 at [13]. 
13
 
For example, Whitecap Leisure Ltd v John H Rundle Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 429, [2008] All ER (D) 383 
(Apr), [22]. 
14
 
Dairy Containers Ltd v Tasman Orient Line CV, The Tasman Discoverer [2004] UKPC 22, [2004] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 667, [2005] 1 WLR 215, Lord Bingham at [12]. William Hare V Shepherd Construction Ltd [2010] 
EWCA Civ 283, [2010] All ER (D) 168 (Mar) at [18]. 
15
 
Internet Broadcasting Corpn Ltd (t/a NETTV) v MAR LLC (t/a MARHedge) [2009] EWHC 844 (Ch), [2010] 
1 All ER (Comm) 112 at [30]–[33], [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 295. In complex financial services contracts, a 
clear stipulation stating that the service provided is an execution-only transaction will excuse the provider 
from a duty to advise and the user must be careful not to treat any communications from the provider as 
departing from that position (Barclays Bank plc v Svizera Holdings BV [2014] EWHC 1020 (Comm)). 
16
 
As regards the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, cl 69(1) contains a similar provision. That clause reads: ‘If a 
term in a consumer contract, or a consumer notice, could have different meanings, the meaning that is 
most favourable to the consumer is to prevail.’ 
17
 
See para 3.107. 
Negligence 
[3.57]  
Traditionally the courts have dealt with the issue of the construction of an exemption clause where the 
defendant's liability involves negligence by using a three stage test. This is commonly referred to as the 
Canada Steamship test because of the case from which its common formulation derives1. It is clear that, 
at this point, it survives the evolution of the general approach to construction which was identified in the 
Investors Compensation Scheme case2. In HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan 
Bank Lord Bingham made the point that ‘There can be no doubting the general authority of the [Canada 
Steamship test] which has been applied in many cases, and the approach indicated is sound’3, but its 
‘rigour’ has been seen as reduced post-Investors4 and developments in relation to the use of the test in 
the light of that evolution will be considered below. However, before considering the test, it should be 
emphasised that many exemption clauses covering liability for negligence will now be affected by UCTA 
1977, s 2. In relation to the contracts to which the Act is relevant5, s 2 prevents the exclusion or limitation 
of liability for negligently caused death or personal injury and only allows a clause to limit or exclude 
liability for other negligently caused loss or damage in so far as the clause satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness6. In addition, in relation to terms which have not been individually negotiated in contracts 
between sellers or supplier, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR)7 should 
also be noted. The Regulations apply a test of fairness and although terms excluding or restricting liability 
for negligently caused death or personal injury are subject to that test, rather than being automatically 
ineffective, the Office of Fair Trading had said that ‘it would be difficult to conceive of circumstances in 
which [such a clause] would not be unfair’8. In addition, the OFT (now replaced by the CMA) obviously 
viewed exemption clauses dealing with other negligently caused loss or damage as generally unfair in the 
consumer context9. 
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[2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 349 at [11]. 
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Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Machinenfabrik Ernst Hesa GMBH [2008] EWHC 6 (TCC), 118 ConLR 104, 
[2008] BLR 155, [180]–[183]. 
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See para 3.67 ff. 
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In Hirtenstein v Hill Dickinson [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm) it was clearly assumed that ‘negligence’ will 
extend to cover professional negligence. On the facts though the court held that for the purposes of s 2(2) 
it had not been properly proved that it the operative clause satisfied the reasonableness test laid down in 
s 11. 
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See para 3.97 ff. 
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OFT Unfair Terms Bulletin No 3 at 1.2. See below para 3.113. 
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The basic formulation of the three-stage test which the courts have adopted to deal with questions of 
whether a clause covers liability based on negligence can be found in the judgment of the Privy Council in 
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R10. Lord Morton stated11: 
‘(1) If the clause contains language which expressly exempts the person in whose favour it is 
made (hereafter called the “proferens”) from the consequences of the negligence of his own 
servants, effect must be given to that provision … 
(2) If there is no express reference to negligence, the court must consider whether the words 
used are wide enough, in their ordinary meaning, to cover negligence on the part of the 
servants of the proferens. If a doubt arises at this point, it must be resolved against the 
proferens … 
(3) If the words used are wide enough for the above purposes, the court must then consider 
whether the “head of damage may be based on some ground other than that of negligence” to 
quote again Lord Greene in the Alderslade case12. The “other ground” must not be so 
fanciful or remote that the proferens cannot be suppose to have desired protection against it; 
but subject to this qualification, which is no doubt to be implied from Lord Greene's words, 
the existence of a possible head of damage other than that of negligence is fatal to the 
proferens even if the words used are prima facie wide enough to cover negligence …’ 
Although Lord Morton was referring to the negligence of the ‘servants of the proferens’, the approach also 
applies in relation to the party's own negligence13. It is based on the idea that ‘it is inherently improbable 
that one party to the contract should intend to absolve the other party from the consequences of the 
latter's own negligence’14. It has been suggested that a less strict approach should be taken to limitation 
clauses than exclusion clauses15, but that is open to criticism16. The scope of the test17 extends beyond 
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Hire) Ltd v British Waterways Board (20 December 1982, unreported), Oliver LJ; Industrie Chimiche Italia 
Centrale SpA v Nea Ninemia Shipping Co SA, The Emmanuel C [1983] 1 All ER 686, Bingham J at 689; 
Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK plc [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm) at [369]. 
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Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 101, Lord Fraser at 105; George 
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 at 814; Trolex Products Ltd v Merrol 
Fire Protection Engineers Ltd (20 November 1991, unreported), Staughton LJ; Jones v Northampton 
exemption clauses in the narrowest sense to indemnity clauses18. However, the line has always been 
taken that Lord Morton's three points are ‘intended as guides to interpretation and not as rigid rules’19, 
and what is being sought is the parties' intention20. The rules have, for example, been seen as 
inapplicable where there is specific acceptance of liability in some cases ‘only’, and those listed cases 
involve some negligence. Such clauses may be seen as excluding liability in all other cases, including 
others involving negligence21. Further, post-Investors, there may be a greater willingness to find that the 
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Engineering Ltd [1967] 3 All ER 586, [1967] 1 WLR 1508; Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 
620, Slade LJ at 625–626; Thompson v T Lohan Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 631. It does not apply to a clause 
identified as defining the obligation, rather than excluding liability: National Westminster Bank v Utrecht-
America [2001] EWCA Civ 658, [2001] 3 All ER 733, paras 49-52. 
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Canada Steamship test is simply inapplicable on the basis that the parties' intention is clear22 or the 
circumstances may be such that the ‘inherent improbability’, on which the test is based, is not seen to be 
present23. 
In relation to the first part of the test, the point has been made that ‘To satisfy [the first test] there must be 
a clear and unmistakeable reference to negligence’24. The term negligence or some synonym for it should 
obviously suffice25, although it had even been suggested that nothing short of the use of the term 
‘negligence’ itself will suffice26. Dismissing an earlier approach, the line was taken that ‘Words such as 
“whatsoever” or “however arising” are merely words of emphasis and cannot be read as equivalent to an 
express reference’ to negligence27. Of course, very explicit references to negligence are not unknown28, 
but are not frequently used. ‘Omissions of express reference to negligence in contracts drafted by lawyers 
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tend to be deliberate’. The ‘draftsman on the underground … would say “one does not want to frighten off 
one or other of the parties”’29. 
When general words are used, which could, potentially, cover negligence but which do not expressly do 
so, stages 2 and 3 become relevant. A clause referring, for example, to loss or damage ‘howsoever 
caused’ has been seen as successfully falling within the second part of the test. It is not only a wide 
clause, it is also more explicit than one which simply refers to ‘any loss’ or ‘any damage’. It directs 
attention not merely to the kinds of loss or damage but also to the cause of the loss or damage30. 
However, a wide but less specific clause may nevertheless be seen as capable of encompassing liability 
based on negligence within the second part of the test. The words ‘any act or omission’ have been seen 
as ‘certainly wide enough to comprehend negligence’31. 
The third stage of the test indicated above could be regarded as part of the second stage. In considering 
whether there could be liability without negligence, the question being asked is merely whether a general 
clause is ambiguous because of one particular factor: the number of ways in which liability may occur. 
Where there can be liability without negligence, the courts have tended to find that a generally worded 
exemption clause is intended to cover only the strict liability and not that based on negligence: 
‘[a common carrier's] liability in respect of articles entrusted to him is not necessarily based on 
negligence. Accordingly if a common carrier wishes to limit his liability for lost articles and does 
not make it quite clear that he is desiring to limit it in respect of his liability for negligence, then the 
clause will be construed as extending only to his liability on grounds other than negligence.’32  
This example and the statement of the test by Lord Morton are in absolute terms as if the presence, or 
absence, of another, non-fanciful, basis of liability determines whether or not a clause is to be construed 
as covering negligence. However, there can be no such determinative rule as the intention of the parties 
is sought33. Even where there is no other, non-fanciful, liability for a clause to cover, on occasion, it may 
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still be found not to encompass negligence34 and, where there is other liability, on occasion a sufficiently 
worded clause may still be found to encompass negligence35. 
However, it should be emphasised that not every alternative basis of liability will be relevant to the third 
part of the test. To be relevant to the question of construction, an alternative basis of liability must not be 
too ‘fanciful or remote’ so that it ‘would not have been within the contemplation of the parties when the 
terms of the [contract] were agreed’36. In the Canada Steamship case the potential for non-negligent 
liability was not wide, but the Privy Council was ‘not prepared to assume that the obligations imposed on 
the lessors by the Civil Code were not in the minds of the parties’ and the clause was construed as 
referring to that liability and not as extending to negligence. In general the question of whether or not any 
alternative basis of liability is too ‘fanciful or remote’ will depend upon the facts of the particular case, but 
it should be borne in mind that: 
‘When two commercial concerns contract with one another, they do not … concern themselves 
with … legal subtleties … We should look at the facts and realities of the situation as they did or 
must be deemed to have presented themselves to the contracting parties at the time the contract was 
made, and ask what potential liabilities the one to the other did the parties apply their minds, or 
must be deemed to have done so.’37  
Some final consideration should be given to the Canada Steamship approach in the light of the principles 
set out in the Investors Compensation Scheme case38. The Canada Steamship case might simply have 
been viewed as part of the ‘old intellectual baggage of legal interpretation’ which is being dispensed 
with39. However, at this point, plainly it has survived Investors, although with some diminution in its 
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impact. The basis for its survival may be that the approach in Canada Steamship has been seen as 
based on an assumption about the probability of one party intending to excuse the other's negligence and 
it has been seen ‘when properly understood’ as ‘according with … common sense’40. In any event, it is so 
well established that, at least in commercial cases, where the parties have been legally advised, it could 
be seen as part of the ‘background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties 
at the time of the contract’, and so to be taken into account in the construction process on that basis41. It 
may be, however, that there will be a growing emphasis upon the fact that the Canada Steamship test 
does not need to be considered where the clause can be regarded as ‘unambiguously’ covering 
negligence. 
Inconsistent terms 
[3.58]  
The exemption clause may appear to be inconsistent with one of the other terms of the contract and the 
question will arise as to whether the parties intended the exemption clause to deprive the apparent term 
of its contractual force or whether the exemption clause is intended to be subject to that other term. In J 
Evans & Son (Portsmouth) v Andrea Merzario Ltd1, from 1959 to 1967 Merzario had shipped machinery 
for Evans on the basis that it would always be shipped below deck to prevent rusting. In 1967 Merzario 
wished to change to using containers to ship goods and discussed that with Evans, who agreed to the 
change to containers on being given an assurance that containers with their goods in would continue to 
be shipped below deck. That agreement was not in writing. Subsequently, Merzario failed to ensure that a 
container with Evans’ goods in it was shipped below deck and was lost overboard. Merzario sought to rely 
upon the standard conditions of the freight forwarding trade, clause 4 of which stated ‘subject to express 
instructions in writing given by the customer, [Merzario] reserves to itself complete freedom in respect of 
means, route and procedure to be followed in the handling and transportation of goods’. On its face, 
clause 4 was inconsistent with any contention that there was an enforceable obligation on Merzario to 
ship the goods below deck. Nevertheless, reversing the decision of Kerr J, the Court of Appeal held that 
the express oral assurance that the machinery would be shipped below deck was an enforceable 
contractual obligation which prevailed over clause 4 (either on the basis that it was a collateral contract or 
because it was part of the main contract, which was partly oral and partly written). Roskill LJ said2: 
‘It is a question of construction. Interpreting the contract … one has to treat the promise that no 
container would be shipped on deck as overriding any question of [an] exempting condition. 
Otherwise … the promise would be illusory.’ 
There was a clear oral statement which both parties knew was essential to the contract and the standard 
terms had to be read subject to that. The same conclusion has been reached in other cases where there 
has been a clear oral promise, which was essential to the contract, but which was apparently contradicted 
in the standard terms3. 
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Where there existed a valid entire agreement clause in the contract, the outcome could have been very 
different. In Mileform Ltd v Interserve Security Ltd4 the claimant argued that the written warehousing 
contract had been varied to give them exclusive rights by an oral contract which amounted to a collateral 
agreement. The court distinguished the case from Andrea Merzario, stating that in the present case there 
was a valid entire agreement clause preventing the admission of oral terms (even if it was proved that 
there was an oral agreement to the effect claimed by the claimant)5. This is an important limitation to the 
collateral contract device used in Andrea Merzario. 
Inconsistencies may also arise between written terms. It may be clear that the particular term should take 
precedence over the general exemption clause6. 
Fundamental breach 
[3.59]  
There has always been some confusion as to exactly what the phrase ‘fundamental breach’ means. It 
could be used to indicate that a breach had occurred which entitled the injured party to terminate the 
contract, or it could be used to indicate that a certain approach to construction is required1, and a similar 
point can be made in relation to the phrase ‘fundamental term’. In Photo Production Lord Diplock stated2 
that the term ‘fundamental breach’ should now be confined to the situation where the breach is such as to 
allow the innocent party to terminate ie the term ‘fundamental breach’ is no longer required in relation to 
construction issues. In the context of construction, fundamental breach was a device used to limit the 
effectiveness of exemption clauses. At one point, it was even sought to create a rule of law to the effect 
that there were some breaches, or terms, which were so fundamental that no exemption clause could 
affect liability in relation to them3. However, this was dismissed by the House of Lords in Suisse 
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Atlantique Société d'Armament Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale4 and again5, and more 
clearly, in Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Ltd6. Fundamental breach was essentially a device which 
the advent of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 rendered redundant7. As an approach to construction it 
might now simply be said that the more fundamental the breach8, the less likely it is that an exemption 
clause was intended to cover it. So, it has been said, for example, the ‘words needed to cover a 
deliberate, repudiatory breach need to be very “clear” in the sense of using “strong” language such as 
“under no circumstances”’ and that there ‘is a particular need to use “clear” in the sense of “strong” 
language where the exemption clause is intended to cover deliberate wrongdoing by a party in respect of 
a breach which cannot, or is unlikely to be covered by insurance’9. 
However, a named rule is no longer required and what must be considered is how much of the 
‘respectable commercial origin’ of the doctrine10 survives, particularly in the light of the evolution which 
was recognised to have taken place in construction generally in the Investors Compensation Scheme 
case11. 
Within the performance of the contract 
[3.60]  
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It may be contended that an exemption clause does not apply to what has occurred because it only 
applies to the performance of the contract, albeit defective performance. In Chanter v Hopkins1 Lord 
Abinger said: 
‘If a man offers to buy peas of another, and he sends him beans, he does not perform his contract. 
But that is not a warranty; there is no warranty that he should sell him peas; the contract is to sell 
peas, and if he sends him anything else in their stead, it is a non-performance of it.’ 
If there is a contract between two parties, X and Y, and X has contracted to deliver peas to Y he will not 
be able to rely upon any clause of the contract excluding his liability if he delivers beans instead. What X 
has done does not relate to the performance of the contract at all and an exemption clause dealing with 
that performance will not cover what has occurred. (Of course, care must be taken in ascertaining exactly 
what the contractual obligations were. The contract may have been one for the supply of peas or beans 
or, even, any green vegetable2.) However, this type of argument has been seen as going beyond delivery 
of entirely different goods, and as extending to the delivery of goods which are so defective that it is 
contended that their delivery does not amount to a performance of the contract3, but such an approach 
must now be regarded as of very restricted application4. 
The main purpose rule 
[3.61]  
An exemption clause may have to be read so as to ensure that it does not defeat the main purpose of the 
contract. In Glynn v Margetson & Co1 there was a contract for the shipment of oranges from Malaga to 
Liverpool. To collect another cargo the ship went a further 350 miles away from Liverpool before heading 
for that port. The delay meant that the oranges were damaged by the time they reached Liverpool. There 
was a clause in the contract of shipment that the ship ‘should have liberty to proceed to and stay at any 
port or ports in any station in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black Sea, or Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, 
Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain or Ireland, for the purpose of delivering coals, cargo, or 
passengers, or for any other purpose whatsoever’. The clause did not prevent the shipowners from being 
liable for the damage to the oranges. The clause provided a liberty to deviate but the approach taken was 
that it had to be read in the light of the main purpose of the contract, ascertained from reading it as a 
whole. The main purpose of getting a perishable cargo from A to B would be defeated if the liberty to 
deviate was not read as confined to ports along the route from A to B. In Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd v 
Rambler Cycle Club this approach was also held to prevent reliance on a clause stating that that ‘the 
responsibility of the carrier … shall be deemed … to cease absolutely after the goods are discharged 
from the ship’ when the contract also provided that delivery should only have been made on production of 
the bill of lading and delivery was made without that document. The court viewed the situation as one 
which was to be equated with what would have occurred if the carriers had burnt the goods or thrown 
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them into the sea. It would have defeated the main object of the contract if the carriers were entirely at 
liberty to deliver the goods to anyone, despite the requirement that delivery should occur on production of 
the bill of lading2. However, the question is the extent to which this type of approach survives Investors. It 
must obviously not be used to resurrect ‘fundamental breach’3 and in Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA (in liquidation) v Ali Lord Hoffmann saw the above type of cases as a matter of ‘judicial 
creativity’ rather than of ‘giving effect to what on the ordinary principles of construction the parties 
agreed’4. Nevertheless, clauses which are potentially very wide in their application will sometimes need to 
be cut down to give effect to the intention of the parties5. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
itself even Lord Hoffmann thought that the ‘full and final settlement clause’ should be subject to some 
limitation on its literal extent (albeit to a lesser extent than did the majority) and in Mitsubishi Corpn v 
Eastwind Transport Ltd6 the approach taken in Glyn v Margetson was used to limit the effect of an 
exemption clause to meet the argument that the clause denied substance to the contract. The extension 
of the approach taken in Sze Hai Tong Cycle Club to delivery on production of a forged bill of lading in 
Motis Exports Ltd v Dampskibsselskabet7 was criticised as ‘coming perilously close to, if not actually to 
be, the doctrine or fundamental breach’8. Nevertheless, it was followed in Trafigura Beheer BV v 
Mediterranean Shipping Co SA9. In addition, in relation to a ‘joint venture in internet broadcasting’, a 
‘literal reading’ of a clause which would have ‘defeat[ed] the main object of the contract’ was rejected 
where it would have allowed a deliberate and personal repudiation ‘without any consequences as to lost 
profit even though lost profit [was] likely to be the only serious consequence’ of repudiation’10. 
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Deviation 
[3.62]  
Traditionally, a distinct approach has been taken in relation to deviation in carriage of goods by sea 
contracts and analogous bailment cases. Any unjustified deviation would provide the injured party with an 
election to end the contract and if that was done the terms ceased to bind, including any exemptions1, 
and similarly in relation to the liability for goods stored otherwise than in the agreed place2, or handed 
over to a subcontractor without authority3. It was, of course, necessary to determine the place of storage 
required by the contract4, or whether any liberty to deviate was given5. In Photo Productions v Securicor 
Lord Wilberforce indicated that despite the general demise of fundamental breach, it might be necessary 
to maintain these rules ‘as a body of authority sui generis’6. Nevertheless, there are indications that this 
area should be assimilated to the general law, so that the effect of deviation would depend upon the 
construction of the contract7. However, it ‘is a question of some controversy whether [the deviation cases] 
now exemplify … a principle of English law’8. 
Exemption clauses and third parties 
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[3.63]  
Traditionally, the rule of privity of contract has meant that basically only the parties to a contract can 
enforce a benefit in it or be burdened by it and there is a full discussion of privity of contract in ch 6. 
However, where contracts conferred benefits on third parties, this was much criticised1. It could thwart the 
intentions of the contracting parties and deny the reasonable expectation of the third parties. The 
common law developed various means of avoiding the privity rule and that has now been furthered by the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Here, brief consideration will be given to the situation in 
which a third party, C, can have the protection of an exemption clause in a contract between A and B 
(See further below ch 6). That issue is of particular importance when C is an employee, or subcontractor, 
of B and A is making a claim, in tort, against C, based on C's carrying out of a task which is part of the 
work dealt with by the contract between A and B. It has been seen as undesirable to allow the privity rule 
to be used effectively to undermine the contractual allocation of the risk and the concomitant insurance 
coverage. In The Mahkutai, for example, the point was made that:2  
‘Recognition has been given to the undesirability, especially in the commercial context, of allowing 
plaintiffs to circumvent the contractual exemption clause by suing in particular the servant or agent 
of the contracting party who caused the relevant damage, thereby undermining the purpose of the 
exemption, and so redistributing the contractual allocation of risk, which is reflected in the freight 
rate and the parties' respective insurance arrangements’. 
Brief consideration will be given here to the third party use of an exemption clause under the C(RTP)A 
1999 and at common law. 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 19991  
[3.64]  
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 came into force on 11 November 1999, basically 
implementing the Law Commission's report, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties1. 
It does not apply to contracts entered into before 11 May 2000 unless they were entered into after the Act 
came into force and expressly provide for the application of the Act2. Section 1 of the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 sets out the basic test of third party enforceability. It states: 
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Eg Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 at 72; Woodar Investment Developments Ltd v Wimpey Construction 
UK Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571, [1980] 1 WLR 277; Swain v Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 at 611; The 
Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 at 335; Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 3 
All ER 895, [1995] 1 WLR 68, Steyn LJ at 76. 
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[1996] AC 650 (at 651). 
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See further below, Ch 6. See generally C. Macmillan ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’. (2000) 63 MLR 721; N. Andrews ‘Strangers to Justice No Longer: The 
Reversal of the Privity Rule Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’. [2000] CLJ 353; A. 
Burrows ‘The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and its implications for Commercial Contracts’ 
[2000] LMCLQ 540. 
1
 
Law Com No 242 (Cm 3329, July 1996). 
2
 
C(RTP)A 1999, s 10. 
‘1(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a contract (a “third 
party”) may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if: 
(a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or 
(b) subject to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit on him. 
(2) Subsection 1(b) does not apply if on the proper construction of the contract it appears that the 
parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party.’ 
In other words, either (a) the contract must expressly provide that the third party may enforce the term or 
(b) the term must purport to confer a benefit on C and on the proper construction of the contract it does 
not appear that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party3. In addition, to 
acquire rights, the third party must be ‘expressly identified in the contract’ to a stated extent (ie ‘by name, 
as a member of a class or as answering a particular description’), but ‘need not be in existence when the 
contract is entered into’4. The third party will not acquire rights to enforce a term ‘otherwise than subject to 
and in accordance with any other relevant terms of the contract’5. Where the original contract would 
confer rights on a third party, there are limitations on the abilities of the contracting parties to affect those 
rights by agreement, variation or rescission of the contract6. However, the point which must be 
emphasised here is that although the Act generally refers to the rights of a third party to enforce a term, s 
1(6) makes it clear that it encompasses the situation in which a third party, C, seeks to avail him, or her, 
self of the ‘benefit’ of exclusions or limitations of liability in a contract between A and B. In fact, although it 
is open to question7, the tenor of the Law Commission Report, from which the Act derives, is that 
exemption clauses which expressly extend their protection to a third party will normally fall within s 
1(1)(a), above, rather than s 1(1)(b) on the basis that ‘an exclusion clause, as a legal concept, has no 
meaning unless it is intended to effect legal rights’8. However, the need to appropriately identify the third 
party to be benefitted means that an exemption clause will not assist even an employee, whose employer 
has failed to expressly extend the exemption clause to them. In that and related situations, there may still 
be scope, for common law developments in the avoidance of the privity rule, for example, through the 
idea of ‘vicarious immunity’, which has been taken up by the Canadian courts9. The Act specifically states 
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Once a third party has established that the relevant term ‘purports to confer a benefit upon him’, he is 
‘entitled to enforce the term directly against the defendant unless the defendant persuades the court that 
the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by him’ – Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v 
Artis [2005] EWCA Civ 519, [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 167 at [22], citing Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves 
& Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 481. 
4
 
C(RTP)A 1999, s 1(3). 
5
 
C(RTP)A 1999, s 1(4). 
6
 
C(RTP)A 1999, s 2. 
7
 
See para 6.64 below. 
8
 
Law Com Rep 242, para 7.10. 
9
 
See London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261 and its extension in 
Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd v Can Drive Services Ltd [2000] 1 Ll Rep 199. See also Trident General 
Insurance Co v McNeice Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107. There have been indications that the English 
that it ‘does not affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apart from this Act’10 
and the Law Commission envisaged that judicial development would continue. It was said:11  
‘We should emphasise that we do not wish our proposed legislation – which we believe to be a 
relatively conservative and moderate measure – to hamper the judicial development of third party 
rights. Should the House of Lords decide that in a particular sphere our reform does not go far 
enough and that, for example … employees (even though not mentioned in the contract) should be 
able to rely on exclusion clauses that protect their employers under a doctrine of vicarious 
immunity, we would not wish our proposed legislation to be construed as hampering that 
development’. 
Where the third party, C, does seek to rely on an exemption clause in the contract between A and B, the 
Unfair Contract terms Act 1977 may fall to be considered. Under s 1(6) a third party seeking to enforce a 
term of the contract (including an exemption clause) ‘cannot do so if he could not have done so … had he 
been a party to the contract’12. 
Avoiding the privity rule at common law 
[3.65]  
Rejecting the impetus to the avoidance of the privity rule shown in Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, 
Zochonis & Co Ltd1, the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd2 emphasised the 
established nature of the privity rule3 and opposition to the use of ‘artifice’ to avoid it to ‘save negligent 
people from the normal consequences of their fault’4. However, Lord Reid prepared the way for avoidance 
of the rule through the use of ‘agency’. He indicated that, although not in the instant case, in other cases, 
it might be found that B had not only contracted on its own behalf, but as agent for C, to create a direct 
contractual relationship between A and C which included the exemption clause. He said5: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
courts might be willing to develop more generalised exceptions than those currently embodied in the 
common law (below) – eg The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650, 664, KH Enterprise v Pioneer Container [1994] 2 
All ER 250, 255. 
10
 
C(RTP)A 1999, s 7(1). 
11
 
Law Com no 242, para 5.10. 
12
 
Contrast the extremely limited scope for the application of UCTA 1977 when a promisor is seeking to use 
a contractual exemption clause as a defence to a claim to a positive benefit under s 1 by a third party. 
Only s 2(1) is applicable – s 7(2). See para 6.66 below. 
1
 
[1924] AC 522. 
2
 
[1962] AC 446. 
3
 
Eg Viscount Simonds at 467, Lord Reid at 473. 
4
 
Viscount Simonds at 472, adopting, with approval the views of Fullager J in Wilson v Darling Island 
Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1955) 95 CLR 43. 
5
 
‘I can see a possibility of the success of the argument if (first) the bill of lading makes it clear that 
the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the 
bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting for those provisions on his 
own behalf is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that those provisions should apply to the 
stevedore, (thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later 
ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration 
moving from the stevedore were overcome.’ 
Although, it has been questioned whether a contract brought about through B's agency is unilateral6 or 
bilateral7, this paved the way for the extended use of HimlayaHimalaya clauses8 such as: 
‘every such servant, agent and contractor shall have the benefit of all exceptions, limitations 
provisions, conditions and liberties herein benefitting the carrier as if such provision were expressly 
made for their benefit, and in entering into this contract, the carrier, to the extent of these 
provisions, does so not only on [his] behalf, but also as agent and trustee for such servants, agents 
and sub-contractors.’9  
Such clauses were accepted by the Privy Council as effective to provide third parties with the protection 
of exemption clauses in The Eurymedon (New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd)10 
and The New York Star (Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd)11. 
Of course, as with any exemption clause, the effectiveness of such a clause to protect C from any 
particular liability will depend upon it being appropriately worded to provide such protection12. In addition, 
there are, of course, technical difficulties, such as those stemming from agency and the need for 
consideration, which may lie in the way of the effectiveness of a Himalaya clause to create a contractual 
relationship between A and C. The need for ‘agency’ to be found may not present too many difficulties 
where there is a pre-existing relationship between B and C13 and where B had no authority to contract on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
[1962] AC 446 at 474. 
6
 
The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154. 
7
 
The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650. The bilateral analysis is the more convincing. 
8
 
This type of clause had been used in Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158 where the ship was called The 
Himalaya. 
9
 
The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 662. 
10
 
[1975] AC 154. 
11
 
[1980] 3 All ER 257, [1981] 1 WLR 138. See also The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650. 
12
 
Apparently appropriately worded clause may be overridden by greater liability undertaken in a direct 
contract between C and A, or even in a bailment on terms between C and A: Lotus Cars Ltd v 
Southampton Cargo Handling plc [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 705. The clause may also be affected by 
legislation: eg Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2003] UKHL 12, [2003] 2 All ER 785. 
13
 
behalf of C that difficulty may often be obviated by ratification14 but there are limitations on the extent to 
which ratification is effective – inter alia, the ‘principal’ must be ascertainable at the time that the contract 
is made15. The question of consideration moving from C is normally dealt with by regarding it as furnished 
by the performance of C's obligations to B (the unloading of A's goods, where C are stevedores)16. In 
addition, the avoidance of undue technicality in this area was indicated in The New York Star, at least 
where what is in question is whether stevedores, employed by carriers, can enjoy the benefits of 
exemptions in the bill of lading. It was said17 that ‘their Lordships would not encourage a search for fine 
distinctions which would diminish the general applicability’ of the agency/Himalaya clause approach. More 
recently, in The Mahkutai18 in approving the line taken in The Eurymedon and The New York Star, the 
Privy Council indicated that it might be extended further. There was seen to be ‘no doubt of the 
commercial need of some such principle as this, and not only in cases concerned with stevedores’ and it 
was questioned whether the development which had taken place in those cases is ‘yet complete’19. It was 
recognised that there were technical limitations on the use of agency and a Himalaya clause to avoid the 
effects of the privity rule, and it was said that20: 
‘the time may well come when, in an appropriate case, it will fall to be considered whether the 
courts should take what may legitimately be perceived to be the final, and inevitable, step in this 
development, and recognise in these cases, a fully fledged exception to the doctrine of privity of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
In The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 the carrier was a subsidiary of the stevedores and in The New York 
Star [1980] 3 All ER 257, [1981] 1 WLR 138 the stevedores were partly owned by the carriers. 
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The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 664. 
15
 
Southern Water Authority v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077. 
16
 
The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 664: 
‘the problem of consideration in these cases is regarded as having been solved on the basis of a bilateral 
agreement between the stevedores and the cargo owners entered into through the agency of shipowners, 
may, though itself unsupported by consideration, be rendered enforceable by consideration subsequently 
furnished by the stevedores in the form of the performance of their duties as stevedores for the 
shipowners.’ 
The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 at 167: 
‘If the choice, and the antithesis, is between a gratuitous promise, and a promise for consideration … 
there can be little doubt which, in commercial reality, this is … This became a full contract when the 
appellant performed services by discharging the goods. The performance of these services for the benefit 
of the shipper was the consideration for the agreement by the shipper that the appellant should have the 
benefit of the exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of lading.’ 
17
 
[1980] 3 All ER 257, [1981] 1 WLR 138 at 144. 
18
 
[1996] AC 650. 
19
 
[1996] AC 650 at 664. 
20
 
[1996] AC 650 at 664. 
contract, thus escaping from all the technicalities with which the courts are now faced in English 
law.’ 
The Mahkutai was concerned with a jurisdiction clause rather than an exemption clause and the court did 
not consider it appropriate to take the point any further in that case. 
Numerous other devices have been employed at common law in an attempt to mitigate the privity rule in 
general21. There are some which should, in particular, be briefly noted in the context of exemption 
clauses. Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd22 could have been seen as indicating a 
general exception to the privity rule, based on vicarious immunity23. However, this was dismissed in 
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd24, where the need to maintain the privity rule in such cases was 
reasserted. As has been indicated, however, a similar device has found favour elsewhere and could 
potentially be adopted here to add a more extensive exception than that provided by the 1999 Act25. 
Another basis of the decision in the Elder, Dempster case26 may be seen as ‘bailment on terms’27. The 
argument is that where C is a bailee of A's goods, C's obligations as a bailee may be subject to the 
exemption clauses as the terms upon which C received the goods into its possession28. This argument 
was ‘given a restrictive treatment’29 in the Midland Silicones case but has since been looked upon more 
favourably30. In addition, there has been some success in mitigating the effects of the privity rule in this 
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See Chapter 6. 
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[1924] AC 522. 
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Viscount Cave at 534, Viscount Finlay at 548, Lord Carson at 565; Scrutton LJ in the Court of Appeal 
[1923] 1 KB 420 at 441–442. See also Scrutton LJ in Mersey Shipping and Transport Co Ltd v Rea Ltd 
(1925) 21Ll L Rep 375. 
24
 
[1962] AC 446. 
25
 
See para 3.64 above. 
26
 
[1924] AC 522, Lord Sumner at 564. 
27
 
See the analysis of Fullager J in Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1955) 95 
CLR 43 at 78. See also The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 at 340; The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 
668. 
28
 
The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 668 – Such an argument was ineffective in The Mahkutai to import the 
jurisdiction clause into the relationship between A and C, on the basis of conflict with the express terms of 
the bill of lading, and in particular, the Himalaya clause, as it expressly imported some terms to the 
benefit of C and the express importation was construed as not including the jurisdiction clause. 
29
 
The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650 at 660. 
30
 
The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 at 339–340; The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650. 
area through the argument that the exclusion clause in a contract between A and B indirectly protects C 
from liability, in tort, for negligence, by negativing, or limiting, the duty of care which C owes to A. The 
‘contractual background’, particularly questions of the allocation of the need to insure, may serve to 
prevent the duty of care arising between a contracting party and a third party, in particular between the 
owner of a building and a sub-contractor carrying out work on it. In each case, the contract terms and the 
background more generally will need to be considered31. Further, it might be contended that indirect32 
enforcement of the exemption could be achieved if B applied to stay A's action against C33. 
The Burden of the Clause 
[3.66]  
A different problem arises where the exemption clause is contained in a contract between B and C and 
the question is whether C can rely upon it in an action taken by A. Again, prima facie, privity of contract 
would prevent any such reliance1. However, C may be able to rely upon the clause where what is in 
question is damage done to A's goods by C, and A can be regarded as having expressly or impliedly 
consented to B, the bailee of the goods, giving possession of the goods to C as a sub-bailee on the 
relevant terms2. It may also be possible to find that there is an implied contract between A and C. In the 
stevedore-consignee situation, such a contract was seen as arising on the basis of the consignee's 
acceptance of the bill of lading and request for delivery of the goods thereunder3. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
Scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
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Southern Water Authority v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077; Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 All ER 
1180; Marc Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine, The Nicholas H [1995] 3 All ER 307; British 
Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 2 All ER 241; John F Hunt 
Demolition Ltd v ASME Engineering Ltd [2007] EWHC 1507 (TCC), [2008] 1 All ER 180, [2008] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 473. It would seem easier to draw such a conclusion where the terms in question are well-known 
standard terms. 
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From C's perspective. 
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Gore v Van der Lann [1967] 2 QB 31; Snelling v John G Snelling Ltd [1973] QB 87. 
1
 
Haseldine v CA Daw & Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343; Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] 
AC 785 at 817. 
2
 
Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority 
[1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 at 167–168; The Captain Gregos (No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 395 at 405; The 
Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324; Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2003] UKHL 12, 
[2003] 2 All ER 785, Lord Hobhouse, [132]–[138]. 
3
 
The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 (see now Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992), by analogy with Brandt v 
Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1924] 1 KB 575. But see Scruttons Ltd v 
Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446. Acts done by a consignee who was then acting simply as the agent 
of the seller would not generate such an implication (The Aliakmon [1986] AC 785). 
[3.67]  
The Act came into force on 1 February 1978, affecting contracts made after that date1. Its name, the 
‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’, can be regarded as misleading. It does not deal with ‘unfair terms’ as 
such and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 are much more aptly named2. The 
1977 Act is basically3 concerned with terms or notices which ‘exclude or restrict liability’, but that should 
not be understood restrictively4, and it provides some scope for looking beyond the form of a term or 
notice in deciding upon its applicability5. There are provisions which deal with attempts to evade the 
application of UCTA 1977 in various ways6. 
The Act affects terms or notices falling within its scope in one of two ways. In some cases they are 
rendered automatically ineffective. In others they are ineffective except in so far as it can be established7 
that they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. The sections which state that a term or notice is to 
be affected in one of those ways can loosely be described as the active sections. Basically they cover: 
(i) cases involving negligence – s 2; 
(ii) contracts in which one party deals as consumer or on the other's written standard terms of 
business – s 3; 
(iii) contracts for the sale of goods or hire purchase or other contracts under which possession or 
ownership of goods passes – ss 6 and 7; 
(iv) contracts requiring someone who deals as consumer to indemnify another – s 4; 
(v) where there is a ‘consumer guarantee’ – s 5; 
(vi) where there is an attempt to evade the operation of the Act through a term in a second contract – s 
10. 
(It should also be noted that s 8 substituted a new s 3 into the Misrepresentation Act 1967 so that 
exemption clauses dealing with misrepresentation are subject to the requirement of reasonableness as 
set out in UCTA 1977, s 11). However, there are further restrictions on the basic situations in which UCTA 
1977 may be relevant. It is generally only relevant to ‘business liability’8 and there are specific ousters, in 
whole or in part, of certain contracts or terms9. 
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UCTA 1977, s 31(2). 
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See para 3.97. 
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UCTA 1977, s 4 specifically covers indemnities used against those who deal as consumers. 
4
 
UCTA 1977, s 13(1) see para 3.75. 
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See, in particular, the final part of UCTA 1977, ss 13(1) and 3(2)(b). 
6
 
UCTA 1977, s 10 – evasion by means of secondary contract. Sections 3(2)(b), 13 – evasion by means of 
the form of the term or notice. Section 27 – evasion by choice of law. 
7
 
UCTA 1977, s 11(5) – ie the burden of proof lies on the person asserting that the clause is reasonable. 
8
 
When the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 becomes law, UCTA 1977 will no longer apply to consumer 
transactions and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 will be repealed10. This 
section should therefore be read with these developments in mind. 
[3.68]  
Business liability With the exception of UCTA 1977, s 61, s 1(3) states that ss 2–7 only apply to 
business ‘liability’, and the exception in s 6 is of limited effect2. ‘Business liability’ is liability for breach of 
obligations or duties arising3: 
(a) from things done or to be done by a person in the course of a business (whether his own business 
or another's); or 
(b) from the occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier4. 
There is no definition of ‘business’5 but it is stated to include ‘a profession and the activities of any 
government department or local or public authority’6. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
UCTA 1977, s 1(3). 
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UCTA 1977, Sch 1, ss 26, 27(1), 29. 
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As at August 2014, the Consumer Rights Bill is at the Second Reading stage of the House of Lords and 
will enter the Committee Stage in October 2014 (services.parliament.uk/bills/2014/consumerrights.html). 
1
 
UCTA 1977, s 6(4). 
2
 
It deals with attempts to exclude or restrict liability for certain statutorily implied terms, most of which are 
only implied where the relevant party contracts in the course of a business – see eg SGA 1979, s 
14(2),(3). 
3
 
UCTA 1977, s 1(3). 
4
 
UCTA 1977, s 1(3) as amended by the Occupier's Liability Act 1984. There is an exclusion from the 
scope of (b) in relation to liability stemming from the dangerous state of premises. Such liability does not 
fall within the Act when it is to someone entering the premises for educational or recreational purposes, 
provided that granting that person access does not fall within the business purposes of the occupier. 
5
 
In doubtful cases it would seem to be a matter of weighing the relevant factors present such as the 
presence or absence of the profit motive (Corfield v Sevenways Garage (1984) 148 JP 648; Blakemore v 
Bellamy (1982) 147 JP 89; Abernethie v A M & J Kleiman Ltd [1970] 1 QB 10, R v Bow Street 
Magistrates' Court, ex p Joseph (1986) 150 JP 650; but see Building and Civil Engineering Holidays 
Schemes v Clark (1960) 39 TC 12; BBC v Johns [1965] Ch 32; Town Investments Ltd v Department of 
Environment [1976] 3 All ER 479, [1976] 1 WLR 1126, Buckley LJ at 1149; Customs and Excise Comrs v 
Fisher [1981] 2 All ER 147, Gibson J at 157; Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 1 AC 655, 
[1992] 2 All ER 275; Re Duty on Estate of Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales 
(1888) 22 QBD 279, Lord Coleridge CJ, at 293), the accoutrements of business such as premises or 
stationary (Corfield v Sevenways Garage (1984) 148 JP 648; Southwark London Borough v Charlesworth 
(1983) 147 JP 470; but see Abernethie v A M & J Kleiman Ltd [1970] 1 QB 10), the frequency of the type 
of transaction in question (Pickford v Quirke (1927) 13 TC 251; Leach v Pogson (1962) 40 TC 585, [1962] 
[3.69]  
‘In the course of a business’ In most cases1, in order for UCTA 1977 to apply, s 1(3)(a) requires the 
relevant obligation or duty to have arisen ‘from things done or to be done … in the course of a business’. 
There is no definition of ‘in the course of a business’, in the Act but it also appears in s 12, in relation to 
the determination of whether someone ‘deals as consumer’, and, in that context, its meaning was 
considered by the Court of Appeal in R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust Ltd2. In that case, 
it was stated that for a transaction to be ‘in the course of a business’ it had to be ‘integral’ to the business, 
or if merely incidental to it, of a regularly occurring type. This will be considered further below3. Here the 
point should be made that it can be forcibly contended that this approach to ‘in the course of a business’ 
is too narrow for the purposes of s 12 and that is even more clearly the case in the context of s 1(3), 
where it determines the basic scope of the Act4. It can be contended that it would be more appropriate if 
transactions which were incidental to the business were encompassed as such, without any reference to 
the regularity of their occurrence5. That type of approach has been taken to the meaning of ‘in the course 
of a business’ in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, where the phrase has been seen merely to distinguish 
between ‘a sale made in the course of a seller's business and a purely private sale of goods outside the 
confines of the business (if any) carried on by the seller’6. 
[3.70]  
                                                                                                                                                                           
TR 289, but see American Leaf Blending Co v Director General of Inland Revenue [1979] AC 676, Lord 
Diplock). On hobbies see Rolls v Miller (1884) 27 Ch D 71, Lindley LJ at 88; Blakemore v Bellamy (1982) 
147 JP 89; Corfield v Sevenways Garage Ltd [1985] RTR 109, Mann LJ at 117; Customs and Excise 
Comrs v Fisher [1981] 2 All ER 147, Gibson J at 157. On the dealings of clubs see Addiscombe Garden 
Estates v Crabbe [1958] 1 QB 513; Carlisle and Silloth Golf Club v Smith [1913] 3 KB 75; John v 
Matthews [1970] 2 QB 443; Building and Civil Engineering Holidays Management Scheme Ltd v Clark 
(1960) 39 TC 12; Cahalne v Croydon London Borough Council (1985) 149 JP 561; IRC v Stonehaven 
Recreation Ground Trustees 1930 SC 206, 15 TC 419; Carnoustie Golf Course Committee v IRC 1929 
SC 419, 14 TC 498. See also Oxford Gene Technology Ltd v Affymetrix Inc [2001] FSR 136, Aldous LJ, 
para 40, in relation to a company set up for Research and development and to commercialise the product 
or process: ‘business’ does ‘not import any limitation as to the stage of research and development…’. 
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UCTA 1977, s 14. 
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But see UCTA 1977, s 6(4). 
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[1988] 1 All ER 847. 
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See para 3.83. 
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Law Com No 69, para 9. 
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See further para 3.83 and see Kidner ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 – Who Deals as Consumer?’ 
(1987) NILQ 46. 
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Stevenson v Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 613, 623. 
Excluded contracts or terms – Schedule 11 Schedule 1 of UCTA 1977 ousts the operation of ss 2–4 
and 7 in relation to certain contracts or parts of contracts. Paragraph 1 contains the most extensive 
ouster. It states that ss 2–4 do not extend to: 
‘(a) any contract of insurance (including a contract to pay an annuity on human life); 
(b) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of an interest in land, or to the 
termination of such an interest, whether by extinction, merger, surrender, forfeiture or the 
like; 
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of a right or interest in any patent, 
trade mark, copyright, registered design, technical or commercial information, or other 
intellectual property, or relates to the termination of any such right or interest; 
(d) any contract so far as it relates – 
(i) to the formation or dissolution of a company (which means any body corporate or 
unincorporated association and includes a partnership), or 
(ii) to its constitution or the rights and obligations of its corporators or members; 
(e) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of any right or 
interest in securities.’2  
A distinction has to be made between the wording of sub-para 1(a) and the rest of the paragraph3. Sub-
paragraph 1(a) ousts from the scope of ss 2–4 ‘any contract of insurance’. This contrasts with the rest of 
the paragraph where the exclusion is only of any contract ‘so far as it relates to’ any of the specified 
matters. Sub-paragraphs (b)–(e) may oust from UCTA 1977 part of a contract which is not primarily 
concerned with the matters referred to in those sub-paras, because that part of the contract does ‘relate 
to’ a relevant matter4 and, similarly, the Act may apply to part of a contract even though the contract is 
primarily concerned with one of those matters5. 
There is limited restriction on the scope of UCTA 1977, ss 2–4 and 7 in para 2 of Sch 1. That paragraph 
is concerned with: 
(a) any contract of marine salvage or towage; 
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Micklefield v SAC Technology Ltd [1991] 1 All ER 275, [1990] 1 WLR 1002. 
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A wide approach has been taken to ‘relates to’: Electricity Supply Nominees Ltd v IAF Group plc [1993] 3 
All ER 372, [1993] 1 WLR 1059, Star Rider Ltd v Inntrepreneur Pub Co [1998] 16 EG 140, Unchained 
Growth III plc v Granby Village (Manchester) Management Co Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 739, [1999] All ER (D) 
1077. But see Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654. See also 385 HL Deb, 
Col 518. 
(b) any charterparty of a ship6 or hovercraft; and 
(c) any contract for the carriage of goods by ship or hovercraft. 
The application of s 2(1) is not ousted in relation to these contracts in any case, and the rest of ss 2–47 
and 7 also remain applicable in favour of a party dealing as consumer. Similarly under para 3, except in 
favour of a person dealing as consumer, there is an ouster of the application of ss 2(2), 3 and 4: 
‘Where goods are carried by ship or hovercraft in pursuance of a contract which either – 
(a) specifies that as a means of carriage over part of the journey to be covered, or 
(b) makes no provision as to the means of carriage and does not exclude that means.’ 
In addition, except in favour of the employee8, UCTA 1977, s 2 does not extend to contracts of 
employment9 and s 2(1) does not ‘affect the validity of any discharge and indemnity given by a person or 
in connection with an award to him of compensation for pneumoconiosis attributable to employment in the 
coal industry, in respect of any further claim arising from his contracting the disease10. 
[3.71]  
International supply contracts The restrictions imposed on some terms by UCTA 19771 do not apply to 
international supply contracts2. Such a contract is defined as requiring possession of the following 
characteristics3: firstly, either it is a contract of sale of goods or it is one under which possession or 
ownership of goods passes, and: 
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Browner International Ltd v Monarch Shipping Co Ltd, The European Enterprise [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
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Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] 2 All ER 293 at 301. 
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UCTA 1977, Sch 1, para 4. 
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UCTA 1977, Sch 1, para 5. 
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The control of exemption clauses dealing with misrepresentation does not occur under UCTA 1977 but 
the Misrepresentation Act 1967, as amended by the UCTA 1977. On that basis, it would seem that the 
restrictions of the 1967 Act would apply to international supply contracts. 
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UCTA 1977, s 26. In their consultation paper on unifying UCTA and UTCCR the Law Commission have 
invited views on whether the International business exemption should continue in the context of business 
to business contracts – Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, Scottish Law Commission 
Discussion Paper No 119 Unfair Terms in Contracts. 
3
 
UCTA 1977, s 26(3). 
‘it is made by parties whose place of business (or, if they have none, habitual residences) are in the 
territories of different states’4  
and, secondly, that:5  
‘(a) the goods in question are, at the time of conclusion of the contract, in the course of carriage, 
or will be carried, from the territory of one State to another; or 
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been done in the territories of different 
States; or 
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered to the territory of a State other than that 
within whose territory those acts were done.’ 
In relation to the first part of the requirements for the application of the section, the reference to a contract 
which is ‘made by the parties’ and then refers to the place of business of the parties ‘is referring to the 
principals to the contract and not to agents through whom the contract may have been made’6. The place 
of business of any such agents could be fortuitous or contrived. The court would take a business sense 
approach in ascertaining who the contracting parties are. In Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis A/S7 
for example, although the defendant’s subsidiary was based in the UK, the court held that as the invoices 
were clearly issued by the head office in Denmark, the relevant defendant (here the claimant had sued 
the entire corporate group) had their place of business in Denmark. The contract between them and K 
(which was established in the UK) was therefore one for the international supply of goods. Hence, UCTA 
1977 did not apply to the exemption clause in the contract. 
In (c), in the second part of the requirements for the application of the section, the use of the word ‘to’ 
requires some international movement of goods8. In (a) there is no requirement that delivery to another 
state be an obligation under the contract. (a) covers the situation where ‘the goods in question will be 
transported across national boundaries, not necessarily in order to fulfil the terms of the contract, but in 
order to achieve its commercial object’9. So, ‘if a person who carries on business abroad, hires equipment 
from a supplier in this country in circumstances where both know that the intention is for it to be used 
abroad, the lease is one pursuant to which the goods will be carried from the territory of one state to the 
territory of another within the meaning of s 26(4)(a)10’. 
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Ocean Chemical Transport v Exnor Craggs [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 519, [45]. 
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[2012] EWHC 1147 (Comm). 
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Amiri Flight Authority v BAE Systems plc [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 385. 
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Trident Turboprop (Dublin) Ltd v First Flight Couriers Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 290, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 
1050 at [28]. 
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Trident Turboprop (Dublin) Ltd v First Flight Couriers Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 290, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 
1050 at [28]. In Air Transworld Limited v Bombardier Inc [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm) the court found that 
the agreement had clearly anticipated that the aircraft would be flown out of Canada to the place of 
[3.72]  
Choice of law Section 27 of UCTA 1977 deals with conflict of laws points. Subsection (1) ousts from the 
scope of UCTA 1977 contracts which are subject to the law of any part of the UK only by choice of the 
parties and which would, apart from that choice, be subject to some other law1. Subsection (2) relates to 
the reverse situation, dealing with attempted evasion of UCTA 1977 by choice of law. It states that the Act 
has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some country 
outside the UK where (either or both): 
‘(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to have been imposed wholly or mainly 
for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of this Act; or 
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually 
resident in the UK, and the essential steps necessary for the making of the contract were 
taken there, whether by him or others on his behalf.’ 
[3.73]  
Saving for other legislation Section 29(1) prevents the Act from affecting any contractual provision 
which: 
`(a) is authorised or required by the express terms or necessary implication of an enactment; or 
(b) being made with a view to compliance with an international agreement to which the UK is a 
party, does not operate more restrictively than is contemplated by the agreement.' 
The section also provides for certain terms to be taken to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness.1  
Terms subject to UCTA 1977 
[3.74]  
Terms excluding or restricting liability For the most part1, the active sections of UCTA 1977 impact 
upon terms (and sometimes notices) which exclude or restrict liability. Section 13(1) can be viewed as 
extending the operation of those sections2. It states: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
residence of the buyer. Clauses which were considered to be relevant included those dealing with pre-
inspection of the aircraft for flight, export taxes and formalities, certificate of airworthiness etc. 
1
 
An example of this section in action is seen in Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA v Gulzar Ahmed Khan and 
Others [2013] EWHC 482 (Comm) – there the contract was more closely connected to Switzerland and 
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A term ‘incorporated or approved by, or incorporated pursuant to a decision or ruling of a competent 
authority acting in the exercise of any statutory jurisdiction or function and it is not a term in a contract to 
which the competent authority is itself a party’. ‘Competent authority’ means ‘any court, arbitrator or 
arbiter, government department or public authority’ (UCTA 1977, s 29(3)). 
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The exceptions being UCTA1977, ss 3(2)(b), 4 and 10. The Law Commission consultation paper 
envisages extending protection for businesses beyond exemption clauses where non-individually 
negotiated terms are in question (Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper No 119 Unfair Terms in Contracts). In the consumer context, such 
protection is already provided by the Unfair terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
2
 
‘To the extent that this part of this Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of liability it also 
prevents – 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or subjecting any 
person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such right or remedy 
(c) excluding or restricting any rules of evidence or procedure.’ 
This first part of UCTA 1977, s 13(1) does not present difficulties, it covers, for example, clauses placing a 
time limit on the notification of breach3, or the making of a claim4, or stating the location of the court, or 
jurisdiction, in which a claim is to be made5 (s 13(1)(a)), clauses preventing set off6 and other rights7 (s 
13(1)(b)), and clauses reversing a burden of proof8 (s 13(1)(c)). However, there is an additional, and more 
problematic final part to s 13(1) which is considered below. 
[3.75]  
Excluding or restricting obligations – identifying exemption clauses The final part of s 13(1) ensures 
that the scope of the Act extends to some terms or notices which take the form of part of the definition of 
the obligation. In so far as relevant s 13(1) states: 
‘To the extent that this part of this Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of any liability … 
sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting any liability by reference to terms and 
notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty.’ 
The Act does not state which terms or notices which ‘exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty’ 
are to be treated in this way. The section seems to highlight the need for a ‘form and substance’ 
distinction to be made1, to identify terms or notices which in form relate to the definition of the obligation 
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Eg Fred Chappell Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd (1987) Times, 22 May, Lexis. 
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Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] 2 All ER 293, Stuart Smith LJ at 301; Phillips Products 
Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, Slade LJ at p 626; Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, [1989] 2 All 
ER 514, HL, Lord Griffiths at 530; Cremdean Properties v Nash [1977] EGD 63. But see Stewart Gill Ltd v 
but are, in substance exclusions of liability, but does not, itself, provide any basis for the distinction to be 
drawn. The need for a ‘form and substance’ approach can be understood in the context of the argument 
that an exclusion clause is not a distinct type of clause at all, but simply part of the definition of the 
obligations. This argument can easily be understood when it is remembered that a clause which is in the 
form of an exclusion of liability could have been drafted instead as a clause in the form of part of the 
definition of the obligations2. For example, consideration can be given to the situation in which A has 
agreed to sell goods to B and deliver them by a certain date. A may wish to ensure that he will not be 
liable to B if industrial action causes late delivery. A could achieve that by a clause in more than one form. 
A could simply use a clause stating that liability for late delivery is excluded where it is caused by 
industrial action. Alternatively, A could specify that he, or she, is only obliged to deliver by the stated date 
if there is no industrial action. The same result can be achieved by two different forms of clause and, as 
has been indicated, it has been contended3 that there is no distinction between exclusion clauses and 
clauses defining the obligations other than at the level of form. The basis of this is that both forms of 
clause mark out the boundaries within which a legal remedy is available. A clause in the form of an 
exclusion of liability does that by removing the legal remedies for breach of what would be, without the 
clause, an obligation. A clause in the form of part of the definition of the obligations simply states the 
obligations. The equation of exclusion clauses with those defining the obligation could have led to 
avoidance of the Act by the redrafting of exclusion clauses in the form of part of the definition of the 
obligation. A similar point can be made in relation to non-contractual notices. 
However, it can be contended that it is possible to distinguish terms or notices which exclude liability from 
those which form part of the definition of the obligations at a level other than form and that such a 
distinction is assumed, and required, by last part of s 13(1)4. In the absence of some central definition of 
terms or notices excluding liability, there is nothing in the Act to indicate how this form and substance 
distinction is to be made. There has been some indication by the courts that what is required for the 
operation of the last part of s 13(1) is a ‘but for’ test. In Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm)5 the approach was 
taken that as there was an obligation, and liability, ‘but for’ the disclaimer, the disclaimer was treated as a 
notice ‘excluding or restricting liability’ falling within the scope of s 2. The same approach was indicated in 
relation to contract terms in Phillips Products v Hyland6. 
There has been little consideration of the ‘but for’ test7. However, the more basic criticism is simply that it 
is too wide, and that it does not make an appropriate ‘form and substance’ distinction. Such a test would, 
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for example, seem to render subject to the Act any express term contradicting a term which would, absent 
the clause, be implied into a contract falling within an appropriate section of the Act8. ‘But for’ the clause 
the implication would be made. In addition, the ‘but for’ test would seem to make it impossible for the 
parties to define an obligation to take due care by stating it widely and then qualifying it, without it being 
subject to s 2 of the Act. However, perhaps the width of the ‘but for’ test is most forcefully illustrated by 
reference to the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In relation to a sale to someone ‘dealing as 
consumer’, s 6(2) of the UCTA 1977 prevents the exclusion or restriction of the terms implied by ss 13–15 
of the SGA 1979. If the sale is not to someone who deals as consumer then, under s 6(3), such a clause 
is effective only if it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. The point to be made here is that the 
‘but for’ test would seem to make subject to the 1977 Act any clause which was merely intended to show 
that the transaction was not one in which it was appropriate to imply the term in question. For example, a 
clause indicating that ‘sale’ goods were simply sold as seen and not ‘by description’ would be subject to 
the Act as a clause in the absence of which SGA 1979, s 13(1) would imply a term9 that the goods should 
correspond with their description10. It seems inappropriate for it to be concluded that the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 should apply to all such clauses, particularly when it is borne in mind that if the sale is to 
a consumer the seller cannot even argue that his clause should survive the application of the Act because 
it is reasonable. 
The ‘but for’ test is too wide and all embracing and is too mechanistic to make an appropriate ‘form and 
substance’ distinction for the purposes of s 13(1). It can be asked whether any such distinction exists 
outside of the Act which could be imported into it. Is there some distinction ‘in nature’ between exclusion 
clauses and those defining obligations which could provide a form and substance distinction for the 
purposes of the Act? When what is being sought is a distinction between terms or notices defining 
obligations and those excluding liability ‘in nature’ irrespective of their form, then what must be looked at 
is the creation, or origin, of the obligations and the relationship of the term, or notice, in question to that 
creation. In other words, the distinction which must be made is between the exclusion of an obligation 
purely by words and its circumstantial displacement11. If there is circumstantial displacement, the term or 
notice in question is ‘in nature’ part of the definition of the obligation. If the displacement is purely by 
words, then the term or notice – the words in question – is, in nature, an exclusion of liability. As has 
already been indicated, this requires consideration of the origin of the relevant obligation and this may 
explain why no simple test has been identified. Other than at the most general of levels, saying nothing 
more specific than has so far been stated here, it is not possible to identify a single test because of the 
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in keeping with Coote's views see First National Commercial Bank v Loxleys [1997] PNLR 211. 
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Yates, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982) at p 78, sees ‘The problem with 
this part of s 13(1)’ as being that ‘it ignores the distinction between the purely verbal delation of a primary 
duty … and the circumstantial displacement of a primary duty…’. The point being made here is that such 
a distinction should be understood as inherent in the operation of the latter part of s 13(1) if sense is to be 
made of the provision. 
different bases of creation of different obligations. There is a distinction between the basis of the creation 
of an express contractual obligation and that of a duty of care in tort. There is also a distinction between 
an express contractual obligation and a contractual obligation stemming from a term implied by statute. 
What needs to be considered in each case is the relationship of the particular term, or, in the tort context, 
the particular non-contractual notice, to the creation of the obligation. However, there is one further point 
which will be relevant in each case, no matter what the basis of the obligation, and that is that the 
situation must be viewed absent the artificialities which the law has placed upon it. The rules about 
incorporation of contract terms, for example, are far divorced from the realities of the situation, even when 
viewed through the eyes of the ‘reasonable person’. These points can be further explained and illustrated 
in the context of the determination of the nature of a term when the obligation to which it relates is one 
stemming from the express terms of a contract. 
Obligations stemming from express terms of the contract are generally seen as founded on the intention 
of the parties, objectively ascertained12. Basically, the nature of a clause should be determined by viewing 
its relationship to those intentions. To determine whether a clause is definitional or exclusionary, in 
nature, those intentions should be projected to the point at which the role of the clause becomes clear – 
the point of performance. In other words what should be considered is the parties reasonable 
expectations of performance. If the clause is then seen as producing a contractual performance which is 
less that that reasonably expected, it is identified as an exclusion clause. Of course, at the legal level, the 
terms as a whole are to be seen as generating ‘expectations’ of a performance which is protected by the 
remedy of damages ie at this level the reasonable expectations of performance equate with the 
performance actually required by the contract terms. At a factual level the parties reasonable 
expectations of the contractual performance may differ from those legally derived and protected 
expectations, because of the artificialities which may be involved in the contracting process, particularly 
when long, standard form documents are used. This artificiality may occur through both the manner of 
incorporation of a term into a contract and also through the style of drafting used. There can, for example, 
be ‘cases in which the application of small print provisions would enable a party to perform a contract in a 
substantially different manner from that which could reasonably have been expected from a perusal of its 
primary terms’13. Such artificialities can occur in the drafting of terms and in almost every form of 
incorporation. They can lead to a situation in which ‘the relatively unsophisticated or unwary party will not 
realise what or how little has been promised’14. When it is said that the assessment must be made at the 
factual level, what is required is a consideration of the impact of the terms on the parties' reasonable 
expectations, absent any such artificialities which may be present in their assessment at the legal level, 
as terms15. (Of course, it is nevertheless the reasonable expectations of the contractually required 
performance which are in question.) It is in the generation of that gap between the factually16 and legally 
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The parties' reasonable expectations as the factual level should be arrived at by taking into account all 
the relevant facts. It will mean taking into account many facts which are also relevant to the legal status of 
the clause in question as a term, but it should not require the drawing of the same conclusions. A clause 
generated reasonable expectations of the contractual performance that the exclusion clause can be 
identified ‘in nature’. The distinction is made between the exclusion of an obligation purely by words and 
its circumstantial displacement, when the words can be viewed as part of the parties' intention, as shown 
in their reasonable expectations. 
In relation to obligations with different bases, the nature of a term or notice will not be determinable by the 
parties' reasonable expectations at the factual level but, in each case, what is required is the same type of 
examination of the relationship of the term or notice to the obligations, absent the artificialities. It can be 
contended that this type of approach leads to the distinction between form and substance required by the 
UCTA 1977 either under the last part of s 13(1) which is applicable to ss 2 and 5 to 7, or in the context of 
the treatment of contract terms under s 3(2)(b)(ii). 
[3.76]  
Indemnities UCTA 1977, s 4 expressly subjects to the requirement of reasonableness contract terms 
which require someone ‘dealing as consumer’ to indemnify another in relation to liability for negligence or 
breach of contract. However, in some circumstances an indemnity clause1 will be treated as a term 
excluding or restricting liability and thus falling within the more extensive provisions of the Act dealing with 
clauses which exclude or restrict liability. Currently, in applying the wider provisions of UCTA 1977 to 
indemnities a distinction has to be drawn between clauses acting reflexively and those acting as 
insurance clauses, ie a clause may operate when the liability is to the indemnifier (reflexive) or when it is 
to a third party (insurance). It has been held that s 2 can apply to a clause acting reflexively2 but not to an 
insurance clause3, and the same reasoning would make similarly applicable other sections which cover 
terms which exclude or restrict liability4. 
Negligence – UCTA 1977, s 2 
[3.77]  
                                                                                                                                                                           
on the back of a ticket may be incorporated by reasonably sufficient notice if the front of the ticket says, 
‘for conditions see back’, but the significance a clause acquires as a contract term may well not carry 
through to ensure its inclusion in the reasonable expectations of performance at the factual level. Trade 
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relation to the question of incorporation, but their relevance to the reasonable expectations at the factual 
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Section 2 relates to ‘negligence’, which is defined, in s 1(1)1, as the breach: 
‘(a) of any obligation, arising from the express or implied terms of a contract, to take reasonable 
care or exercise reasonable skill in the performance of the contract; 
(b) of any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill (but not any 
stricter duty); 
(c) of the common duty imposed by the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 or the Occupiers Liability 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1957.’ 
This encompasses breaches of contractual obligations to exercise reasonable care and skill2, the 
common law duty of care arising under Donoghue v Stevenson3 or Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller and 
Partners4, for example, and the common duty of care under Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s 2(2). Section 
2 of UCTA 1977 deals with the attempted exclusion or restriction of liability for negligence through ‘any 
contract term or notice given to persons generally or to particular persons’. The reference to ‘notices’5 
extends the coverage of the section to notices which are not contractual6 and it is clear that vicarious 
liability is encompassed7. Under UCTA 1977, s 2(1), the relevant term or notice is rendered automatically 
ineffective if the negligence results in personal injury8 or death. In relation to negligence resulting in other 
loss or damage, a term or notice excluding or restricting liability is ineffective except in so far as it satisfies 
the requirement of reasonableness9. 
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The content of the contractual obligation will depend upon the terms of the particular contract but such 
obligations commonly arise where the contract is concerned with the provision of a service. See, for 
example, the term implied by Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s 13 where a service is supplied in 
the course of a business. 
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[1932] AC 562, eg Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620. 
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[1964] AC 465, eg Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm) [1990] 1 AC 831, [1989] 2 All ER 514, HL; Beaton v 
Nationwide Building Society [1991] 2 EGLR 145; McCullough v Lane Fox & Partners Ltd [1996] 1 EGLR 
35. 
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Under UCTA 1977, s 14, a ‘notice’ includes ‘an announcement, whether or not in writing, and any other 
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Davies v Parry [1988] 1 EGLR 147, McNeil J at 155; eg Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm) [1990] 1 AC 831, 
[1989] 2 All ER 514, HL; Beaton v Nationwide Building Society [1991] 2 EGLR 145; McCullough v Lane 
Fox & Partners Ltd [1996] 1 EGLR 35; Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society [1984] EGD 934. 
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Section 1(4). Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, Slade LJ at 625. 
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Personal injury includes ‘any disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition’: s 14. 
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Flamar Interocean Ltd v Denmac Ltd, The Flamar Pride and Flamar Progress [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434, 
Potter J; Building Services (London) Ltd v Kerryredd Engineering Ltd (12 April 1991, unreported), CA. 
The scope of UCTA 1977, s 2 provides an example of the problem of determining the appropriate 
application of the Act when exclusions of liability can be indistinguishable, at least in form, from the 
definition of the obligation10. Here the problem may occur, for example, in relation to a claim for negligent 
misstatement where a disclaimer has been used. For the most part the courts have simply assumed that 
UCTA1977 applies11 or they have used the ‘but for’ test to arrive at that conclusion12 or they may simply 
state that the terms defined the relationship so that no duty of care arose and s 2 had no application13. 
Where a contract term or notice purports to exclude or restrict liability for negligence, UCTA 1977, s 2(3) 
states that ‘a person's agreement to or awareness of it is not of itself to be taken as indicating his 
voluntary acceptance of any risk’. This prevents the evasion of the Act by a plea that a contract term or 
notice, excluding or restricting liability, by itself, established that volenti was present and thus that there 
was no liability14. 
Dealing as consumer or on the other's written standard terms of 
business – UCTA 1977, s 3 
[3.78]  
UCTA 1977, s 31 covers contracts under which one party deals as consumer or on the other party's 
written standard terms of business. In those contracts, it subjects to the requirement of reasonableness2, 
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934; PartCo Group Ltd v Wragg and Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 594, [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 343. 
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JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corpn [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm), [2008] All ER (D) 
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See also Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] 2 All ER 293, Stuart-Smith LJ at 298. 
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W Photoprint Ltd v Forward Trust Group Ltd (1993) 12 Tr LR 146; Liberty Life Insurance Co Ltd v Sheikh 
(1985) Times, 25 June, Lexis; Lease Management Services Ltd v Purnell Secretarial Services Ltd (1994) 
13 Tr LR 337; United States v ARC Construction Ltd (8 May 1991, unreported), Lexis; St Alban's City and 
District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481, CA; AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource 
Ltd [1996] CLC 265; Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundations Ltd (1992) 33 Con LR 1; 
Charlotte Thirty Ltd and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46; Chester Grosvenor Hotel Ltd v 
Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd (1991) 56 BLR 115; Stag Line v Tyne Shiprepair, The Zinnia [1984] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 211; Zockoll Group v Mercury Communications Ltd [1998] FSR 354; Schenkers Ltd v 
Overland Shoes Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 498; Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co v Youell 
[1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 136; Paragon Finance plc v Stautnton [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 1025; British 
Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389; Pegler v Wang (2000) 70 
ConLR 68. In the Law Commission consultation, the question of whether terms were ‘individually 
negotiated’ is preferred to that of whether they were standard, to set the basic scope of the fair and 
reasonable test in the business to business context – Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, 
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 119 Unfair Terms in Contracts. 
terms by which the party who does not deal as consumer, or on whose written standard terms of business 
the contract is made, claims: 
(a) when in breach of contract, to exclude or restrict liability in respect of the breach (s 3(2)(a)), or 
(b) to be entitled to render a performance substantially different from what was reasonably expected (s 
3(2)(b)(i)), or, in whole or in part, to render no performance at all (s 3(2)(b)(ii)). 
The question of when someone deals as consumer is covered by s 123. There is no definition of ‘written 
standard terms of business’, but it should require two questions to be considered: 
(i) does the relevant party have ‘written standard terms of business’ (which should be a matter of the 
pattern of dealing on the terms in question when the contract is of a type to which the terms are 
appropriate4); and 
(ii) was the particular contract made on those terms (which should depend upon the degree of 
variation5 and also which terms were varied – some are inherently variable6)? 
The burden of proving that the contract is on one party's written standard terms of business will lie on the 
party claiming that the statute applies7. There will usually be no difficulty with the requirement that the 
standard terms be written. The requirement that the ‘written standard terms’ have to be, in some sense, 
the terms of the relevant party does not prevent UCTA 1977, s 3 encompassing terms drawn up for 
general use by those in a particular trade8. The terms will, of course, have to have been ‘adopted’ by the 
relevant party9. 
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UCTA 1977, s 11 – see para 3.84. 
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See para 3.83. 
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Chester Grosvenor Hotel v Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd (1991) 56 BLR 115. But see McCrone v 
Boots Farm Sales Ltd 1981 SLT 103, Lord Dunpark at 105; British Fermentation Products v Compare 
Reavell [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389 at 401 – ‘usually used’. The statement of Potter J in Flamar 
Interocean Ltd v The Flamar Pride [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 at 438 is ambiguous. 
5
 
Law Com Rep No 69, para 156; Watford Electronics v Sanderson [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 984 at [113]; 
Hadley Design Associates v Westminster BC [2003] EWHC 1617 (TCC) at [83]; United States v ARC 
Construction Ltd (8 May 1991, unreported); Ferryways NV v Associated British Ports, The Humber Way 
[2008] EWHC 225 (Comm), [2008] EWHC 225 (Comm), Teare J at [92] – ‘although a large part of the 
final agreement was negotiated and was not part of the standard terms, the latter were untocued by the 
negotiation and remained a sufficiently significant and important part of the agreement to enable it fairly to 
be said that the parties dealt on the Defendant's standard terms and conditions’. In Pegler v Wang (1999) 
70 ConLR 68 the somewhat extreme line was taken that ‘so far as concerns the exclusion clauses, Pegler 
were dealing “on the other's written standard terms of business”, and that is sufficient to cause the Act to 
apply to those terms.’ For a somewhat different approach to that contended for here see Salvage 
Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654, Off Ref, at 672; Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV 
Pasilac (22 April 1993, unreported). 
6
 
St Alban's City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1995] FSR 686, Scott Baker J at 706. 
7
 
British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, 402. 
8
 
One particular issue which has come to the fore in relation to whether one party deals on the other party's 
written standard terms of business is whether the contract between employee and employer can fall 
within that categorisation10. (Obviously its significance depends upon another contentious point: whether 
an employee ‘deals as consumer’ in making their contract of employment11). The line has been taken that 
the contract of employment of a bank employee is not made on the bank's written standard terms of 
business on the basis that the bank's business is banking and the terms of the employment contract are 
not standard terms of that business12. This obviously takes a narrow view of the scope of the ‘standard 
terms of business’ within s 3, nevertheless, the section has been seen as basically concerned with 
protecting the users or recipients of services and so inappropriate to the employment context13. However, 
the point has been made that to deny the application of s 3 to employment context is to encourage the 
type of distortion of interpretation in relation to employment contracts which led to the problems of the 
doctrine of ‘fundamental breach’ in contracts more generally before the introduction of UCTA14. Such a 
narrow interpretation need not be given to ‘written standard terms of business’. 
Section 3(2)(a) of UCTA 1977 covers the obvious situation of terms by which the proferens claims to 
exclude or restrict liability for breach of contract. It subjects such terms to the requirement of 
reasonableness. It may be seen as ‘directed to an exemption clause of the classic type exonerating a 
party in default from the ordinary consequences of the default’15. 
In contrast to the clear scope of UCTA 1977, s 3(2)(a), is s 3(2)(b). The latter subsection is not stated to 
cover exclusions or restrictions of liability but rather terms dealing with performance. Section 3(2)(b)(i) 
deals with the situation in which a term is being relied upon to provide a performance which is 
substantially different from that reasonably expected, with reasonable expectations being assessed as at 
the time when the contract was made16. Clearly, if the subsection is to have substance, although those 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Law Com No 69, para 151. Cox Plant Hire (London) Ltd v Dialbola (21 December 1983, unreported); 
United States v ARC Construction Ltd (8 May 1991, unreported); Schenkers Ltd v Overland Shoes Ltd 
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 498. But see St Alban's City and District Council v International Computers Ltd 
[1995] FSR 686, Scott Baker J; Schroeder Music Publishing v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616, [1974] 1 
WLR 1308, Lord Diplock at 1308. 
9
 
British Fermentation Products v Compare Reavell [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389. ‘Adoption’ should be a 
matter of use and intention. 
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H Collins ‘Legal Responses to the standard from contract of employment’ (2007) 36(2) ILJ. 
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See below para 3.83, note 6. 
12
 
Commerzbank AG v Keen [2006] EWCA Civ 1536, [2007] IRLR 132, [2006] 2 CLC 844. See also Brigden 
v American Express Bank Ltd [2000] IRLR 94, 631 IRLB 13 but see Liberty Life Insurance v Sheikh (17 
June 1985, unreported), CA. 
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M Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (OUP, 2003). 
14
 
H Collins ‘Legal Responses to the standard from contract of employment’ (2007) 36(2) ILJ. 
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Timeload Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [1995] EMLR 459, Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 
16
 
expectations are of the contractual performance, they cannot be taken simply to reflect what is legally 
required17. There may be a divergence between the performance which is required and that reasonably 
expected because of complexity of drafting and the artificial way in which terms may be incorporated. 
Section 3(2)(b)(i) may encompass, for example, ‘trap provisions’ – ‘cases in which the application of small 
print provisions would enable a party to perform a contract in a substantially different manner from that 
which could reasonably have been expected from perusal of its primary terms’18 – or provisions conferring 
a discretion – it may be reasonable to expect the discretion to be exercised within narrow bounds19. 
However, the point should be made that if s 3(2)(b)(i) is to cover a term conferring a discretion on the 
proferens, the discretion must relate to the proferens performance and not that of the other party. It has 
been held not to apply to a term conferring a discretion on a lender as to the interest rate to be paid by 
the borrower20. 
Section 3(2)(b)(ii) poses a problem. The point can be made that if a term entitles a party to say that 
something is not required by the contract then it is not part of the contractually required performance. 
Prima facie s 3(2)(b)(ii) appears to be circular and without content21. It has been said that UCTA 1977, s 
3(2)(b)(ii) ‘has no application where the contract term cannot operate alone but only in combination with 
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December 2003); SAM Business Systems v Hedley [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 465 at [62]; Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Co v Youell [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 136, Potter LJ at 142. But see W Photoprint 
Ltd v Forward Trust Group Ltd (1993) 12 Tr LR 146; Megaphone International Ltd v British 
Telecommunications plc (28 February 1989, unreported); Brigden v American Express Bank [2000] IRLR 
94; Peninsula Business Services v Sweeney [2004] IRLR 4. 
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Liberty Life Insurance Co v Sheikh (1985) Times, 25 June, Lexis, Kerr LJ. In IG Index plc v Colley [2013] 
EWHC 478 (QB) the court was not convinced that a manifest error clause (a stipulation in the spread-
betting contract permitting the service provider to amend or void any bets placed by the client if there was 
an error that provider believed to be obvious or palpable) fell within s 3(2)(b). Stadlen J held that voiding a 
bet would not involve rendering no performance by the provider of its contractual obligation since once 
the bet was voided there would be no contractual obligation to perform. Therefore the clause did not 
come within the scope of s 3(2)(b). In any event the judge thought that the right to void the bets where 
there was a manifest error satisfied the requirement of reasonableness (at [844]–[845]). 
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Timeload Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [1995] EMLR 459; Zockoll Group Ltd v Mercury 
Communications Ltd [1998] FSR 354; Lahji v Post Office Ltd (unreported, 19 December 2003). See also 
the example given by the Law Commission based on Anglo Continental Holidays v Typaldos (London) Ltd 
[1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep 61: Law Com Rep no 69. 
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Paragon Finance plc v Staunton [2001] EWCA Civ 1466, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 1025. Clearly setting 
the interest rate could literally be regarded as performance on the part of the proferens, but the court's 
approach embodies the underlying assumption that even the broader parts of UCTA are restricted to what 
can be regarded, in some sense, as an exemption clause. See also Barclays Mercantile Business 
Finance Ltd v Marsh [2002] EWCA Civ 948, [2002] All ER (D) 203 (Jun), Dyson LJ, para 21. For similar 
restrictions see Rolls Royce Power Engineering v Ricardo Consulting Engineers [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 
129 at [75]; United States v ARC Construction Ltd (8 May 1991, Unreported). 
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See W Photprint Ltd v Forward Trust Group Ltd (1993) 12 Tr LR 146. 
some other event’22. However, it is suggested that content can be given to the section if a distinction is 
drawn between clauses which are part of the definition of the obligation in both form and substance and 
those which are only in the form of part of the definition of the obligation but which are, in substance, 
exclusion clauses23. Content can found in s 3(2)(b)(ii) if the latter clauses are left out of the initial 
consideration of the performance required. They can then be seen as terms which are being used to 
claim that ‘in respect of the whole or any part of his obligation’ the relevant party is entitled to ‘render no 
performance at all’. 
Indemnities – UCTA 1977, s 4 
[3.79]  
Section 4 of UCTA 1977 subjects to the requirement of reasonableness1, a term by which a person who 
deals as consumer2 is required to indemnify another in relation to liability for negligence or breach of 
contract. The indemnitee is not required to be the other party to the contract3. The liability may be direct 
or vicarious4 and it may be to the indemnifier or to another5. An indemnity clause may just state that one 
person is to indemnify another, or it may achieve that effect in other words. It may, for example, state that 
one person is to be responsible for liability which is the immediate responsibility of another6. The 
categorisation of ‘transferred servant’ clauses is unclear7, but the better view would seem to be that such 
clauses should fall within the ambit of UCTA 1977, s 4. It has been suggested that a heavier burden is 
involved in establishing that an indemnity clause satisfies the requirement of reasonableness than in 
relation to other clauses8. 
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Eg United States v ARC Construction Ltd (8 May 1991, unreported) Lexis. 
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Arthur White (Contractors) Ltd v Tarmac Civil Engineering Ltd [1967] 3 All ER 586, [1967] 1 WLR 1508; 
Thompson v Lohan [1987] 2 All ER 631. 
8
 
Jones v Northampton Borough Council (1990) Times, 21 May, Lexis, Ralph Gibson LJ. 
There is no provision in UCTA 1977 specifically dealing with indemnities other than those used against 
those who deal as consumers, but, as has been indicated, there is scope for some indemnity clauses to 
be regarded as clauses excluding or restricting liability and as falling within the more general provisions of 
the Act9. 
Guarantees of consumer goods – UCTA 1977, s 5 
[3.80]  
Under UCTA 1977, s 51, a manufacturer or distributor of goods cannot, by reference to any contract term 
or notice, contained in, or operating by reference to, a guarantee of the goods, exclude or restrict liability 
in negligence in relation to loss or damage arising from goods proving defective whilst in consumer use. 
The goods must be ‘of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’2. The section does not 
apply to contracts under which possession or ownership of goods passes3. Goods are ‘in consumer use’ 
when a person ‘is using them, or has them in his possession for use, otherwise than exclusively for the 
purposes of a business’4. A guarantee is anything in writing which contains, or purports to contain, ‘some 
promise or assurance that defects will be made good by complete or partial replacement, or by repair, 
monetary compensation or otherwise’. 
Goods – UCTA 1977, ss 6 and 7 
[3.81]  
Sections 61 and 72 of UCTA 1977 deal with terms excluding or restricting liability for breach of certain 
terms implied into contracts under which possession or ownership of goods passes. Section 6 covers 
contracts for the sale or hire purchase of goods and s 7 deals with other such contracts. It should be 
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AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 278; Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International 
Foundations Ltd (1992) 33 ConLR 1. The Law Commission consultation envisages maintaining those 
situations in which terms are automatically ineffective in any replacement legislation. It is envisaged that, 
in the business to business context, individually negotiated terms will not be subject to the fair and 
reasonable test: Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, Scottish Law Commission Discussion 
Paper No 119 Unfair Terms in Contracts. 
2
 
Charlotte Thirty and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 ConLR 46; Stag Line v Tyne Shiprepair Group Ltd, 
The Zinnia [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 211. 
noted that, unlike the rest of the active sections3, s 6 is not currently restricted to ‘business’ liability but 
when the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 becomes law, the entirety of these provisions in UCTA 1977 will 
cease to apply to consumers. Under UCTA 1977, s 6(2), liability for the terms implied by Sale of Goods 
Act 1979, ss 13–15 and the corresponding terms implied into contracts of hire purchase by Supply of 
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, ss 8–10, cannot be excluded or restricted when the acquirer of the 
goods ‘deals as consumer’4. If the acquirer does not ‘deal as consumer’, then the exclusion or restriction 
is ineffective unless it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness5. The exclusion or restriction of the 
corresponding implied terms6 in other contracts under which possession or ownership of goods passes 
are dealt with in the same way under s77. There is a divergence of treatment under UCTA 1977, ss 6 and 
7 of the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of the implied terms as to title. Under s 6, such 
liability cannot be excluded or restricted8. Under s 7, the liability for breach of the term implied by Supply 
of Goods and Services Act 1982, s 29, cannot be excluded or restricted10, but liability in respect of the 
terms implied in law in relation to (a) the right to transfer ownership of the goods, or give possession; or 
(b) the assurance of quiet possession can be excluded or restricted by a term satisfying the requirement 
of reasonableness11. 
Both ss 6 and 7 are stated to apply to terms which exclude or restrict the relevant liability. The argument 
may be raised that a term does not exclude or restrict liability but rather prevents the implication from 
being made12. This raises issues of form and substance and the appropriate use of the last part of UCTA 
1977, s 13(1)13. 
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UCTA 1977, s 8 is also exempt but that is merely an amendment of s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 
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UCTA 1977, s 6(3). On the requirement of reasonableness see s 11. Note the specific applicability of Sch 
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UCTA 1977, s 7(2) – where the acquirer deals as consumer. UCTA 1977, s 7(3) – where the acquirer 
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UCTA 1977, s 6(1). 
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UCTA 1977, s 7(3A). 
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UCTA 1977, s 7(4). On the requirement of reasonableness see s 11. Note the specific applicability of Sch 
2 to contracts falling within ss 6 or 7: see para 3.88. 
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Second contracts – UCTA 1977, s 10 
[3.82]  
Section 10 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 is an anti-avoidance provision, designed to prevent the 
use of a term in a second contract to achieve, in relation to a first contract, what the active sections would 
not allow to be achieved by a term in the first contract. Although obscurely drafted, it seems clear, that 
whether the term should be automatically ineffective, or only ineffective if it fails to satisfy the requirement 
of reasonableness, should depend upon what would have happened to it had it been a term excluding or 
restricting liability in the first contract. The section does not apply where the ‘second contract’ is an 
agreement compromising claims1. It has been suggested that UCTA 1977, s10 only applies where both 
contracts are not between the same parties2, but that is not required by the wording of the section and 
would seem to be undesirably restrictive of an anti-avoidance provision. 
‘Deals as consumer’ – UCTA 1977, s 12 
[3.83]  
The meaning of ‘deals as consumer’ is covered by UCTA 1977, s 121. The basic definition is in s 12(1)2, 
which states: 
‘12(1) A party to a contract deals as consumer in relation to another party if – 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as 
doing so; and 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods or hire purchase, or by 
section 7 of this Act, the goods passing under or in pursuance of the contract are of a 
type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’3. 
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These provisions referring to consumer transactions are likely to be replaced by the newly proposed 
Consumer Rights Act. 
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In Rasbora v JCL Marine [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 645 it was said (Lawson J at 651) that ‘although the effect 
of the novation was to substitute a corporation for a private person as the buyer … in my judgment this 
mere substitution did not alter the character of the original transaction to a non-consumer sale’. However, 
it would seem that the company which became the buyer would have been regarded as making a 
consumer purchase in any event. 
3
 
This third requirement is now limited to those claiming to deal as consumers who are not ‘individuals’: s 
12(1A) as added by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002: see below. 
In s 12(2) there is some further limitation on those who deal as consumers where what is in question is a 
sale by competitive tender or auction. Originally, any buyer in such circumstances could not be regarded 
as ‘dealing as consumer’. This has been amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 20024 so that in relation to an ‘individual’ that restriction only applies to the purchase of 
second hand goods, sold at a public auction at which individuals have the opportunity of attending the 
sale in person. In relation to someone who is not an individual the more general restriction remains in 
relation to the purchase of goods by auction or competitive tender. Those Regulations also impact upon 
goods contracts more generally. Section 12(1)(c) is dis-applied where the person claiming to deal as 
consumer is an ‘individual’5. It is for the person claiming that a party does not deal as consumer6 to show 
that he or she does not7. 
Obviously, to determine whether someone is dealing as consumer, it is vitally important to determine 
when they will be contracting ‘in the course of a business’8. In relation to UCTA 1977, s 12, that phrase 
was considered in R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust Ltd9 and the Court of Appeal 
basically adopted the approach taken to the interpretation of the same phrase in the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1968. Dillon LJ said10: 
‘there are some transactions which are clearly integral parts of the business concerned, and these 
should be held to have been carried out in the course of those businesses; this would cover, apart 
from much else, the instance of a one-off adventure in the nature of trade where the transaction 
itself would constitute a trade or business. There are other transactions, however, such as the 
purchase of the car in the present case, which are at the highest only incidental to the carrying on of 
the relevant business; here a degree of regularity is required before it can be said that they are an 
integral part of the business carried on and so entered into in the course of that business.’ 
                                                     
4
 
SI 2002/3045 coming into force on 31 March, 2003, Regulation 14(3) substituting a new s 12(2). 
5
 
Regulation 14(2), adding s 12(1A) after s 12(1). 
6
 
It has been held that an employee can ‘deal as consumer’ – Brigden v American Express Bank Ltd [2000] 
IRLR 94 and see Chapman v Aberdeen Construction Group plc [1991] IRLR 505, Lord Caplan, Court of 
Session, Inner House, (but see Degeld Options Ltd v Malook (1 July 1990, unreported), Popplewell J). 
However, s 3 of UCTA has been seen as basically concerned with protecting the users or recipients of 
goods or services and not really appropriate to the employment context (see M Freedland, The Personal 
Employment Contract (OUP, 2003). Collins also finds it unconvincing to regard employees as ‘dealing as 
consumers’ but he does argue that s 3 should apply to standard form employment contracts on the basis 
that they are the employer's written standard terms of business (H Collins ‘Legal Responses to the 
Standard Form Contract of Employment’ (2007) 36(2) ILJ). 
7
 
Section 12(3). 
8
 
The phrase is also in s 1 and is there relevant to determining the scope of many of the active sections: 
see para 3.70. 
9
 
[1988] 1 All ER 847. 
10
 
[1988] 1 All ER 847 at 854. See also Neill LJ at 858–859. 
This indicates that a contract will be made in the course of a business if it is either: 
(a) integral to the relevant party's business, in itself, or 
(b) merely incidental, in itself to that business, but regularly occurring. 
For obvious reasons, cases decided under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 should be helpful in 
understanding this. In the instant case, the buyer was found not to have contracted in the course of a 
business – it ‘dealt as consumer’. It was in business as a freight forwarding agent. The purchase of a car 
was not integral to that business11 and, as it was only the second or third such purchase, it was not a 
regularly occurring type of transaction. It should be noted that a company may deal as consumer, which 
contrasts with the definition of ‘consumer’ under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
199912. 
The approach taken to which transactions are integral to a business would seem to be very narrow13. It 
does not, for example, encompass the sale of a car by a taxi business14, or by a courier15. This would 
indicate that only transactions which are the basis of the business should be regarded as integral to it, eg 
the supply of taxi services by a taxi business and courier services by a courier. In relation to merely 
incidental transactions, what was stated to be required was that that type of transaction should be 
regularly occurring, but the tenor of the judgments would suggest not merely a requirement of regularity 
but also of some degree of frequency so that they can, in some way, be regarded as the ‘normal practice’ 
of the business16. 
The approach taken to the meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ in R&B Customs Brokers is open to 
considerable criticism. In the particular case, it enlarged the availability of the greater protection provided 
for those who deal as consumers but inappropriately, leading to the comment as to the ‘absurdity of a 
major trader claiming the protection afforded to a consumer whenever he stepped out of his habitual line 
of business’17. Further, as the phrase ‘in the course of a business’ appears twice in the definition in UCTA 
1977, s 12 (also requiring the proferens to deal ‘in the course of a business’), in other cases, it curtailed 
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See also Peter Symmons & Co v Cook (1981) 131 NLJ 758, Lexis. 
12
 
There are now some distinctions drawn under s12 where the person claiming to deal as consumer is an 
‘individual’ – s 12(1A) and s12(2) as added /amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 2002. On the 1999 Regulations and the definition there of consumer see para 3.100. 
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Devlin v Hall [1990] RTR 320; Davies v Sumner [1984] 3 All ER 831. But see Chester Grosvenor Hotel Co 
Ltd v Sir Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd (1991) 56 BLR 115; Ormsby v H & H Factors Ltd (26 January 
1990, unreported). 
14
 
Devlin v Hall [1990] RTR 320. The sales by the car hire business in Havering London Borough v 
Stevenson [1970] 3 All ER 609 were regularly occurring. There was a fleet of 24 cars and a car was sold 
when inter alia the business had had it for about two years. 
15
 
Davies v Sumner [1984] 3 All ER 831. 
16
 
Havering London Borough v Stevenson [1970] 3 All ER 609, Lord Parker CJ at 611. 
17
 
Prostar Management v Twaddle 2003 SLT (Sh Ct) 11 at [12]. 
it18. Certainly, it is too narrow an approach to be used in relation to the same phrase in UCTA 1977, s 119. 
In addition, it is an interpretation which seems to be inconsistent with the words themselves. What is 
required is that a transaction be ‘in the course of a business’ not that it be ‘in the course of business’. ‘The 
former suggests things done by and for a business, whilst the latter suggests acts limited to the kind of 
business in which a person is engaged’20. Transactions which are merely incidental to the relevant party's 
business could be construed as having been made in the course of a business without any need to 
establish a pattern of such transactions21. 
Under UCTA 1977, s 12(1)(a) a person does not deal as consumer if either they (i) contract in the course 
of a business, or (ii) hold themselves out as doing so. The idea of ‘holding out’ as contracting in the 
course of a business may bring to mind someone claiming a trade discount or some such situation. 
However, the reference to such ‘holding out’ has to be understood in a way which is consistent with the 
interpretation of ‘in the course of a business’ in general and therefore, at present, in a manner consistent 
with the line taken in R&B Customs Brokers22. This provides a further indication of the inappropriateness 
of the current approach to the meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ in s 12. 
In relation to contracts falling within UCTA 1977, ss 6 or 7, there has been an additional requirement if a 
party is to deal as consumer. Under s 12(1)(c), the goods had to be of a type ordinarily supplied for 
private use or consumption23. That further restriction is now limited to the situation in which the person 
claiming to ‘deal as consumer’ is not an individual24. The characterisation of goods as a type ordinarily 
supplied for private use or consumption could take account of factors such as25 the size, quantity26 and 
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Eg if R & B Customs Brokers had been selling a car, it would seem that they would similarly not have 
dealt in the course of a business and any purchaser from them could not have dealt as consumer, no 
matter that the purchaser had no business involvement at all. 
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See para 3.69. 
20
 
Kidner ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 – Who Deals as Consumer?’ (1987) NILQ 46 at 53. 
21
 
See St Alban's City and District Council v ICL [1995] FSR 686. And see now Stevenson v Rogers [1999] 
1 All ER 613 and the approach taken to the interpretation of ‘in the course of a business’ in the context of 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 14(2). But see Peter Symmons & Co v Cook (1981) 131 NLJ 758, Lexis. 
22
 
Felderol Finance plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 747, [2004] All ER (D) 138 (May). 
But see Law Com Rep No 69, paras 149–150. 
23
 
Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 645; Ormsby v H & H Factors Ltd (26 January 1990, 
unreported). 
24
 
Section 12(1A) as added by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002. 
25
 
Kidner (1987) 38 NILQ 46 at 54  
26
 
A sufficient quantity might, in itself, indicate that a business is being pursued or a ‘one off transaction in 
the nature of trade’. 
quality27 of the goods and, also, the purpose for which the goods are made or purchased, and these latter 
factors might relate, for example, to the predominant purpose or the usual purpose. Whatever the 
approach taken to categorising ‘types’ of goods, the question remains as to whether ‘ordinarily’ should be 
interpreted as ‘usually’ or ‘commonly’. The latter would allow someone to deal as a consumer where the 
goods are of a type which are supplied for private use or consumption in a substantial minority of cases, 
rather than requiring that the supply for private use or consumption should provide the majority of 
occasions on which goods of the relevant type are supplied28. 
The requirement of reasonableness – UCTA 1977, s 11 
[3.84]  
Basic test Under UCTA 1977 a clause is often rendered ineffective except in so far as it satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness1, the basic test for which is set out in s 11(1) in relation to contract terms: 
‘In relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness … is that the term shall have been 
a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought 
reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
made.’ 
When what is in question is a non-contractual notice, s 11(3) deals with it, stating: 
‘In relation to a notice, (not being a notice having contractual effect), the requirement of 
reasonableness under this Act is that it should be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on it having 
regard to all the circumstances obtaining when the liability arose or (but for the notice) would have 
arisen.’ 
There are clear differences between the two tests, particularly in the time frame of the assessment. When 
a contract term is in question, the time frame against which the assessment is made is that of the 
conclusion of the contract. The circumstances to be considered are those which were, or ought 
reasonably to have been, in the contemplation of both parties2 at the time the contract was made. In 
particular, no account can be taken of the particular breach, only the potential for a breach of the relevant 
type, and a clause may be unreasonable because of its potential application, even though its use in 
relation to the particular breach would be reasonable3. (It is safer to draft a series of narrow clauses than 
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E g carpets may be of domestic or commercial ‘quality’, Kidner (1987) 38 NILQ 46 at 55. 
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Kidner (1987) 38 NILQ 46 at 55. 
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The Law Commission's consultation envisages a ‘fair and reasonable’ test backed up by a list of factors 
and separate lists of terms for the consumer and the business to business context, which are to be 
treated as failing that test unless the contrary is shown – Law Commission Consultation Paper No 166, 
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 119 Unfair Terms in Contracts. 
2
 
Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundations Ltd (1992) 33 ConLR 1; Flamar Interocean Ltd v 
Denmac Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434; Chester Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Ltd (1991) 56 
BLR 115; Jones v Northampton Borough Council (1990) Times, 21 May, Lexis; Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees & 
Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 at 169. 
3
 
Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 257. In relation to the assessment of potential 
breaches see also Skipskredittforeningen v Emperor Navigation Ltd [1997] CLC 1151, Mance J at 1164; 
one wide one – that way at least some may survive the test.) In contrast, in relation to non-contractual 
notices, the time frame of assessment is that of the time when the liability arose or (but for the notice) 
would have arisen. However, it has been said that ‘the fundamental standard to be met in order to satisfy 
the reasonableness test is broadly the same for both contractual and non-contractual notices, namely that 
it should be fair and reasonable in all the relevant circumstances’4. The basic approach required is a 
gathering and weighing of the relevant factors so that the court must ascertain a whole range of 
considerations, put them in the scales on one side or the other, and decide at the end of the day on which 
side the balance comes down,5 and that must be done in relation to each particular case, and cannot 
simply be determined because a standard form contract has been assessed previously6. 
In Lloyd v Browning7 it was stressed that when assessing the reasonableness of the exemption clause, 
the ultimate question is not whether the clause is in general a fair and reasonable clause. The ultimate 
question is whether or not it was a fair and reasonable clause as contained in the particular contract. This 
should not be interpreted as enjoining the court to ignore the general purpose behind clauses such as the 
one in question. Neither should one ignore the purpose behind deploying the clause in question as a 
special condition into the particular contract. Most boiler plate clauses are designed to achieve certainty, 
and as such should be read not only in the specific context of the parties’ relationship but also from a 
broader context. 
There are non-exhaustive ‘guidelines’ in UCTA 1977, Sch 28 and in s 11(4) there are matters specified for 
consideration, when what is in question is a term or notice limiting liability to a ‘specified sum’9. Although, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Bacardi- Martini Beverages Ltd v Thomas Hardy Packaging Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 549, [2002] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 335, [26]. In Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 361 the conclusion reached 
at first instance that the clause failed to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness was reversed in the 
light of narrower construction by the Court of Appeal. For example, although the clause in question 
excluded liability for certain categories of loss ‘in any circumstances’, and other clauses accepted liability 
in general for deliberate and negligent acts, the clause was not viewed by the Court of Appeal as covering 
liability for ‘fraud, malice or recklessness’. The line was taken that ‘Liability for fraud or malice or 
recklessness which is a species of either, goes without saying: parties contract with one another in the 
expectation of honest dealing’ (at [35]). 
4
 
Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654, HH Judge Thayne Forbes (Off Ref). 
5
 
George Mitchell Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, [1983] 3 WLR 163, Lord Bridge at 171; 
Rees Hough Ltd v Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd (1983) 2 ConLR 109. See also Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v 
APV Pasilac Ltd (22 April 1993, unreported). 
6
 
Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620 at 628; First National Commercial Bank v Loxleys 
[1997] PNLR 211; Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundations Ltd (1993) 33 Con LR 1; 
Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society [1984] EGD 934; Sonicare International Ltd v East Anglia 
Freight Terminal Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 48 at 55; British Fermentation products v Compair Reavell 
[1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, 403. 
7
 
[2013] EWCA Civ 1637 at [33]–[34]. 
8
 
The guidelines are only made relevant by ‘statutory prescription’ to terms covered by UCTA 1977, ss 6 or 
7 (see UCTA 1977, s 11(2)), but they are generally, factually relevant in other cases and will be 
considered as such: see para 3.88. 
9
 
See para 3.87. 
the sections which apply the reasonableness test, state that a term (or notice) is ineffective ‘except’ (or, 
‘but only’), ‘in so far as’, it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, terms or notices are simply 
effective or ineffective as a whole10 unless a ‘term’ (or ‘notice’) contains several distinct units and the 
reasonable and unreasonable can be treated as distinct terms and severed11. Again, the point can be 
made as to the greater safety in drafting a number of separate terms so that all protection is not lost when 
part of the exemption sought is regarded as unreasonable12. From time to time there have been dicta13 
which might be taken to suggest that there should not be, because there is no need for, a close scrutiny 
of the reasonableness of exemption clauses in commercial contracts between businesses of equal 
bargaining power. However, it should not be ignored that the matter of bargaining strengths is merely one 
factor; other relevant factors must be given proper consideration in every case14. 
[3.85]  
Burden of proof and pleadings Section 11(5) of UCTA 1977 places the burden of proof upon the person 
claiming that the contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness and this may be of 
‘great significance’1. When a defence is based on an exemption clause to which UCTA 1977 and the 
requirement of reasonableness may be relevant, the ‘assertion as to the term satisfying the requirement 
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George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 737; Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio 
Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 257. 
11
 
Watford Electronics v Sanderson [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696 – first and second sentence of the clause 
treated as distinct terms. Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 361, [2009] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 586 – the elements of the clause in question which were viewed as separate sub-clauses 
(although only numbered as such by the court) were treated as distinct terms for the purposes of the 
application of the requirement of reasonableness. In particular, a limitation element was treated as 
independent of an exclusion element. Trolex Products Ltd v Merrol Fire Protection Engineers Ltd (20 
November 1991, unreported), Nourse LJ. 
12
 
See, for example, the loss of whole clauses in Lobster Group Ltd v Heidelberg Graphic Equipment Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 1919 (TCC), [2009] All ER (D) 37 (Aug) even though only regarded as partly unreasonable. 
13
 
Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 843; Salvage Assn v CAP Financial 
Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654; Chester Grosvenor Hotel v Alfred McAlpine (1991) 56 Build LR 115; Fillite 
Runcorn v APV Pasilac (22 April 1993, unreported); Edmund Murray v BSP International (1992) 33 
ConLR 1; Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696, para 
55; SAM Business Systems v Hedley [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 465; Granville Oil v Davis Turner [2003] 1 
All ER (Comm) 819; Frans Maas v Samsung Electronics [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 251; Sterling Hydraulics Ltd 
v Dichtomatik Ltd [2006] EWHC 2004 (QB), [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep 8, [26]; JP Morgan Chase Bank v 
Springwell Navigation Corpn [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm), [2008] All ER (D) 167 (Jun), [603]. 
14
 
The Trustees of Ampleforth Abbey Trust v Turner and Townsend [2012] EWHC 2137 (TCC); also Elvanite 
Full Circle Limited v AMEC Earth & Environmental (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 1191 (TCC). 
1
 
Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, Slade LJ at 628; St Alban's City and District Council v 
ICL [1995] FSR 686. See also Astea (UK) Ltd v Time Group Ltd [2003] EWHC 725 (TCC), [2003] All ER 
(D) 212 (Apr) – failure to adduce evidence to show clause was reasonable was seen as making a finding 
of unreasonableness ‘inevitable’. 
of reasonableness may properly be regarded as a necessary particular of the defence’ to be included in 
the pleadings2. 
[3.86]  
Appeals The courts have given some consideration to the approach to be taken to an appeal from a 
decision on the requirement of reasonableness in Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s 11. In George 
Mitchell Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd1 Lord Bridge, with whom the other members of the court agreed, 
said: 
‘There will sometimes be room for a legitimate difference of opinion as to what the answer should 
be, where it will be impossible to say that one view is demonstrably wrong and the other 
demonstrably right. It must follow … that, when asked to review such a decision on appeal, the 
appellate court should treat the original decision with the utmost respect and refrain from 
interference with it unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly 
and obviously wrong.’ 
Decisions on the requirement of reasonableness provide only limited guidance for the future2. 
[3.87]  
Limitation clauses Section 11(4) makes two factors particularly relevant to, but not determinative of1, the 
question of the reasonableness of a clause which purports to limit liability to a specified sum. When 
someone purports to use such a clause regard is to be had to: 
(a) the resources which he could expect to be available to him for the purpose of meeting the liability 
should it arise; and 
(b) how far it was open to him to cover himself by insurance. 
This should cover limitations stating a sum and also those stating a formula from which a sum can be 
ascertained2. Whether there is a basis for a particular sum will be considered3 and the scope of a clause 
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Sheffield v Pickfords Ltd (1997) 16 Tr LR 337. Ord 18 r 12(1) RSC. See also Circuit Systems Ltd (in 
liquidation) and Baston v Zuken-Redac (UK) Ltd (1995) 42 ConLR 120; AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource 
Ltd [1996] CLC 265, Hobhouse LJ at 278. 
1
 
George Mitchell Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 737, Lord Bridge at 743. See also Ormsby v 
H & H Factors Ltd (26 January 1990, unreported), Neill LJ; Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International 
Foundations Ltd (1993) 33 Con LR 1; Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, Slade LJ at 629; 
Warren v Truprint [1986] BTLC 344, Lexis; Schenkers Ltd v Overland Shoes Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
498, Thorpe LJ at 508; Overseas Medical Transport Services v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 273, 276; Watford Electronics v Sanderson [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 
696, 707; Britvic Soft Drinks v Messer UK Ltd [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 321, [19]. 
2
 
Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620; British Fermentation Products v Compair Reavell 
[1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, 403. 
1
 
Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep 164. 
2
 
In Shared Network Services Ltd v Nextira 1 UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 3845 (Comm), for example, it was held 
that a limitation of liability which referred to an amount received under a contract by a party seeking to 
may be relevant – if a clause seeks to cover several different types of breach with a single limit, the limit 
may not be appropriate for all of them4. In relation to standard terms, it may be easier to show a monetary 
limit is reasonable if it is regularly reviewed5. The cases show that the availability and cost of insurance is 
an important factor generally6, not only in relation to clauses limiting liability. A limitation clause may 
contain restrictions other than a simple monetary cap. It may restrict the availability of other remedies, 
and the extent and appropriateness of the remedies remaining will be reviewed, in determining the 
reasonableness of the clause7. 
[3.88]  
Guidelines – UCTA 1977, Sch 2 Schedule 2 contains guidelines for the application of the requirement of 
reasonableness. The factors in Sch 2 are: 
‘(a) the strength of the bargaining position of the parties relative to each other, taking into 
account (among other things) alternative means by which the customer's requirements could 
have been met; 
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in accepting it had an 
opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other persons, but without having to 
accept a similar term; 
                                                                                                                                                                           
limit liability was quite common under various types of commercial contract, and there was nothing 
inherently unreasonable in that form of limitation. 
3
 
St Alban's City and District Council v ICL [1995] FSR 686; Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services 
[1995] FSR 654; Salvage Assn v CAP Financial Services [1995] FSR 654; Moores v Yakely Associates 
(1998) 62 Con LR 76; Frans Maas v Samsung Electronics [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 251. But see Sonicare 
International Ltd v East Anglia Freight Terminal Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 48 at 55. 
4
 
Overseas Medical Supplies Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] CLC 1243, 1253. Distinguished in 
Granville Oil v Davis Turner [2003] EWCA Civ 570, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 819 where the same diversity 
of breaches was covered but the limitation was a time clause rather than a monetary restriction. 
5
 
Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees & Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164. It will be difficult to argue 
that a monetary limit is reasonable if it is contained in an outdated version of the proferens terms which 
have been used by accident and a higher amount is contained in the current terms: Salvage Association v 
CAP Financial Services [1995] FSR 654, St Albans City and District Council v International Computers 
Ltd [1995] FSR 686. 
6
 
In The Trustees of Ampleforth Abbey Trust v Turner and Townsend [2012] EWHC 2137 (TCC) HHJ 
Keyser QC found that the liability cap of £111,000 odd (the amount paid under the contract) was 
unreasonable because the contract imposed on the defendant an obligation to take out professional 
indemnity insurance to a level of £10 million. See para 3.90. 
7
 
Rees Hough Ltd v Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd (1983) 2 Con LR 109; White Cross Equipment v 
Farrell (1982) 2 Tr LR 21; Charlotte Thirty and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46; Schenkers 
Ltd v Overland Shoes Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 498, Pill LJ at 507; WRM Group Ltd v Wood [1998] CLC 
189 at 196; Skipskredittforeningen v Emperor Navigation [1997] CLC 1151; Granville Oil v Davis Turner 
[2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 819; British Fermentation Products v Compare Reavell [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 
389; SAM Business Systems v Hedley [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 465; Lobster Group Ltd v Heidelberg 
Graphic Equipment Ltd [2009] EWHC 1919 (TCC), [2009] All ER (D) 37 (Aug). 
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of 
the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous 
course of dealing between the parties); 
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition is not complied 
with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with 
that condition would be practicable; 
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the 
customer.’ 
By s 11(2) the above guidelines are applicable when the contract is one covered by UCTA 1977, ss 6 or 
71 but, even in that context, they are not exhaustive. Outside of ss6 and 7 the guidelines will not apply by 
‘legislative prescription’, but the factors set out in the guidelines are still likely to be factually relevant to 
the reasonableness of an exemption clause2. 
[3.89]  
Guidelines – Smith v Bush1 In Smith v Bush Lord Griffiths made some widely applicable points2. He 
said3: 
‘I believe that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of factors that must be taken into 
account when a judge is faced with this very difficult decision. Nevertheless, the following matters 
should in my view always be considered. 
(1) Were the parties of equal bargaining power? … 
(2) In the case of advice, would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an 
alternative source taking into account considerations of costs and time? …. 
(3) How difficult is the task being undertaken for which the liability is being excluded? When a 
very difficult or dangerous undertaking is involved there may be a high risk of failure which 
                                                     
1
 
Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundations Ltd (1992) 33 ConLR 1. 
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Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep 164 at 169; Phillips 
Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620 at 628; Rees Hough Ltd v Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd 
(1983) 2 ConLR 109; Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654; Flamar 
Interocean Ltd v Denmac Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434, Potter J at 438–439; Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio 
Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 257; Schenkers Ltd v Overland Shoes Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 498, Pill LJ 
at 505; Overseas Medical Supplies Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 981, 
[1999] CLC 1243, CA, at 1248; British Fermentation Products v Compair Reavell [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 
389, 402. But see Jones v Northampton Borough Council (1990) Times, 21 May, Lexis. 
1
 
[1990] 1 AC 831, [1989] 2 All ER 514, HL. 
2
 
St Alban's City and District Council v ICL [1995] FSR 686 at 710; Ormsby v H & H Factors Ltd (26 
January 1990, unreported); Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654; Beaton v 
Nationwide Building Society [1991] 2 EGLR 145 at 151; Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac (22 April 
1993, unreported). 
3
 
[1989] 2 All ER 514 at 531. 
would certainly be a pointer towards the reasonableness of excluding liability as a condition 
of doing the work … 
(4) What are the practical consequences of the decision on the question of reasonableness? This 
must involve the sums of money potentially at stake and the ability of the parties to bear the 
loss involved, which, in its turn, raises the question of insurance …’ 
There is some overlap here with the factors referred to in Sch 2. It should be noted that the case was 
concerned with liability for negligent misstatement and Lord Griffiths' second point is put in terms specific 
to the case. More generally, the question is simply that of the availability of an alternative source of 
whatever is being contracted for4. 
[3.90]  
Insurance Insurance is a highly significant factor in considering the requirement of reasonableness. The 
availability of insurance to cover a potential liability is made specifically relevant to the reasonableness of 
a limitation clause by s 11(4). It is also a factor which the courts have indicated as being generally 
significant1. The reasonableness of the risk allocation in the exemption clause is assessed against the 
possibilities2 open to either party to insure against it and the cost of doing so3. A limit on liability may be 
reasonable although it is less than the cover available to the party using the clause. The same cover may 
also deal with other contracts or other liabilities under the particular contract4. 
[3.91]  
Availability of alternatives Another significant factor is the availability of alternatives. It is referred to in 
paras (a) and (b) of Sch 2 and it was also referred to by Lord Griffiths in Smith v Bush1. If there are other 
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Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services [1995] FSR 654. 
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requiring exceptional circumstances beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties. 
1
 
See para 3.89. 
parties from whom the relevant goods or service could be obtained, then that may be significant2 as an 
indicator of whether there is an imbalance in the bargaining positions3. Where the proferens seeks to rely 
on an exemption clause it may also be significant in relation to the issue of ‘reasonableness’ to ask 
whether the proferens had offered the other party an alternative higher priced contract involving less risk 
to that other party4. The reality of any alternative will be considered5. 
[3.92]  
Inequality of bargaining power Inequality of bargaining power is referred to in para (a) of the Sch 2 
guidelines. It was also referred to by Lord Griffiths in Smith v Bush1. It has been said that relative 
bargaining power is to be assessed on a broad basis2. One important question in considering the parties' 
relative bargaining power is whether there was an alternative source of supply of whatever was being 
contracted for3 and whether the alternative source used the same terms4. Standard terms used 
throughout a trade will not indicate inequality of bargaining power if arrived at by representatives of those 
commonly involved on both sides of the transaction5. It is possible for the relative bargaining power of 
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Woodman v Phototrade Processing Ltd (1981) 131 NLJ 935, Lexis. See also Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees 
and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep 164 at 170; R W Green Ltd v Cade Bros Farms [1978] 
1 Lloyd's Rep 602. 
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Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm) [1990] 1 AC 831, [1989] 2 All ER 514, HL (cost); Warren v Truprint [1986] 
BTLC 344, Lexis. 
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See also Keeton & Sons Ltd v Carl Prior Ltd [1986] BTLC 30, Lexis; Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees & Hartlepool 
Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164; Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac Ltd (22 April 1993, 
unreported); Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620; Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac Ltd 
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[2013] EWCA Civ 1637. In West v Finlay [2014] EWCA Civ 316 the fact that a consumer was one of the 
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Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Shiprepair Group Ltd, The Zinnia [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 211, Staughten J at 222. 
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W Photoprint v Forward Trust Group Ltd (1993) 12 Tr LR 146; White Cross Equipment Ltd v Farell (1982) 
2 Tr LR 21; Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, Slade LJ at 629; George Mitchell Ltd v 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 737; Schenkers Ltd v Overland Shoes [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 498, 
506. 
4
 
St Alban's City and District Council v ICL [1995] FSR 686. 
5
 
parties to change where there is a continuing relationship6. One contract, for example, may effectively 
result in one of the parties effectively becoming a monopoly supplier to the other because of the need for 
compatibility with what has already been supplied and that may impact upon the reasonableness of the 
exemption clause in later contracts7. Similarly, there may be an equalisation of bargaining power where a 
small business becomes, for the large business, a relied-upon contractor8. 
[3.93]  
Consequences There were factors indicating the reasonableness of the disclaimer in Smith v Bush1, but 
they were outweighed by the potential consequences of holding the disclaimer effective2 – the individual 
might have been left with a mortgage still to pay and an uninhabitable dwelling. Against that background it 
was regarded as preferable that such disclaimers should not be effective so that the costs of a negligent 
valuation would effectively be borne by house purchasers as a whole, through slightly increased valuation 
fees to cover valuers' increased insurance costs. 
[3.94]  
Other factors Guideline (c) refers to the factor of knowledge, ie whether there was, or should have 
been1, knowledge of the existence, and sometimes extent2, of the exemption clause on the part of the 
party against whom the clause is being used3. The fact that a clause has the potential to cover negligence 
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Rolls Royce v Ricardo [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 129 at [77]. 
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[1990] 1 AC 831, [1989] 2 All ER 514, HL. 
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See also Ormsby v H & H Factors Ltd (26 January 1990, unreported); St Alban's City and District Council 
v ICL [1995] FSR 686 (decision on reasonableness followed by CA [1996] 4 All ER 481); Watford 
Electronics v Sanderson [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696, [54]. 
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The fact that a clause has been incorporated should not, of itself, indicate that there should be taken to be 
knowledge: AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265; Britvic Soft Drinks v Messer UK Ltd 
[2002] EWCA Civ 548, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 321, [21]. Although actual knowledge is obviously the 
strongest form of this factor, an objective assessment should also be relevant but should be more 
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Charlotte Thirty and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 ConLR 46; Keeton Son & Co Ltd v Carl Prior Ltd 
[1986] BTLC 30, Lexis; McCullagh v Lane Fox & Partners [1996] 1 EGLR 35, Hobhouse LJ at 46. 
3
 
may be an indicator of unreasonableness4. Guideline (d) refers to the situation in which there is an 
exclusion or restriction of liability unless a condition is complied with. For example, it may be stated that 
any claim must be notified within a specified time5. A ‘condition’ which will operate capriciously is 
indicative of unreasonableness6. In Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds it was seen as indicative of 
unreasonableness where there is a pattern of past settlement of claims by the proferens, with the 
proferens not adhering to the clause7, but that reasoning was questionable and should not now be seen 
as of general application8. In Smith v Bush9 Lord Griffiths made the point that if a task is very difficult or 
dangerous it may be reasonable to exclude or restrict liability, and similarly where the proferens cannot 
assess the risk, for example, where the proferens is loading goods and has little knowledge of their 
value10 or where goods are being supplied which may be used for a wide range of purposes and the 
specific purpose is unknown to the supplier.11 After initially failing to do so12, the courts have now 
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Sterling Hydraulics Ltd v Dichtomatik Ltd [2006] EWHC 2004 (QB), [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep 8, [29]. 
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recognised the difficulties inherent in the process of writing software and the relevance of that to the 
reasonableness of an exemption clause13. 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 31  
The section 
[3.95]  
At common law, it is said that a person cannot avoid or limit the consequences of their fraudulent 
misrepresentation by means of an exemption clause2, although they may be able to do so where the 
fraud is not theirs, but that of an employee3. In addition, the question of construction of an exemption 
clause dealing with liability for misrepresentation will need to be considered, just as would a clause 
dealing with liability for breach4. It may be found, for example, that a clause is appropriately worded to 
cover innocent but not negligent misrepresentation5. However, most significantly, exemption clauses 
dealing with misrepresentation may be affected by Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 36, which states: 
‘If a contract contains a term which would exclude or restrict – 
(a) any liability to which a party to a contract may be subject by reason of any misrepresentation 
made by him before the contract was made; or 
(b) any remedy available to another party to the contract by reason of such a misrepresentation. 
That term shall be of no effect except in so far as it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness as 
stated in s 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and it is for those claiming that the term 
satisfies that requirement to show that it does.’ 
This is stated to cover clauses excluding or restricting liability for pre-contractual misrepresentation and, 
also, the exclusion or restriction of any remedy for such a misrepresentation. It deals with, for example, 
attempts to exclude the right to rescind, as well as the exclusion or restriction of damages for 
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John Carter (Fine Worsteds) Ltd v Hanson Haulage (Leeds) Ltd [1965] 2 QB 495. HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 349. 
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See para 3.54. 
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Eg Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 88. ‘This contract is neither 
cancellable or voidable by either party’ – construed as merely applying to innocent misrepresentations. 
6
 
As amended by Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s 8. 
misrepresentation. It is for the party seeking to rely upon the clause to establish that it satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness, which is the same test as under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19777. 
The ‘time frame’ of assessment under UCTA 1977, s 11(1) is that of the conclusion of the contract, ie it is 
against the circumstances which were known to, or which should have been known to, the parties at the 
time of contracting that the ‘reasonableness’ of the clause is assessed8. 
The current s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 was substituted by s 8 of UCTA 1977. The drafting of s 
26, UCTA and the policy behind it have been held to be such that the exemption from UCTA of 
‘international supply contracts’ also applies to exempt them from the application of s 3, Misrepresentation 
Act 19679. 
Terms excluding or restricting liability or remedies 
[3.96]  
Section 3, Misrepresentation Act 1967 is stated to apply to terms which exclude or restrict liability, or 
remedies, for misrepresentation. The section may apply, in some cases, where the clause in question is 
not in the form of an exclusion, or restriction, of liability or remedies. It has been seen as applicable to 
attempts to prevent there from being a legally recognised misrepresentation through, for example, 
clauses trying to turn statements of fact into mere statements of belief1. Questions may arise as to its 
application in relation to clauses stating that there is to be no reliance on a statement and in some cases 
s 3 has been seen as applicable2. It was suggested above3 that the current trend in relation to the 
mechanical enforcement at common law of the non-reliance clauses which often accompany entire 
agreement clauses is the type of approach which invites a broad approach to the scope of s 3, and it has 
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See para 3.7. 
been seen as applicable in such circumstances4. Section 3 has been seen as inapplicable where what is 
in question is a clause denying that an agent has authority to make representations5. 
The EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts was made under art 100A to facilitate the 
establishment of the internal market, however, the approach taken in the current Directive is not to 
enforce complete uniformity but rather to provide a minimum level of consumer protection, leaving 
member states free to provide more extensive protection through their own national laws, such as, 
currently the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. This document covers the: basic scope of the unfair terms 
in consumer contracts; enforcement of the terms of contracts; excluded terms; the meaning of ‘consumer’, 
‘seller or supplier’; contracts concluded between a seller or a supplier and a consumer; terms not 
individually negotiated; contract terms; ‘core’ exclusion; plain intelligible language of the terms of the 
contracts; construction of the contracts; unfair terms of the contract; ‘grey’ list and other unfair terms; and 
choice of law clauses. 
F Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts1  
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Basic scope 
[3.97]  
The EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts1 was made under art 100A to facilitate the 
establishment of the internal market2. However, the approach taken in the current Directive is not to 
enforce complete uniformity but rather to provide a minimum level of consumer protection, leaving 
member states free to provide more extensive protection through their own national laws, such as, 
currently3, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.4. In the UK implementation was initially by the Unfair 
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Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in Beatson and Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault 
in Contract Law, Collins ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 229, Brandt and Ulmer 
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For the evolution of the Directive see CCC 48/77, OJ 1980C 291/35, COM (84) 55, OJ 1990 C234/2, OJ 
C73/7. 
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The Law Commissions have recommended a single unified piece of unfair terms legislation (Law Com No 
292, Scottish Law Commission No 199). 
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Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 19945 which came into force on 1 July 19956 They have now 
been replaced by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR), which came into 
force on 1 October 19997. The 1999 Regulations adopted language which is even closer to that of the 
original Directive than the 1994 Regulations and they also made changes in relation to enforcement. In 
interpreting the Regulations, their origins as an EU measure must be borne in mind so that effect is given 
to the Directive8. 
The Regulations apply a fairness test9 to terms in contracts between ‘consumers’ and ‘sellers or 
suppliers’10, which have not been ‘individually negotiated’11 and that is not restricted to written terms12. It 
has been said that it is limited to express terms13. An unfair term is one which, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
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The Directive required implementation by 31 December 1994. In relation to possible actions when a 
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Lister v Forth Dry Dock [1990] 1 AC 546; Marleasing SA v La Commercial: C-106/89 [1992] 1 CMLR 305; 
Faccini Dori: C-91/92 [1995] All ER (EC) 1. It may be necessary to consider versions of the Directive in 
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should be given an EC interpretation: see SrL CILFIT and Larificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health: 
283/81 [1982] ECR 3415 at 3430. If a Directive is not fully implemented a claimant may rely directly on it if 
the other party is the ‘State’, in a broad sense (Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority: 52/84 
[1986] QB 401; Foster v British Gas [1988] 2 CMLR 697; Griffin v South West Water Services [1995] 
IRLR 15). In addition, in limited circumstances there may be an action against the state for a failure to 
implement a Directive where that causes loss to someone for whose benefit the Directive was made 
(Francovich v Italy: C-6, 9/90 [1992] IRLR 84; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame 
[1991] 1 AC 603). 
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Regulation 5. 
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Regulation 4(1). 
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Regulation 5. 
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Recital 11 of the Directive. 
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Baybut v Eccle Riggs Country Park Ltd (2006) Times, 13 November, [2006] All ER (D) 161(Nov), [23]. 
Reg 4(2) (below para 3.99) would seem to take terms implied by statute or regulation outside of the scope 
of the Regulations and it seems unlikely that a term would be implied at common law which would be 
found to be unfair under the 1999 Regulations. 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer14. Any unfair term does not bind the consumer15. Schedule 2 of 
the UTCCR 1999 contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which may be unfair16 (the ‘grey 
list’), and this list was significantly relied upon by the Office of Fair Trading17. The core exemption means 
that certain terms, defining the main subject matter of the contract and price terms, in relation to the issue 
of the appropriateness of the price, cannot be the subject matter of the fairness test, provided they are in 
‘plain intelligible language’18. In general, there is considerable emphasis upon terms being in plain 
intelligible language in the Regulations.19  
As has been indicated, to an extent the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations can be 
regarded as complementary to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and vice versa, and some 
comparisons can usefully be made. Unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which is basically20 
restricted to terms which ‘exclude or restrict liability’, the application of the Regulations is not limited to a 
specific type of term, although they must be ‘not individually negotiated’. The Regulations are restricted to 
contracts between ‘consumers’ and ‘sellers or suppliers’, whereas UCTA 1977 extends to some contracts 
between businesses. Both the Regulations and the Act can be used to strike down a term in a dispute 
between two particular parties. However, under the 1994 Regulations, the Director General of Fair 
Trading was also given powers to try to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in general use21. That 
has been maintained under the 1999 Regulations (for the Office of Fair Trading and latterly the 
Competition and Markets Authority) and extended to other ‘qualifying bodies’ set out in Schedule 122, 
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Guidance (OFT, February 2001). It is unlikely that the CMA, the successor to the OFT, would not do 
likewise. 
18
 
UTCCR 1999, reg 6(2). 
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Regulation 7(1) states that ‘A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is 
expressed in plain intelligible language’. There is no penalty, as such, stated for a failure to use such 
language. However, it would seem that language which is not plain and intelligible will indicate that the 
term is fair. Also, as has been indicated, ‘core terms’ are only exempt from the fairness test provided they 
are in ‘plain intelligible language’: reg 6(2). Finally, in the context of a claim between a particular 
consumer and a particular seller or supplier (as opposed to the more general level of enforcement by the 
Director General of Fair Trading or a qualifying body: see below) there is also a rule of interpretation in 
the Regulations that ‘if there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most 
favourable to the consumer shall prevail’ (reg 7(2)). 
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But see para 3.75. 
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UTCCR 1994, reg 8. 
22
 
such as trading standards departments, and the Consumers' Association23. There will be many cases in 
which the possible application of both UCTA 1977 and the Regulations will need to be considered. This 
overlap obviously may cause confusion and, at the very least, adds to the complexity of the law in an area 
where simplicity and clarity might be thought to be particularly desirable as consumer rights are in 
question. The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission have produced recommendations for a 
single unified piece of replacement legislation24. The EU has since issued the Consumer Rights 
Directive25 which was intended to consolidate the various EU laws on consumer protection. The new 
directive thus replaces Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts 
and Directive 85/577/EEC to protect consumers in respect of contracts negotiated away from business 
premises. Most of the requirements of the Directive have already been implemented in the UK by the 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 201326. 
The EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) however survives largely intact27, 
though the UK Regulations made under its auspices will be repealed and its relevant provisions 
incorporated in the new Consumer Rights Act. The new law is intended to apply where there is an 
agreement between a trader and a consumer for the trader to supply goods, digital content or services, if 
the agreement is a contract28. Under the Bill, there is no need for the contract in question to be in writing. 
The new s 1(2) provides that the law ‘applies whether the contract is written or oral or implied from the 
parties’ conduct, or more than one of these combined’. This might be contrasted against the UTCCR 
which apply to express terms29. 
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The rules in the Directive relating to payment surcharges have been adopted in the UK through the 
Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012, which came into effect on 6 April 2013. 
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 — extend the unfairness assessment to individually negotiated contractual terms or to the 
adequacy of the price or remuneration; or, 
 — contain lists of contractual terms which shall be considered as unfair. 
2. The Commission shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraph 1 is easily accessible to 
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Enforcement 
[3.98]  
The Regulations may be used by the individual consumer who is in dispute with a particular seller or 
supplier to strike down a particular term of the particular contract between them. An unfair term is not 
binding on the consumer1. The contract as a whole will continue to bind the parties ‘if it is capable of 
continuing in existence without the unfair term’2. Enforcement at this individual level has been 
strengthened by the judgment of the CJEU in the Océano Grupo case3 that a national court has the 
power to find that a term is unfair and not binding on a consumer under the Unfair Terms legislation even 
though that issue has not been raised by the consumer ie the court may evaluate a term under the Unfair 
Terms legislation of its own motion and will normally be under a duty to do so4. This was regarded as 
necessary to fulfil art 6 of the Directive under which unfair terms do not bind the consumer (as consumers 
often do not know the law and may not regard it as viable to pay for advice) and in keeping with the 
Directive's requirement for enforcement at the more general level (see below) to prevent the continued 
use of unfair terms drawn up for general use. The point has been made, however, that ‘there is an 
inherent limitation on the power of national courts to intervene of their own initiative, for a court cannot 
hold a term unfair if it does not so appear from the case presented to it’5. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
See note 13 above. 
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UTCCR 1999, reg 8(1). 
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UTCCR 1999, reg 8(2). In Case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse v Jahani BV [2013] 3 CMLR 45 the CJEU held 
that the national courts are required to exclude the application of an unfair contractual term in order that it 
did not bind the consumer, without being authorised to revise the content of that term. It followed thus that 
art 6(1) did not allow a national court which had established that a penalty clause in a contract concluded 
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the consumer instead of excluding the application of that clause in its entirety with regard to that 
consumer. As for the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, cl 67 carries a similar provision: ‘Where a term of a 
consumer contract is not binding on the consumer as a result of this Part, the contract continues, so far 
as practicable, to have effect in every other respect.’ The language of the test is relaxed a little – it has to 
be said that the change from ‘capable’ to ‘practicable’ provides better clarity. 
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Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Quintero case C-240/98, [2000] ECR I-4941. 
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Mostaza Claro v Centro Movil Milenium SL: C-168/05 [2006] ECR I-10421, [2007] 1 CMLR 22. In 
Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira Case C-40/08 [2010] 1 CMLR 865, in 
deciding whether a court should consider the fairness of an arbitration clause in proceedings to enforce 
an arbitral award when the consumer had not been present at the arbitration or applied for annulment of 
the arbitrator's decision, the Court of Justice recognised the need for finality and that the court should not 
re-open the award if the principles of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘equivalence’ were satisfied, ie if there had been 
effective procedures available to the consumer to challenge the award and ‘the conditions imposed by 
domestic law under which the courts and tribunals may apply a rule of Community law of their own motion 
must be no less favourably treated than those governing the application by those bodies of their own 
motion of rules of domestic law of the same ranking’ (at [49]). See also Case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse v 
Jahani BV [2013] 3 CMLR 45. 
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S Whittaker, ‘Judicial Intervention and Consumer Contracts’ (2001) 117 LQR 215. 
In their action in a particular dispute the Regulations are not unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
However, as has been indicated, the Regulations also provide for a more general level of enforcement. 
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (formerly the Office of Fair Trading) and certain ‘qualifying 
bodies’ may consider complaints that terms ‘drawn up for general use’ are unfair and can seek injunctions 
against those using, or recommending the use of, such terms which they view as unfair, to prevent that 
use or recommendation from continuing6. The significance of this more general level of enforcement of 
the Regulations should not be doubted and has been recognised by the House of Lords in Director 
General of Fair Trading v First National Bank7 where Lord Steyn took the view that the ‘system or pre-
emptive challenges is a more effective way of preventing the continued use of unfair terms … than ex 
casu actions’8. 
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) was set up in 2013 under the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013 to replace the Office of Fair Trading as regards the latter’s consumer affairs powers9. 
The CMA has been conferred all the necessary enforcement and policy-making powers of the OFT. Its 
powers and functions are to some extent in a transitional stage pending the passage of the Consumer 
Rights Act. 
UTCCR 1999, reg 10 requires the regulator (the CMA) to consider any complaint made to it that a term 
drawn up for ‘general use’ is unfair10 unless it appears to be ‘frivolous or vexatious’ or a ‘qualifying body’ 
has notified the regulator that it agrees to consider the complaint11. The regulator may bring proceedings 
for an injunction ‘against any person appearing’ to it ‘to be using, or recommending the use of, an unfair 
term drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with consumers’12. In deciding whether or not to 
pursue an injunction in respect of a term which the regulator considers to be unfair, it may ‘have regard to 
any undertakings … as to the continued use of such a term in contracts concluded with consumers’13. 
The regulator is under a duty to give reasons for its decision to apply, or not to apply, for an injunction14. If 
an injunction is sought it need not be confined to the specific term but may also relate ‘to any similar term, 
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UTCCR 1999, reg 10(3). 
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UTCCR 1999, reg 10(2). 
or a term having like effect, used or recommended for use by any person’15. As has been indicated, the 
Regulations allow for injunctions to be obtained not only against those who use the term in question but 
also those who recommend its use16 and this might cover, for example, a trade association which 
recommends a set of standard terms for its members, including the term in question. 
The issue has arisen as to whether, if a term is found to be unfair when an action is taken at the general 
level, this only relates to the future use of the term or can also impact on existing contracts. This was 
considered by the Court of Appeal in Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons17. The court considered the 
differences between individual action and the general action, recognising the variances in relation to the 
fairness test and the approach to construction so that it would be possible for an individual consumer to 
successfully contend a term was unfair even where it had been found fair at the general level (and vice 
versa). They nevertheless concluded that if a term was found to be unfair at the general level, an 
injunction could relate not only to future contracts but also to existing contracts. However, Arden LJ 
emphasised that whether an injunction could be granted in relation to existing contracts, and on what 
terms, depended upon the circumstances of the case. She saw the situation as one in which a balance 
had to be struck: 
‘Provisionally, it seems to me that under general principles of Community law, the grant of the 
injunction will have to be proportionate, that is to say the interference with the rights of the supplier 
by the grant of the injunction will have to be justified by the need to protect the consumer interests. 
In addition, Community law requires that the remedy should be sufficiently effective.’18  
In setting the terms of the injunction Her Ladyship thought therefore that the courts could ‘“carve out” 
contracts fulfilling a particular description’ or ‘the court could give the supplier leave to seek the 
permission of the court to bring claims to enforce existing contracts in particular circumstances’19. Moore-
Bick LJ favoured merely ‘prohibiting any attempt to rely on or enforce the term in question without 
permission of the court’ if there are ‘grounds for thinking that the term in question might be enforceable in 
some cases’. His Lordship sought to avoid ‘interference with existing rights’20. 
It should however be noted that a court or tribunal cannot strike down a term as being unfair simply 
because the term in question was required to have been cleared as fair by the authorities but had not 
been. The court or tribunal must carry out its own assessment as to the term’s unfairness, as a matter of 
EU law21. 
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Kock v Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (C-206/11) [2013] 2 CMLR 21 – a case about the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, but on this point it is submitted that there should be no difference 
between the two directives. 
There is also enforcement at the general level under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. This allows certain 
‘enforcers’ (such as the CMA22) to apply for enforcement orders in relation to certain consumer protection 
legislation (including the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999) where the infringement 
‘harms the collective interests of consumers’23. 
As for the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, the role of an ‘unfair terms enforcer’ rests primarily on the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)24. The CMA also has the power to seek an injunction against 
an undertaking which it considers ‘is using, or proposing or recommending the use of’ an unfair term or 
notice25. It can do so with or without having first received a complaint26. 
The Bill also places a legal responsibility on courts to consider the fairness of terms even though the 
issue is not raised27. This provision reflects the view of the CJEU in Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro that 
‘the nature and importance of the public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on 
consumers justify, moreover, the national court being required to assess of its own motion whether a 
contractual term is unfair’28. The courts would be excused from assessing the fairness of terms if they do 
not have adequate information to do so29. In addition, the courts would only have to look at the term or 
terms in question, not the entire contract30. 
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Clause 71(3) which in turn reflects the ruling by the CJEU in Case C-243/08 Pannon (2009) ECR I-4713 
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Excluded terms 
[3.99]  
Regulation 4(2) states that the Regulations do not apply to: 
‘contractual terms which reflect: 
(a) mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (including such provisions under the law of any 
Member State or in Community legislation having effect in the United Kingdom without 
further enactment)1; 
(b) the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the 
Community are party.’2  
The line taken in the Directive is that the ‘statutory or regulatory provisions of Member States which 
directly or indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to contain unfair terms’ 
and it is therefore not regarded as necessary to subject such terms to the fairness test3. Here the CMA 
advises on such provisions to ensure the terms are fair4. 
The scope of the exclusion from the Regulations is somewhat unclear5. The reference to ‘mandatory’ 
provisions could have been taken as merely excluding those terms which had to be included on the basis 
of legislation, whatever the parties' wishes. However, the recitals to the Directive take the line that the 
exclusion includes ‘rules which, according to the law shall apply between contracting parties provided that 
no other arrangements have been established’6. This would also seem to provide for the exclusion of any 
terms which are included on the basis of statute or regulation unless the parties provide otherwise. One 
argument for narrowing this refers to the jurisprudence of the European Court on ‘mandatory provisions’ 
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 The Law Commission are of the view that the reference to the mandatory or regulatory provisions 
of ‘any member state’ is an ‘incorrect incorporation of the Directive’ (emphasis added) and that terms 
which do not reflect relevant UK measures should be subject to UTCCR 1999: Unfair Contract Terms Law 
Com Consultation Paper No 166, para 3.36. 
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 It has been contended that ‘the Regulations refer to ‘the provisions or principles of such 
conventions. So that a term based on the principles of a relevant convention would not be governed by 
the Regulations even though the contract in which the term was contained was not governed by the 
convention eg where a term in a contract for domestic carriage of goods was based on the principles of a 
convention which in terms governed only international carriage’ (Treitel The Law of Contract (10th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999) p 253. The Law Commission views this interpretation as ‘doubtful’ 
(Unfair Contract Terms Law Com Consultation Paper No 166, para 3.38). 
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Recital 13. 
4
 
For an extensive discussion see Unfair Terms in Contracts Law Com Consultation No 166, Scot Law Com 
Discussion Paper No 119 paras 3.36–3.40, 4.75. 
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OFT Bulletin 1, 2.1. 
6
 
Recital 13. 
in the context of the Cassis de Dijon decision7. This would require the justification of the relevant terms in 
the public interest if they were to be excluded and seems to be an inappropriate and uncertain exercise in 
the different contexts in which the Regulations fall to be considered8. 
However, terms going beyond the ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ (however interpreted) or 
the ‘provisions or principles of international conventions’ will fall within the scope of Regulations9, as will 
terms which accurately reflect the legislation in their content but which are incorporated into a different 
contractual context from that in which the legislation applies9. 
The Regulations do not apply to a term merely embodying a common law rule10. 
As regards the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, cl 73 provides that the part of the new Act dealing with unfair 
terms does not apply to a term of a contract, or to a notice, to the extent that it reflects— 
(a) mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions11, or 
(b) the provisions or principles of an international convention to which the United Kingdom or the EU is 
a party. 
These provisions are very similar to reg 4(2) and are likely to be applied in a similar manner. 
‘Consumer’ 
[3.100]  
Regulation 3(1) states: 
‘“consumer” means any natural person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession.’ 
Although the definition limits ‘consumers’ to natural persons, there is an exception to that limitation in 
relation to arbitration clauses under s 90 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Under that section ‘the Regulations 
apply where the consumer is a legal person as they apply where the consumer is a natural person’. 
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This was assumed to be the case in Direct Line Insurance plc v Fox [2009] EWHC 386 (QB), [2009] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 1017 at [50], following Direct Line Insurance plc v Khan [2001] EWCA Civ 1794, [2001] All 
ER (D) 476 (Oct) at [36] where the rule was not embodied in an express term. 
11
 
Clause 73(2) states that ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ would include rules which, 
according to law, apply between the parties on the basis that no other arrangements have been 
established. 
(Obviously the ‘legal person’ in question must be acting for purposes outside its trade, business or 
profession in order to qualify as a consumer for the purposes of s 90)1. However, the basic restriction of 
the classification of ‘consumer’ under the Regulations to ‘natural persons’ contrasts with the approach 
which has been taken to the question of who ‘deals as consumer’ under s 12 UCTA 1977, which can 
encompass a company2. (Although, under the amendments to UCTA made by the Sale and Supply of 
Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 some distinction is made between those situations in which the 
person claiming to be a consumer is an ‘individual’ and those where it is not, with the former being 
afforded more protection under some circumstances3.) However, the basic exclusion of companies from 
being ‘consumers’ under UTCCR 1999 indicates, in itself, a different, and less broad approach to the 
meaning of consumer than that taken to ‘deals as consumer’ under UCTA. 
Under UCTA the courts have taken the line that someone may deal as consumer if the transaction is not 
integral to their business or regularly occurring. In the Di Pinto case4, in the context of the meaning of 
consumer in the doorstep selling Directive5, the Court of Justice stated that a distinction could not be 
drawn between the ‘normal’ acts of a business and those which are ‘exceptional in nature’. The question 
was whether the acts were for the purpose of satisfying requirements ‘other than the family and personal 
requirements of the trader’.6 Similarly, in Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl7 the European Court has seen 
consumer contracts under the Brussels' Convention (now replaced by EU Regulation 44/2001, the so-
called Brussels I Regulation) as confined to those ‘concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual’s 
own needs in terms of private consumption’.8 and the latter approach was considered when the meaning 
of consumer under the Unfair Terms Directive and the Brussels convention fell to be addressed by 
Longmore J in Standard Bank London Ltd v Apostoliakis9. That case was concerned with foreign 
                                                     
1
 
Heifer International Inc v Christiansen [2007] EWHC 3015 (TCC), [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 831, [2008] 
Bus LR D49. 
2
 
R & B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominion Trust Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 847, [1988] 1 WLR 321. 
3
 
SI 2002/3045. See para 3.83. 
4
 
Case C-361/89 [1991] ECR I-1189. 
5
 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC to protect consumers in respect of contracts negotiated away from 
business premises. 
6
 
[1991] ECR I-1189 at [16]. See also the opinion of Advocate General Misco in Cape Snc v Idealservice 
Srl Case C-541/99, [2001] ECR I-9049, [2002] All ER (EC) 657 at [26]–[28]. 
7
 
Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR I-3767. 
8
 
Benincasa v Dentalkit SRL Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR 1-3767 at [15]. See also Case C-508/12 Vapenik 
v Turner [2013] CJEU which held that in the context of European enforcement orders, the definition of 
‘consumers’ within Regulation 805/2004, art.6(1)(d) referred to a person who concluded a contract for a 
purpose which could be regarded as being outside his trade or profession with a person who was acting 
in the exercise of his trade or profession. 
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exchange investment contracts made with the bank by a wealthy couple who were a civil engineer and a 
lawyer. Longmore J took the basic line that entering into foreign exchange contracts was ‘not part of a 
person's trade as a civil engineer or a lawyer’ and that ‘the only question’ was whether they ‘were 
engaging in the trade of foreign exchange contracts as such’ and he did not believe that they were. He 
took the view that ‘they were disposing of income which they had available. They were using money in a 
way which they hoped would be profitable but merely to use money in a way one hopes would be 
profitable is not enough … to be engaging in trade’. In addition, he took the view that the scale of the 
transactions – 28 contracts with a total exposure of $7 million – did not make any difference. The fact that 
the definition of consumer looks to the purpose of the transaction seemed to him to ‘militate against 
looking at a general consequence or scale of value’. In relation to the line taken in Benincasa, he thought 
that the description there of contracts ‘concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individuals own needs in 
terms of private consumption’ was met in the instant case – ‘the contracts made … were for the purpose 
of satisfying the needs of Mr and Mrs Apostoliakis, defined as an appropriate use of their income, and 
that the need was a need in terms of private consumption’ He made the point that ‘consumption cannot 
be taken as literally consumed so as to be destroyed but rather consumed in the sense that a consumer 
consumes, viz he uses or enjoys the relevant product’. Undoubtedly a contract for the investment of 
disposable income must be regarded as being capable of being a contract made by a consumer, and the 
size of that investment will be relative to the financial situation of the individual consumer. There must, 
however, come a point at which a secondary means of making money becomes a secondary trade or 
business of the individual in question10. In Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Ltd11 it was indicated that the 
number of properties which a landlord had was relevant in determining whether he was a consumer when 
entering into a contract for the services of a letting agent12. 
As has been indicated, the question raised under reg 3(1) may not merely be whether a transaction falls 
within a trade, business or profession, but also whether there is a trade, business or profession. That 
question arose in the case of a footballer who appointed a company to act on his behalf in relation to, for 
example, contractual negotiations with his employers and the commercial exploitation of his ‘identity’. The 
footballer contended that he was the employee of a football club and did not have a trade or profession. 
The judge concluded he had the trade or profession of ‘professional footballer’13. If a transaction is 
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entered into by someone in order to pursue their business activities, it is not taken outside their ‘business’ 
because personal guarantees are provided and family property is used as security14. However, an issue 
may arise in relation to a transaction which is is of a type in which the person concerned engages as a 
matter of their business, but which on the particular occasion is engaged in as a matter of private 
consumption, such as the car dealer who buys a car for private use. The line has been taken that 
‘purpose connotes intention. If a party acts in a way which furthers their intention, ie to further their trade, 
business or profession, their actions are excluded from the Regulations. If an action is for a different 
purpose but which has an incidental result which furthers its trade, business or profession it does not 
result in the contract being excluded from the protection of the Regulations’15. This may suffice where 
there is a clear ‘personal’ purpose behind the transaction and any business benefit is merely incidental, 
but questions may arise in relation to more mixed transactions (such as a car bought partly for business 
use and partly for personal use). In the context of the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001) and its 
predecessor, the Brussels Convention, the CJEU in Gruber v BayWa AG has taken the line that a 
contract with mixed purposes will not be a consumer contract ‘unless the trade or professional purpose is 
so limited as to be negligible in the overall context of the supply’16. An objective assessment should be 
made of this ‘unless the person who claims the capacity of consumer behaved in such a way as to give 
the other party to the contract the legitimate impression that he was acting for the purposes of his 
business’17; for example, ‘where an individual orders, without giving further information, items which could 
in fact be used for his business, or uses business stationery to do so, or has goods delivered to his 
business address, or mentions the possibility of recovering value added tax’18. 
The position of an agent who would fulfil the definition of consumer, but who is contracting on behalf of a 
principal who would not, may fall to be considered. Plainly, where the agent has no personal involvement 
in the contract then the potential to classify the agent as a consumer should not be relevant and the 
contract should not fall within the scope of the Regulations. However, where the agent is not simply 
contracting as agent, but is also undertaking personal liability under the contract, then, in relation to that 
liability, the terms will fall to be considered under the Regulations19. 
A note of general relevance is that the UTCCR and UCTA are to be complemented by the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (which implement EU Directive on Unfair Commercial 
Practices20) – the 2008 Regulations make a distinction between ‘average consumer’, ‘average targeted 
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Directive 2005/29/EC. 
consumer’ and ‘average vulnerable consumer’ when providing for consumer protection against ‘any act, 
omission and other conduct by businesses directly connected to the promotion, sale or supply of a 
product to or from consumers (whether before, during or after a commercial transaction, if any)’ which is 
an unfair commercial practice. In the case of the Directive, the CJEU held in Case C-59/12 BKK Mobil Oil 
Korperschaft des offentlichen Rechts v Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV21 that even 
a public law body can be treated as a consumer. The court ruled that a public body charged with a task of 
public interest, such as the management of a statutory health insurance fund, fell within the persons 
covered by Directive 2005/29 prohibiting unfair commercial practices. It stated that the members of such 
a body had to be regarded as consumers who could be deceived by misleading information circulated by 
that body, thus preventing them from making an informed choice as envisaged by art 6(1). How that 
decision will (if at all) influence the application and interpretation of the word ‘consumer’ in the UCCTR 
and UCTA remains to be seen. 
As for the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, cl 2(3) defines a consumer as ‘an individual acting for purposes 
that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’. Although it does not 
refer to ‘natural person’, it is submitted that the term ‘individual’ must necessarily exclude legal persons, 
including small businesses, charities and social organisations. For clarity, it specifically refers to an 
individual who is acting outside his craft. It is also especially useful that the reference to ‘wholly or mainly’ 
is added – it is intended to make clear that the purposes behind the transaction must be wholly or mainly 
outside the individual’s trade, business, craft or profession. However, it remains unclear whether the new 
definition has changed the scope of the restriction applied in Gruber v BayWa AG22 where it was held by 
the CJEU that in cases of mixed transactions, the personal purpose has to be negligible before the 
contract would be considered to be a consumer contract. 
‘Seller or supplier’ 
[3.101]  
Regulation 3(1) states: 
‘“seller or supplier” means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by these 
Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly 
owned or privately owned.’ 
The reference to ‘purposes relating to his business’ would seem to indicate a broad approach to whether 
someone is a ‘seller or supplier’. Certainly ‘related to’ does not seem to indicate that a strong connection 
with the business is required1, although plainly some relationship between the particular transaction and 
the business is required ie it is not merely a test of whether the seller or supplier is ‘in business’. The 
reference to a business which is ‘publicly owned’ makes it clear that it is possible for a local authority to 
fall within the Regulations as a ‘seller or supplier’ but the question will be asked whether the functions it is 
carrying out in relation to the particular transaction are such that it does so in that case. In London 
Borough of Newham v Khatun2, before concluding that the transaction fell within the Regulations, the 
court basically considered whether the function being performed was one which was performed by a 
private sector business. 
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Under the 1994 version of the Regulations the definitions of seller and supplier were somewhat different, 
limiting the definitions to the seller ‘of goods’ and to the supplier ‘of goods or services’. The definitions in 
the Directive contain no such restrictions3. The restrictions in the 1994 Regulations had been imported 
from references in the recitals to the ‘seller of goods or the supplier of services’4. Their importation in this 
way was questioned, particularly in relation to the apparent exclusion of contracts dealing with land5, and, 
as can be seen any such limitation has been dropped from the 1999 version of the implementing 
Regulations. In London Borough of Newham v Khatun6 the Court of Appeal clearly viewed the 
Regulations as capable of applying to contracts dealing with land, even those transferring or creating an 
interest in land. Further in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Hofstetter the 
CJEU assumed that the Directive applied to a contract for the purchase of a building which was to be 
constructed7. 
As a comparison, the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 does not use the term ‘seller’; instead it uses a more 
widely encompassing term – ‘trader’. Clause 2(2) of the Bill defines a trader as ‘a person acting for 
purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting personally or 
through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf’. Clause 2(7) stresses that a 
‘business’ includes the activities of government departments and local and public authorities. Such bodies 
may therefore come within the definition of a trader. It would appear that not-for-profit organisations, such 
as charities, mutuals and co-operatives, may also come within the definition of a trader. For example, if a 
charity shop sells t-shirts or mugs, it would be acting within the meaning of trader8. 
Contracts concluded between a seller or a supplier and a 
consumer 
[3.102]  
Consideration has been given above to the definitions of ‘consumer’ and ‘seller or supplier’, however 
some further comments need to be made in relation to the fact that the fairness test applies to relevant 
terms in ‘contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer’. Firstly, in relation to the 
requirement for a ‘contract’ and secondly in relation to the necessity for it to be between ‘a seller or 
supplier and a consumer’. 
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As has been indicated, the UTCCR 1999 are concerned with contracts. The suggestion has been made 
that, as the implementation of a European measure, it may be that, for example, the English courts will 
not simply be able to apply the English law notion of contract in applying the Regulations. Rather some 
European concept of contract will need to be worked out through the European Court in order for the 
Directive to be properly implemented in the various Member States1. This might then allow for some 
agreements without consideration to be regarded as contracts for the purposes of the Regulations. 
Further, in the public law field, at the European level, for the purposes of the Directive, the provision of 
some public services might be seen as contractual when they are not otherwise so regarded by the laws 
of a particular Member State2. 
The second point to be made here relates to contracts which will not be regarded as being between 
‘consumers and sellers or suppliers’. In the UTCCR 1994, Sch 1 contained a list of contracts excluded 
from the scope of the Regulations. These were: 
(a) any contract relating to employment 
(b) any contract relating to succession rights 
(c) any contract relating to rights under family law 
(d) any contract relating to the incorporation and organisation of companies. 
There is no such list in the UTCCR 1999. However, it was originally derived from recital 10 to the 
Directive, where the exclusion of these contracts is seen as following from the Directive’s coverage being 
of contracts between ‘consumers and sellers or suppliers’ and it could, therefore, still impact upon the 
UTCCR 1999. 
In contrast, Part II of the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 on unfair terms purports to apply to contracts 
between a trader and a consumer3. It avoids any reference to seller or supplier. As to its exclusions, the 
Bill does not apply to contracts of employment or apprenticeship4. Contracts of employment are regulated 
by specific legislation. As such, the exclusion of such contracts from the Consumer Rights Bill avoids any 
potential overlap between different regimes. 
One further issue which arises in relation to the UTCCR 1999 references to contracts between ‘sellers or 
suppliers and consumers’ lies in relation to contracts under which it is the consumer who appears to be 
the supplying party such as the sale of a car by a consumer to a business (eg a ‘trade-in’) or the situation 
in which an individual provides a guarantee to a business lender in order for a third party to be able to 
obtain a loan. In Bayersiche Hypotheheken v Dietsinger: C-45/965 the European Court of Justice showed 
itself willing to find that the protection of Directive 85/577 (the ‘Doorstep Selling’ Directive) could extend to 
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the latter situation where both the guarantor and the person receiving the loan were consumers. In 
Barclays Bank plc v Kufner6 the line was taken that this approach should be followed in the context of 
UTCCR 1999, although it can be questioned whether it is appropriate to limit the application of the 
Regulations to the situation in which the loan is to a consumer. It can be contended that it should be 
sufficient if the guarantor is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession. To 
conclude otherwise is to place too much emphasis upon the secondary nature of the guarantee, which 
should be seen as falling within the Regulations in its own right. Kufner maintains too much of the idea 
that the supply must flow from the ‘seller or supplier’ to the consumer, which predominated in those 
earlier cases in which it was indicated that a guarantee provided by a consumer could not fall within the 
Regulations at all because the supply flowed from the consumer to the bank7. It should be emphasised 
that different language versions of the Directive do not have the same overtones as to direction of supply 
as is present in the reference in the English language version of the Regulations. The French version is, 
for example, the more neutral ‘professionel’, simply referring to someone in business or carrying on a 
profession8. 
Terms not individually negotiated 
[3.103]  
In appropriate contracts, and subject to certain exceptions1, the Regulations apply the fairness test to any 
terms which have ‘not been individually negotiated’2. Regulation 5(4) places the burden of proving that a 
term was individually negotiated upon a seller or supplier. Some guidance as to which terms are not 
individually negotiated is provided by UTCCR 1999, reg 5(2) which states: 
‘a term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been 
drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the 
term.’ 
This does not state the essential requirements for a term to be not individually negotiated. It merely states 
one set of circumstances in which a term will be so categorised. It raises the question of what the terms 
should have been drafted ‘in advance of’. It would seem that the Regulation should be taken to refer to 
terms drafted ‘in advance’ of negotiations3. The reference to the ‘substance of the term’ makes it clear 
that cosmetic or trivial alterations will not suffice to lead to a term being regarded as ‘individually 
negotiated’. Also, ‘the fact that a consumer or his legal representative has had the opportunity of 
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considering the terms of an agreement does not mean that any individual term has been individually 
negotiated’4. 
Commonly terms which are not ‘individually negotiated’ will be the seller's or supplier's ‘standard terms’ of 
business, but terms may be ‘not individually negotiated’ without being standard terms. Terms can, for 
example, fall within reg 5(2) without needing to be standard form terms. Where there is a ‘pre-formulated 
standard contract’, reg 5(3) makes it clear that the fact that a specific term has been negotiated does not 
prevent the rest of the contract terms from being regarded as non-individually negotiated. On a broader 
scale, this would seem merely to be dealing with one particular example of a type of argument ie that 
sufficient of the contract terms have been changed to mean that all of them should be regarded as 
individually negotiated. There must come a point at which that is so, but it should be remembered that the 
burden of proof is on the seller or supplier to show that the terms were individually negotiated. 
The newly proposed Consumer Rights Act will apply to all terms in contracts between traders and 
consumers whether negotiated or not. It will also apply to notices to the extent that they relate to rights or 
obligations between traders and a consumer or purport to exclude or restrict a trader's liability to a 
consumer as long as it is reasonable to assume the notice is intended to be read by a customer (for 
example, a sign in a hotel room, or a notice on the back of a train ticket)5. A ‘notice’ includes an 
announcement, whether or not in writing, and any other communication or purported communication6. 
Terms 
[3.104]  
It is clear that the scope of the UTCCR 1999 is restricted to contract ‘terms’. Regulation 4(1) states that 
the Regulations apply ‘in relation to unfair terms …’1. This raises a difficulty in the context of clauses 
which are a standard part of a business's contracting procedure, but the procedure is defective, so that 
the clauses are not effectively incorporated. In that situation, prima facie, there is no ‘term’ for the 
Regulations to apply to2. Of course, non-contractual notices may impact upon liability in tort and they may 
then be subject to the control of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19773 and when contractual liability is in 
question it might be thought to be irrelevant whether a clause is ineffective under the general law, 
because it has not been incorporated, or under the Regulations, because it is unfair. However, 
consumers frequently do not know their rights and do not litigate. Consumers may well be misled as to 
                                                     
4
 
UK Housing Alliance v Francis [2010] EWCA Civ 117, [2010] All ER (D) 283 (Feb) at [19]. 
5
 
Clause 61(6) of the Consumer Rights Bill 2014. 
6
 
Clause 61(8). 
1
 
Stephen West, Carol West v Ian Finlay & Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316; in the case of ‘non-terms’ but 
mere commercial practices considered to be unfair, the Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (which 
implement EU Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 2005/29/EC) may apply. In the Consumer Rights 
Bill 2014, not only terms will be subject to the unfair terms regime but also ‘consumer notices’ would be 
caught (cl 62(2)). Such a notice would include ‘an announcement, whether or not in writing, and any other 
communication or purported communication’ (cl 61(8)). 
2
 
But see Munckenbeck & Marshall v Harold [2005] EWHC 356 (TCC), [2005] All ER (D) 227 (Apr). 
3
 
UCTA 1977, s 2. See para 3.77. 
their rights by clauses which would not have a legal impact upon their rights, leaving them in a situation in 
which they cannot enjoy their rights to the full. Of course, any term which falls within the scope of the 
powers of the CMA or ‘qualifying body’ can be removed from standard terms so that it is no longer used 
and cannot then mislead the consumer. This provides considerably greater protection for consumers than 
any individual's right to say that a term is not binding on them. The restriction on the scope of the powers 
of the CMA and ‘qualifying bodies’ might be limited by an appropriate emphasis on, and approach to, the 
fact that Regulation 12 allows for injunctions to obtained against those ‘recommending the use of an 
unfair term drawn up for general use’4. However, even if effective in itself, such can approach would only 
extend to some cases. An alternative, but more interventionist and contrived, approach could be taken to 
the interpretation of the Regulations. In the context of the powers of the CMA and ‘qualifying bodies’, 
where the real concern is not with one particular contract, but with the general use of a set of terms, and it 
should be the procedure for incorporation which should be considered, rather than the steps taken to 
incorporate a clause in one particular case, it could be contended that it should be sufficient if the 
procedure adopted was intended to lead to the incorporation of the clauses drawn up for general use5 – 
even if it was inappropriate to do so6. This does however require a significant step to be taken in the 
interpretation of the Regulations7. 
There is a further difficulty in this area in relation to the question of unfairness. Even if the more general 
powers under the Regulations can apply where the procedure adopted for incorporating clauses is 
ineffective, a problem arises as to whether a clause without legal effect can be unfair. Prima facie 
unfairness depends upon a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties and it can be 
questioned how a clause without legal impact can generate such an imbalance. This question is 
considered below with related issues8. 
The ‘core’ exclusion 
[3.105]  
Regulation 6(2) provides the ‘core’1 exclusion from the fairness test. It states: 
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‘In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term shall not relate - 
(a) to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied in 
exchange.’ 
This is derived from equally obscure provisions in the Directive. Article 4(2) states: 
‘Assessment of the unfair nature of terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject 
matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of price and remuneration on the one hand, as against the 
services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other in so far as those terms are in plain intelligible 
language.’ 
In addition, recital 19 states: 
‘Whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, assessment of unfair character shall not be made of 
terms which describe the main subject matter of the contract nor the quality/price ratio of the goods 
or services supplied; whereas the main subject matter of the contract and the price/quality ratio may 
nevertheless be taken into account in assessing the fairness of other terms; whereas it follows, inter 
alia, that in insurance contracts, the terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and 
the insurer's liability shall not be subject to such assessment since these restrictions are taken into 
account in calculating the premium paid by the consumer.’ 
Regulation 6(2) provides some preservation of the basic principle that the courts will not inquire into 
adequacy of consideration and it has been said, of the core exclusion in the Directive, that it seems to be 
intended to exclude from the scope of the Directive ‘anything resulting from the contractual freedom of the 
parties’2. When what is in question is a standard form contract, what both parties are most likely to have 
been aware of are the price and a few other central terms and those are the areas where some ‘freedom 
of contract’ is preserved.3 The need for transparency if freedom of contract is to operate effectively is 
recognised in the fact that ‘core’ exclusion only applies if the relevant terms are in ‘plain intelligible 
language’. In Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National4 Lord Walker identified the core exclusion as part of 
a ‘compromise solution balancing the need for consumer protection against residual freedom of contract’5. 
However, it has been clear from the publication of the Directive that there were considerable potential 
difficulties in determining the boundaries of the core exclusion. There was clear potential for the familiar 
problem to arise, for example, as to whether exclusion clauses should be regarded as part of the 
definition of the subject matter of the contract6 and from the example of the operation of the core 
                                                                                                                                                                           
The terminology seems to have become very common despite the concerns of the Court of Appeal in 
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481, [2001] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 1000, [25], and Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National [2009] UKSC 6 now also indicates a 
need to treat it with care. A similarly expressed provision is found in the Consumer Rights Bill 2014(cl 64). 
2
 
Howells and Wilhelmsson EC Consumer Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) p 94. 
3
 
Unfair Contract Terms Guidance OFT Feb 2001, para 19.3 
4
 
[2009] UKSC 6. 
5
 
[2009] UKSC 6 at [6] – having referred to the ‘particularly influential’ article of Brandner and Ulmer (1991) 
28 CMLR 647. 
6
 
exclusion given in recital 19 (above) it was also clear that there was potential for the core exclusion to be 
construed as very extensive, with considerable impact upon the effectiveness of the Regulations7. 
Further, it has been questioned whether the exclusion is of terms or issues ie it has been questioned 
whether the exclusion relates to, for example, a price term or only to fairness challenges as to the 
‘adequacy of the price or remuneration’ (ie whether it was an ‘appropriate price’8 or value for money)9. 
The drafting of the core exclusion in reg 3(2) of the 1994 version of the Regulations indicated the term 
approach, but that of reg 6(2) in the 1999 version indicates the issues approach. Some assistance in 
determining the scope of the core exclusion has now been provided by the House of Lords in Director 
General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc10 and by the Supreme Court in Office of Fair Trading v 
Abbey National11. Unfortunately, the two cases do not indicate a clear, uniform line. The point should be 
made that the First National Bank case was concerned with the UTCCR 1994, rather than the current 
version, and that would seem to have had some impact even though the point was made that the 
underlying Directive was the same in both cases12. In particular, it would seem to have had an impact in 
the approach to the terms/issues question. In First National Bank a ‘term’ approach was assumed. In the 
Abbey National case, with the drafting of reg 6(2) pointing to it, an issues approach was adopted and 
referred to as the ‘excluded assessment’ approach13. Nevertheless, the broadest comments on approach 
in the House of Lords, and, in particular, that a restrictive approach is required, do not seem to have been 
dependent upon the version of the Regulations under consideration. 
The First National Bank case was concerned with one of the terms in First National's standard form 
contract for lending money to borrowers through regulated agreements under the Consumer Credit Act 
1974. The particular term allowed for the continuance of the contractual rate of interest after judgment for 
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default. The significance of the term was that, without it First National would have ceased to have a right 
to interest on the amount outstanding once judgment had occurred. Without such a term, the contractual 
right to interest would have ‘merged’ with the judgment and, as judgment had to be sought in the county 
court, no interest could be awarded as what was in question was a regulated agreement14. The court had 
power to order payment by instalments of the sum for which judgment was given15, but that did not 
include future interest to cover the further time taken to repay the principal. It also had powers under 
section 136 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, when making a ‘time order’ to allow repayment over a 
period of time, to amend any term of the agreement16. However, what caused the problem brought before 
the courts in this case was that the county court would give judgment for First National Bank on the 
consumer's default, and make an order allowing for repayment by instalments. The consumer would duly 
make those instalment payments and then be shocked to discover that a considerable sum was still owed 
because, under the relevant contractual term, the contractual rate of interest had continued to be payable 
after the judgment. That interest could not be covered by the payments ordered by the court and the court 
had not, when making the order, considered whether to provide any relief from it. The consumer had not 
understood the interaction of the term and the legislation. There were two basic arguments to be 
considered by the courts: firstly, that the term in question was within the core exclusion and not covered 
by the fairness test, and secondly, that it was, in any event, fair. The High Court17, the Court of Appeal18, 
and the House of Lords all found that the term was not within the core exclusion, but only the Court of 
Appeal regarded it as unfair. The aspect of the case dealing with the application of the fairness test will be 
returned to below. What is of interest here is the approach taken to the scope of the core exclusion. 
In deciding that the term in question was not within the core exclusion Lord Bingham accepted the 
distinction between terms ‘which express the substance of the bargain and “incidental” (if important) 
terms which surround them’19. Similarly, Lord Steyn thought that the term in question was not within the 
core exclusion and was a ‘subsidiary’ term. However, basically the line was taken that the particular term 
was not within the core exclusion because it dealt with the situation after default20. More broadly, the 
House of Lords recognised the need for a restrictive approach to the core exclusion if the purpose of the 
Regulations is not to be frustrated21. Lord Bingham took the line that the core exclusion should only cover 
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terms ‘falling squarely within it’22. In addition, Lord Steyn also recognised a more specific risk in relation to 
the approach to be taken to the core exclusion. He recognised that a restrictive approach is necessary to 
avoid ‘the main purpose of the scheme [being] frustrated by endless formalistic arguments as to whether 
a provision is a definitional or exclusionary provision’23 ie he was recognising the risk of the core 
exclusion generating excessive argument about the type of issue indicated above as potentially 
problematic – whether an exclusion clause should be regarded as part of the definition of the obligations. 
After First National Bank it seemed that it could be said that the core exclusion does not encompass 
incidental or subsidiary terms, that a restrictive approach is to be taken to its scope generally and that 
there should be an avoidance of the type of argument which contends that an exclusion clause is part of 
the definition of the obligations, and it seemed that the way to achieve the broader aim of a restrictive 
approach to the core exclusion was through considering the significance of terms in the eyes of the 
parties. However, despite adopting an issues approach, the Supreme Court in Office of Fair Trading v 
Abbey National24 has indicated a much less restrictive approach to the compass of the core exclusion25, 
simply taking the line that the payment in First National Bank was not a part of the price because it was a 
payment after default. 
Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National26 involved an action by the OFT against seven banks and one 
building society (‘the Banks’). The terms in question were those which impose charges in relation to 
overdrafts which have not been agreed in advance or in relation to unsuccessful applications for such 
overdrafts (not the terms imposing interest payments on the overdrafts). Such overdrafts may be 
successfully, or unsuccessfully, ‘requested’, in a number of ways, but all such ‘requests’ result, or would 
result if acquiesced in by the bank, in the customer's account becoming overdrawn or going beyond an 
agreed overdraft limit. What were referred to as the customer's ‘Relevant Instructions’ to the bank to bring 
about that situation could take such forms as a cheque being presented, direct debits becoming payable, 
a withdrawal from an ATM, or even the debiting from an account of an amount to cover interest or fees 
payable to the bank. Such ‘Relevant Instructions’ themselves gave rise to ‘Relevant Charges’ and if the 
bank acquiesced and provided the unarranged overdraft there were then Relevant Charges in relation to 
that as well as interest. These Relevant Charges formed part of the charging structure adopted by the 
banks in relation to current accounts and that was described by Andrew Smith J at first instance:27  
‘The charging structure adopted by the Banks in relation to current accounts is commonly known as 
“free-if-in-credit banking”. … under this structure customers do not pay bank charges for the day-
to-day operation of the account while it is in credit (although there are often charges for additional 
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services such as, for some banks, stopping cheques written by the customer or supplying additional 
bank statements). The Banks do, however, have the benefit of customers’ credit balances … and 
also interest will be incurred and fees may be incurred if the customer's account goes into debit or 
in other circumstances. These fees include the Relevant Charges.’ 
The courts were asked to consider whether the Relevant Charges were covered by the core exclusion or 
could be subject to the fairness test. At first instance, and in the Court of Appeal28, it was found that they 
were not covered by the core exclusion. The Court of Appeal took the line that the Relevant Charges 
would not be viewed as part of ‘the essential bargain’ (particularly by consumers) and so would not be 
covered by the core exclusion. It is an approach which is in keeping with the idea that the area covered 
by the core exclusion can be left unpoliced (provided it is plain intelligible language) because it is the area 
where the consumer should be aware of (or is most likely to be aware of) the contents of the contract. 
However, it must now be viewed as an approach which has taken that idea too far. Lord Walker stated: 
‘Any monetary price or remuneration payable under the contract would naturally fall within the language 
of paragraph (b)’ of reg 6(2)29. The court simply took the line that the Relevant Charges were undoubtedly 
the price, or part of the price, paid by the bank's customers for the services provided by the bank and that 
was not affected by the payments being contingent30. Of course, in keeping with an issues (or ‘excluded 
assessment’) approach, the judges did emphasise that that was not the end of the matter. They indicated 
that it was only a challenge to the price on the basis of ‘adequacy’ (ie value for money) that was excluded 
and not some other basis for a fairness challenge. However, even on the basis of an issues approach, the 
Supreme Court in Abbey National has indicated more scope for the core exclusion than did the general 
comments of the House of Lords in First National Bank. The scope of reg 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(b) must be 
considered further. Reg 6(2)(b), as the subject of much more specific discussion by the courts, will be 
considered first. 
It should not be thought that any reference to payment means that a fairness challenge is precluded 
under reg 6(2)(b). In Abbey National itself, Lord Walker made the point that ‘not every term that is in some 
way linked to monetary consideration falls within Regulation 6(2)(b)’ and that ‘Paras (d),(e),(f) and (l) of 
the “grey list” in Schedule 2 of the 1999 Regulations are an illustration of that’31. Lord Mance also made 
the point that ‘There can be payments which do not constitute either price or remuneration’ and further 
that ‘payments which do constitute price or remuneration in this sense can be challenged as unfair on 
grounds which do not relate to their appropriateness in amount’32. The question of the scope of the 
reference to ‘price or remuneration’ will be considered first. 
In Abbey National the Supreme Court accepted that, as a payment after default, the payment in the First 
National Bank case was not part of the ‘price or remuneration’. Payments after default will not fall within 
the exclusion in reg 6(2)(b). However, as is well known from the rules on penalty clauses, a rule dealing 
with payment on breach can be avoided by careful drafting of a relevant term as, for example, one 
dealing with an alternative performance rather than a breach. In relation to the application of reg 6(2)(b), it 
was made clear that whether a term is a default term will not depend upon the form of the clause. The 
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[2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 All ER 667 at [101]. He also made the point that ‘Heads (d), (e), (f), and (l) in the 
grey list … fall within one or both categories. 
Supreme Court in Abbey National indicated its approval33 of the line taken on this point in Bairstow Eves 
London Central Ltd v Smith and Darlingtons (a firm) (Pt 20 defendants)34. That case was concerned with 
estate agents' fees, which had, mistakenly, not been paid by the vendor's solicitors at the time of the sale. 
The contract provided for a ‘standard commission rate’ of 3 per cent and an ‘early payment discounted 
rate’ of 1.5 per cent. The standard rate became payable if the estate agents were not paid at the 
‘discounted rate’ within ten days of the sale. The question arose as to the application of the 1999 
Regulations to the term requiring 3 per cent commission. The estate agents argued it was covered by the 
core exclusion and not subject to the fairness test. Gross J concluded that it was not covered by the core 
exclusion. He thought it ‘plain that both parties contemplated an agreed operative price of 1.5 per cent 
with a default provision of 3 per cent’ (the market for estate agents was such that the estate agents 
recognised that they were unlikely to obtain business at 3 per cent and the negotiations had focused on 
1.5 per cent). So, a default provision will not be covered by the core exclusion and whether a term is a 
default provision will not simply be determined by the form of the clause. Plainly, there is not to be (and it 
may never have been possible for there to be) an avoidance of the type of ‘formalistic arguments’ which 
Lord Steyn had wanted to avoid in relation to the core exclusion.35 Equally plainly, even though reg 
6(2)(b) is not to be confined to ‘essential terms’, consideration of the parties' perception of the role of a 
term is still required. The significance of this will be returned to below. 
However, as has been indicated, the Supreme Court emphasised that the scope of the core exemption 
under reg 6(2)(b) is not simply restricted by the fact that it only refers to payments which are the ‘price or 
remuneration’; it is also restricted by the fact that it only prevents challenges on the basis of ‘adequacy’ ie 
of the ‘appropriateness’ of the sum or, more simply, whether the contract is value for money. However, 
there are considerable difficulties in drawing the line between a fairness challenge on the basis of 
‘adequacy’ and a fairness challenge relating to payment on other grounds. That can be illustrated by 
considering possible challenges to the Relevant Charges envisaged by Lord Phillips in Abbey National. 
The Relevant Charges came from 20 per cent of the banks' customers, but provided 30% of their revenue 
stream from current accounts36. Lord Phillips indicated the possibility of a challenge on the basis of the 
unfairness of the bank's ‘method’ of pricing or pricing structure. He said:37  
‘It may be open to question whether it is fair to subsidise some customers by charges on others who 
experience contingencies that they did not foresee when entering into their contracts’. 
However, it is difficult to divorce the cross-subsidy argument from a challenge on the basis of ‘adequacy’. 
It would seem to involve the contention that customers who incur Relevant Charges pay more than is 
appropriate for the services related to those charges and, as Lord Phillips said:38  
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[2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 All ER 667 at [78]. Lord Phillips did seem to envisage the possibility of a 
challenge on the basis that the relevant charges were excessive in relation to the relevant services 
provided in exchange ie a challenge not based on the overall price/ services ratio. However, there seem 
to be major hurdles in the way of a challenge based on saying ‘this part of the price’ is excessive for ‘this 
‘an assessment of the fairness of charges will be precluded if the basis of the attack is that by 
reason of their inclusion in the pricing package, those who pay them are being charged an excessive 
amount in exchange for the overall package’. 
The Supreme Court seems to have thought that it was drawing a clearer borderline around the core 
exclusion than the lower courts. However, it would seem that there are no simple lines to be drawn 
around the scope of reg 6(2)(b), and that can be further illustrated. As has been indicated, the Supreme 
Court recognised that the grey list illustrates that some terms related to payment fall outside of the core 
exclusion. Element (l) indicates that at least some price variation clauses are subject to the fairness test 
and may be unfair. Such clauses may fall outside the core exclusion on one of the two bases considered 
above. The first possibility is that the type of argument used in Bairstow Eves could be extended to say 
that terms providing a means of changing the initially agreed price are not price terms (leading to 
arguments as to whether the initially agreed price includes the variation, similar to the alternative 
performance / default term argument). However, difficult borderlines would need to be drawn. As has 
been indicated, the Supreme Court in Abbey National denied that the Relevant Charges were precluded 
from being ‘the price’ on the basis thaythat they were dependent upon a contingency. The second 
possibility is that a limited view would be taken of when fairness is being challenged on the basis of 
‘adequacy’ so that the fact of an inappropriate right to vary (eg one not hedged round with suitable 
limitations) can be raised without the underlying problem, of the potential for an excessive, varied price, 
precluding the challenge. Even with the borderline difficulty, it is suggested that the former approach is 
the appropriate one as an extension of the approach taken in Bairstow Eves. 
Consideration must also be given to the scope of reg 6(2)(a), and it should be emphasised that the 
regulation itself limits its coverage by its reference to the ‘main’ subject matter of the contract. This was 
acknowledged in Lord Walker's comment39 that ‘delivery of goods or peripheral extras may be 
disregarded as ancillary for the purposes of para (a) of Regulation 6(2), but the charges for them, if 
payable under the same contract, are part of the price for the purposes of para (b)’. (Identifying the goods 
as the ‘main subject matter of the contract’.) It can be suggested, however, that he was placing too little 
emphasis upon the restriction of reg 6(2)(a) to the ‘main subject matter’ of the contract when he 
suggested40 that in relation to ‘a week's stay at a five-star hotel offering a wide variety of services’ there ‘is 
no principled basis on which the court could decide that some services are more essential to the contract 
than others and … the main subject matter must be described in general terms – hotel services’. The 
‘principled basis’ would be the view of the parties and again it can be suggested that the acceptance of 
Bairstow Eves shows the potential for such an approach. 
In the First National Bank case, the House of Lords recognised the risk that the purpose of the 
Regulations would be frustrated if a restrictive approach was not taken to the core exclusion. In Abbey 
National the Supreme Court may be seen to be taking such a wide view of the scope of the core 
exclusion that it will lead to the effectiveness of the Regulations being much diminished. There is some 
indication in the Supreme Court that the emphasis in the Regulations is on policing consumer choice 
                                                                                                                                                                           
part of the service’. It could be argued not to be precluded by Reg 6(2) which could be seen to be 
restricted to the overall price/ services issue, but Lord Mance made the point (at [99]) – ‘any challenge to 
the fairness of a term must be to its fairness in the context of the relevant contract in which it appears. It is 
‘beside the point’ if it is not. If, on a proper analysis, the customer's potential liability for the relevant 
charges is the or part of the ‘price or remuneration’ in exchange for which the overall package of banking 
services is supplied, and it is challenged on the ground that it makes such price or remuneration 
disproportionate overall, then reg 6(2)(b) excludes the challenge. If there is no challenge to the overall 
proportionality of the overall price or remuneration of the package, then I fail to see how a challenge to 
the proportionality of the relevant charges in relation to the cost of providing particular services in isolation 
can be admissible or relevant.’ 
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rather than consumer protection, but even that requires sufficient account to be taken of the realities of 
consumer contracting and what the consumer is likely to take account of. In recognising the 
appropriateness of the approach taken in Bairstow Eves, some function has been maintained for the 
perception of the parties of the role and significance of a term. This must be used to full effect if the 
effectiveness of the Regulations is not to be considerably curtailed by the core exclusion. It will need to be 
taken further than the Supreme Court may have envisaged, but it need not entail reintroducing the 
‘essential term’ approach of the Court of Appeal or simply taking the perspective of the consumer41. 
(Sellers and suppliers are likely to be well aware of the consumer's usual reaction to standard terms.) 
As far as the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 is concerned, cl 64(1) provides that ‘a term of a consumer 
contract may not be assessed for fairness … to the extent that— 
(a) it specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price payable under the contract by comparison 
with the goods, digital content or services supplied under it’. 
Clause 64(1) however is further subject to a condition that the term in question (which is claimed to 
specify the main subject matter or the assessment is of the appropriateness of price) must be transparent 
and prominent42. Consequently, a price clause set out in very small print or in convoluted language would 
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Section 64(2); moreover, a term would be considered transparent if it is expressed in plain and intelligible 
language and (in the case of a written term) is legible (s 64(3)); and a term is prominent for the purposes 
of this section if it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would 
be aware of the term (s 64(4)).There is some concern as to the introduction of the new concept of an 
‘average consumer’ (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/consumer/memo/cr28.htm). 
It was initially suggested by the Financial Services Consumer Panel to Parliament that the phrase ‘taking 
into account social, cultural and linguistic factors’ should be added to the definition in the Bill, to account 
for groups of consumers with different characteristics, and to allow for the ways in which individuals 
interact with information. The Panel’s view was that that would also bring the definition in line with CJEU 
jurisprudence (see 3.106). The Government however rejected the suggestion, stating that the proposed 
test is not an objective exercise, and that all the circumstances relating to whether an individual consumer 
is vulnerable can be taken into account when assessing the fairness of the terms. The provision also 
does not take into account any need for different levels of prominence for terms which may impose 
different levels of burden on the consumer. The Government also dismissed that contention. The net 
result is that ‘average consumer’ is now defined in the Bill as ‘a consumer who is reasonably well-
informed, observant and circumspect’ (cl 64(5)). It might be suggested that this ‘average consumer’ test 
may be setting the threshold too high, especially for the [vulnerable] consumer who has been specifically 
targeted by the trader. Looking to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, we find 
a more flexible standard. In those Regulations, although the ‘average consumer’ test maintains an 
objective standard, it adopts a variable test depending on the circumstances. There, reg 2 provides that: 
‘(4) In determining the effect of a commercial practice on the average consumer where the practice is 
directed to a particular group of consumers, a reference to the average consumer shall be read as 
referring to the average member of that group. 
(5) In determining the effect of a commercial practice on the average consumer— 
(a) where a clearly identifiable group of consumers is particularly vulnerable to the practice or the 
underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader 
could reasonably be expected to foresee, and 
(b) where the practice is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of that group, 
a reference to the average consumer shall be read as referring to the average member of that group.’ 
not be exempt from the assessment of fairness. The proposed provision would also deal with the 
increasing phenomenon of price comparison websites where there is much pressure on traders to 
advertise low headline prices, whilst recouping their profits through other charges. The new law should 
provide better tools to combat unfair charges hidden in the website. 
This new section replaces reg 6(2) of the UTCCR. It may be recalled that in Office of Fair Trading v 
Abbey National plc43 the Supreme Court concluded that the concepts of main subject matter and price are 
to be narrowly construed as ‘the two sides of the quid pro quo inherent in any consumer contract’, that is, 
the goods or service that the trader agrees to provide, and the price that the consumer agrees to pay. 
Lord Walker explained that the fact that other types of price terms appeared on the grey list reinforced 
this narrow construction of the exemption: 
‘This House’s decision in First National Bank shows that not every term that is in some way linked 
to monetary consideration falls within Regulation 6(2)(b). Paras (d), (e), (f) and (l) of the “grey list” 
in Schedule 2 to the 1999 Regulations are an illustration of that.’44  
On that basis, it would follow that if a term relates to aspects of the price other than the amount, such as 
time for payment, payment structure, withdrawal rights or forms of payment, that term may be assessed 
for fairness but the amount itself cannot be assessed as long as the term passes the transparency and 
prominence tests. 
Plain intelligible language 
[3.106]  
‘Plain intelligible language’ is an important concept in the Regulations. ‘Core terms’ can be subject to the 
fairness test only if they are not in ‘plain intelligible language’ and reg 7(1) ‘requires’ that written terms be 
drafted in ‘plain intelligible language’. There is, in addition, a rule of construction in reg 7(2) in relation to 
the situation in which there is ‘doubt about the meaning of a written term’. The rule of construction is dealt 
with below. Here consideration will first be given to what amounts to ‘plain intelligible language’ before the 
impact of Regulation 7(1) is addressed. 
The first question is as to what is ‘plain intelligible language’? One question is to whom should it be plain 
and intelligible? What is needed is the setting of a standard and this requires an objective approach, and 
the OFT (the former ego of the CMA) had referred to the view of ‘the ordinary consumer’1. In Office of Fair 
Trading v Abbey National Andrew Smith J took the line that there was ‘no real dispute between the 
parties that the question whether terms are in plain intelligible language is to be considered from the point 
of view of the typical or average consumer’ and he equated this with a concept used elsewhere by the 
Court of Justice ‘in applying and interpreting European Consumer law’ the ‘concept of the average 
consumer … who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ and he thought 
that it provided ‘an appropriate yardstick guide to whether a term is in plain intelligible language’2. He also 
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clarified the level of understanding further, viewing it not only as a matter of whether ‘the typical consumer 
can understand the actual wording used in contractual documentation but also its effect’,3 and he said:4  
‘The question of plain intelligible language is, as it seems to me, directed to whether the contractual 
terms put forward by the seller or supplier are sufficiently clear to enable the typical consumer to 
have a proper understanding of them for sensible and practical purposes’. 
However, his views as to the terms in question being, for the most part, in ‘plain intelligible language’ 
would indicate that the understanding of the ‘effect’ of a clause ‘for sensible and practical purposes’ is not 
a very demanding standard in relation to complex provisions. The ‘plain’ and ‘intelligible’ terms would not 
have enabled a consumer to discern whether a particular transaction would trigger a ‘charge’ as, for 
example, they would not know the order in which payments in and payments out would occur. 
Some less abstract points can be made. The fact that a court could give meaning to ‘vague’ words does 
not mean that they are plain and intelligible: 
‘Without some form of definition [“associated” and “connected”] are vague words. That is not to 
say that a court could not give meaning or apply them if it had to. The point is not that they are void 
for legal uncertainty. The point is that they are too vague to be classed as plain and intelligible’.5  
Albeit, in the language of the ‘ordinary consumer’, the OFT had previously indicated some specific points 
which are of value when considering the identification of ‘plain intelligible language’. The OFT stressed 
that it should normally be the ordinary consumer without legal advice – ‘consumers would rarely consider 
there was any necessity for them to seek legal advice before entering into most types of contract’6. It is 
therefore usually ‘not sufficient for terms to be clear and precise for legal purposes’, normally they must 
be ‘intelligible to ordinary members of the public’7. (The OFT however suggested an exception in relation 
to ‘contracts normally entered only on legal advice’8). More concretely, some specific factors can be 
identified if terms are to be in ‘plain intelligible language’. It may be inappropriate, in particular, to use a 
contract drafted to be used with other commercial parties when contracting with a consumer. In a contract 
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with a consumer there should be an avoidance of technical legal terminology such as ‘consequential 
loss’, ‘time is of the essence’9, and ‘force majeure’10’, but if it is unavoidable it should be explained11. The 
OFT did not restrict its objections to obviously obscure jargon. ‘Relatively straightforward technicalities 
such as references to “indemnity”… can have onerous implications of which consumers are likely to be 
unaware’12. ‘Ordinary words should be used as far as possible, and in their normal sense’13. The OFT had 
also considered ‘wide exclusion clauses, qualified by reference to statute liable to be unfair, by reason of 
lack of clarity (if not for other reasons too). … if not for other reasons too’. ‘Such  As far as the OFT was 
concerned, “such a term may not be unclear or uncertain in law, but if consumers cannot understand the 
statutory references, they may be prevented or deterred from pursuing legitimate claims.’14 In addition, 
‘plain intelligible language’ may not merely be a matter of the words used. The OFT saw ‘intelligibility’ also 
as a matter of how contracts are ‘presented and used’. There is seen to be an issue of ‘legibility’ – of print 
size and colour and quality of paper15. Further, there is also the style of the document – long sentences 
and frequent cross-referencing do not assist ready intelligibility16, ‘significant points can be highlighted 
and unavoidable technicalities explained’17. It has also been suggested that long documents may be 
improved if ‘accompanied by summaries of their main points’18, but care will have to be taken with any 
such summaries if they are not to mislead19 and, more generally a term may be found to be not in plain 
intelligible language because of the impact of accompanying non-contractual materials. In OFT v Abbey 
National an error in a ‘boxed warning’ meant that an accompanying term was not in plain intelligible 
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language even if the ‘boxed warning’ was not itself a term20. In some cases, particularly with longer and 
more complex sets of terms, there may be some scope for difficulties with the language of the terms to be 
ameliorated by opportunities given to the consumer to digest and understand them. Information packs, 
dispatched to consumers before the contract is made may be of assistance to the seller or supplier when 
the fairness of a term is questioned as may the provision of a ‘cooling-off period’ after the contract is 
made, providing the consumer with an opportunity to withdraw, without penalty, after time for digestion 
and consideration of the terms21. Although a cooling off period would seem not to affect the question of 
whether a term is plain and intelligible, it may, nevertheless, impact upon its fairness. Finally, the question 
can also be raised as to whether it will always be sufficient if the only language in which the contract is 
expressed is English. A supplier may know, or be in a situation where he, or she, should be aware that 
English is not the first language of the relevant group of consumers. Certainly, in such a case, it would 
seem that there would be an impact upon the fairness test and, in particular, the element of good faith. 
The question which must now be addressed is as to the effect of reg 7(1) and the ‘requirement’ that 
written terms be in ‘plain intelligible language’. The UTCCR 1999 and the Directive must be considered. 
Recital 20 of the Directive states: 
‘Whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually 
be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable 
to the consumer shall prevail.’ 
Much of that recital is reflected in art 5 which states: 
‘In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these 
terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the 
meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail …’ 
And the implementation is in reg 7, which in its turn states: 
‘(1) A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in plain 
intelligible language. 
(2) If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most 
favourable to the consumer shall prevail …’ 
It should be noted that neither art 5, nor reg 7, embody the reference which is to be found in recital 20, to 
the need for the consumer to be provided with an ‘opportunity to examine all the terms’, and the 
significance given to that recital 20 reference by the regulator will be returned to below. What must first be 
dealt with is the mandatory tone in which art 5 refers to the need for ‘plain intelligible language’, but 
without specifying any penalty for a failure to draft contracts in compliance with such a ‘requirement’. (It 
could be seen as simply linked with the effect of the rule of construction also dealt with in art 5 with its 
inherent ‘penalty’ for ambiguity22.) The mandatory tones of art 5 and, even more so, reg 7 (with its 
separation of the ‘requirement’ from the rule of construction), favour the contention that there is a 
requirement that written terms be drafted in plain intelligible language. However, the absence of any 
penalty, as such, within the Regulations23, simply for failing to draft in plain intelligible language, would 
seem to mean that there is no separate requirement and lack of clarity in the language of contract terms 
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is merely relevant to the application of the fairness test and, in particular, that element of it which focuses 
on whether the supplier was acting in good faith24. Further, if the lack of plain intelligible language itself 
directly impacted upon the enforcement of a term, there would have been no need for the line taken in 
relation to the construction rules by the CJEU in European Commission v Spain25 which is considered 
below. It should be noted, however, that it has been contended that the Consumer Injunctions Directive26 
could be seen as providing a penalty as it requires injunctive relief to be available, in certain 
circumstances, where there is ‘any act contrary’ to a listed Directive, including the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Directive27. 
The final point to be made here is in relation to the reference in recital 20 to the consumer being given an 
opportunity to examine the terms. The OFT (now the CMA) had stated that this reference meant has seen 
that as indicating that under the Directive and the Regulations ‘consumers have a right to know and 
understand the terms of their contracts’28 ie that ‘plain intelligible language’ is only half of the issue, the 
other being an appropriate opportunity for the consumer to become acquainted with the terms. The lone 
appearance of the reference to the consumer's opportunity to examine the terms in recital 20, without 
further reference to it in art 5, weakens this contention. However, it makes considerable sense for a ‘core 
terms’ exemption based on the preservation of freedom of contract, to be restricted not only by the 
intelligibility of the language of the terms but also their accessibility, and it is plain that the accessibility of 
the terms should be relevant to the fairness test, particularly its good faith aspect. The Law Commission's 
proposals for unified unfair terms legislation would explicitly make ‘transparency’ (including accessibility) 
relevant to both the core exemption and the fairness test, rather than merely that the language be plain 
and intelligible.29  
As regards the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, it is provided that ‘a trader must ensure that a written term of a 
consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent’30. That section goes on to provide that 
a consumer notice is considered to be transparent if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and 
it is legible31. It should be remembered the prominence test discussed above32 does not apply here. The 
trader is only under a legal duty to ensure transparency of terms, not prominence. The trader is only 
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subject to the requirement of prominence if he seeks to exempt his terms relating to subject matter and 
appropriateness of price from the assessment of unfairness33. 
Construction 
[3.107]  
In the context of disputes between a particular consumer and a particular seller, or supplier, UTCCR 
1999, reg 7(2) states a rule of construction, that doubt about the meaning of a written term will lead to the 
interpretation most favourable to the consumer prevailing1. The common law is well used to construction 
on the basis of the contra proferentem rule that any ambiguity in a clause will be construed against the 
person putting it forward2 and European Commission v Spain would indicate the same type of approach 
when an individual dispute is in question under the Regulations3. It has, however, been seen as also 
extending to the situation where the contract contains two contradictory clauses, allowing the one 
favourable to the consumer to prevail4. In the context of the reference to ‘plain intelligible language’ in 
relation to the core exclusion, it has been said:5  
‘Any lawyer worth his salt can usually contrive possible alternative meanings of contractual words 
and the fact this can be done does not of itself make any given language insufficiently plain and 
intelligible. For that to result the alternative wording, or uncertain effect, must be one of substance 
or significance, and not merely of legal contrivance’. 
This warning would also seem apt in the context of reg 7(2). 
Regulation 7(2) only applies if after applying the rules on construction of contracts there is in fact an 
ambiguity in the language6. It was held in Stephen West, Carol West v Ian Finlay & Associates that the 
lower court had erred in applying reg 7(2) because the language of the contract was clear – there was 
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therefore no ambiguity in the contract which would trigger the application of doubt about the meaning of 
the contract required in reg 7(2)7. 
It would thus appear that there is no material difference between the principle of construction in reg 7(2) 
and the contra proferentem rule. Andrew Smith J’s dictum that they were ‘to much the same effect’ in The 
Financial Services Authority v Asset LI Inc8 was endorsed in AJ Building and Plastering Limited v 
Samantha Turner9. It has been suggested that reg 7(2) might go beyond the common law rule, on the 
basis that the former but not the latter would require a court, faced with a case of ambiguity, to favour one 
less likely interpretation over two more likely interpretations10. That proposition was however rejected by 
Judge Keyser QC in AJ Building and Plastering Limited v Samantha Turner11, who said: 
‘If the normal principles of construction yield a clear preference, even of two competing 
interpretations over one, the remaining ambiguity applies only to the preferred interpretations; all 
others have been rejected before invoking any rule or principle of last resort; and they are still 
rejected, even if they remain possible interpretations in the sense that there is room for other courts 
or judges to favour them – a common enough state of affairs in appellate courts. Neither at 
common law nor, in my view, under regulation 7(2) is the court that invokes what I may call the 
tie-breaker required or permitted to apply it in favour of an interpretation that has already been 
rejected by means of the application of the normal canons of construction.’ 
Hence in the construction exercise, regard must continue to be had to the factual matrix. 
It is probably also trite to state that the term must have been properly incorporated into the contract 
before a court or tribunal would resort to reg7(2)12. 
When a term drawn up for general use is being considered in the context of the powers of the regulator 
(CMA), or the qualifying bodies, reg 7(2) makes it clear that the rule of construction, there set out, does 
not apply. The approach to be taken was stated by the CJEU in European Commission v Spain:13  
‘[In] actions for cessation which involve persons or organisations representative of the collective 
interests of consumers … in order to obtain, by way of prevention, the most favourable result for 
consumers as a whole, it is not necessary, where there is doubt to interpret the term in a manner 
favourable to them. Accordingly an objective interpretation makes it possible to prohibit more 
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frequently the use of an unintelligible or ambiguous term, which results in wider consumer 
protection.’ 
‘Objective’ interpretation, rather than a contra proferentem approach, is to be taken. 
Unfair terms 
[3.108]  
The unfairness test is dealt with by UTCCR 1999, regs 5(1) and 6(1), with an indicative and non-
exhaustive list of terms that may be unfair in Sch 2 (the ‘grey’ list). Regulation 6(2) sets out the 
circumstances to be taken into account in the application of the test. It states: 
‘Without prejudice to regulation 12, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking 
into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by 
referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion 
of the contract and to all other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is 
dependent.’ 
In relation to the assessment of terms in particular contracts between particular sellers or suppliers and 
consumers, the ‘time frame’ of the assessment is that of the conclusion of the contract, as with the 
requirement of reasonableness in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 19771. All the other terms of the contract, 
including any on which the core exemption impacts2, and all the circumstances attending the conclusion 
of the contract are relevant, as are the terms of other, ‘dependent’, contracts3. If a second contract is not 
‘dependent’ it may still be relevant as part of the surrounding circumstances. Any circumstances occurring 
after the conclusion of the contract, such as breaches, cannot be relevant, as such, but the potential for 
them may be relevant if it was foreseeable at the time the contract was made. It is plain that much of this 
would fit awkwardly in the context of the more general assessment of terms under the powers of the 
regulators. That is now acknowledged, to an extent, in the regulations in the reference to regulation 6(1) 
being ‘without prejudice to regulation 12’, which deals with those powers4, but they do not indicate how 
the more general assessment differs. Obviously, however, a more abstract assessment must be in 
question and, having recognized the omission from the Directive and the Regulations, the House of Lords 
has taken the line that the ‘Directive and the Regulations must be made to work sensibly and effectively 
and this can be done by taking into account the effect of contemplated or typical relationships between 
contracting parties’5. It is clear that the particular performance or breach of a contract is irrelevant to the 
assessment at the level of both the particular contract (because of the ‘timeframe’ of the assessment) and 
also at the level of the more general assessment. Equally clearly, however, the potential use of a term is 
significant and, for example, the argument that an entire agreement clause was fair as it was ‘neutral’, 
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merely providing certainty for both parties, did not succeed as it was ‘obvious that the main practical 
effect was to prevent the customer relying on representations by [the supplier's] salesman’6, Further the 
OFT had formerly taken the line that:7  
‘The test of unfairness takes note of how a term could be used. If a term is so widely drafted that it 
could be used in such a way as to cause consumer detriment, then it is open to challenge. The OFT 
cannot regard such a term as fair solely on the basis of protestations that it is not in practice used 
unfairly.’ 
Similarly, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, an exemption clause may operate reasonably in 
relation to the breach which has occurred, but fail to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness because 
of its potential coverage8 In the context of the Regulations, the OFT made the point that if it is claimed 
that a term is not, in practice, used unfairly, it may be drafted too widely, and if rewritten, to reflect actual 
practice, might then be fair9. It has been noted that:10  
‘Unfair terms normally give business a benefit which is excessive rather than wholly unwarranted, 
and often the firm's underlying interest is a vital one. Suppliers can avoid losing all the protection 
offered by, for instance, a ‘boiler plate’ exclusion clause, by agreeing to narrow it and accept 
liability (as fairness requires) for negligence.’ 
The test of unfairness itself is set out in reg 5(1) which states: 
‘A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’ 
There are basically two elements here which need to be considered11: 
(i) significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer; and 
(ii) the requirement of good faith. 
It has been suggested that the term does not contain two separate elements, but that if a term creates a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations, that must be contrary to good faith12. However, 
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‘There are three independent requirements. But the element of detriment to the consumer does not add 
much. But it serves to make clear that the Directive is aimed at significant imbalance against the 
consumer, rather than the seller or supplier’ – Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank 
[2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 All ER 97, Lord Steyn, [36]. 
whilst sufficient significant imbalance might be enough to indicate a lack of good faith in some cases13, 
UTCCR 1994, Sch 2, contained a separate list of factors relevant to the assessment of good faith, thus 
making plain its separate existence from ‘significant imbalance’. That list was not repeated in UTCCR 
1999 but as it was originally derived from the recitals to the Directive, it can still be influential in relation to 
the interpretation of those regulations as the implementation of a EC measure. In addition, in considering 
the application of what was, admittedly, UTCCR 1994, in Director General of Fair Trading v First National 
Bank14 the House of Lords plainly treated the fairness test as containing the two distinct elements 
identified above. In West and Another v Finlay15 we are reminded that it is necessary to consider 
significant imbalance and good faith separately as well as together in making the ultimate overall 
assessment. Lord Justice Vos commented: ‘it could be argued that it carries qualitative as well as 
quantitative connotations. If it were to do so, it could be that the question whether a term creating an 
imbalance creates a “significant” imbalance might turn in part on the exercise of good faith. For the 
purposes of this case, we do not think it is necessary to decide this question and, having heard no 
argument on the point, we prefer to express no concluded view.’16. The matter thus remains unresolved 
although the Court of Appeal in West v Finlay approached the matter first by making some tentative 
conclusions about significant imbalance before examining the issue of good faith and then finally drawing 
together the two sets of conclusions in pronouncing that the clause was not unfair. 
Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, it is for the person seeking to rely upon the exemption clause 
subject to the requirement of reasonableness to establish that the term is reasonable17. There is no stated 
rule in the Regulations or the Directive as to the burden of proof in relation to the fairness test. However, 
in the light of the court's ability to declare a term unfair of its own initiative, this does not lead to the simple 
conclusion that the burden must be on the consumer. The European Commission takes the view that:18  
‘… there is no problem concerning the burden of proof, because the unfair nature of a clause is not 
a matter of fact to be substantiated by the parties concerned, but a matter of law which the court 
must independently decide upon according to the rules of law … Unfairness is therefore very much 
a matter of law, but potentially may depend upon elements of fact which the court may not know 
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and this becomes [a matter of the] burden of proof for one or other side which may want the clause 
to be declared unfair or not unfair as the case may be’. 
It has been suggested that an attempt should be made to produce uniformity in the approach to the 
fairness test across the EU through referring suitable cases to the European Court under art 234 
(formerly art 177) procedure19 and there was criticism of the courts involved in Direct General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank20 for failing to make such a reference21. However, in Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Hofstetter22 the CJEU declined to express a view on 
the fairness of a particular term. That was for the national court to decide. The CJEU is to ‘interpret 
general criteria used by the community legislature in order to define the concept of unfair terms’23. 
The OFT had previously provided guidance as to its views on whether particular terms, or types of term, 
are unfair24 and these should be considered. In relation to the OFT's ‘Guidance on Unfair Terms in 
Tenancy Agreements’25 the line was taken ‘Although the Court is in no sense bound by the guidance 
provided by the Office of Fair Trading … the guidance does give landlords helpful commonsense 
indications of what is likely to be considered fair and should be carefully taken into account’26. For the 
time being, the CMA is likely to follow this approach27. 
There are some terms in relation to which the fairness test is not applied because they are automatically 
deemed unfair under the Regulations. This covers arbitration clauses in relation to claims under a 
specified sum28 and also clauses putting the burden of proof on the consumer in relation to whether a 
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distance supplier or intermediary has complied with obligations under the distance marketing of consumer 
financial services Directive29. 
The CJEU has also confirmed that it is no defence for the supplier to argue that the clause in question did 
little more than to reproduce verbatim national legal stipulations applicable to a different category of 
contracts (RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV30). In that case, it was held 
therefore that the national court should assess in each individual case whether such a term allowing a 
supplier of gas unilaterally to alter the price satisfied the requirements of good faith, balance and 
transparency. 
As far as the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 is concerned, the provisions on unfairness closely mirror those in 
the UTCCR. Clause 62 provides that a consumer is not bound by an unfair term or notice31. A term or 
notice is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer32. A significant imbalance is 
created if the term in question limits the consumer’s rights or disproportionately increases his obligations 
as compared to the trader’s rights and obligations. This clause also sets out factors that a court should 
take into account when determining whether a term is fair, notably that it should consider the specific 
circumstances existing when the term was agreed, other terms in the contract and the nature of the 
subject matter of the contract33. This assessment is known as the ‘fairness test’. Clause 63 then provides 
a list of terms that may be used to assist a court when considering the application of the fairness test34. 
[3.109]  
Significant imbalance The point has been made that significant imbalance could be understood in a 
number of ways1. Firstly, as requiring a weighing of all the rights and obligations under the contract, or 
secondly, it could be seen as requiring a search for related balancing terms within the contract or even, 
thirdly, as requiring consideration beyond a single contract so that there would be an imbalance if, for 
example, ‘the supplier reduces the price slightly … but at the risk of placing a very large potential loss on 
the small number of consumers for whom the risk will materialise’2. The relevance of the third approach 
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may be as a particular way of identifying that the balance issue in question is essentially one related to a 
particular type of risk in the relation to the particular consumer (low risk of very serious consequences),3 
and certainly at first instance in OFT v Abbey National AndewAndrew Smith J made the point4 that ‘the 
Directive and the 1999 Regulations are concerned with the fairness of the individual contract between the 
individual seller or supplier and a particular consumer and are not directly concerned with whether the 
seller or supplier treats fairly consumers as a body’.5 The second of the above possible approaches is 
suggested by the ‘grey list’. Paragraph 1(d) of the grey list6, provides, for example7, for terms having the 
‘object or effect of’: 
‘permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decided not 
to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive compensation of 
an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the 
contract.’ 
The approach of the OFT8 would suggest a combination of the second and first possible approaches. In 
OFT Bulletin 4 it was said9: 
‘… we need to establish first that there is no balancing proviso – which we interpret as one which: 
first is as potentially detrimental to the supplier as the term in question is to the consumer; and 
secondly is obviously linked to it, so that the two, on a common sense view tend to cancel each 
other out … We also look of course at the rest of the contract for any qualifying provisos that 
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would tend to remove the possibility of detriment in the term under consideration, rather than 
balancing it.’ 
However, Lord Bingham in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank indicated the first, 
‘overall’ approach. He briefly described significant imbalance, stating10: 
‘The requirement of significant imbalance is met if a term is so weighted in favour of the supplier 
as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract significantly in his favour. This may 
be by the granting to the supplier of a beneficial option or discretion or power, or by imposing on 
the consumer of a disadvantageous burden or risk or duty … This involves looking at the contract 
as a whole’. 
The overall approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in UK Housing Alliance v Francis,11 where what 
was in question was a sale and leaseback of the consumer's home. At the time of completion of the sale 
£87,500 was paid to the consumer. There was to be a ‘final payment’ of £37,500 if the consumer 
remained as a tenant for ten years, but that was not to be paid (or to be paid in a reduced proportion after 
six years) if the tenancy was terminated earlier. The consumer defaulted on the rent and the tenancy was 
terminated. The consumer claimed that the term precluding the final payment was an unfair term. The 
Court of Appeal found that there was no significant imbalance. The consumer was protected by the need 
for a court order to oust him from possession of the house. Also, as there was potential for the movement 
in the market to make the contract a good or a bad deal for either of the parties, ‘the retention of what 
[was] less than a third of the price [did] not cause any imbalance let alone a significant one’12. 
The CJEU’s preferred approach is similar – the particular term in question should be evaluated against 
the background and context of all the other terms of the contract. It stated: 
‘Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the same directive, that assessment must have regard to the nature of 
the services for which the contract was concluded as well as to all the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which 
it is dependent. Consequently … the national court must, in order to determine whether the 
contractual term on which the claim brought before it is based may be unfair, take account of all of 
the other terms of the contract.’13  
That is not to say that it is never useful, in appropriate cases, to focus on the particular term in question. 
In Munckenbeck & Marshall v Harold14 the term was regarded as creating a significant imbalance 
because there was no mirror-image, balancing right for the consumer. Similarly, an apparently neutral 
term, such as an entire agreement clause may be seen as significantly imbalanced where its ‘main 
practical effect’ will be significantly detrimental to the consumer15. It may be seen as equivalent to a term 
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which is imbalanced on its face and for which there is no balancing term. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
take an ‘overall’ approach to the question of significant imbalance in relation to an entire agreement 
clause. 
That said it is important not to be easily swayed by a finding of imbalance – most clauses at issue will 
show an imbalance at face value. What matters is whether that imbalance is significant. In West v 
Finlay16, the court found that although the net contribution clause (NCC)17 plainly caused an imbalance, 
that imbalance should not be viewed in isolation, and in the bigger context the imbalance was not 
significant for the following main reasons: 
‘(a) the prevalence of the usage of the NCC in standard RIBA forms, (b) the fact that the clause 
would be regarded as not unusual in a commercial contract, and (c) the fact that it was the Wests 
who in this case would be taking the final decision on the future choice of main contractor, very 
likely being alive (bearing in mind Mr West's banking background) to the fact that that contractor's 
financial stability was a matter of importance’. 
It was clear that commercially speaking the clause was unexceptional and standard and this made a 
difference to the court’s decision on as to whether there was significant imbalance. The reference to the 
Wests’ strength in the bargain is consistent with the tenor of recital 16 of the original Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts. However that recital is largely concerned with the matter of good faith, not 
significant imbalance. That demonstrates how difficult (and artificial) it is to treat ‘significant imbalance’ 
and ‘good faith’ separately. 
Similarly, in First National Bank itself, what was in issue was the term requiring continuance of the 
contractual rate of interest after default. In looking at the question of significant imbalance, basically the 
court emphasised that the interest was simply continuing to be charged, as from the start of the contract, 
and there was no change in the circumstances which made the term one generating a significant 
imbalance. The House of Lords viewed the situation as unexceptionable as interest payments are the 
price of a loan, and merely continuing them after judgment for default was seen as simply ensuring that 
the price for the borrowing continued to be paid as long as the borrowing continued. Lord Bingham said:18  
‘The essential bargain is that the bank will make funds available to the borrower which the 
borrower will repay, over a period, with interest. Neither party could suppose that the bank would 
willingly forgo any part of its principal or interest. If the bank thought that outcome at all likely, it 
would not lend… There is nothing unbalanced or detrimental to the consumer in that obligation; the 
absence of such a term would unbalance the contract to the detriment of the lender.’ 
Where a term deals with something continuing after the happening of a particular event, it may be asked 
whether there has been a change in the balance of the rights and obligations. Similarly, where the same 
charge is made in different circumstances it may be asked whether the balance of the rights and 
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obligations is different in the different circumstances. In Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Ltd19 the case 
was concerned with a contract between property owners and letting agents. The contract provided for an 
11 per cent commission for the agents when the property was initially let to a tenant, and also for an 11 
per cent commission on each renewal of it. The question arose as to the fairness of the renewal 
commission20. The court decided that there was a significant imbalance (and a lack of good faith so that 
the term was unfair). When the property was first let to a tenant the letting agents would have to 
undertake significant work which would not have to be undertaken on a renewal. The judge took the line 
that:21  
‘The commission amounts in question are significant, and operate adversely to the client the more 
time goes on. Commensurate services are not provided as time goes on.’ 
Again, as in the First National Bank case, the term in question related to payment upon the happening of 
a specified event. In both cases, the overall balance in the contractual rights could be considered relative 
to those at the commencement of the contract, rather than having to weigh them in absolute terms, ie the 
relative benefits/burdens were unchanged in First National Bank, and had tipped against the consumer in 
Foxtons. 
When what is in issue is a term allowing a supplier to vary a term, or terms, the question will be, in a 
sense, one of a relative weighing. However, the potential for the balance of the contract rights and 
obligations to move against the consumer will be clear. What will be focused on will be any restrictions on 
the supplier's right and what the consumer can do in response. In Peabody Trust (Governors of the) v 
Reeve22 the court had to consider a unilateral right to vary the terms of tenancy agreements made 
between a ‘social landlord’ and its tenants. The right was extensive, giving the landlord ‘almost carte 
blanche in the field of variations, apart from the areas of rent and statutory protection’, and it was said 
that:23  
‘There is no doubt that a unilateral right of variation in favour of a landlord causes a “significant 
imbalance” in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the tenant. The landlord can 
impose material changes but the tenant cannot. The tenant's only right is to walk away from the 
tenancy by giving notice to quit under the procedure set out in section 103 of the Housing Act 
1985. However, in the case of relatively low cost housing operated by a registered social landlord, 
this is unrealistic. The tenant will typically have a strong necessity, will be of relatively limited 
means, may well lack experience and familiarity with contractual terms and will have a very weak 
bargaining position.’ 
One further point addressed by the House of Lords in the First National Bank case should be considered. 
The term could, in a sense, be seen as a departure from what would otherwise be the ‘default position’ – 
it departed from what would otherwise be the situation created by statute ie no interest would be payable 
after judgment – and the Court of Appeal in First National Bank had indicated that such departure in the 
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instant case showed a significant imbalance24. However, that was clearly not the view taken by the House 
of Lords. Lord Bingham, having considered the development of the statutory background, concluded that 
he did not think that ‘the term could be stigmatised as unfair on the ground that it violates or undermines a 
statutory regime enacted for the protection of consumers’25. Similarly, Lord Steyn did not think that that 
the argument could prevail ‘in circumstances where the legislature has neither expressly nor by 
necessary implication barred a stipulation that interest may continue to accrue after judgment’26. The OFT 
has said that ‘its starting point in assessing the fairness of a term is … normally to ask what would be the 
position of it did not appear in the contract’27, but plainly the approach cannot be taken that departure 
from the default position is automatically unfair. The basis of the particular default position, and the impact 
of the departure from it, must be considered28. 
The final point to be considered here in relation to ‘significant imbalance’ concerns its application when 
the basic difficulty with the term in question is that it is misleading – a term which might appear to the 
consumer to have an effect other than it actually has. An example is provided by the OFT29. 
‘The OFT normally objects to clauses which reflect the general contractual position concerning 
damages for breach of contract but in a misleading way. Contracts sometimes give the impression 
that, if they are cancelled by the consumer, the company can recover all the profit it would have 
made. In law the supplier actually has a duty to mitigate …’ 
Plainly the OFT takes the view that such misleading terms should be unfair and controlled by the 
Regulations, and prima facie there should be no difficulty in finding a lack of good faith in such 
circumstances (see below), but how can it be said that such a term ‘causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’. The concern 
is not with the actual effect it will have upon the parties' rights and obligations but with the effect which the 
consumer will wrongly think it will have. If such terms are to be caught by the fairness test then an 
appropriate approach will need to be taken to the interpretation of the Directive and the Regulations and 
the solution is suggested by the problem. The terms distort the rights and obligations which the consumer 
believes he, or she, has. A significant imbalance can be found if it is judged at that level, referring, for 
example, to the ‘effectively usable’ rights and obligations of the parties30. (The same problem (and 
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The Advocate General stated in Aziz v Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
(Catalunyacaixa) (Case C-415/11), [2013] 3 CMLR 5: ‘A significant imbalance should be considered to be 
unjustified in particular where the consumer’s rights and obligations are curtailed to such an extent that 
the party stipulating the contractual conditions could not assume, in accordance with the requirement of 
good faith, that the consumer would have agreed to such a provision in individual contract negotiations.’ 
solution) also arises in relation to the situation in which a supplier adopts an ineffective system for 
incorporating his, or her, standard terms into contracts with consumers and the OFT, or other qualifying 
body, wishes to police them at the general level to prevent consumers being misled as to their rights. The 
prior issue of how Regulations dealing with contract terms can apply in such a case was considered 
above31). However, the treatment of an informational defect in First National Bank will be returned to 
below in considering good faith32. 
The CJEU has held that in order to ascertain whether there is significant imbalance, it is also relevant to 
assess what rights and obligations are available to the parties under national law in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties (Aziz v Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa)33) 
{29}. Such a comparative analysis would enable the national court to evaluate whether and to what extent 
the contract placed the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national 
law in force. 
[3.110]  
The requirement of good faith For a term to be unfair the ‘significant imbalance’ it generates must be 
‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’. The reference to good faith was not one which was familiar to 
lawyers in England, and Wales, although it must now be becoming more so, with its important role in the 
Unfair Terms Regulations since 1994. It has long been more familiar in civil law systems, but there are 
considerable differences in its treatment within those systems1. However, in relation to good faith under 
the Regulations, significant guidance has now been provided by the House of Lords in Direct General of 
Fair Trading v First National Bank2. 
The facts of the First National Bank case were outlined above3. Here note should be made of the 
comments on ‘good faith’4. Lord Bingham said:5  
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‘The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires 
that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or 
traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to 
the customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether deliberately or 
unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of experience, 
unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining position or any other factor 
listed in or analogous to those listed in Schedule 2 of the regulations.’ 
Similarly, Lord Steyn saw good faith as importing ‘the notion of open and fair dealing’6. Obviously this 
relies on the setting of standards and, more broadly, Lord Bingham also recognised that good faith ‘looks 
to good standards of commercial morality and practice’7 and, again similarly, Lord Steyn saw the ‘purpose 
of the provision of good faith and fair dealing’ as being ‘to enforce community standards of fairness and 
reasonableness’. On this view then, good faith broadly embodies certain ‘standards’ of dealing in relation 
to the two aspects of good faith – open dealing and fair dealing – which in turn seem to contain the ideas 
of (broadly) the sufficiency of notice of terms (including the clarity of their drafting)8 and of advantage not 
being taken of a superior position by the seller or supplier9. Whether or not it is possible to achieve 
European ‘community’ standards has been questioned10 and, in any event, the approach taken by the 
CJEU in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Hofstetter11 to the scope of its 
decision making on fairness, would deny the need to search for European, rather than national, 
standards. It can be further noted that whilst Lord Bingham referred to the ‘advantage taking’ being 
deliberate or unconscious, Lord Steyn simply referred to good faith as an ‘objective criterion’12 and it is 
suggested that given the need to apply the fairness test to terms at the general level, and not merely in 
the context of a specific contract (a point which will be returned to below), the objective approach should 
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suffice to show a lack of good faith. In Peabody Trust (Governors of the) v Reeve the judge took the line 
that he did not ‘suggest for a moment that the Claimant’ landlord had ‘deliberately tried to take advantage 
of the tenant but it certainly’ seemed to him ‘that if their interpretation of clause 5 was correct they would 
“unconsciously” be “taking advantage of the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of experience, 
unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining position” as … set out by Lord 
Bingham’13. Further, the discussion in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v 
Hofstetter of the Oceano Grupo case14 indicates an objective approach and it also suggests that a 
significant imbalance can be such as to be sufficient, in itself, to show the supplier's lack of good faith15. 
However, it should be questioned whether the idea of ‘advantage taking’ provides a sufficiently high 
standard. Lord Bingham's reference to schedule 2 is a reference to a list of matters to which, in particular, 
regard was to be had in assessing good faith under the 1994 Regulations. The list does not feature in the 
1999 Regulations, but derives from the recital 16 in the original Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts and remains therefore of relevance to the interpretation of the Regulations as the 
implementation of a European measure16. Recital 16 states: 
‘Whereas in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of 
bargaining position of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term 
and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; 
whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals 
fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account.’ 
It can be contended that there is an emphasis here on a factor which admittedly was not specifically 
referred to in the schedule 2 list in the 1994 regulations – the factor of the seller or supplier taking account 
of the legitimate interests of the consumer. It is contended that the recitals show that good faith is 
intended to go further than restraining advantage taking and actually requires sufficient account to be 
taken of the legitimate interests of the consumer17. The other factors could be seen as merely indicative 
of whether or not that has occurred and certainly Lord Bingham seemed to be treating the factors referred 
to in schedule 2, and analogous factors, as indicative of whether the narrower criteria of ‘advantage 
taking’ by the seller or supplier has been satisfied18. 
In considering good faith it has been seen as appropriate to ask whether the term was ‘imposed on the 
consumer in circumstances which justify a conclusion that the supplier has fallen short of the standards of 
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fair dealing’19. Where a standard form JCT building contract was introduced by the consumer's agent, 
rather than the supplier, there was seen to be no possibility of a finding of a lack of good faith where the 
consumer had ‘insisted on the terms’20. Further, the same line was taken where the consumer's agent 
introduced the term and the supplier knew that the consumer was professionally advised21. More broadly, 
the advice and other legal protection available to the consumer may be relevant to thsthe issue of good 
faith when the terms are introduced by the supplier. In UK Housing Alliance v Francis22 the transaction 
was a sale and leaseback of the consumer's home, and the term complained of was one precluding (or 
reducing) the ‘final payment’ to be made to the consumer after ten years tenancy if the tenancy was 
terminated before then. There was no lack of good faith as the transaction ‘necessitated’ that the 
consumer instructed a solicitor, and when the landlord wanted to terminate the tenancy agreement early, 
the consumer ‘would have the protection of the court if and when a possession order was sought by the 
landlord’23. 
It has been suggested that the element of ‘good faith’ in the Directive and the Regulations embodies both 
a substantive and a procedural element and can overlap with the ‘significant imbalance’ element of the 
fairness test24 and this does result from the approach taken by the House of Lords in First National Bank. 
It embodies a procedural element in its reference to ‘open dealing’ and, in addition, the idea of the seller 
or supplier not taking advantage of the consumer (or, more positively, taking account of the consumer's 
interests) provides the basis for the substance of the terms to be considered and for there to be an 
overlap with the test of ‘significant imbalance’. As has been indicated, the discussion in Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Hofstetter of the Oceano Grupo case suggests that 
a significant imbalance can be such as to be sufficient, in itself, to show the supplier's lack of good faith25. 
This would allow, for example, for a clause excluding or restricting liability for negligently caused personal 
injury to be found to be unfair no matter how clearly it was drawn to the consumer's attention, and in the 
Peabody Trust case the judge commented that even had the variation clause been ‘clearly and 
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unambiguously set out’, it was such a ‘sweeping and one sided provision’ he doubted whether it ‘could be 
held to be fair’26. 
A further point to be made is in relation to the fact that the fairness test has to operate in two different 
situations – in relation to a particular contract and at the more general level. It has been noted that the 
House of Lords in First National Bank recognised that that was significant, and that the application of the 
Regulations had to be adapted to the more general level27. Lord Steyn took the view that, at the more 
general level, the ‘directive and the regulations must be made to work sensibly and effectively’ and that 
could be done by ‘taking into account the effects of contemplated or typical relationships between the 
contracting parties’. However, what should be noted here is that he took the further view that ‘the primary 
focus’ at the more general level ‘is on issues of substantive unfairness’28. It has already been indicated, 
that the substance of the contract may well have an influential role even on the ‘good faith’ element of the 
fairness test through consideration (at least) of whether advantage has been taken of the consumer. 
However, even at the more general level, the procedural aspect should not be neglected. Clearly there is 
no difficulty in considering whether the standard terms are in ‘plain intelligible language’ even at the more 
general level and, in addition, the sellers or suppliers practice in introducing the standard terms can be 
considered. The OFT previously had made the point that in relation to good faith it regards it as significant 
to look at ‘the trader's marketing practices, documents and administrative procedures’ and whether they 
‘enable the consumers to know exactly what they are doing and pull back from commitments at any point 
before the whole picture is clear’29. 
The final point to be made here is in relation to informational defects. Prima facie, when the problem 
faced by a consumer is an informational one, although there may be difficulties in finding a significant 
imbalance30, there would seem to be no difficulty with the good faith element of the test (provided always 
that the informational problem is sufficiently significant). However, some obstacles to that prima facie 
conclusion may be seen to have been created by the approach taken by the House of Lords in First 
National Bank. The basic problem in that case was informational. Consumers were shocked to discover 
that they still owed considerable sums after they had complied with a court ordered repayment schedule 
which had been devised on the basis of what they could afford. The House of Lords made the point that 
the term continuing the obligation to pay the contractual interest rate after default was ‘clearly and 
unambiguously expressed’31. However, the difficulty did not lie in the term as an intelligible piece of 
English. The difficulty lay in the impact of its interaction with the legislation, and the consumers' lack of 
awareness of that. That was addressed by the House of Lords to the extent that they considered that the 
problem lay in the legislation and not the term, and was not something for which the lenders were seen as 
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responsible, and was not, therefore, viewed as unfair32. The approach raises concerns as to the efficacy 
of UTCCR 1999 to address ‘informational defects’ which are not simply matters of the accessibility of the 
term in question or of its intelligibility as a piece of English33. It is suggested that, on this point, the case 
should be seen as confined to its very specific facts, or emphasis placed upon the fact that the House of 
Lords viewed the informational problem as not the fault of the supplier. There certainly should be no 
difficulty in finding unfairness in relation to the type of situation considered above34 where terms mislead 
consumers as to their rights. 
[3.111]  
Fairness – factors The preceding paragraphs break down the test of unfairness into the two elements of 
significant imbalance and a lack of good faith. The further point can be made that in First National Bank 
Lord Millett indicated a more overall approach in identifying factors which, for the most part, would be 
relevant to both those elements. He said:1  
‘There can be no one single test of [fairness]. It is obviously useful to assess the impact of an 
impugned term on the parties’ rights and obligations by comparing the effect of the contract with 
the term and the effect it would have without it. But the inquiry cannot stop there. It may also be 
necessary to consider the effect of the inclusion of the term on the substance or core of the 
transaction; whether if it were drawn to his attention the consumer would be likely to be surprised 
by it; whether the term is a standard term, not merely in similar non-negotiable consumer contracts, 
but in commercial contracts freely negotiated between parties acting on level terms and at arm's 
length; and whether, in such cases, the party adversely affected by the inclusion of the term or his 
lawyer might reasonably be expected to object to its inclusion and press for its deletion.’ 
So, whilst the consumer's likely surprise at the term, most obviously goes to the good faith element of the 
fairness test (in particular ‘open dealing’), it could also be indicative of imbalance and the departure of a 
term from the consumer's reasonable expectations was seen in that light in Office of Fair Trading v 
Foxtons Ltd2. More plainly, the fact that a similar term would be accepted by a commercial party of equal 
bargaining power may be indicative of both the ‘balanced’ nature of the term and of the fact that it has not 
been included to take advantage of the consumer3. However, the point should be made that the question 
of what the reaction of a commercial party would be must be approached with caution. Different factors 
may operate in the different contexts. 
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The ‘grey’ list and other unfair terms 
[3.112]  
As has been indicated, Schedule 2 contains a list of terms which may be regarded as unfair1 and is set 
out below. The OFT once said that:2  
‘It is the most authoritative guide to what fairness entails. It is not a “black list” but the exact shade 
of grey is debatable. Our view is that if a term appears in the list it is under substantial suspicion, 
but that correspondence with an item in the list cannot of itself determine the issue of unfairness.’ 
This not only indicates the importance of the list as a guide to which terms will be unfair, but also 
emphasises that ultimately it is the fairness test in reg 5(1) – set out above – which must determine the 
issue. The list is not exhaustive and the OFT had made the point that ‘exclusion from the [grey list] cannot 
be seen as forming any sort of “white list”. Any standard term will be seen as being unfair whether or not it 
appears in … the list, if it fails the test in’3 reg 5(1) and the OFT duly identified other types of term (not 
falling within the list) which it regards as ‘questionable in the light of the general test of fairness4 – eg 
‘indemnification clauses’, ‘unfair enforcement clauses’5 and ‘signed statements’6. The terms in the ‘grey’ 
list are not identified by their form but by their ‘object or effect’. In one sense that makes the compass of 
the list less certain, but it has the benefit of helping to avoid difficult questions as to the classification of 
clauses. A term may be ‘under suspicion’ even if it does not look like a term on the list, ‘if it is calculated to 
affect consumers in the same way as anything on the list’7. In other words, this formulation of the grey list 
terms helps to avoid the type of questions which arise in relation to identifying exemption clauses and the 
appropriate coverage of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. (Such difficulties are avoided more 
generally because the application of the fairness test is not restricted to a certain type of clause – such as 
one excluding or restricting liability – but the extent of that avoidance does depend upon the approach 
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to make any claim. … Wording of this kind gives rise to the same objections as exclusion clauses’. 
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taken to identifying terms falling within the ‘core exclusion’8.) The grey list itself should now be 
considered. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 sets out the basic terms, according to their ‘object or effect’ but 
some qualification is placed upon it in certain areas by paragraph 2. Schedule 2 states: 
‘1. Terms which have the object or effect of – 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death 
of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that 
seller or supplier; 
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, 
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any 
claim which the consumer may have against him; 
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the 
seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his own will 
alone; 
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter 
decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to 
receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the 
latter is the party cancelling the contract; 
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation; 
(f) authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where 
the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to 
retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or 
supplier himself who dissolves the contract; 
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so; 
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not 
to extend the contract is unreasonably early; 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract; 
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a 
valid reason which is specified in the contract; 
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided; 
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a 
seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases 
giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is 
too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded; 
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to 
interpret any term of the contract; 
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(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his 
agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality; 
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not 
perform his; 
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations 
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, 
without the latter's agreement; 
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other 
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to 
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract. 
2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) 
(a) Subparagraph (g) is without hindrance to terms by which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to terminate unilaterally a contract of indeterminate duration 
without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to 
inform the other contracting party or parties thereof immediately. 
(b) Subparagraph (j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due 
to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where 
there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to inform the other 
contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are 
free to dissolve the contract immediately. 
Subparagraph (j) is also without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier 
reserves the right to alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate 
duration, provided that he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice 
and that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract. 
(c) Subparagraphs (g), (j) and (1) do not apply to: 
– transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other products or services where 
the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the 
seller or supplier does not control; 
– contracts for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller's cheques or international money 
orders denominated in foreign currency; 
(d) Subparagraph (1) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, 
provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described.’ 
As regards the Consumer Rights Bill 2014, cl 63 introduces Sch 2, which provides a list of indicative and 
non-exhaustive terms which may be regarded as unfair (the ‘grey list’). The list is intended to assist the 
courts in deciding whether a particular term is unfair9. The fact that a particular term is not on the list, 
though, does not imply that it is not unfair. This clause and the Schedule are taken almost verbatim from 
art 3(3) and the Annex in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive. 
Terms on the ‘grey list’ are subject to the assessment of fairness even if they would otherwise qualify for 
an exemption under cl 64 (which provides for an exemption ordinarily for terms referring to the subject 
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matter of the contract or the price). Terms on the ‘grey list’ are also so subject even if they satisfy the 
transparency and prominence tests as defined in cl 64(3)(4)10. 
That is consistent with EU case law. In Case C-478/99 Commission v Sweden, the CJEU stated: 
‘It is not disputed that a term appearing in the list need not necessarily be considered unfair and, 
conversely, a term that does not appear in the list may none the less be regarded as unfair ... In so 
far as it does not limit the discretion of the national authorities to determine the unfairness of a 
term, the list contained in the annex to the Directive does not seek to give consumers rights going 
beyond those that result from Articles 3 to 7 of the Directive ... Inasmuch as the list contained in 
the annex to the Directive is of indicative and illustrative value, it constitutes a source of 
information both for the national authorities responsible for applying the implementing measures 
and for individuals affected by those measures.’11  
Part 1 of Sch 2 is as included in the UTCCR (and in the Directive) but the terminology has been made 
consistent with the language used elsewhere in the Bill. Three additional items have been added to the 
list as recommended by the Law Commission in their report of March 201312: 
(a) Paragraph 5 which adds to the ‘grey list’ terms of a contract which have the object or effect of 
requiring that a consumer pay a disproportionate amount if they decide not to continue the contract. 
In this paragraph the phrase ‘decides not to conclude or perform’ includes the situation where a 
consumer cancels a contract and is charged a so-called ‘termination fee’. 
(b) Paragraph 12 which adds to the ‘grey list’ terms which have the object or effect of allowing the 
trader to determine the subject matter of the contract after the contract has been agreed with the 
consumer. In certain circumstances13, this would not apply to contracts which last indefinitely. 
(c) Paragraph 14 which adds to the ‘grey list’ terms which have the object or effect of allowing the 
trader to set (for the first time) the price under a contract (or the method for calculating the price), 
after that contract has been agreed with the consumer. The paragraph specifically provides that, in 
certain circumstances14, it does not apply to contracts which last indefinitely, contracts for the sale 
of securities and foreign currency (etc), and price index clauses. This is essentially only for the 
avoidance of doubt, because in most of these situations the price of the contract, or the method for 
calculating it, will be determined before the contract is agreed, so para 14 would not be relevant. 
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It might also be observed that cl 63 is the chosen instrument to implement art 15 of the Distance 
Marketing Directive (Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services)15. That Directive lays down common minimum standards for the information that must be given 
to a consumer prior to a distance contract for financial services being concluded. There are also 
provisions for rights of withdrawal (‘cancellation rights’) in many circumstances, and provisions to protect 
consumers in relation to misuse of payment cards in connection with distance contracts for financial 
services, unsolicited supplies of financial services and unsolicited communications about such services. 
Article 15 provides that any contractual term or condition that puts the burden of proof on the consumer 
(rather than the trader) to show non-compliance with the Directive is an unfair term. 
[3.113]  
Exemption and related Clauses There is considerable overlap between UTCCR 1999 and UCTA 1977. 
This is most obvious in relation elements (a), (b), and (q) of the grey list. Even in relation to those clauses 
which are automatically ineffective under UCTA 1977, the Regulations may still be of significance 
because of their operation at the more general level, ensuring the removal of such clauses and 
preventing them from misleading consumers. Section 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 renders 
automatically ineffective terms excluding or restricting liability for negligently caused death or personal 
injury. Nevertheless, the OFT had still encountered clauses purporting to have that effect1. Such clauses 
are only ‘grey listed’ in the Regulations but the OFT said that ‘it would be difficult to conceive of 
circumstances in which [such a clause] would not be unfair’2. In addition, the OFT obviously saw 
exemption clauses dealing with other negligently caused loss or damage as generally unfair in the 
consumer context and some clauses have been redrafted to make it clear that they do not extend to 
liability for negligence3. In general it can be suggested that the factors which have proved important in 
determining ‘reasonableness’ under UCTA 1977 may prove helpful in identifying unfairness in exemption 
clauses under the Regulations4. However in making any such analogies care must be taken in moving 
from the business to business contracts which have often been the context for consideration of the 
‘requirement of reasonableness’ under the 1977 Act to the consumer contracts which fall to be addressed 
under the Regulations. The OFT took the view that:5  
‘Rights and duties under a contract cannot be considered evenly balanced unless both parties are 
equally bound by their obligations under the contract and the general law. Suspicion of unfairness 
falls on any term that undermines the value of such obligations by preventing or hindering the 
consumer from seeking redress from a supplier who has not complied with them.’ 
If a particular exemption or limitation is sought, it may be wise to restrict its scope to what is seen as 
essential. So, for example, the OFT indicated that terms which exclude all liability for consequential loss 
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may be unfair6. Firstly, because they may mislead the consumer, who may understand a reference to 
consequential loss more broadly than it is likely to be construed – as extending to all loss consequent on 
the breach. Secondly, because they are not usually restricted to the loss which is actually unforeseeable. 
The OFT indicated that it would not usually object to clauses which are restricted to losses which are 
actually unforeseeable, rather than also encompassing losses which are merely usually unforeseeable7 
eg clauses which do not encompass any unusual loss the potential for which has been drawn to the 
attention of the seller or supplier. 
Element (b) includes terms which have the ‘object or effect of … inappropriately excluding or limiting the 
rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the … supplier… in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the … supplier of any contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting 
a debt owed to the … supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him’. This was 
one indicator that a ‘withholding notice clause’ in a JCT Minor Works contract was unfair in Domsalla (t/a 
Domsalla Building Services) v Dyason8. The reinstatement of the consumer's house was being paid for by 
his insurance company following its destruction by fire. The consumer was the contractor's ‘employer’, but 
he had contracted as the insurer's agent and although he could be personally liable to the contractor, the 
consumer had no control in relation to the operation of the building contract. In particular, the contract 
required a withholding notice to be issued in relation to any amount to be withheld from the amount due 
under a certificate of payment and the consumer could not issue, or have issued, such a notice even 
where he had concerns about defects or delay. Such matters were in the control of the insurance 
company. Against that background, the impact of the requirement of a withholding notice was seen as 
‘substantially’ affecting the consumer's rights if he did become personally liable and he had had no 
opportunity to read or consider the clauses in making the contract. In contrast, the contractors would not 
be adversely affected if the withholding notice clause was not held to be binding (they could still rely on 
rights to suspend work and proceed against the insurers directly)9. 
Element (q) of the grey list would cover arbitration and adjudication clauses. Arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts dealing with claims for a modest amount (as specified from time to time) are deemed 
unfair for the purposes of the Regulations10. Above that amount such clauses would be subject to the test 
of fairness under the Regulations11. However, in the context of contracts dealing with building work in 
relation to which questions about such terms tend to arise, the standard terms containing the term may 
have been introduced by an agent of the consumer. Where such standard terms are introduced by the 
agent of a professionally advised consumer, that should prevent any lack of good faith on the part of the 
supplier12. This contrasts with the situation where the terms were introduced by the supplier and even 
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though a box was signed, drawing attention to the terms, ‘the impact of the arbitration clause would not 
have been apparent to a layperson’ and the ‘requirement of fair and open dealing means that for 
consumer transactions the arbitration clause and its effect need to be more fully, clearly and prominently 
set out’13. An adjudication clause, incorporated from the JCT minor works contract, has been seen as a 
neutral term, not generating a significant imbalance because it ‘applies equally’ to both parties14 and 
element (q) of the grey list was seen as of no ‘relevance’ to it on the basis that it did not hinder the 
consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other remedy but only bound the parties until the 
dispute is resolved by legal action, arbitration or agreement’15. However, factors may be present that 
mean that such clauses cannot be taken at face value as neutral terms, but are terms excluding or 
hindering the consumer's right to take action. In particular, the consumer's financial position may impact. 
In relation to an adjudication clause from RIBA standard terms, the line was taken that ‘a procedure which 
the consumer is obliged to follow, and which will cause irrecoverable expenditure in either prosecuting or 
defending it, is something which may hinder the consumer's right to take legal action.… Costs in an 
adjudication can be significant'16. In relation to a claim for £5,230 the point was made in relation to an 
arbitration clause, which was found to be unfair, that there was an ‘element of imbalance to the detriment 
of the consumer where the claims are small and the fees payable to the arbitrator are comparatively 
significant’ (in the case, over £2,000)17. When an arbitration would have only covered part of the 
consumer's claim, in finding unfairness, it was noted that the consumer's ‘means are limited, though they 
have insurance to cover their costs to a certain limit. So they will suffer, at least, an inconvenience if they 
have to conduct two sets of proceedings, and possibly injustice through lack of resources’18. 
Element (q) could also cover jurisdiction clauses and the European Court of Justice has seen a 
jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on the place of the seller's business as unfair as beneficial to the 
seller at the expense of the consumer ie giving the seller easy access to the court and potentially 
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imposing a burden in that respect on consumers (ie when the consumer is from another jurisdiction)19. It 
would seem that an arbitration clause referring disputes to arbitrators outside of the consumer's 
jurisdiction would generally meet with the same response. Although in Heifer International Inc v 
Christiansen20 the court did not view a clause referring disputes to an arbitration board in Copenhagen as 
unfair, it should be recognised that the consumer's resources were in this case obviously not those of the 
‘ordinary consumer’. Further, it should be emphasised that the consumer's lawyers had chosen the 
standard terms and the fairness of the clause was also indicated as much of the work would be done in 
Denmark, it was the consumer's choice to employ skilled Danish labour, and although the Danish 
Arbitration Board was likely to conduct proceedings in Danish, the consumer could afford translators. In 
contrast, in the context of a commercial contract, where the claimant was of limited means and 
experience, the point was made that it would assist the court to decide if a clause requiring arbitration in 
Utah was onerous, within the ‘red hand rule’21, if there was evidence as to whether it would ‘in practice 
mean that [the claimant] has no real prospect of pursuing the claim’22. 
[3.114]  
Forfeiture/penalty and analogous clauses Element (d) of the grey list deals with the forfeiture of a 
consumer's deposit on the consumer's withdrawal where there is no corresponding right for the 
consumer. Element (e) relates to clauses requiring the consumer to pay a ‘disproportionately high sum in 
compensation’ and overlaps with the common law rule providing relief in relation to penalty clauses. That 
rule is, however, very form based and easily avoided by appropriate drafting1. A clause in a contract 
covered by the Regulations, serving the same function as a penalty clause, as indeed a clause requiring 
a deposit may do, should not, however, escape the fairness test on the basis of its form. Even if it is not 
seen as falling within the grey list, it should still be subject to the fairness test in general, provided that an 
appropriate approach is taken to the ‘core exemption’ and the Supreme Court's approval, in OFT v Abbey 
National2 of the line taken in Bairstow Eves London Central Ltd v Smith and Darlingtons (a firm) (Pt 20 
defendants)3 indicates such an approach will be taken. The key element relating to the fairness of such 
clauses would seem to be the disproportion of the ‘compensation’ which, at some point, passes from the 
consumer to the seller or supplier in relation to the seller or supplier's loss. The question of any balancing 
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right for the consumer on the default of the seller or supplier may also be relevant and in its absence, an 
unusual term was held to be unfair even though it was a genuine pre-estimate of loss:4  
Embodying both the problem of an apparent lack of connection to the actual loss of the supplier and a 
lack of any balancing right for the consumer, the following clause was revised, at the behest of the OFT, 
to take account of both factors. As originally drafted it said:5  
‘No order which has been accepted by [the company] may be cancelled by the Customer except 
with the agreement in writing of [the company] (who have a discretion whether or not to except 
such cancellation) and on terms that the Customer shall indemnify [the company] in full against all 
losses and costs incurred by [the company] as a result of cancellation. A minimum cancellation 
charge of 25% of the contract price will be payable by the customer in the event that [the company] 
accepts such cancellation.’ 
The revised clause removed the minimum payment, restricting the company's claim to its losses and 
costs, and also provided a balancing right for the consumer on cancellation by the company. The revised 
clause stated: 
‘You cannot cancel an order unless we agree in writing. You must pay any losses and costs we 
suffer because of the cancellation. If we cancel the contract, we must pay you any losses or costs 
you suffer because of the cancellation.’ 
[3.115]  
Terms dealing with contract duration There will normally be nothing unfair in a term dealing with the 
duration of a contract, however, elements (f), (g) and (h) of the grey list all relate to terms in this area 
which ‘may be unfair’. Element (f) relates, inter alia, to a term allowing the seller or supplier to dissolve the 
contract at their discretion, without a similar right for the consumer. Depending upon any restrictions on 
the point at which that could occur, such a contract term could render the entire contract void for want of 
consideration. When the fairness of any such term is in question, however, the OFT had taken the view 
that:1  
‘Fairness and balance require that consumers and suppliers should be on an equal footing as regards 
rights to end or withdraw from the contract. The supplier's rights should not be excessive, nor 
should the consumer's be over restricted. This does not however, mean a merely formal equivalence 
in rights to cancel, but rather that both parties should enjoy rights of equal extent and value…’ 
In addition the OFT made the point that:2  
‘Cancellation of a contract by a supplier can leave the consumer facing inconvenience at least, if 
not costs or other problems. When that is so, a unilateral right for the supplier to cancel without 
liability to do more than return prepayments is likely to be considered unfair.’ 
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If a seller or supplier feels that there are certain circumstances in which a right to cancel is necessary, the 
right should be set out within the limits of that necessity. So, for example, a roadside breakdown service 
originally used a clause which stated:3  
‘We may cancel membership at any time by sending seven days' notice by recorded delivery to 
your last known address and in such event you will receive a pro rata refund if your subscription, 
unless the service has been used.’ 
The OFT viewed that as ‘potentially unfair … since it allowed [the business] to cancel contracts on a 
discretionary basis and thus to get out of a bad bargain’4. The clause was redrafted to allow the business 
to cancel in limited circumstances. 
‘If excessive use of the service has occurred through failure to seek permanent repair following any 
temporary repair effected by an agent or due to lack of routine vehicle maintenance, we may cancel 
membership by sending seven days’ notice by recorded delivery to your last known address.’ 
Similarly, as element (g) indicates, if a seller or supplier is to be given a right to cancel a contract of 
indeterminate duration without reasonable notice, such a right should be restricted to the situations in 
which it is felt to be necessary and can be justified. The scope of element (g) is restricted by para 2 of the 
grey list (above). 
Element (h) deals with automatic renewal of contracts of fixed duration and with an unreasonably early 
deadline for the consumer to indicate the intention to discontinue. Similarly, contracts which are not of 
fixed duration may have provisions for termination which are viewed as unfair because of an excessive 
notice period5. 
[3.116]  
Terms binding consumers to ‘hidden terms’ It has been suggested that element (i) of the grey list 
could be very extensive in its impact where the written terms contain a clause binding the consumer to 
the contract. In such circumstances, if there has been insufficient opportunity for the consumer to become 
acquainted with the terms, the whole contract would not bind the consumer1, but that would not be the 
case if the terms were incorporated even without the clause in question. More narrowly, this element of 
the grey list would cover terms such as those attempting to incorporate other terms by reference when, 
prior to contracting, there was ‘no real opportunity’ for the consumer to ‘become acquainted’ with the 
other terms2. The OFT had placed some emphasis on ‘real opportunity’. The point has been made that 
‘small print, even where the font size, pitch and printing contrast are good, can discourage or prevent 
consumers from reading their contracts’3. More broadly the OFT had stressed:4  
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‘We interpret “real” opportunity as something more than the theoretical right to refer to a book held 
by the operator. While it is not practicable to put much information legibly on the back of a normal 
sized ticket, it is by no means impossible to take reasonable steps – for example displaying posters 
in ticket offices – to alert consumers to, and summarize, significant provisions which they might 
not otherwise realise applied to them, and ignorance of which would cause them detriment.’ 
Whilst summaries of terms may have their own problems in terms of a capacity to mislead, it is clear that 
what is intended is a reduction in the artificiality which can occur in incorporation. The OFT did also 
indicate that in its view a finding of unfairness might be avoided by a cooling off period, providing the 
consumers with an opportunity to review the terms after the contract has been made and permitting them 
a period within which they can withdraw without penalty5. 
[3.117]  
Seller / Supplier's Discretion as to elements of the performance Elements (j), (k), and (l) of the grey 
list deal with various situations in which the seller or supplier is given rights to vary the terms of the 
contract, the characteristics of the product or service to be provided and the price respectively. There are 
limitations placed upon the scope of those elements by para 2 of schedule 2. Element (m) deals with the 
related situation in which the seller or supplier is given the right to determine if goods or services are in 
conformity with the contract or the interpretation of any term of the contract. The OFT made the point 
that:1  
‘a right for one party to alter the terms of the contract after it has been agreed, regardless of the 
consent of the other party is under strong suspicion of unfairness. A contract can be considered 
balanced only if both parties are bound by their obligations as agreed.’ 
If the seller or supplier does think it necessary to maintain control over some element of the contract in 
one of these ways, it would seem that there is less likely to be unfairness if the seller's or supplier's rights 
are restricted to what is viewed as essential2 – as was indicated above in relation to the terms covered by 
elements (f) and (g). It may also help to show fairness if the consumer's consent to any change is 
maintained through the right to withdraw without prejudice. In the contract of a supplier and installer of 
kitchens a clause was seen as ‘of questionable fairness’ in the light of para 1(k)3. The unrevised clause 
stated: 
‘If, for any reason, the Company is unable to supply a particular item of furniture or a particular 
appliance, the Company will notify the Customer. The Company will normally replace it with an 
item of equivalent or superior standard and value.’ 
The clause was revised to state: 
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‘If, for any reason beyond the company's reasonable control, the company is unable to supply a 
particular item of furniture or a particular appliance, the Company will notify the Customer. With 
the agreement of the Customer the Company will replace it with an item of superior standard and 
value.’ 
The revised clause was seen as an ‘improvement’ as it specified that the substitution must be for reasons 
‘beyond the company's reasonable control’ and required the consumer's consent to the change. The 
restrictions on a supplier's rights to make a change will have to be sufficiently limited and specific. The 
OFT took the view that ‘a term which merely says that variations will be “reasonable” or will only be made 
“reasonably” is unlikely to be any fairer than one which contains no such qualification, unless there can be 
little doubt in the consumer's mind as to what sort of variation, broadly speaking, such wording allows and 
in what circumstances’4. 
Some indication of the correctness of the OFT's basic approach to clauses conferring a wide discretion 
and of the limitations on cancellation or termination as a balancing factor was provided in Peabody Trust 
(Governors of the) v Reeve5 in the context of a landlord and tenant contract. The clause was one giving a 
‘social landlord’ ‘almost carte blanche in the field of variations apart from the areas of rent and statutory 
protection’6. The judge took the line that:7  
‘54. Although the Court is in no sense bound by the guidance provided by the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT 356 “Guidance on unfair terms in tenancy agreements”), … that guidance 
does give landlords helpful commonsense indications of what is likely to be considered to be 
fair and should be carefully taken into account when drafting a variation clause in a tenancy 
agreement. 
55. For example, the OFT must be right in saying (at para 3.89) that a term is likely to be 
objectionable if it “gives the landlord a broad discretion that could be used to impose new 
restrictions, penalties or burdens unexpectedly on the tenant.” By contrast, a term allowing 
for variations is less likely to be thought unfair if “its effect is narrowed, so that it can be 
used to vary terms to reflect changes in the law, for example, rather than be used to change 
the balance of advantage under the contract?” (at para 3.92).’ 
The landlord unsuccessfully argued that its status as a ‘social landlord’ should mean that the term was 
not unfair as it was contended that it could ‘be trusted only to impose reasonable and proper variations’8 
(although it was viewed as a relevant factor). Further, it did not help the landlord to argue that if tenants 
did not like new terms, they could terminate the lease and go elsewhere. The point was made that ‘in the 
case of relatively low cost housing operated by a registered social landlord, this is unrealistic. The tenant 
will typically have a strong necessity, will be of relatively limited means, may well lack experience and 
familiarity with contractual terms and will have a very weak bargaining position.’9  
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[3.118]  
Entire Agreement Clauses Element (n) of the grey list covers some ‘entire agreement clauses’ and 
others may well also be unfair under UTCCR 1999. (In its first Bulletin on the Regulations the OFT 
identified entire agreement clauses as amongst the unfair terms it had most commonly encountered1). 
Such terms are attempts to ensure that there are no terms outside of those contained in the written 
standard form and also that there is no liability for pre-contractual statements as misrepresentations. 
They can take many forms such as:2  
‘You agree that this Agreement is the complete and exclusive statement between us which 
supersedes all understandings or prior agreements oral or written, and all representation or other 
commitments between us relating to the subject matter of the Agreement.’ 
In the past, the OFT had plainly taken the view that such clauses were generally unfair. It was 
commented that:3  
‘Consumers commonly and naturally rely on what is said to them when they are entering a contract. 
If they can be induced to part with money by claims and promises, and the seller can then simply 
disclaim responsibility by using an entire agreement clause, the scope for bad faith is clear. Even if 
such a term is not deliberately abused, it weakens the seller's incentive to take care in what he says, 
and to ensure that his employees and agents do so.’ 
In OFT v MB Designs4 the court was not persuaded that it should view an entire agreement clause as a 
‘neutral’ term which merely created certainty for both parties. The view was taken that it was ‘likely’ that in 
the ‘vast majority of cases’ the ‘main practical effect of terms of this nature will be to prevent the customer 
from relying on representations’5. The term was seen as unfair. 
However, the OFT did not see any objection to terms which provide a warning for consumers ‘that the law 
favours written terms’ provided that ‘it does not undermine the court's power to consider other statements 
where necessary’ and the OFT gave the example that ‘a contract may include a statement that it is a 
binding document, and that consumers should read it carefully and ensure that it contains everything they 
want and nothing they are not prepared to agree to’6. Of course, the OFT emphasised that any such 
statement must be clearly worded and sufficiently drawn to the consumer's attention, ‘for instance, by 
appropriate highlighting’7. 
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Choice of law clauses 
[3.119]  
Regulation 9 of the UTCCR 1999 includes a provision intended to prevent evasion of the Regulations by 
a choice of law clause. It applies the Regulations ‘notwithstanding any contract term which applies or 
purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection with the territory 
of the Member States’. 
As far as the Consumer Rights Bill 2014 is concerned, it is permissible for the contractual parties to agree 
that the contract is to be governed by the law of a particular country (cl 74). This is useful where the 
trader is based in a country other than the UK. However, the effect of cl 74 is that the consumer would not 
be deprived of the provision of the Act on unfair terms where the contract has a close connection with the 
UK, even if the contract states that the law of a non-EEA State applies. As far as the choice of law points 
to an EEA country, the presumption is that the law on unfair terms in consumer contracts would be the 
same and there is no need to subject the contract to the Consumer Rights Act. It should of course also be 
borne in mind that the Rome I Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) would govern which law 
applies to a consumer contract. Thus, where there is a choice of law, that choice must satisfy the 
requirements of the Rome I Regulation. Where there is no choice, then the provisions in the Rome I 
Regulation would apply to assist the English court to ascertain the applicable law of that consumer 
contract. 
